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Foreword
The

International

Law Studies "Blue Book" series was initiated by the Naval War

College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises and articles that contribute to the broader

understanding of international law. This, the seventy-second volume of that
a collection of articles prepared by friends of Professor Richard J. "Jack"

series, is

Grunawalt to

Oceans Law and Policy
Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College.
Jack Grunawalt came to the Naval War College in 1986 as the Charles H.
Stockton Professor of International Law, and held that Chair until becoming the
Director, Oceans Law and Policy Department in 1989. Under his leadership of its
international law program, the Naval War College has regained its historic stature
as the world's preeminent military institution for the study and articulation of the
rules of law governing the world's oceans, both in time of peace and in time of war.

mark the occasion of

It is

his retirement as the Director,

the renaissance of the "Blue Books" during Professor Grunawalt's tenure

that has contributed significantly to the restoration of the Naval
stature in the study of international law. Indeed, this
series that

has been published since 1990. Thus,

Grunawalt's contributions to the Naval

War

publication of a "Blue Book" in his honor.

It is

it is

is

War

College's

the ninth volume in the

most appropriate that Jack

College be recognized through the

also a testament to the high regard in

which he is held that so many notable contributors, both military and civilian,
would prepare articles for this special edition, which is unique in the long history of
the "Blue Book" series.
While the opinions expressed in this volume are those of the individual authors
and not necessarily those of the United States Navy or the Naval War College, they

make

a valuable contribution to the study of the varied areas of international law

that are addressed.

Operations and the

On

behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval

Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend to the contributing

authors and the editor our gratitude and thanks.

I would also like to thank Jack
Grunawalt on behalf of the faculty and students of the Naval War College who have
been privileged to be associated with him and to have learned from him.

JAMES

R.

STARK

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President,

Naval

War College

Preface
Every so often someone comes along who makes a real difference

—the kind

of difference that, in the great scheme of things, matters. Professor Jack

one such individual, for it is no exaggeration to label him the
father of operational law in the United States military. Indeed, before I came to
the Naval War College, an Air Force colleague pulled me aside to "warn" me
about Jack Grunawalt, the man who saw himself as the "keeper of the ROE"
(rules of engagement) After three years of working for him, I am convinced he
is not only the "keeper," but that this is a good thing for our nation. Today,
there are simply no military operations conducted by U.S. forces, or even those
of other countries, that do not evidence the hand of Jack Grunawalt. Whether
directly through application of the Standing Rules of Engagement he helped to
craft or indirectly through the thousands of Grunawalt- trained judge advocates
and operators around the world, his influence is omnipresent. This "keeper"
has guarded and nurtured his charge well.
Grunawalt

is

.

Moreover, he also authored what
operations manual in the world, The

is

the lead law of military

clearly

Commanders Handbook on

Law

the

of

NWP-9

(now 1-14M). Copies of that masterpiece can be
found from the bridges of Latin American warships and the ICRC Legal
Adviser's Office to the Yale Law School Library and the Combined Air
Operations Center for Operation NORTHERN WATCH. I know of no other
work in recent times that can pretend to make a comparable claim.

Naval Operations,

His greatest legacy, however,

lies

not in these accomplishments or those

described in the introduction to this book. Rather,

it lies

in his influence

on the

who will continue to shape operational law in the years to come. He
is very much the Myres McDougal of this corpus of law, for the mark of Jack
Grunawalt, like McDougal, is indelibly imprinted on all those who have had
individuals

the good fortune to have worked with

Of

mentorship.

him

course, the Grunawalt experience

crusty opinionated sea captain he remains

academia. But

So
he

as

or benefited from his selfless

it is

is

—even

not always pleasant; a
in the

ivory halls of

always an experience from which one emerges bettered.

Jack Grunawalt prepares to head off to the adventure-filled retirement

justly deserves, those of us

who have had

him over the

years

Amicorum,

book of friends. The

operations

this

—

deemed

Jack's law.

it

the honor of working closely with

appropriate to honor
topic

him with

was self-evident

this Liber

— the law of

military

Who the contributors should be was also obvious. Jack

Grunawalt often talks of the Oceans Law and Policy (OLP) "family." It includes
present and former faculty members of the Naval War College, members of the

OLP

advisory board, holders of the Stockton Chair of International

College,
this

and

"special friends." It

OLP family that we

at the

turned to produce

work.

Hopefully, the end product
all

to the

is

Law

is

a

book that represents what Jack Grunawalt

about. Consider the contributors,

who

is

range from vice admirals to

Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard officers;
service academy and law school professors; a war college dean; CINC legal
advisers; and a Joint Chiefs legal adviser. Indeed, the age gap between the
youngest and oldest contributor is a half-century. It is a high tribute to Jack that
lieutenant colonels;

his influence

Then

is felt

across such a diverse group.

there are the topics. Contributors were given only the guidance

mind the book was a tribute to Jack Grunawalt) that they should
about operational law. Look carefully at the result. The subjects range

(bearing in
write

from the law of war to the law of the

sea; rules of engagement for

Caribbean island to enforcing no-fly zones over

"occupying" a

Iraq; collective self-defense to

covert action; the use of nuclear weapons to peace operations. Yet, the very
diversity of topics reflects the diversity of operational law

itself.

It

also

which the Grunawalt influence has been
Jack Grunawalt is no more or less at ease talking about

represents the range of issues to

brought to bear.

maritime intercept operations than nuclear warfare

...

or theoretical

... or exploitation of resources in the exclusive
economic zone. He is a man of extraordinary scope, and the only defining
parameter of this book was that contributions somehow involve military
international relations

operations.

Many have been involved in the creation of this expression of admiration for
Professor Jack Grunawalt. The Naval War College Foundation provided a
generous grant to support its publication. Captains Dan Brennock and Ralph
Thomas of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies creatively ensured additional
funding whenever needed. Captain Thomas also agreed to proof drafts during
my absence on an extended hardship research trip to London, Bonn, and
Geneva. Lieutenant Commander Sarah Supnick, USNR, selflessly volunteered
her own time, and friendship, as associate editor for over two months during a
critical period of production. Ms. Gina Vieira at the War College's Publications
Division generated draft after draft, always with an unfailing sense of humor.

Oceans Law and Policy Department
took the book from proofs to publication with typical Marine determination.
Special thanks is due to the Naval War College Press, particularly this volume's
editor, Ms. Pat Goodrich. Few can imagine Pat's professionalism in managing a
Lieutenant Colonel James

gaggle of type-

Duncan

of the

A lawyers, oblivious to any rules of style or grammar, seemingly
XII

concerned only with the
Lorraine

and Danielle

travails of

endnotes. Finally, a personal thanks to

who,

always,

as

suffered

silently

through

my

preoccupation with the task at hand.

On behalf of all Jack's friends, we wish him fair winds

MICHAEL N. SCHMITT,
Professor of Law

and following

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

United States Air Force Academy

xni

seas.

SailoivScholar

Ralph Thomas

MUST BEGIN WITH A MODIFICATION

I

each of us in government service

is

of the standard disclaimer that
required to include with any

"The views expressed herein are my own and not necessarily those
of Jack Grunawalt's friends, whose reflections on Jack I've been asked to
represent." Though the memories of Jack that I relate are my own, they also
attempt to synthesize all that he means to each of us. The only debate would
be in the selection of adjectives that most aptly describe him. Should it be the
"highest" or "greatest" respect? Should it be "enormous" or "extraordinary"
publication:

accomplishments ?

To capture
he

is

the essence of the legend (a word used to describe

out of earshot) that

is

him only when

Jack Grunawalt seemed an impossibly presumptuous

There are others who have known him longer, those he counts as his
friends, and those to whom he turns for the wise counsel that has guided

task for me.
closest

him in his careers as an active duty Navy judge advocate and then as
a professor on the faculty of the Naval War College. I have had, however, the
unique opportunity (and the greatest personal and professional privilege) of not
only knowing Jack for many years but of having been closely associated with him
and

assisted

seven years here at the Naval

for

War

College. For five of those years

served as the Deputy Director, Oceans

whenever
deputy."

I

am asked what my position is,

The former (and

formal)

title

I

Law and

I

have

Policy Department, but

normally answer, "Jack Grunawalt's

often generates quizzical expressions,

while the latter prompts immediate recognition.

have deliberately not included specific references to those who have
worked with Jack over the years and whose friendship and advice he values so
I

highly.

Among them are individuals who have measureably contributed to the

development of operational law
well as

many who have

as

it is

practiced today in the

armed services

,

as

assisted Jack in his efforts to restore the tradition of

excellence in the study of law at the Naval

War

College.

—

Were

I

to

do

so,

I

would almost certainly omit many deserving of mention something I would
not want to do. Each of you knows who you are. I would also like to apologize in
advance to Jack, who, while he can never be described as retiring, has always
been uncomfortable with introductions
that
describe
his
many
accomplishments. His typical response

had heard

that." Well, Mrs.

is

often a deflecting

"I

wish

my mother

Grunawalt you should hear what your son has

accomplished.

Today, many people know Jack primarily

for his

accomplishments

as the

Stockton Professor of International Law and the Director, Oceans Law and

Department at the Naval War College. In fact, he has been at the War
College long enough for me to have learned to refer to him as "Professor"
Grunawalt after all those years when he was "Captain" Grunawalt, Judge
Advocate General's Corps, United States Navy. Indeed, it was as Commander
and then as Captain Grunawalt that he began to exert the influence that
eventually rendered him the honorary title of "the father of operational law" as
we know it today. While he was not the first Navy judge advocate we would
refer to as an "operational lawyer," he is acknowledged as the officer who firmly
established judge advocates as key advisers to operational commanders on all
Policy

—

who led the effort to integrate lawyers onto the
battle staff and into the command center and to acquire the security clearances
aspects of their mission.

It is

he

necessary for their participation in the decision-making process.

advocates

now

today they are,

accept those as "givens"

we owe

largely to

—not

Navy judge

so long ago they were not.

That

Captain Grunawalt.

In the process of becoming what

I

consider to be the finest operational

Navy JAG Corps ever raised, Jack Grunawalt served under a
generation of Navy leaders that are themselves legends Admiral Thomas
lawyer the

—

Hayward, Admiral James Holloway, Admiral James Watkins, Admiral William
Crowe, and Admiral Robert Long. His assignments, which included Special
Counsel to the Chief of Naval Operations and Staff Judge Advocate to the
Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command, reflect the high regard
in

which he

is

held.

Following service in Vietnam as the Deputy Director, U.S. Naval
Center,

Da Nang, then-Commander Grunawalt was

presented with his

opportunity to be heavily involved in the practice of operational law

was assigned
the

first

when he

Judge Advocate to the Commander, Seventh Fleet,
responsible for directing the Navy's efforts during the Vietnam

as the Staff

command

Law

xvi

War. There Jack had the opportunity to see the results of flawed rules of
engagement. I've never heard him say so, but I suspect his career4ong (both
careers) drive to ensure that rules of engagement never again produced such
results began with that assignment.
But had that not been the motivation, clearly his service as the Counsel for
the Long Commission that investigated the tragic bombing on 16 October
1983 of the Marine Battalion Landing

Lebanon, focused

Team

on the

his attention

(BLT) Headquarters in Beirut,

critical role

of rules of engagement.

Specifically selected to be the

Counsel by Admiral Long, who headed the

Commission, Jack learned of the

now infamous Blue Card/White Card Rules of

Engagement (ROE) that the Marines used in carrying out their security
responsibilities. The robust Blue Card ROE set forth the rules for guarding the
relocated U.S. Embassy following its destruction by a car bomb in April 1983.
Much more restrained were the "peacekeeping" White Card ROE in effect at
Beirut International Airport where the Marines were headquartered. It was the
latter that substantially reduced the ability of the Marines on perimeter
security

to

stop

the

explosive-laden

truck

that

destroyed

the

BLT

Headquarters. In one moment, 241 American military personnel, mostly

on the Long Commission resulted in
a personal crusade (a word I've never heard him use) to do whatever he could
to ensure that no more American military personnel would never die because

Marines, died.

I

believe Jack's experience

of a failure of rules of engagement.

Captain Grunawalt capped

his

The
better known,

active duty service by authoring

Commander s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations or as it is
NWP 9. Regarded as the finest military manual of its kind in the world, it
provides legal guidance to operational commanders on the many complex
,

situations they confront,

both in peacetime and during

conflict.

NWP 9 evidences one of the consistent themes that have characterized Jack
Grunawalt's service

—an appreciation of the

difficult role

of the line officer,

who sails the Navy's ships and flies her aircraft. (Many times I've heard him say
during a rules of engagement presentation to a group of commanding officers,
"Rules of engagement can be hard, just like everything else you do.") With that
in mind, Jack wrote

make

NWP 9 not for lawyers,
on how

but for operators, recognizing that

and fight their ships and aircraft.
Therefore, and as Jack often notes, there are no footnotes, case citations, nor
Latin phrases in The Commanders Handbook (now in its third iteration, it is
today known as NWP 1-14M).
they

Given

the decisions

his practical

when asked

to operate

approach to the law,

it

should come as

to define the phrase "operational law," a

xvn

little

surprise that

new phrase coined

to

Department of Defense of what had previously
international law, Professor Grunawalt stated quite simply

describe the practice within the

been referred to as
that it "is whatever

it

mission. Perhaps

providing advice on a difficult law of the sea or law of

it's

is

that assists the

commander

in accomplishing the

armed conflict question, or assisting with the development of rules of
engagement for a sensitive operation, or perhaps it's assisting in the convening
of a court-martial, or drafting a will or power of attorney." These few words
capture the essence of Jack Grunawalt it's the lawyer's role to do whatever it
takes to help the operational commander
but Jack always adds an important
caveat. While the lawyer's role is to be proactive and creative in assisting the

—

commander

—

to accomplish a desired result,

it is

the lawyer's responsibility to

ensure that the result and the manner in which
consistent with the rule of law.

it

is

accomplished are

As Jack has observed so frequently,

the values of

the United States as a nation and the personal values of American military

and no action must ever be taken which
compromises those values. It was to this principle the conduct of military
operations within the rule of law
to which he dedicated himself most fully
upon his move to the Naval War College following retirement from the Navy.
professionals are reflected in the law,

—

—

The

study and teaching of law had been an integral part of the Naval

College program for decades. Indeed,
Luce's

it is

reflected in

Order, dated 2 September 1885, to the

first

first

War

Admiral Stephen

Naval

War

B.

College

The working days will be Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. The lectures on International
Law will be delivered daily at 10 am. ..." The first civilian professor joined the
War College faculty over 110 years ago, when James R. Soley was appointed to
class:

"Lectures will begin

on September

7.

teach international law. That professorship, which became the Stockton Chair

been held by some of the most eminent international legal scholars
in the world. They include John Bassett Moore, later a judge of the Permanent
Court of International Justice; Professor Manley O. Hudson, who went on to

in 1967, has

become

a judge

on the International Court of Justice; Berkeley Professor Hans

Kelsen; and Newport's own, Professor
In 1986,
first

Howard

Levie.

now retired Captain Jack Grunawalt was

appointed to the Chair.

chairholder in the history of the Stockton Chair to

military career into the College's oldest

unprecedented three

Law and

Policy

years.

Then in

and most prestigious

move

directly

chair,

he held

1989, he proposed the creation of an

Department within the Center

for

The

from a
it

for

an

Oceans

Naval Warfare Studies.

Bob Wood, then and now the Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare,
observed, "When [Jack] first came into my office to propose an Oceans Law

As

Dr.

and Policy Department,

it

was evident he spoke with considerable authority.
xvin

His vision entailed

it

as

no

less

than a center of excellence which would

—

on operational law a repository of current practice, a
place of original scholarship, and the teacher not only of U.S. Armed Forces,
but of the forces of friendly States as well. He envisioned that the Oceans Law
and Policy Department would draw the parameters of operational law into the

become the

authority

Wood

"An ancient proverb proclaimed that
young men would dream dreams and old men would have visions. I concluded
21

st

century." Dr.

continued,

was subject to psychedelic hallucinations or that he was a
dreamer and visionary of tremendous power. Happily for the nation, and for
either that Jack

me

—he was

—

certainly the latter."

Jack was appointed the

first

director of the newly formed department, a

position he occupied until his retirement in the

preceding Jack's

arrival,

War

the

summer

of 1998. In the years

College had witnessed a decline in the

emphasis placed on international law. But the dedicated visionary that spoke to
Dr.

Wood of his

dream of a center of excellence oversaw the

restoration of the

and

College's reputation as the world's pre-eminent institution for the study

teaching of the law of naval operations, both in peacetime and during conflict.

In his contribution to this volume, Admiral James H. Doyle describes the

War

and speaks of
Professor Grunawalt's many accomplishments. I will defer to Admiral Doyle
and refrain from repeating them here; rest assured, however, that they can be
described as enormous, indeed, extraordinary. Among them was his
revitalization of a program that had in great part established the College's
position on the international legal scene
the publication of the
truly

remarkable "Grunawalt era" at the Naval

College,

—

"International

Law

Studies" series, recognized throughout the world for

its

Through Jack's
diligence and dedication, the series is now as productive and useful as it has
ever been in its nearly 100-year history. Therefore, on the occasion of his
contribution to the understanding of international law.

retirement from the Naval

War College, Jack's

mentors have collaborated to honor him with

Book"

if

you

sailor-scholar.

will.

On

We

this

"Blue Book"

could think of no more

behalf of

all

and

closest friends, colleagues,

fitting

—

Jack's "Blue

tribute

to

this

those whose lives have been touched, either

professionally or personally, by the legend that

is

Jack Grunawalt,

we humbly

ask that he accept this token of our respect and admiration.
So, Mrs. Grunawalt,

should be.

He

if

you are proud of all your son has accomplished

has served his

Navy and

his

us.

It

is

opportunity.

xix

.

.

you

country with unparalleled devotion

during times of both peace and war. Along the way, he

knowledge and vision with

.

selflessly

shared his

our honor to have had that great

I

Secrets in Plain View:

Way

Covert Action the U.S.

M.E.

Bowman

E AMERICANS HAVE A UNIQUE CULTURE. We champion openness
in government but implement many policies in secret. Historically, we
have been quick to fight for national honor but equally quick to publicly and
mercilessly criticize ourselves; a future historian might even conclude that we
defined our culture by airing dirty laundry.

debated our national morality

Mexico

to the Maine; from

—from

Vietnam

From

the very beginning,

we

publicly

slavery to the Indian campaigns; from

to

Panama.

We

even exposed

"secret"

executive actions by televising the introspective and painful investigations of such

Church Committee hearings. Probably
the world, we can expect that sooner or later

notable events as Iran-Contra and the

more than any other nation
virtually

any executive

in

activity of the

United States

will

be publicly scrutinized.

Executive Action
Lacking precise definition, executive action has become a term of

art that

describes activities designed to influence behavior. Executive action often
"secret," but

not always.

United States,

it is

If secret, it

often

is

coercive.

When

is

practiced by the

always a tool of foreign, never domestic, policy.

Covert Action the

Executive action

may be

applied directly

economic leverage, or political
Executive action

may

also

surrogates, propaganda, or
activities.

action.

activities

—

US, Way

—by

or

it

military or paramilitary force,

may consist of mere persuasion.

be applied indirectly, for example by using

even covert

Each of these techniques will be

military,

a focus,

economic, and

from time to time,

for covert

1

Covert action practiced by the United States shares

common practice

rarely admit, the

on other

Prior to

nations.

The United

World War II,
lot,

cultural heritage

of international intelligence gathering
States was

—

of

no exception.

the United States was, perhaps, the least experienced

spy master of the developed nations.
desultory

its

A scant few decades ago, nations would tacitly concede, but

with intelligence.
spying

political

2

U.S. intelligence activities had been a

sometimes favored, sometimes

vilified,

rarely admitted

always in jeopardy of extinction. Yet, at the end of World

War II, we

and

not only

planned to continue into peacetime the intelligence institutions conceived in
war,

we

also codified

and published the

intent.

More

recently,

we undertook

a

similar catharsis with covert action.

American Candor
The National Security Act of 1947 was a mold for much of contemporary
U.S. Government intelligence practice. A legislative behemoth originally
devoted to overhauling the military establishment, the draft Act was seized

upon

handy

which to create the National Security Council, a
Director of Central Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Each is
an institution important enough, and certainly visible enough, to obscure what
as a

may be

tool by

the most significant aspect of the Act.

United States

officially

By this peacetime

legislation, the

and publicly recognized intelligence gathering

legitimate foreign policy process.

The Act was eloquent

as a

3

testimony to the belated acceptance by the United

States of international intelligence gathering that included even reading other
people's mail.

reaction

—

4

Perhaps even more significant, however, was the world

or lack thereof. Global ennui eloquently testified to international

acceptance of intelligence

The 1947 Act
to

gather

obliquely

5

did more, however. Just as the

intelligence

—an

activities.

internationally,

it

Act acknowledged
also

a purpose

acknowledged

—

albeit

acceptance of the necessity to engage in covert action. In

understatement worthy of our British heritage, the Act required that the

M.E.

Bowman

Central Intelligence Agency perform such other functions as the National
Security Council might direct.

The meaning
obvious at
history,

it

its

6

Act might have been less than
it was clarified. By that point in

of that language in the 1947

creation, but four decades later

was probably unnecessary to

clarify

the fact that the U.S. engages in

international covert action, but the clarification was, nevertheless, instructive.

when

In 1991, in an era

the sovereignty of developing nations was at

its

emotional apex, the Congress of the United States once again did something
that only a secure democracy could dare.

admission, Congress publicly confirmed

amending the U.S. Code
policy.

more

to

its

Not

unlike

1947

its

legislative

policy of peacetime covert action by

explicitly

acknowledge covert action

as U.S.

7

Congress statutorily confirmed an acceptance of covert influence on the
affairs

of other nations. This easily was our most profound statement

willingness to

mold other nations

to our liking.

It

was

also unusual

on U.S.

candor in an

when proliferation of new nation-States elevated sovereign emotions to
new heights. 8 Nevertheless, as with the 1947 legislation, not a ripple disturbed
era

the surface of the nation-state system.

U.S. Covert Action
Because covert action amounts to interference with sovereign
nations always seek to distance themselves from the activity.

axiomatic
issues

—covert

actions inherently,

and

all

era of the Cold

War.

The reason

is

nations find

of international behavior.
it

processes from public view; certainly, that was never
10

rights,

universally, are fractious political

that flaunt a universal need for rules

Nevertheless, from time to time,

9

necessary to cloak

more

official

true than during the

Adversaries and ideology aside, the Cold

War interest in

avoiding nuclear conflict promoted a relatively high tolerance for covert action
as well as

understood "rules" for the genre. "Plausible deniability" was a key

goal; indeed, in that bipolar

world

it

became

rule

Our limited experience with modern covert
World War II. 12 Ours is a culture that easily

number

one.

11

action originates primarily in
tolerates covert actions as a

daring-do adjunct to armed combat, but to surreptitiously influence

change) other governments in peacetime

is

far

more

difficult

for

(or

us to

countenance. Not unlike our history of intelligence gathering, covert action
has no luster in the United States

—we simply don't

like secrecy.

consider ourselves as ingenuous, open, and honest.

We

deviousness and secrecy as the product of evil empires.

More

We

like to

prefer to regard

importantly,

we

Covert Action the

believe strongly in a

which

US, Way

government of shared

definitionally

restricts

power. Covert action,

political

participatory

activity,

seems

somehow

antithetical to these ideals.

Despite this cultural inhibition, covert action was "writ large" in the political

environment of the post' War period. The fall of Nazism and the rise of
communism ushered in an era of political tension, paranoia, economic
distress
and nuclear terror. Covert actions seemed to be ideally suited to
accomplish foreign policy goals without unacceptable risk of rekindling military

—

conflict.

Prodded by Cold War fears, the number of covert actions multiplied.

Communist insurgencies and communist-inspired political subversion had
become ubiquitous reality during the tedious process of rebuilding, or building
anew, from a war-ravaged world. Polarized

political views,

coupled with a

tenuous peace, made traditional foreign policy slow and cumbersome in a
fast-developing world.

By

a promise

high-impact alternatives ideally suited for post-war

of swift,

contrast, covert action

beckoned policy makers with

containment policy. The result, observed Henry Kissinger, is that all Presidents
since World War II "have felt a need for covert operations in the gray area

between formal diplomacy and

military intervention."

13

Shielding the United States as well as the President from public scrutiny,

14

even marginal success served to breed new covert actions. Knowledge of covert
operations became so commonplace that the United States was accused of
being

responsible

for

nearly

all

internal

difficulties

worldwide.

15

Not

American political consensus of the war years that had
insulated intelligence and covert action from close scrutiny did not survive the

surprisingly,

the

advent of peace.
Close scrutiny did not occur overnight, but
irresistible force.

when

Covert actions begun under the

it

OSS

started,

it

became an

continued through the

both formative and mature years of the CIA. Then, more plebeian domestic
concerns related to U.S. intelligence

activities

focused legislative attention on

Our proclivity for participatory democracy prevailed;
policy came up for debate, and covert action was no

covert activities as well.
all

"secret" foreign

Under the sharp scrutiny of Senator Frank Church, the intelligence
community suffered the slings and arrows of what many might justifiably
exception.

consider to have been righteous hindsight.

Post-war domestic abuses of intelligence resources are a matter of history.

Even so, most observers today will concede
clearly perceived as

that

many of the

"abuses" are more

such when seen through the eyes of the citizen of the 1970s

than through the eyes of citizens of the 1930s, 40s, or 50s, when the relevant
activities

were

initiated.

The

interim years had elevated personal privacy rights

M.E.

Bowman

and sharpened the analysis of Constitutional guarantees
against government intrusion. As each passing day made it less likely that
communism would absorb the United States, apocalyptic post-war fears
receded to focus on more personal concerns. Tolerance for "Big Brother"
decreased, and government increasingly was put on a tighter leash.
to pedestal heights

In this climate, the

United

Church Committee began

its

well-known probe of

States' intelligence activity. It inquired, inter alia, into the scope of U.S.

covert action,

its

value,

techniques, and

its

whether covert action had become a substitute
covert capability should be maintained, and,

its

necessity.

16

questioned

It

for decision-making,

if so,

whether

it

whether a

should remain in

the CIA.

The Committee

pointedly concluded

its

analysis with the observation that

CIA charter (the National Security Act of
Act had a savings clause to provide for
Act empowered the CIA to "perform such

covert action was not included in the
1947), but conceded that the

contingencies. Specifically, the

other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security
as the

National Security Council

this clause, the

may from time

to time direct."

17

Relying on

National Security Council did issue a series of directives

specifying the CIA's covert mission.

18

Then came the invasion of South Korea.

As with Germany, World War II's end left Korea divided into spheres of
influence. The Soviets controlled the North and the United States the South.
Unlike the European experience, however, both powers withdrew, leaving the

Koreans to

settle their

own

quarrels.

The

result

was a conflagration that

threatened bipolar stalemate. In this situation, covert operations seemed
especially desirable.

With modest beginnings

own

justification.

in Korea, covert operations quickly supplied their

By 1953, moderate successes

authorization of covert operations
capability

CIA

covert action capability.

Organizing the
Soviet

Union

Korea had prompted the

forty-eight

countries.

19

As covert

became necessary to create within the
Plans (DDP) to absorb and make more efficient the

matured and expanded,

the Directorate for

in

in

20

it

This was not merely a matter of efficiency.

DDP reflected concern for the expansive interest shown by the

in the

Third World and a

Covert actions of

this era

felt

need

to

combat that

interest.

were extensive, varied, and expensive

—and

wholly Executive in origin. All were undertaken pursuant to the inherent,
albeit nebulous, Constitutional authority of the President.

There

is

room, of

course, for traditional legislative/executive debate over the Constitutional

authority to authorize covert action, but, at least in that period of our history,

5

it

US. Way
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is

quite likely that Congress

wanted no part of the covert operations

Senator Leverett Saltonstall explained Congressional inactivity

It is

not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA

officials to

a question of our reluctance ... to seek information ...

it is

personally, as a

on

tar baby.

way:

this

speak to us

.

.

which

subjects

member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have.

I

21

Legislative Initiatives

Not

until

1974 did Congress seriously begin to consider a role

covert operations.

Up

for itself in

to that time, the only outlet for Congressional concerns

over covert action had been the traditional briefing process, but the expansive

growth of covert actions soon proved

this to

be inadequate. According to one

modern architects of covert action, Clark Clifford, the use of covert
action had become a primary official activity which simply had "gotten out of

of the

hand."

22

Congressional remediation, equally traditional, was legislation.

Frustrated generally by lack of knowledge,

23

and

specifically

by massive

amended

the Foreign

covert operations (and expenditures) in Peru, Congress

Assistance

Act

to

deny expenditures

for

covert

operations

unless,

a

Presidential finding of importance to the national security preceded the
24

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment also mandated a reporting
requirement and increased the number of committees to be informed of covert
actions. It was, to be sure, watershed legislation, but for many it was simply too
operation.

little

too

late.

Amendment was ineffective
had thrown down a marker.

In the final analysis, the

lacked teeth; nevertheless, Congress

because

it

Soon thereafter, a long-smoldering conflict between Nicaragua and
Honduras erupted. Politically, the United States looked with disfavor on the
Nicaraguan regime and adopted a policy of supporting Honduras, or, more
accurately, of opposing Nicaragua. U.S. actions in support of Contra guerrillas

were both overt and covert, each prompting substantial criticism and venting
emotions not unlike those of the Vietnam
to the

1983 Defense Appropriations

Contras.

25

Originally

a

classified

Authorization Act, the Boland

era.

Bill

One

result

was an amendment

designed to end

addition

to

the

Amendment restricted

all

1983

aid to the

Intelligence

the use of appropriated

funds to overthrow the Sandinista government and limited

CIA

covert

operations to the interdiction of Nicaraguan arms supplies.

Of

course, the Boland

more substantive

effect

Amendment

accomplished neither goal.

Of

little

than the Hughes-Ryan amendment, yet another spark

M.E.
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was required to rekindle Congressional scrutiny and to prompt an oversight
role. Two were quickly forthcoming.

The

first

was a second

catalyst

legislative "fix,"

dubbed Boland

legislation prohibited military or paramilitary support for the

II.

This

Contras by the

CIA, DoD, "or any other agency or entity involved in intelligence

activities."

26

The net result, according to Bud McFarlane, National Security Advisor, was to
transfer the responsibility to the National Security

President had

made

Council

staff,

because "The
27

The "job,"
an ineptly conceived plan to interrupt commerce

clear that

it

would include
by mining Nicaraguan harbors.
unfortunately,

It

he wanted a job done."

was a covert action that quickly

lost its

covertness in implementation.

This "covert" action prompted an international outcry,
international legal opinion.

The Nicaraguan mining

29

28

as well as adverse

Worse, however, was the domestic controversy.

affair resulted in truly vitriolic

debates over covert

action, with the predictable result of diminishing public acceptance for the
tactic.

Kindling even greater consternation, however, was the second spark

Iran^Contra

affair.

Executive Order 12,333 vested in the

CIA

—the

exclusive

euphemism for covert action, "unless the
another agency is more likely to achieve a particular

jurisdiction over "special activities," a

President determines that
objective."

30

At

the time of drafting,

it

was generally assumed that the "other

agency" would be the Department of Defense, but the vagueness of the
language permitted the White House

itself,

through the

directly in a covert action, with disastrous results.

NSC

staff,

to engage

31

After this disgrace, covert action acquired something of a pariah status. In

wake of "Iran-Contra" and Nicaraguan mining, covert action translated as
"dirty tricks," somehow antithetical to the "American way." American
reluctance to countenance either government secrecy or official failure was
the

reinforced and the undesirable nature of covert action seemingly confirmed.

32

The result of national anguish over these "failures," not necessarily wise, not
33
necessarily unwise, was new legislation that defined covert action. It was not
definition that Congress sought, however, but rather a threefold

means of

gaining limited procedural control and limited oversight of covert action.
it

First,

sought to gain more timely information from the President concerning

Executive intent to implement covert actions. Second, Congress intended to
limit the ability of the President to avoid accountability to

"plausible deniability."

measure of

fiscal

34

Finally,

Congress decided to opt

Congress with

for a very a limited

control over the broad Executive authority to authorize a

covert action.

7
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The implementation of these procedures includes oversight authority vested
the

in

committees.

intelligence

Importantly,

the

legislation

prohibits

authorization of a covert action, or expenditure of appropriated funds for one,
unless the President

first

makes

government, that the activity
objectives,

and that

it is

is

arm of

a written finding, specifying the action

necessary to support identifiable foreign policy

important to the national security. 35

that the intelligence committees be kept fully

It

further requires

and currently informed. 36

Covert Action: The Congressional View

A

commonly

presumably,

accepted, though noninclusive,

of

"special

paramilitary operations,

might include, the

39

activities"

coup

is

and

d'etat,

list

of covert actions and,

propaganda,

37

political

intelligence support.

40

action,

Whatever

38

it

legislation clearly rejects the definition of "special activities"

found in Executive Order 12333. 41 The reason

for the rejection,

however,

is

marginally helpful.

The

drafters intended to exclude the over-broad

interests

concept of foreign policy

from their definition of "covert action." The vast reach of foreign

policy simply

makes

it

necessary to negate that frame of reference.

The

clear

intent was to create an imprecise but manageable definition that would limit

reporting only to a class of activities that the drafters believed should be

brought to their attention.
Neither the statute nor the statutory history cogently defines the
included in the concept of events designed to influence
military

conditions

abroad.

That,

however,

is

economic, or

political,

inherently

activities

rational.

An

excessively rigid statute easily could eliminate altogether any capability for

covert action by levying conditions that would

demanding too much

make

secrecy implausible or by

prior definition of operations that require flexibility

decision-making in the

and

field.

Recognizing the "easier said than done" nature of their

effort,

Congress set

about to define by exclusion the scope of their interest in covert action. The
statute,

To

and most of the

legislative history, focus

on what covert action

is

not*

2

oversimplify, excluded from Congressional oversight are the traditional

activities of the military,

enforcement

officers.

the intelligence community, diplomats and law

Remaining

to

be included,

therefore,

are

covert

propaganda, and covert political

activities

—and

whatever the "nontraditional" counterparts to the exempted

activities

might

paramilitary operations,

be.

8
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The statutory history makes clear that "covert action" is intended to include
even nonattribu table efforts in support of a noncovert activity. The sine qua
non of a covert action, however,

is

not secrecy, whether in whole or in part, but

rather plausible deniability. If plausible deniability

be claimed, the activity undertaken simply

is

is

not viable, or

if it is

not to

not a covert action. Therefore,

even "activities undertaken in secret but where the role of the United States
will be disclosed or acknowledged once such activities take place are not covert
actions."

43

Covert Action in Practice

The

practical problem, however,

deniability.

Chicken and egg

Frequently

it is

exempted

is

more

subtle than

issues are a natural

concomitant of covert action.

impossible logically to differentiate between covert actions and

activities.

Payments

for intelligence acquisition

coffers of dissident groups sufficiently to

mount

consequences.

may

strengthen the

a successful revolution.

purpose to gain intelligence or to influence events?
legislative

mere secrecy and

the

Is

The two have very different

Support given to local intelligence or police

organizations might have the effect of neutralizing hostile intelligence services,

but also of gaining valuable intelligence information.
effect?

Does the potential

Similarly quixotic

intervention.
stability

now

No

is

for

Which

an unintended consequence

is

the collateral

trigger reporting?

the distinction between forceful and non-forceful

longer defined merely by territorial integrity, international

rests

means that covert

on myriad complex and
action, with

its

intangible features. In turn, this

undercurrent of manipulation, easily can

the fine balance of national and international perceptions and fears.

operation to support paramilitary forces
political

44

programs; but just as

likely,

may have

tip

A covert

the effect of influencing

support for political programs

may

promote esteem for dissident paramilitary organizations. The natural effect of
foreign policy, whether covert or overt, and regardless of the use of force, may
be lowering the threshold for what

will

be perceived as unacceptable

intervention.

Despite the

risks,

the United States' experience in this century seems to

confirm a national self-interest in maintaining a covert action capability.

It is

as

true today as ever in history that a covert action adjunct of foreign policy

remains necessary.

It is

ever-increasing cost.

also true, however, that covert operations

Inaptly applied,

come with an

covert action can be a damaging

instrument. Unfortunately, covert action and plausible deniability can be
seductive.

Covert Action the
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Secrecy gives the covert enterprise a poignant emphasis. Absent the glare of

and the public impact of overt

can become a
beguiling adventure. History indicates that policy makers sometimes find it an
irresistible temptation to opt for covert action in lieu, rather than in support, of
sunlight

foreign policy.

4

Used

force, covert action easily

as a knee-jerk substitute for policy,

it is

rarely effective;

more importantly, the failure of a covert option puts the option at risk for the
future. Used properly, covert actions may serve national and even
international needs.

The Balance
Therein

lies

covert action

debatable,

it is

clear that

both the Congress and the Executive

Both presume that legal authority exists to engage
covert action and each presumes to have a Constitutionally authorized, if

believe
in

is

the legislative purpose. Although the precise authority for

it

a necessary option.

not precisely defined,

The

role.

legal authorities for covert action

were discussed in the Church

Committee's Final Report, without closure, and continue to be debated today.
In

asserting

its

current

Congress

role,

legislatively

created

procedural

requirements precedent to the Executive authorizing covert action.
laudable intent was to ensure coherent policy, but
surgical
1)

The

skill.

Secrecy:

Although covert action
it

acceptable measure of secrecy.

which the covert action

may

a goal that requires

reasons for this are threefold.

valuable tool of statecraft,

extreme,

it is

is

is

is

generally acknowledged to be a

a limited tool, wholly

A failure of secrecy risks

necessary.

dependent on an

the foreign policy to

dedicated, exposes national warts, and, in the

leave only the distressing options of withdrawal or overt military

intervention. Painful experience demonstrates that secrecy
is

The

The concomitant

of secrecy likewise

is

is

as perishable as

it

threefold.

Need to know: To maintain secrecy, it follows that operational
knowledge must be narrowly restricted. Removing knowledge from the
effective controls of the Executive, and committing it to the less constrained
legislature, puts the enterprise and those involved at additional risk. That does
a)

not

mean
b)

the risk

is

unreasonable, merely that

it

exists.

Reasonable scope: Perhaps more important

is

4

the barnyard bromide

that one shouldn't bite off more than one can chew. Covert actions
sufficiently limited

the

must be of a

scope and duration that they can be accomplished within

parameters o( secrecy.

History demonstrates

undertakings are likely to lose their mantle of secrecy.
10

that

overly

ambitious

M.E.

c)

There

Practical benefit:

is

Bowman

a practical side to secrecy as well. Normally,

secrecy will be required to ensure the safety of persons involved.
infrequently, secrecy

future use.

required to preserve the covert option for a repetitive,

is

Sometimes

it is

even useful to take advantage of an opportunity to

cast another in the role of unscrupulous actor.
2)

Not

47

Unlike clandestine operations, which are intended not

Plausible deniability:

known at all, covert operations generally are known, but the national actors
remain invisible. The reason for this essential feature harkens to concepts of both
sovereignty and diplomacy. The nation-state system that grew out of the Peace
to be

of Westphalia (1648) hinges

on sovereign

international instability historically has

inviolability,

been the

therefore, a

preserving stability despite interference with sovereign rights

To

lessen the risk of

war or

which

However, nations do

result.

interfere with the internal affairs of other nations;

for lack of

is

means of

required.

political polarization of states, the ability of the

and of the affected nation to disclaim knowledge,
is a necessary charade. Without plausible deniability, nations would be forced
into humiliating political retreat and to curtail, or even sever, diplomatic ties in
the face of a sovereign affront. At the extremes, even war can result.
actor to disclaim responsibility,

3)

Political

Judgment: Finally, the most subjective and least manageable

problem associated with shared Constitutional powers
political

judgment.

48

The

real question

is

is

the exercise of shared

not whether both the executive and

the legislative branches of government have a role in foreign policy; rather,

it is

how each may fulfill its perceived role without bringing to fruition the very real
problem of interfering with the other.
Legislation

is

inherently inflexible and slow to be displaced, even

when

national needs change. Executive decision-making capability can be prompted,
for

good or bad, by the exigencies of the moment. Cutting Solomon's baby in

half,

we should expect

that legislation affecting covert action, properly

considered, would (1) slow impulse, but not impede decision-making, with

procedural rather than substantive requirements;

decision-making that takes into account popular
Executive

to

remain

sufficiently

flexible

to

(2)

will,

promote executive
and, (3) permit the

meet changing or novel

circumstances. Objectively, the Congressional attempt to control covert
action seems to meet these goals.

A Potent Option
it

By any standard, covert action is less offensive than overt intervention, but
remains politically risky. 49 Such are the sensitivities of nations that today
11
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even economic or

political
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may be viewed with

coercion

eye as the world once viewed physical intervention.
case as the tensions of the Cold

concerned about global

War continue

conflict, intrusive

50

the same jaundiced

This will certainly be the

to dissipate.

With the world

less

behavior that once might have been

tolerated as anemic warfare, or justified as a measure of extra-legal justice, will

become less

acceptable. Nevertheless, just as overt but coercive diplomatic and

economic activities will be

tolerated,

even if condemned, so will covert

actions.

There are limits, however, beyond which the American public will not
countenance covert action and both the executive and legislative branches of
government must know and respect those limits. The bottom line is that the
President cannot, without repercussion, engage in a covert action that the

people would not approve were they

know

to

of the facts and circumstances.

Congress, without covert action capabilities

The

has chosen to serve as the

itself,

people's overseer.

With what
legislative

action.

hopefully the

is

wisdom of Solomon, both the executive and

branches publicly acknowledge a willingness to engage in covert

The world knows,

know, that the U.S. is willing to interfere
of other sovereigns. It knows also that Congressional

in the internal affairs

if it

cares to

involvement negates the probability,
Finally, the

could be

if

not the

possibility, of a

rogue executive.

world also must presume that the American citizenry would,

fully

if it

informed, approve the covert actions undertaken.

What makes the United States unique is that we dislike the fundamentals of
our own policy. We take national pride in promoting self-determination, public
disclosure,
Still,

and public diplomacy.
our

despite

moralistic

sovereignty and acknowledge a
find

it

anomalous that we

nations. But ours

is,

We dislike secrecy. We dislike covert action.

after

all,

we

foundation,

commitment

will interfere

sidestep

Westphalian

to secret foreign policy.

with the internal

affairs

Even we
of other

a unique culture.
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refers

more

not apparent." FINAL

precisely to actions not intended

ones ascribed to other actors.

JOHN PRADOS, PRESIDENT'S SECRET WARS

10.

See generally

11.

Plausible deniability

originate then.

Today "clandestine"

at 131.

is

became

The term was

a

(1986).

household phrase with Iran-Contra, but

evolutionary.

The Church Committee noted

been used to shield the President from knowledge

—placing the onus

it

did not

had
covert action on

that the term

for

subordinates. Current legislative history clearly shows that Congress intends that the President

be unable to use
12.

But

cf.

it

to avoid accountability to Congress.

KNOTT,

supra note

2.

Knott's excellent treatise

early use by presidents, but, as with intelligence,

War

II,

13.
14.

and no singular

no

on covert operations documents
World

expertise ever really developed until

responsibility for covert operations

was assigned

until

even

later.

HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 658-659 (1979).
President Harry Truman discovered the essential dilemma early. Covert actions required

oversight, but he

knew

that he could not plausibly deny activities too openly discussed at official

an era of "containment" foreign policy, was to have covert action
worked out of a special panel in which he did not participate. See PRADOS, supra note 10, at 79.
President Dwight Eisenhower, who criticized the Truman foreign policy of containment, quickly
learned that the problems of control versus security and plausible deniability were colossal. He,
too, came to rely on a special group to run covert operations. By then, however, covert
operations had grown so rapidly that secret oversight was more a wish than a reality. See id. at
councils. His solution, in

144-148.
15.

1975 testimony of former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford,

supra note

1,

cited in

FINAL REPORT,

at 141.

on assassination before
moving to a concentrated focus on the intelligence community and the FBI. See generally AN
Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Rep. No. 94-465 (1975). The Committee
16.

Possibly to capture attention, this scrutiny focused initially
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denounced ill-advised assassination plots, but not assassination itself. Not until President Jimmy
Carter banned the technique by Executive Order did it cease to be a potential arrow in the
national security quiver.
17. See

subsequent

FINAL REPORT, supra note
legislation. It

now

1,

at 153.

The language

has been slightly modified by

requires that the Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency

"perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security

may

as

50 U.S.C. §403-3 (d) (5).
18. E.g., NSC-4-A authorized covert psychological operations and NSC 10/2 authorized
covert political and paramilitary operations. Both were directed primarily at the Soviet Union,
but, of course, containment policy meant they were geographically unfocused.
the President or the National Security Council

19.

Final Report, supra note

l,

direct."

at 145.

20. For a brief description of this process, see John B.

U.S. Policy, INT'L

See also

J.

INTELLIGENCE

PRADOS, supra note

Chomeau, Covert Actions Proper Role

AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE,

in

410-411.

Fall 1988, at 407,

10, at 110-111.

CONG. REC. S. 5292

(daily ed. Apr. 9, 1956) cited in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 149.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 153.
23. The Church Committee noted that covert activities mounted into the hundreds in each
of the administrations of Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson.
Final Report, supra note l, at 56.

21.

22. See

24.

22 Pub. L. 93-559, 50 U.S.C. §2422 (1974). President Gerald Ford personally opposed

on the

the personal certification requirement in his recommendations

REPORT, supra note 1 at 58, n. 26.
25. Pub. L. No. 97-377, §793, 46 Stat. 1865 (1982).
26. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §8066, 98 Stat. 1935 (1984).

legislation. See

See also Pub. L.

(Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1987) §9037, 100
Stat. 3341-109 (1986).

Stat.

FINAL

No. 99-591

3341-108; §9045, 100

REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR WITH THE MINORITY VIEW 48-52 (Brinkley and Engelberg eds., 1988). The National
27.

Security Council was, and

is,

a policy-advising body, not

an "agency or entity involved in

intelligence activities."
28.

Compare Christopher C. Joyner

Reflections

on

& Michael A. Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua:

the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention,

N. Moore, The

Secret

War in

25 VA.

J.

INT'L L. 62 1

(

1985) with John

Central American and the Future of World Order, 80

,

AM. J.

INT'L L.

43 (1986).
29. Military

and Paramilitary

Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4.

30. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 4, § 1.8(e).
31. see house select comm. to investigate covert

arms transactions with

Iran and Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
nlcaraguan opposition, report of the congressional committees investigating
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S. REP. NO. 216, H.R. REP. NO. 433, at 3-1 1 (1987).
32.

E.g., a

covert operation in support of Afghanistan guerilla resistance to the 1979 Soviet

invasion remains a source of criticism. In 1997 the United States was

still

trying to recover

Stinger anti-aircraft missiles originally destined to oppose Soviet aircraft but today potentially in

the hands of terrorists.
33. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(3); see note 43 infra.
34. See,

e.g.,

MARK RlEBLING, WEDGE: THE SECRET WAR BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA

(1994).
35.

50 U.S.C. §413b(a).
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Bowman

M.E.
§413b(b).

36.

Id.,

37.

The dissemination of nonattributable information or communications designed to affect
The substance may be either true or false, or some

the conditions under which governments act.

combination of each.
38. This might consist of advice, money, or physical assistance, with a purpose to encourage

desired activities or dissuade those considered hostile.
39. Secret military assistance, usually in the form of training.
40. E.g., security assistance

41.

Two

and intelligence training for the leadership of the

"right" faction.

respected authorities argue that the statute was intended to supersede the

Order No. 12,333. See

definition found in Exec.

REGULATING COVERT ACTION 123

W. MICHAEL REISMAN and JAMES BAKER,

The author respectfully disagrees with the breadth

(1992).

of that statement. Legislative history indicates that the intent was to regulate by procedure only a
limited portion of the Order's concept of activities, not to displace legislatively

its

broad foreign

policy scope. Reisman and Baker criticize the legislative definition as under-inclusive and write
more approvingly of the definition in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. Virtually any definition
will

be subject to criticism as being either under or over-inclusive, but under-inclusion

is

consistent with the limited scope of oversight that Congress then thought appropriate.
42. Covert action

means an

activity or activities of the

United States Government to

influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where

the United States

Government

will

it is

intended that the role of

not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not

include:
(1)

activities

the primary purpose

of which

is

to

acquire

traditional

intelligence,

counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational
security of

United States Government programs, or administrative

activities;

(2)

traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to

(3)

traditional law

enforcement

activities

enforcement agencies or routine support to such
(4)

activities to

such

activities;

conducted by United States Government law
activities; or

provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities

described in paragraphs

or (3) of other United States

(1), (2)

Government agencies abroad.

50U.S.C§413b(3).
42 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 193, 236. Some view this
language to indicate that Congress meant to treat all Executive actions intended to remain
43. S. REP.

NO.

85, at

secret as covert action. This writer believes that view

unintended consequences,

this

is

is

grossly over-inclusive. Like the issue of

a subject deserving of a stand-alone analysis.

44. An even more difficult question is whether any Executive action that is intended to
remain secret invokes the statute. Despite the statutory language and its legislative history, this is

an

which reasonable minds can

issue over

differ

and

is,

more

an

properly,

issue for separate

analysis.

45.

PRADOS,

supra note 10,

is

a thoughtful study of paramilitary covert actions that, in large

measure, reflects this concern.
46.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment,

for

example, required the

actions to eight congressional committees, four in each house.

CIA

While

to report

it is

against the propriety of Congress being in the "know," in practical terms this

members, plus

staff, all

newly exposed to

in foreign policy and, perhaps, the

47.

One

concluded:

facts,

covert

meant

argue
sixty

the mere intimation of which can cause a failure

death of the actors.

writing of General Washington's military espionage apparatus,
was deemed good propaganda to impute clandestine methods only to the enemy,

historian,

"It

all

difficult to
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thus implying that Britain was unscrupulous and had to use underhanded tactics to succeed."

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA

9 (1977).

Cranch 170 (1805), the Supreme Court limited the foreign policy
powers of the President because the Congress had chosen to speak. During a period of hostilities
with France, and acting on Presidential orders, the U.S. Navy seized a ship departing a French
port. Congress, however, had enacted legislation to halt the intercourse with France which
48. In Little v. Barreme, 2

authorized seizure of ships sailing to a French port. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice

Marshall opined that the President's orders would undoubtedly have been lawful had not

Congress legislated
49.

To

differently.

illustrate,

Iran (placing the

two covert actions usually cited

Shah

in power)

and "Success"

in

as successes

were Operations "Ajax" in

Guatemala (displacement of President

Arbenz). Both were short-term gains, and neither materially affected the balance of power in the

Cold War; yet
truth

is

a failure in either

might well have forced those nations into the Soviet camp. The

that national interest suffers

if

a covert action

fails,

particularly so

if it is

the

While it is impossible to know the real history of all covert
paramilitary actions do not have a gleaming record of success.
paramilitary action.

50. See

e.g.,

more

visible

actions, covert

Mitrovic, Non-Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States, in PRINCIPLES

INTERNATIONAL

LAW CONCERNING

FRIENDLY RELATIONS

Sahoviced., 1972).
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International

Law and Naval Operations

James H. Doyle,

Jr.

TWO HUNDRED YEARS from American commerce
IN THE OVER
Revolutionary War through two World Wars, the Korean and

raiding

in the

Vietnam

and a host of crises along the way, to the Persian Gulf conflict,
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, there has been a continuous evolution
in the international law that governs naval operations. Equally changed has
been the role of naval officers in applying oceans law and the rules of naval
wars,

command. This paper explores that
commanders and their operational lawyers

warfare in carrying out the mission of the

evolution and the challenges that
will face in the 21st century.

The

Early Years and Global

Wars

Naval operations have been governed by international law since the
days of the Republic.

Soon

after the

Continental Congress authorized

early

fitting

out armed vessels to disrupt British trade and reinforcement, the Colonies
1

and Maritime courts to adjudicate prizes. American
captains of warships and privateers were admonished to "respect the rights of
2
neutrality" and "not to commit any such Violation of the Laws of Nations."
The first Navy Regulations enjoined a commanding officer to protect and
defend his convoy in peace and war. 3 In the War of 1812, frigate captains
established Admiralty

International

employed the

Law and Naval

Operations

traditional ruse de guerre in boarding

trade licensed by the enemy.

4

merchant

ships to suppress

President Lincoln's blockade of Confederate

ports satisfied the criterion of effectiveness (ingress or egress dangerous) under

international law.

5

The 1870 Navy

Regulations directed commanders in chief

to strictly observe the laws of neutrality,

comply with the laws of blockade.

whether belligerent or neutral, and

to

6

For most of the 19th century, sailor-diplomats, in distant waters and with no

means
law.

to consult with

Washington, were practicing and shaping international

Commanders combined naval

force with diplomacy in dealing with the

Barbary Powers, negotiating treaties with Algiers and Turkey, and facilitating
early trade with China. In

Commodore Matthew
opened Japan

one of the great

Perry, acting alone,

to U.S. trade. This

historical events of that era,

concluded a treaty in 1854 which

was followed by Commodore Robert

W.

Shufeldt's 1882 treaty opening Korea. But with the advent of the telephone

cable and worldwide communications, a naval officer's wide latitude to
8

determine foreign policy declined, but not necessarily

and peace

his ability to affect

war

in crisis situations at sea.

Ashore at the Naval War College, then Captain Charles H. Stockton wrote
9
the Naval War Code of 1 900 pursuant to tasking by the Secretary of the Navy.
After a thorough critique by international lawyers, the code, like the Civil War

Code regulating land warfare, strongly influenced the codification of the
law of armed conflict in the Hague Conventions of 1907. Professor John
Bassett Moore instituted the International Law Studies ("Blue Book") series in
10
while Professor George Grafton Wilson from Brown University
1901,
Lieber

lectured at the

War College from

1900 to 1937 and edited over seven thousand

pages of "Blue Books," "every one of which was intended to provide the naval
officer at

might

home and

face."

11

alone in foreign ports with precise answers to problems he

Thus, with the Hague Conventions, Geneva Protocol of 1925,

London Protocol of 1936, and the various naval treaties and conferences in the
1930s, the 20th century marked a new partnership of statesmen, naval officers,
and international lawyers working together to develop rules of conduct that
govern naval operations. This partnership has continued to this day in the
variety of conferences and conventions that followed World War II. These
13
12
included the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Protocols Additional;
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, High Seas, Fisheries, and
14
Continental Shelf Conventions of 1958; the 1972 US/USSR Incidents at Sea
15
Agreement; and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.

16

Naval

deliberations

officers

have been active participants

and negotiations.
18

in

all

stages

of the

James H. Doyle,
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In the actual practice of international law at sea, the global nature of two

world wars with powerful belligerents as adversaries stressed the customary and

Hague laws
blockade,

enemy character and

of neutrality, particularly contraband,

and

the

merchant

protecting

rules

ships.

17

However,

the

fundamental principles of a balance between necessity, proportionality and

humanity were reaffirmed
civilian population,

Nuremberg,

at

and the wounded,

18

sick,

even

as

it

was obvious that the

shipwrecked, and prisoners of war

needed additional formal protection.

The Cold War and Era
The

post- World

War

II

of Detente

era began with the ratification of the United

Nations Charter, whose Articles 51 and 52 recognize the inherent right of
self-defense

and the

right to establish regional organizations to deal with the

maintenance of international peace and
sea, the

U.S.

territorial sea

Navy was guided by both

security. In

peacetime operations at

the customary three-mile limit of the

with the right of innocent passage, and the traditional high seas

freedoms that included routine navigation,

fleet exercises,

naval patrols, flight

and weapon firing, all with due
regard for the rights and safety of others. But peace was elusive and the Cold
War period from 1945 to 1990 saw at least ten armed conflicts at sea, albeit
operations, surveillance, intelligence gathering,

localized, that involved

an application of the laws of naval warfare regarding

blockade, quarantine, maritime exclusion zone, mining,

visit

convoy protection, and targeting merchant ships and neutrals.

The Navy

and search,

19

recognized a need for formal guidance and issued The

Naval Warfare (NWIP

10-2) in 1955,

Law

of

based exclusively on the Hague and

Geneva Conventions and the customary law of war. 20 The Navy

also

recognized the need for a cadre of international law specialists within the

community of naval

lawyers,

which

in 1968

became the Judge Advocate

General (JAG) Corps. International law, while continually evolving, was

becoming increasingly complex.

No

longer could the operational

commander

cope with the myriad of issues involving overseas base agreements, foreign
claims,

and

treaty provisions, as well as the peacetime law of the sea

rules of naval warfare,

and the

without specialized legal advice. During the 1950s and

from the International Law Division of Navy JAG worked closely
with the Politico-Military Branch of the Office of the Chief of Naval
60s, lawyers

Operations to resolve legal
delegation to the 1958

issues.

Navy

Geneva Conventions, and the
19

on the
adviser on

lawyers were key players
principal

International

Law and Naval

national security interests was a vice admiral

Operations

who was a former Judge Advocate

General of the Navy.
Following the failure of the 1960 Conference on the

agreement on the breadth of the
technology and the rising

territorial sea

demand

Law of the Sea to reach

and the contiguous

fishing zone,

ocean resources dramatically intensified
the race to use the world's oceans.
Navy lawyers were soon immersed in
preparations for another law of the sea conference with an ever-expanding
for

21

community of

nations.

jurisdiction, fisheries

Emerging and unsettled

management, economic zone

seabed exploitation, environmental protection,

issues

in

coastal

state

control, high seas rights,

scientific research,

and dispute

settlement had to be reconciled with U.S. security and economic interests. For

naval operations the

critical

challenges were to limit the breadth of the

no greater than twelve miles, ensure passage through
international straits and archipelagic waters, and maintain traditional high seas
freedoms, especially in a new exclusive economic zone. The mobility and
presence of naval forces deployed worldwide were, and still are, a cornerstone
critical to reassuring allies and deterring potential
of U.S. foreign policy
22
enemies, responding in crisis situations, and carrying out treaty obligations.
Navy lawyers participated in all phases of the lengthy negotiations and can
rightly claim success in satisfying national security imperatives. Even now, they
territorial

sea to

—

are in the forefront of efforts to ratify the 1982 Convention, since the deep

seabed provisions have been reformed and the U.S. has expressed an intention
to

become

a party.

23

Along with the law of the sea negotiations in this era of detente were
deliberations on the Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
SALT I, chemical warfare, nuclear testing, and incidents at sea with the Soviet
Union, all of which raised issues that affected naval operations and required legal
advice. For example, in the Incidents at Sea negotiations with the Soviet Union,

was whether the U.S. should accede to the Soviet demand that a
fixed distance limit the approach of ships and aircraft. The Joint Staff convinced
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the State Department that
a critical issue

fixed distances

would undermine the U.S. position on the freedom and mobility

of its naval forces

on the high seas, be

limiting warship access to the Indian

inconsistent with the U.S. position against

Ocean under

interfere with essential intelligence gathering,

a

"Zone of Peace" proposal,

and generate endless arguments

over violations of some arbitrary and meaningless fixed distance.

24

Similarly,

was important that the U.S.
and the Soviet Union hammer out an understanding affirming the customary

following the 1988 Black Sea "bumping" incident,

and conventional

right of innocent passage.

20

25

it
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In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense issued
instructions requiring not only training in the law of war, but also legal review

of operational plans, contingency plans, and rules of engagement to ensure
consistency with applicable domestic and international law, including the law

of armed conflict.

26

Additionally,

development were to be examined

new weapon
for

systems and munitions in

compliance with law of war obligations.

In 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consolidated a set of worldwide peacetime
rules of

engagement (ROE)

for

maritime forces. Operational planners and

convened

war issues, and
courses in operational law were established at the Army and Air Force JAG
schools, and the Naval Justice School. These seminars and classes were

military lawyers in

all

services

to discuss law of

invaluable in clarifying misperceptions as to legal versus policy restrictions.

Navy and Marine Corps lawyers were beginning to be trained in oceans law and
the law of war. Those assigned to

commands, and

fleet

and amphibious
marine force elements, who had been primarily
fleet,

carrier group,

concerned with the administration of military

The

justice,

were

now expected

to

and requirements were changing
rapidly. In this regard, operational law for the Navy and Marine Corps
encompasses both the U.S. domestic legislation and public international law
that affects naval operations, with special emphasis on oceans law and the rules
render advice in operational law.

of naval warfare.

culture

27

The New World Order
Nineteen hundred eighty-six marked the beginning of a new dimension of

Naval War College that future historians may well
refer to as the "Grunawalt era." Captain Richard J. Qack) Grunawalt, JAGC, U.
S. Navy (Retired), assumed the prestigious Charles H. Stockton Chair of
International Law. Grunawalt, a Navy lawyer for twenty-six years, had vast
experience in international law, serving as Fleet Judge Advocate, U.S. Seventh
Fleet and the senior adviser to both the joint theater commander in the Pacific
and the Chief of Naval Operations. With this background and a vision for the
future, he instituted a number of initiatives that reinvigorated the
international law program at the War College and put the institution in the
forefront of the development, debate, and exposition of operational law.
international law at the

Oi

great

significance,

Professor

Grunawalt wrote The

Commander's

Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 9), which was promulgated by
28
the Department of the Navy in 1987. The Handbook replaced NWIP 10-2,
which, although amended several times, was obsolete. The author wisely chose
21
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Operations

one manual, "The Law of Peacetime Naval Operations," Part I,
and "The Law of Naval Warfare," Part II. As has been experienced during the
to

combine

Cold

in

War and

faced even more frequently today, there

is

humanitarian

animosities,

ethnic

conflicts,

nations

tragedies,

in

deep-seated

line

religious

and regional

disarray,

anywhere in the world can turn "peace" into war overnight. 29

aggressors, a crisis

A

With

and war.

between peace

no bright

is

commander must be prepared

to

move

easily

manual with the advice and counsel of his

from Part

to Part

I

II

of the

military lawyer. In addition, there

are areas in the law of naval warfare, like neutrality, that cannot be applied

without a thorough understanding of the legal divisions of the oceans and
airspace in Part

Part

I.

warships and military

I

rights are

Convention, Part
law,

the protection of persons and property at sea,

aircraft,

and the safeguarding of U.
and navigational

S.

national interests at sea. While the ocean areas

on domestic

Law

of the Sea

legislation, general international

UN Charter to provide guidance on matters such as asylum, drug

and the

interdiction with the Coast Guard,

Law

UN

based primarily on the 1982

also relies

I

and navigation of

also covers the international status

and the

right of self-defense. Part

II,

"The

of Naval Warfare," explains the principles and sources of the rules,

adherence to and enforcement of the law of armed

conflict, neutrality,

naval

conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction (nuclear,

targeting,

chemical, biological), noncombatants, and deception during war.
Significantly,

both Parts

I

engagement, with Article 51 the

and the law of armed

II

provide guidance on the rules of

legal

foundation for peacetime application

and

conflict the

framework

for

wartime

use. In 1981, in

airspace over international waters in the south central Mediterranean, two

F-14s from the Nimitz battle group exercised their right of unit self-defense

when they responded to an attack on them by two Libyan SU-22 fighters. 30 The
rules of

engagement

specific situation. For
after the

USS

are flexible in the sense that they

can be tailored

for a

example, during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War of 1980-1988,

Stark was hit by Exocet missiles fired from an Iraqi Mirage F-l,

the belligerents were warned by Notices to Mariners and

warships would

fire

if

Airmen

approached U.S. ships

their aircraft

that U.S.

in a

manner

indicating hostile intent, unless they provided adequate notification of their
intentions.

31

But

as

the

later

USS

demonstrated, the most carefully crafted
operational

commander on

the scene.

32

ROE still require

22

incident

the judgment of the

may be issued as
may be tailored for

Rules of engagement

general guidance covering a range of contingencies, or they
a specific operation.

Airbus

Vincennes-lranian

James H. Doyle,
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"The Law of Naval Warfare," is based on various treaties,
conventions, and customary law, and includes the Additional Protocols to the
1949 Geneva Conventions where consistent with U.S. policy. Neutrality under
the UN Charter is discussed, as is the London Protocol of 1936 on the
33
protection of merchant ships. Guidance on the latter considers the practice of
belligerents during and following World War II. For the benefit of Navy and
Marine Corps legal officers responsible for advising commanders, there is an
encyclopedic Annotated Supplement to The Commander s Handbook on the Law
of Naval Operations, prepared by the Naval War College with the assistance of
operational law experts from various commands and organizations. It contains
a section-by-section analysis of the Handbook with a full discussion of the
concepts and sources of the rules. Volume 64 of the "Blue Book" series
contains essays by distinguished and respected authorities in international law
commenting on the manual and addressing the more controversial and
Part

II,

significant areas of operational law.

34

Professor Grunawalt explained that the

Handbook was

to be used by

commanders and staff at all levels of command; that it constituted
general legal guidance; and that it would enable the commander and staff to
better understand the legal foundations for orders and their responsibilities
under domestic and international law in the execution of the mission. The
Handbook serves as an authoritative demonstration of how the U.S. interprets
and applies oceans law and the rules of naval warfare, and, hopefully, will
influence the behavior of other nations. Military manuals and handbooks are
important both in disseminating operational rules and developing
35
international law.
The Handbook has been distributed widely to foreign
governments and their naval leadership. In the short time since publication, it
has guided the development of naval manuals in a number of allied nations and
coalition partners. Additionally, international lawyers and naval experts, who
from 1988 to 1994 prepared the San Remo Manual on International Law
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, found the Handbook to be a major source in
operational

formulating a progressive statement of the law of naval warfare.

For the future, the Joint

Law of War Manual is

36

in preparation by a task

group

of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Joint Staff, and Department of

Defense operational law experts.

37

The sections on the war on land and

the war

and space will replace out-of-date Army and Air Force manuals. The
section on war at sea will be an overview with the Handbook remaining intact to
provide more detailed guidance. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-0, Doctrine
for Joint Operations, states that "As with all actions of the joint force, targeting
and attack functions are accomplished in accordance with international law,

in the air
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the law of war, and international agreements and conventions, as well as rules

of engagement approved by the National

Command

Authorities for the

commanders, planners, and legal experts must
consider the desired end state and political aims when making targeting
38
decisions."
As the military services train, plan, and conduct joint and
multinational operations in accordance with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Joint Vision 2010, it is entirely necessary and appropriate that there be a
joint legal manual to guide joint and multinational commanders.
particular operation. Military

War College in 1972 had terminated the
long-standing International Law Week in which international law scholars met
Reorganization of the Naval

with students to discuss subjects in the

field related to

Although international law was integrated on

naval operations.

a piecemeal basis into various

naval warfare courses, the study of international law was

left

without a place in

the core curricula of the resident courses. This fragmentation and de-emphasis

of international law also reduced the effectiveness of the Stockton Chair, with

no international law support within the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies, which provides the College's strategic research and
war-gaming focus. In early 1988, at a meeting with the President and the Dean
the result that there was

of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Professor Grunawalt proposed that an

oceans law and policy research activity be established in the Center to support

War

Advocate General, and the entire Navy in the
study, instruction, war gaming, and research in international and operational
39
law.
Following up immediately in a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations,
the

College, the Judge

endorsing the

initiative,

the President noted that "the range of international

law issues currently at play in the Persian Gulf encompasses such diverse yet
critically

important areas of the law of the sea and the law of armed conflict as

the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, innocent passage of the
territorial sea, transit

passage of

straits,

neutral and belligerent rights, naval

mine and counter-mine warfare, the inherent right of self-defense,
and flag nation authority and responsibility over merchant shipping. Each of
these oceans law and policy concepts impact upon and are reflected in the rules
targeting,

of engagement provided to the operating forces by the National
Authorities.

While the

Command

and
management,

situation in the Persian Gulf provides sharp

immediate focus to the application of international law in

crisis

the role of oceans law and policy in routine peacetime operations, in strategic

and contingency planning, and in the execution of the Freedom of Navigation
40
Program, is no less important." Thus, the Oceans Law and Policy Department
was born, and Jack Grunawalt accepted the appointment as the first Director
in July 1989.
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With eventual staffing of Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Coast
Guard officers experienced in operational law, the Oceans Law and Policy
Department

in ten short years has revolutionized the role of the

College in operational law.

At

Naval

War

the tenth annual meeting of the Operational

Law Workshop and Advisory Board, the many activities of the Department
were reviewed. The instruction programs on the national level include courses
in oceans law, the law of armed conflict, and rules of engagement. They are
taught at the

War

College, Surface Warfare Officers School,

Naval

Justice

School, Submarine School, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Joint

Commanding

Targeting School, Coast Guard Prospective

and
Executive Officers School, Naval and Air Force Academies, Submarine Group
10, and the Military Sealift Command. Both line officers and lawyers receive
instruction. Internationally, the courses are taught in a

Grunawalt and
Japan,

—Argentina,

Officers

number of countries by

Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,

his staff

Germany,

Mexico, Panama, Peru, South Korea, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Operational law instruction on a seminar basis

commanders and

staffs at

is

also- provided to

operational

the fleet level in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast

Guard. The sessions with the operational commanders and planners are
in fostering understanding, respect,

commanders and

and

critical

teamwork between the
dealing with the complex and

a spirit of

their military lawyers in

evolving challenges in operational law.

A

typical three -day course in operational law covers general principles of

international law, the U.S. national security organization, law of the sea,

freedom of navigation operations, protection of persons and property

at sea,

maritime law enforcement, law of armed conflict, weapons and targeting,

and rules of
engagement. The ROE portion includes lessons learned from operations in
Libya, Beirut, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, the USS Stark and
Vincennes incidents, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and the "friendly fire"
shootdown of the Army Black Hawk helicopter in northern Iraq. In addition,
UN military operations other than war and noncombatant evacuations are
blockade,

neutrality,

maritime

interception

operations,

analyzed.

In

conjunction

with

these

Commander s Handbook and
Book"

series,

activities,

the

Department updates the

the Annotated Supplement, publishes the "Blue

coordinates the activities of the Stockton Chair, periodically

holds conferences in operational law, and conducts research into such diverse
areas

as

the

legal

regime

for

the

Straits

of Hormuz,

Greek-Turkish

confidence-building, intervention, and Bosnian Implementation Force (IFOR)
operations.
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With these new initiatives and programs,
become the focal point and corporate memory
policy affecting operations at sea by U.S.

law firmly established, the

War

and

Operations

War

the Naval

for matters of

allied navies.

College has

oceans law and

With

operational

College has the capability to conduct

long-range planning in the law of the sea and naval warfare, detached from the
day-to-day legal issues that consume the time and resources of the various
agencies in

Washington and the

Command, Maritime

fleet staffs.

The

consolidation of the Navy's

and Concepts Development
Group and Strategic Studies Group with the Naval War College will greatly
facilitate the integration of oceans law and policy with command and
Doctrine

Battle Center,

operational doctrine. Integrating doctrine with long-range thinking, teaching,

war gaming, research, and naval studies will be invaluable in sorting out Navy
requirements, priorities, and programs, as well as strategy and tactics.
Operational law should be a part of that process. With staffing and support

from

all

the services, constant interaction with the military lawyers in the battle

groups and expeditionary units, the

and theater commands, the Joint
ocean law conferences convened by

fleet

and OSD, and the attendance at
operational commanders, the War College
Staff,

this regard, the College's

Operational

(another Jack Grunawalt initiative)

Law and

Policy

is

is

a key player in the joint arena. In

Law Workshop and Advisory Board

important in the oversight of the Oceans

Department and provides a unique forum

for

an exchange oi

fresh ideas.

In reflecting on the history of international law at the Naval

War College,

it

can be said without exaggeration that Professor Jack Grunawalt's legacy as
Director, Oceans Law and Policy Department, Center for Naval Warfare
Studies, will equal or surpass the

and George Grafton Wilson

mark made by

Professors Charles H. Stockton

in the early days of the institution.

In the actual practice of operational law during the Persian Gulf War, the

Department of Defense observed that training in the law of war was reflected in
U.S. operations. Furthermore, adherence to the law of war impeded neither
coalition planning nor execution. The willingness of commanders to seek legal
advice at every stage of operational planning ensured respect for the law of war
throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm. There were difficult issues that
had to be dealt with at every echelon of command, e.g., targeting to avoid
collateral damage and injury to civilians, the use of civilians and hostages as
human shields, environmental terrorism, ruses and perfidy, treatment and
repatriation of prisoners of war, war crimes, the conduct of neutral nations, the
role of the International Committee of the Red Cross and human rights groups,
26
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and responding to disinformation. In a politically charged atmosphere,
commanders and their lawyers were under constant media scrutiny as they
41
planned and carried out joint operations.

Between April 1992 and November 1995, U.S. armed forces participated in
a wide range of air and naval operations in support of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions aimed at terminating the ethnic-based conflicts raging
42
within the former Yugoslavia. By the time the fighting ended in late 1995, the
U.S. and its allies had flown more than 109,000 sorties, just slightly less than
the number flown by Coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War. Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft were involved in the following operations:
Provide Promise (2/93-1/96)

—providing

air

cover for

air delivery

of relief

supplies;

—enforcing the ban on
over Bosnia
—enforcing the complete embargo on
of
equipment
Yugoslavia;
—conducting
the

Deny Flight (4/93-12/95)
and Herzegovina;

military flights

Sharp Guard (6/93-6/95)

weapons and
Deliberate

Bosnian-Serb

military

Force

deliveries

to

(8/95-9/95)

Army and

air

providing

air

strikes

against

defense suppression, close

air

support,

combat air patrol, and search and rescue, supplemented by Tomahawk missiles
launched from a U.S. Navy Aegis

These

cruiser.

military operations in the

other-than-war category

(MOOTW)

illuminated complicated issues of law and policy that had to be dealt with by

commanders and their military lawyers in a political environment in which UN
and NATO participants held differing views regarding the future of Bosnia and
its neighbor States. Procedures for coordination and liaison at each level of the
command chain were required since both the UN and NATO had to consent
before military force could be applied. Detailed rules of engagement and other
operational constraints had to be formulated in order to avoid both casualties
within NATO and UN forces and unnecessary loss of life or damage to property
within Bosnia itself. U.S. commanders and staff had to take the lead in devising
the complex and sensitive terms of reference, mission statements,

command

arrangements, rules of engagement, and target selection that are mandatory in

MOOTW

coalition operations that involve a wide variety of aircraft types

from various nations. The Bosnian

air

operations were successful in that there

was an overall lack of significant collateral damage to life and property.
However, there were instances of an inability to deliver ordnance on specific
ground targets because of an immediate and serious threat to NATO forces,
UN peacekeeping forces, or to Bosnian civilians. Furthermore, NATO's ability
to suppress helicopter flights in the no-fly zone was only partially effective due
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down

to the political costs of mistakenly shooting

UN

aboard or a

The

helicopter.

a helicopter with civilians

shoot-down of the Black

tragic

same time period

helicopter during this

Operations

illustrates the

Hawk

importance of effective

coordination, communications, identification, and deconfliction procedures,
in addition to detailed

ROE.

In a counterpart to the

air

Security Council Resolutions,

operations over Bosnia and pursuant to

NATO

UN

and Western European Union (WEU)

warships began maritime interception operations (MIO) in the Adriatic Sea to

monitor compliance with the embargo on goods in and out of Yugoslavia. 43
After several months of interrogations which determined that violations were

indeed occurring, the Security Council authorized action by boardings,
inspections,

and diversions under chapters VII and VIII of the

Enforcement was extended to prohibit
entering the

territorial

commercial maritime

all

sea of Yugoslavia

when

it

"contraband" ships were making an end run through the
enforcement.

NATO

and

WEU

operation called Sharp Guard.

UN

Charter.

traffic

from

was discovered that
territorial sea to

avoid

were then consolidated into one

forces

From 1992

to 1996,

Sharp Guard surface ships

challenged nearly 75,000 merchant ships, boarded and inspected 5,951 at sea,

and diverted and inspected 1,480

As

sorties in support.

in port.

Maritime patrol

a result of these efforts,

no

ships

aircraft flew 7,151

were reported to have

broken the embargo or sanctions during the almost four years that the
operations were in effect.

44

The critical issues to be sorted out in maritime interception operations are
command and control, rules of engagement, and communications. The
Adriatic MIO began in a parallel command structure with NATO and the WEU
each controlling

their respective warships. This structure

Persian Gulf MIO in that the U.S. and the

own

forces,

nation

was similar to the

UK each exercised control over their

with the added feature that Arab/Islamic nations utilized a lead

concept

for

controlling

their

ships.

arrangement was developed on an ad hoc
coordination.

The

This

basis

trifurcated

command

and required extensive

Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration

Center (C3IC) was used to exchange intelligence and operational information,
and coordinate enforcement action. In the Adriatic, once Sharp Guard was in
effect,

the

operational

Commander

effective

and

command

NATO

and

in Chief, Allied Forces

ideal

structure

procedures. However, future

formulate their

of

own ad

hoc

with

WEU

ships

well

trained in

NATO

coalition forces will probably have to

command and
28

was centralized under

Southern Europe. This was a highly

NATO

MIOs with

ships

control structure.
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In rules of engagement, the Sharp Guard unified

command

used

NATO

However, there was a confusion
factor since French, U.S., and UK ships were in the Adriatic operating under
their respective national ROE and then would rotate into the MIO and change
to NATO ROE. But even under the ideal, single NATO ROE, commanders and
staff still had to sort out issues of interpretation such as what constitutes a

ROE, which

greatly simplified the problem.

and what kind of disabling fire is authorized.
Communications connectivity and interoperability have been continuing
challenges in multinational operations. In Sharp Guard, communications were
facilitated by common training, language, publications, similar equipment, and
NATO procedures. For future MIOs, a great deal of prior planning will be
necessary to resolve technical problems and insure that compatible
communication equipment is available.
hostile act or hostile intent,

Maritime interception operations have become an important method of
enforcing economic sanctions. Legally, they are in a category of their own, but

have features of blockade (probably
contraband, and quarantine.

pacific blockade),

Whether

the particular

visit

MIO

is

and search,

pursuant to a

Security Council resolution or justified by individual or collective self-defense,
notification

of

the

enforcement action

terms,

is

conditions,

required.

interesting to

It is

and
note that the enforcement

limitations,

area

affected,

action often included diversion for inspection in port or just diversion, as well
as

boarding and inspection at

confiscation.
visit

sea,

The San Remo Manual

and search.

rather than detention,

capture,

or

provides for diversion as an alternative to

45

The Challenges Ahead
For the foreseeable future, U.S. naval forces

will

support of national interests. This was emphasized

be deployed worldwide in

when

the Nimitz Carrier

Group was ordered into the Persian Gulf ahead of schedule in 1997 as a
warning to Iran and Iraq to stop incursions into the U.S. -enforced "no-fly" zone
46
in southern Iraq. As the Chief of Naval Operations has stated, "Our global
presence insures freedom of navigation in international trade routes and
Battle

supports U.S. efforts to bring excessive maritime claims into compliance with
the law of the sea."
claims

that

47

affect

Volume 66 of the "Blue Book"
the

territorial

sea,

series

international

documents excessive
straits,

overflight,

and navigation in the exclusive economic
zone.
Many of the actions taken under the U.S. Freedom of Navigation
Program, including diplomatic efforts and peaceful assertions of the rights and
archipelagic sea-lanes passage,
48
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freedoms of navigation and overflight recognized in international law, are

The volume

described.

also details

how

international agreements, as well as

U.S. domestic legislation on the protection of the marine environment and

marine resources, have the potential, in their application and enforcement, to
infringe on the exercise of traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and
overflight. Excessive

maritime claims can also hamper military operations in

international waters

and airspace

United

States.

stem the flow of

to

illegal

drugs into the

In addition to countering excessive maritime claims, the

challenges ahead affecting naval operations in "peacetime" include protecting

the sea routes of international trade, particularly

straits,

insuring access to

and gas resources, maintaining access to the high seas for
telecommunications, upholding the sovereign immunity of warships and other
public vessels and aircraft, continuing to participate in efforts to protect the
marine environment and enhance the management of fisheries, and modifying
naval operational practices to limit sources of pollution from warships.
Protection of the marine environment is a major issue of concern and cannot
be compartmentalized. For example, technical solutions and new equipment
are required to process waste from ships. Continued U.S. leadership in the
critical

oil

International Maritime Organization

is

essential.

In the area of naval warfare, there are factors that must be considered before

commander and his lawyer can
modern international law has been
the

Much

deal with the individual rules.

of

movement to limit state sovereignty.
There have been remarkable advances in human rights and the protection of
a

the environment as a result of the initiatives and efforts of non-governmental
organizations

(NGOs),

international law.

of

49

command must

thus

presaging

an increasing

role

for

NGOs

Joint Vision 2010 points out that "future leaders at

all

in

levels

understand the interrelationships among military power,

and economic pressure, as well as the role of the various
government agencies and branches, and non-governmental actors, in
50
achieving our security objectives." In actions under chapter VII of the UN
diplomacy,

Charter, effective participation will most likely be limited to the great powers,
i.e.,

States with a resource base

and an internal

political organization that

enable the leadership to clarify global interests and,
sufficient
force.

51

if

necessary, mobilize

domestic support to enable them to deploy an adequate military

For the U.S., this

will

mean working through

Presidential Decision

met

Directive 25 (PDD-25) to ascertain whether the two-tier criteria are

order to permit U.S. involvement in

UN

peacekeeping operations.

there are Congressional concerns about involving U.S. forces in

expressed,

e.g.,

in

Also,

UN operations,

in proposed legislation prohibiting U.S. forces

30
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James H. Doyle,

Jr.

under foreign operational control and restricting the sharing of intelligence
information.

53

In what has been termed the third great revolution in history, developments
in

computers and telecommunications have dramatically reduced the

time and distance.

The

ability of television to

of international crises has created

new

effects of

broadcast instantaneous images

challenges for diplomats, government

and military commanders and their lawyers, and a demand for an
immediate policy and legal response. Enormous pressure is put on the military
commanders not only because their tactics and casualties are scrutinized
instantaneously, but also because media reports impact the morale of soldiers,
officials,

sailors,

and airmen. 54

Military Operations

promoting peace but,

Other than

War

are focused

on deterring war and

as recent experience indicates, often involve the use or

threat of force. In such cases, Joint
directs that military force

Pub

3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations,

be applied prudently. "The actions of military

personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force,
including specific ROE. In operations other than war,

ROE will

often be

more

and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover,
these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry,
55
tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment."
In future
MOOTW, achieving a balance between the level of violence necessary to
accomplish the mission and the force essential to protect our own and friendly
forces will be a challenge. This balance was reached in Deny Flight and
Deliberate Force by limiting strikes to air defense sites and only expanding the
target base on a graduated basis when Serbian forces violated UN conditions.
To minimize collateral damage, precision-guided munitions comprised more
than 90 percent of the air-to-ground ordnance delivered by naval aircraft, in
contrast with less than 2 percent used during the Persian Gulf War. Restraints
on target selection will sometimes be decided at the political level with UN and
coalition participation. In Operation Earnest Will (reflagging and protecting
Kuwati tankers during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War), after the USS Samuel B.
Roberts hit an Iranian laid mine, the National Command Authority decided
that the appropriate and proportionate response was to attack Iranian oil
56
platforms, attacking Iranian ships only if they fired on U.S. ships.
More
recently, in the Bosnian operation under the Dayton Accords, the former
Implementation Force (IFOR) commander and his military lawyer had to take a
strong stand in the political negotiations to get rules of engagement with the
57
In the
flexibility to use force commensurate with accomplishing the mission.
area of individual and unit self-defense, a difficult issue will be to define in the
restrictive, detailed,
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constitutes a hostile act or intent in the

weapons, means of delivery, countermeasures, and

tactics

light

of

new

technology,

so that defensive action

can be taken in anticipation of an imminent attack in accordance with the
Commanders Handbook. 58
In future wars, the "goal

is

to

win

as quickly as possible

and with

as

few

casualties as possible, achieving national objectives

and concluding

on terms

multinational partners." 59

favorable to the United States and

its

hostilities

However, there will still be challenging issues to resolve involving targeting,
collateral damage, over- the -horizon weapons, protection of merchant ships,
medical transport, civilian aircraft, noncombatants, 60 the environment, and
self-defense, especially if the armed conflict is limited in scope and area. The
mingling of civilians with combatants will present problems in targeting to
avoid civilian casualties, particularly with the increasing use of "stand-off'

weapons

USS

to minimize exposure to casualties.

61

In the Iraqi Mirage attack

Stark, the pilot followed standard Iraqi policy

firing

on the

on

target discrimination by

largest radar return believed to be in the Iranian

accepted responsibility for an erroneous attack.

62

on

war zone. Iraq

In the regime of self-defense

Commander of the Naval Forces had
to resolve convoy escort responsibilities among multinational ships,
particularly as to whether a convoy commander operating under national rules
during the Persian Gulf War, the former

of engagement could respond in self-defense to an attack on a foreign flag ship
in his convoy.

63

In this regard,

it is

important to remember that the rules of

engagement have to be clear and concise for implementation by commanders
and subordinates who may not have an operational lawyer or access to legal advice.
In the environmental arena, international outrage at the depredations visited

upon Kuwait and upon the waters of the Persian Gulf during the Gulf War
drew renewed attention to the ongoing debate among environmentalists,
scientists, lawyers, policy makers, and military officials as to whether

Volume 69 of
Symposium on the

international law was adequate to protect our natural heritage.

the "Blue Book" series documents the proceedings of the

Protection of the Environment during

Naval

War

Armed

Conflict held in 1995 at the

College and attended by national and international government
64
and operational commanders. It is obvious
the protection of the environment will be a

officials, legal scholars, scientists,

that in future

armed

major

The

issue.

conflicts,

Persian

Gulf War,

Bosnian

peacekeeping,

interception operations, and other events since emergence of the

maritime

New World

more than enough legal issues of
substance to focus the attention of the commander and his operational lawyer.
The Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe reported that in a twelveOrder demonstrate that there continue
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period during 1996' 1997, his naval forces participated in thirteen joint

and combined operations involving peacekeeping, peace
65
noncombatant evacuations, and humanitarian missions.

enforcement,

The Commander and Operational Lawyer
The

practice of operational law in the

Navy and Marine Corps has matured

and a few international
law specialists at the Washington level grappling with issues of oceans law and
the rules of naval warfare. Now, there are trained and experienced operational
lawyers working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the
Marine Corps, Judge Advocate General, the Naval War College, and most
importantly, on the staffs of joint, theater, fleet, battle groups, expeditionary
units, and other major operational commands. With satellite communications
and secure radios, these experts can rapidly communicate, share opinions,
receive guidance, make recommendations, get additional material, and do all
that is necessary to develop the best legal advice for the commander. Then,
using the Commanders Handbook, the Joint Chiefs of Staff peacetime rules of
engagement, the National Command Authorities wartime rules of
engagement, and policy directives, detailed guidance can be formulated and
promulgated to subordinate commanders and those tasked to perform the
mission. In this process, it is important that operational lawyers have the
latitude to exchange ideas, opinions, and tentative recommendations with
their counterparts up and down the chain of command, keeping their leaders
fully apprised of these contacts and sensitive to concerns about premature
disclosure of options that have not yet been approved either as
recommendations or directives. In searching for reasoned legal advice, "turf
considerations" and "not invented here" attitudes are unhelpful, to say the
significantly since the days of line officers acting alone

least.

The

best operational lawyers are activists

—speaking

out, offering advice

and seeking ways to support the commander in
carrying out the mission under the law, but mindful that the commander is
ultimately accountable and must weigh political and policy considerations,
along with legal, in reaching a decision. In addition, a thorough understanding
of what the individual ship, aircraft, expeditionary unit, soldier, sailor, marine
and airman are trained to do is essential in this era of joint and combined
in the planning process,

operations.

For their part, commanders and operational planners at

all levels

must have

an understanding of the fundamental principles of oceans law and the
33
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naval warfare. They must be able to evaluate the advice of operational lawyers,

know what questions to ask, and when to listen or not listen. In the worst case,
a commander who defers entirely to his lawyer may jeopardize the mission.
Mutual trust and respect between the commander and his lawyer are essential
in getting the best legal advice. The tone the commander sets with the staff can
be critical as to the stature of the lawyer. The operational lawyer who is
expected to routinely and actively participate in the planning and decision
process can be counted

on

to render effective legal advice.

Coping with the complex and changing

issues of oceans

naval warfare in the 21st century requires a team
the operational lawyer.

effort

law and the rules of

by the commander and

The former Commander, Implementation Force and

Allied Forces, Southern Europe, states that his military lawyer was a key player

and war council team, sitting right next to him,
actively participating in evaluating options, and offering advice in reaching
66
decisions.
In a similar vein, the former Commander Naval Forces, Central
Command, during the Persian Gulf war, observed that he had great rapport
with his lawyer, who was an active participant on the staff and was invaluable
67
in dealing with the legal and policy issues during the war. At the National
Security Council level, the former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed
that his Navy lawyer was indispensable in sorting out the legal and policy issues
involved in the use of force and rules of engagement, and ensuring that the
Chairman's views on these issues were represented in interagency debates and
and part of his

daily planning

the decision-making process.

68

With that kind of teamwork, and mutual trust and respect, there is no doubt
that commanders and operational lawyers, in the Jack Grunawalt tradition, will
meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Notes

Carl Ubbelohde, The
Revolution (1960).
1.

See

2.

Letter from

J.

Crawford

ed., 1996). See letter

and Spanish Courts (Nov.

23, 1777), in

allegedly carrying Spanish goods

the role of American

Courts and the American

Commanders of Armed American
10 DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1777, at 1012-13

American Commissioners

Vessels (Nov. 21, 1777) in

(Michael

Vice- Admiralty

id.

in France to

from American Commissioners
at

in

France to French

1020-21, justifying the capture of a French ship,

from London to Cadiz by an American privateer and explaining

prize courts in adjudicating prizes.

Naval Regulations issued by Command of the President, Jan. 25, 1802 (facsimile, U. S.
Naval Institute, 1970). Previously, on Nov. 28, 1775, the Continental Congress adopted a code
3.

of naval regulations patterned after the 1749 British regulations governing His Majesty's ships,
vessels,

and forces by sea. See

L.

H. Bolander,

A History of Regulations in the U.S. Navy, 75 NAVAL

INST. PROC. 1354(1947).

34

James H. Doyle,
See Michael

4.

J.

Jr.

Crawford, The Navy's Campaign against

Trade

the Licensed

AM. NEPTUNE 165 (1986).
See James m. Mcpherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil

in the

War

of

1812, 46
5.

War

Era 385

(1988).

U.S.

6.

1990,

NAVY REGULATIONS,

0705 ("At

art.

all

times,

1870,

art.

commanders

observe, the principles of international law.

94. See also current U. S.

and require

shall observe

Where

departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations

NAVY REGULATIONS,

necessary to

commands

their

fulfill this

to

responsibility, a

authorized.")

is

7. See Charles O. Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval
Officers 1778-1883 (1912).
8. see david f. long, gold braid and foreign relations, diplomatic
Activities of u. S. naval Officers, 1798-1883 (1988).

The United States Naval War Code of 1900, reprinted and critiqued in INTERNATIONAL
DISCUSSIONS, 1903 (Naval War College, 1903). Captain Stockton collaborated with
Captain Asa Walker in the preparation of the Naval War Code of 1900.
9.

LAW

JOHN

10. See

B.

HATTENDORF ET

AL.,

SAILORS

AND SCHOLARS: THE CENTENNIAL

WAR COLLEGE (1984).

HISTORY OF THE U.S. NAVAL
11. Id. at 56.
12.

in

Geneva Convention

Armed

for the

(I)

Amelioration of the Condition of the

Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114;

Wounded and Sick

Geneva Convention

(II)

for the

Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea,

Aug.

Prisoners of

12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.

War, Aug.

3217; Geneva Convention

(III)

relative to the

Treatment of

U.S.T. 3316; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the

12, 1949, 6

Protection of Civilian Persons in
13. Protocol

Additional

(I)

Protection of Victims of International
(II)

to the

Armed

Geneva Conventions of Aug.

Conflicts, June 8, 1977,

12, 1949,

and

and Protocol Additional

relating to the Protection of Victims of

Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
(Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 1982).

Non-International

WAR 389, 449

Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606;
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312; Convention on Fisheries and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138;
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 471.
14.

15.

Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents

On

and Over the Sea, May

25,

1972,

U.S.-U.S.S.R., 26 U.S.T. 1168.
16.

Convention of the Law of the Sea opened for signature Dec.
in 21 I.L.M. 1261-1354.

10, 1982, art. 308,

U. N. Doc.

A/Conf. 62/122, reprinted

17. See W. T. MALLISON, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN
GENERAL AND LIMITED WAR (58 International Law Studies, 1966) ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE
LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA (50 International Law Studies, 1955).
18. The Hostage Case (United States v. List et al.), 11 T.W.C. 1253-54 (1950); See MYRES
S. MCDOUGAL AND FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC ORDER 525
;

(1962).
19. See

George K. Walker,

State Practice Following

World

NAVAL WARFARE: TARGETING ENEMY MERCHANT
Studies, Richard
20.

J.

Grunawalt

War 11, 945-1 990,
1

in

THE LAW OF

SHIPPING 121 (65 International Law

ed., 1993).

THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, NWIP

357-422.

35

10-2, reprinted in

TUCKER,

supra note 17, at

International

21. See

22

See

THE SEA

Law and Naval

Operations

ANN L.

HOLLICK, U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1981).
DEPT OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF

(2d ed. 1996).

Message from U.S. President transmitting UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and
to the Implementation of Part XI, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
23.

Agreement Relating

Agreement, supra note 15. See also David F. Winkler, When Russia
Invaded Disneyland, NAVAL INST. PROC, May, 1997, at 77 (overview of Incidents at Sea
negotiations, Nov. 1970-May 1972).
24. See U.S.-U.S.S.R.

25. Joint

Statement by the United States and the Soviet Union, with Uniform Interpretation
Law Governing Innocent Passage, Sep. 23, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1444-47

of the Rules of International
(1989).

26. See W. Hays Parks, The Gulf War: A Practitioner's View, 10 DICK. J. INT'L. L. 393 (1992)
Ashley
Roach, Rules of Engagement, NAVAL WAR C. REV, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 46.
J.
27. See Parks, supra note 26, on the roots and evolution of operational law following the
watershed My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War.
28. Revised in

NWP

NWP

9A, and further revised and promulgated in 1995 as
P5800.7. The 1995 edition expands on the treatment of
and weapons; addresses land mines for the first time; and provides a new

1989

as

M4M/FMFM M0/COMDTPUB
neutrality, targeting,

section

on maritime law enforcement and land warfare.
John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs

29. General
Forgetfulness,

WASH. POST,

Breed

Sep. 28, 1997, at C-4.

30. See Roach, supra note 26, for a discussion of the peacetime

engagement and the exercise of the
Rules of Engagement:

Can

of Staff, Success

and wartime

right of self-defense in the incident. See also

A Primer, THE ARMY LAWYER, July

1993, at

Guy

rules of

R. Phillips,

4.

31. See Walker, supra note 19, at 162.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs
commanding officer obeyed the rules
32.

of Staff, after thorough investigation, found that the
of engagement in exercising the right of self-defense. In

commanders during Earnest Will (reflagging and
protecting Kuwaiti tankers), Admiral Crowe said, "If the rules of engagement are going to tilt in
any direction, I want them to tilt toward saving American lives." ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE,
JR., THE LINE OF FIRE 208 (1993).
33. The London Naval Treaty IV, 46 Stat. 2858, 2881-2 (1931), contains the identical rules
personally briefing Middle East Force major

as in the Protocol of 1936.

34.

THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Robertson,
35. See

International

(64

Law

Studies,

Horace

B.

Jr. ed., 1991).

W. Michael Reisman

Practice: the Role of Military

& William K. Leitzau, Moving International Law from Theory to

Manuals

in Effectuating the

Law

of Armed Conflict, in

id.

at

1.

36. San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts
AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) contains sections on general principles, regions of

operations, basic rules

and

methods and means of warfare at sea, measures
search, diversion, and capture, and protected persons,

target discrimination,

short of attack, interception,

visit,

medical transports, and medical

aircraft.

Innovations in the Manual include the effect of

UN

Security Council Resolutions, clarifying the concept of military objective, discussing the rules
applicable to zones, elaborating

on

military operations in various sea areas,

rules regarding aircraft operations in

war.

The second

part of the

armed

conflict

and

and introducing new
between peace and

in the "gray" area

Manual contains an explanation

of each paragraph (rule). These

explanations were authored by Professor Salah El-Din Amer, Louise Doswald-Beck, Vice

36

James H. Doyle,

Jr.

Admiral James H. Doyle, Jr., Commander William Fenrick, Christopher Greenwood, Professor
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Professor (Rear Admiral) Horace B. Robertson, Jr., and Gert-Jan
F. Van Hegelsom.
37.

of the

Parks, Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, Department
Tenth Annual Operational Law Symposium and Advisory Board, Naval

Memorandum from Hays
Army,

for the

War College

(Feb. 27, 1997) (on

with author).

file

Pub 3-0,

38. Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint
39.

Memorandum from

Richard

III— 25 (1995).

Grunawalt,

J.

International Law, for the Record of the International

1988) (on

file

Charles

H.

Law Meeting

Stockton

Professor

of

of 10 Feb. 1988 (Feb. 25,

with author).

40. Letter from Rear

Admiral Ronald

Chief of Naval Operations (Feb.

J.

Kurth,
(on

11, 1988)

file

USN,

President,

Naval

War College,

to the

with author)

Department of Defense Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf
War—Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, Apr. 10, 1992, 31 1.L.M. 612 (1992). See also
Steven Keeva, Lawyers in the War Room, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 52, and Parks, supra note 26.
41. See U.S.

Dean Simmons et al., Air Operations over Bosnia, NAVAL INST. PROC, May

42. See
58, for

1997, at

an assessment of the operational lessons learned.

43. See Richard Zeigler,
Interception Operations,

background, legal

43

Ubi Sumus?

Quo Vadimus?

Charting the Course of Maritime

NAVAL

justification,

L. REV. 1 (1996), for a comprehensive analysis of the
conduct of operations, and recommendations for the future

regarding the maritime interception operations in the Persian Gulf and

Red

Sea, in the Adriatic

and in the Caribbean Sea off Haiti. See also LOIS E. FIELDING, MARITIME INTERCEPTION
AND U. N. SANCTIONS: RESOLVING ISSUES IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, THE CONFLICT IN
Sea,

THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND THE HAITI CRISIS (1997).
44. Interview with Admiral Thomas J. Lopez, USN, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces,
Southern Europe, and Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces Europe, in 13 SURFACE SlTREP
1-5 (Surface

Navy Assoc, Aug.-Sep.,

45.

SAN REMO MANUAL,

46.

U.

S.

1997).

supra note 36 at 196.

Dispatches Carrier Group to Persian Gulf,

WASH. POST,

Oct.

1997, at A8.

4,

47. Admiral Jay L. Johnson, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Operational Primacy, 22
Surface Warfare 3, 5 (May-June 1997).
48. J. Ashley Roach & Robert w. Smith, Excessive maritime Claims (66
International Law Studies, 1994).
49. See W. Michael Reisman, Redesigning the United Nations, 1 SINGAPORE J. INT'L. &COMP.
L.

1

(1997).

50.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Joint Vision 2010, at

l,

28 (1996)

51. See Reisman, supra note 49.
52. See Col.
in

James

P. Terry,

The

U. N. Operations, 31 TEX. INT'L.
53. See

Criteria for Intervention:
L.J.

What Color

S. Military Policy

Law and

United Nations

101 (1996).

George K. Walker, United

States

Peacekeeping or Peacemaking Operations, 29

Nordquist,

An Evaluation of U.

National Security

WAKE

FOREST

L.

REV. 435 (1994); Myron H.

Helmet?: Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates,

Newport

Papers No. 12 (Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Aug. 1997).
54. See Diplomacy

and

Conflict Resolution in the Information Age, 3

1997).
55. Doctrine for Joint Operations, supra note 38, at
56. See

Crowe, supra note 32,

at

187-211.

37

V-3.

PEACE

WATCH

Q une

International

57. Conversation

Law and Naval

Admiral Leighton Smith,

with

Operations

USN

(Ret.),

former

Commander

International Force (IFOR) and Allied Forces, Southern Europe (Oct. 8, 1997).
58.

NWP

1-14M, supra note

28, at 4.3.2.1

59. Doctrine for Joint Operations, supra note 38, at 1-2.
60. See Louise Doswald-Beck, Vessels, Aircraft

Armed

and Persons

Entitled to Protection

During

1994 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 211, in which a Senior Legal Adviser,
Committee of the Red Cross, analyzes the state of the law and makes
recommendations for improvement.
61. See W. Michael Reisman, The Lessons ofQana, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 381 (1997) (analysis
of Israeli artillery fire on a UN compound containing civilians and the right of self-defense). See
also Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Modem Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in THE
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 34, at 362-83, for a selective review of some of the
new technology weapon systems, e.g., Tomahawk and Harpoon cruise missiles, Captor mines,
directed energy devices, and depleted uranium ammunition, that are not unlawful per se, but can
be employed in such a way as to make their use unlawful.
62. See 26 I.L.M. 1427-28 (1987).
63. Conversation with Admiral Stanley Arthur, USN (Ret.), former Commander, U.S.
Central Command, Commander Seventh Fleet, and Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Oct. 9,
Conflict at Sea,

International

1997).
64. See

PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT

Law Studies, Richard Grunawalt

et

al.

(69 International

eds., 1996).

65. Lopez, supra note 44.
66. Smith, supra note 57.
67. Arthur, supra note 63.
68. Conversation with

Chiefs of Staff,

Europe (Oct.

Admiral William

Commander

in

Chief

J.

USN (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint
and Commander Allied Forces, Southern

Crowe,

Pacific Forces,

18, 1997).

38

The Law of War
in

Historical Perspective

Leslie C.

I

FIRST

Green

GOT TO KNOW JACK GRUNAWALT when I participated in some

of the symposia he organized at the Naval

he was a great organizer,
personality. In

College,

I

my two years

full

as

War College. I soon realised that

of enthusiasm, and possessed of a

Stockton Professor of International Law

have come to value him as a colleague and friend

—and almost

warm
at the
as the

father of a small family of fellow workers.

As

a former British

Army

officer

with a somewhat restricted knowledge of

had some fears associated with being in an Oceans Law and
Policy Department. But Jack made me welcome and integrated me into his
team. It did not take me long to realise that here was a man with catholic
interests willing to listen to another's views, even though they might be radical
and perhaps even "revolutionary." Discussing one's views with him would
often result in a modification of one's radicalism, and certainly a clarification of
doubt. It soon became clear that Jack's views and interests were wide in the
extreme, and he was obviously prepared to share them.
Having heard Jack lecture and seen his rapport with a class of officers from a
variety of commands and countries, I soon recognised that he is a born teacher.

maritime law,

I

The Law

Jack

is

also very modest.

Soon

after

of

War

joined the College, he told

I

me

that he did

not consider himself a true professor since he had never held an academic

appointment.

I

reminded him that he held a

professorial

appointment

at a

recognized and highly respected institute of specialized and higher learning and

watched him in

that having

action,

know

I

that he

more than adequately

is

entitled to be addressed as Professor.
It

is

with great delight that

contributing to this Liber

Amicorum

in

among

international law

This somewhat chauvinistic attitude

character.

comments

those of his amid

honour of Jack Grunawalt.

modern

has often been claimed that

It

find myself

I

Eurocentric in

is

frequently based

is

works of the "fathers" of international law, many of

in the

were Christian monks.

1

It is

a view strengthened by pointing out that

" [t]

on

whom
he era

of the independent territorial State began in earnest with the Treaty of

War and

Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years'

hegemony

asserted by the

Roman

Catholic Church."

2

the political

Such an

attitude,

however, tends to minimize the significance of the system that prevailed in
ancient and medieval times.

some

restraints

From

were necessary during armed

references in the

enjoined to slaughter

who

victorious Israelites

they paid tribute.
while

modified

rejected

made

If

It is

Thus, we find numerous

on the

limitations

true that the Israelites were frequently

at the direct instruction of God

Him;
4

show mercy

to

The Prophets

tell

to the

and normally

enemy would

us that in other wars the

the inhabitants of conquered territories slaves unless

peace was not accepted upon defeat, the males were to be

women and children were to be spared, but made slaves. The rabbis

this so that their status

became that of servants rather than

Prisoners of war were to be treated

informed

conflict.

the inhabitants of the cities they captured, but this

constitute a sin against the Lord.

5

had been recognized that

3

all

was only when the war was waged
against heathens

it

Old Testament wherein God imposes

warlike activities of the Israelites.

slain,

earliest times

his

king when asked

if

common practice,

he might

humanely and not

slain,

slaves.

as Elisha

6

kill

them. In the days of the kingdom,

enemy be hungry, give him bread to
7
eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink." Not only were the innocent
to be protected, but precautions were also to be taken not to harm the local
this

was the

fauna and

flora, subject to

for "if thine

the needs of military necessity. Thus, soldiers were

told not to destroy trees or fruit, other than that
8

which was required

9

the building of defenses. Josephus interpreted this to

not to be set on

fire

nor beasts of burden slaughtered.
40

10

mean
In

for

food or

that the land was

fact,

commenting on

Leslie C.

Green

Jewish behavior during conflict in biblical times, one commentator has

remarked:
11

much of the old law through
reinterpretation or imaginative explanation. Due to this it seems that the
Israelites were indeed a "merciful" people when compared with their neighbours,
The

such

rabbis

softened

impact of

the

and violations to
on the whole, the Israelite warriors conducted themselves
restricted manner in accordance with rules and regulations

as the Assyrians.

Although,

as in

any

case, exceptions

regulations occurred,
in a disciplined,

derived from divine inspiration.

12

main part, the penalty for
disregarding the imprecations concerning conduct in combat were punishable
It

must be borne

in mind, however, that, for the

only by religious, that

The

is

to say divine, sanction.

were not the only ancient people to consider it necessary to
impose some measure of control on their warlike activities. Sun Tzu
Israelites

maintained that in war one should only attack the enemy armies,
policy

is

to attack cities.

Attack

cities

only

when

there

early as the seventeenth century B.C., the Chinese,

is

no

when

for "the worst

alternative."

13

As

resorting to war,

limited their activities by a conscious application of principles of chivalry.

This

may be seen in the

refusal of the

of Sung's minister of war to attack

was "deemed unchivalrous among Chinese chariot
take] advantage of a fleeing enemy who was having trouble with

an unready enemy, while
aristocrats [to

Duke

14

it

might even be

his chariot (he

assisted), [to] injure a ruler, [or to] attack

an

enemy state when it was mourning a ruler or was divided by internal troubles."

The

sacred writings of ancient India equally sought to introduce some

measure of humanitarianism. The Mahabharata} 5

states that "a king

never do such an injury to his foe as would rankle the

should

no sleeping

latter's heart,

enemy should be attacked, and with death our enmity is terminated." 16 The
Laws of Manu, promulgated at approximately the same period, postulate that:
when the king fights his foes in battle, let him not strike with weapons concealed,
nor with barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazed with
are the

fire.

.

.

.

These

weapons of the wicked. 17

Moreover,

it

was generally recognized that proportionality between the

combatants was a requirement, so that elephants should be used only against

same way as foot soldiers would fight against foot soldiers. 18
19
Similarly, the Ramayana condemned weapons which could "destroy the entire
race of the enemy, including those which could not bear arms
because such

elephants, in the

.

41

.

.

Law

The

War

of

destruction en masse was forbidden by the ancient laws of war, even though

enemy] was fighting an unjust war with an unrighteous objective." 20 The
Mahabharata, too, forbade the use of "hyperdestructive" weapons, since these
were "not even moral, let alone in conformity with religion or the recognized
[the

rules of warfare."

21

among

In ancient Greece,

the city States:

[T]emples and priests and embassies were considered inviolable.

was shown

.

.

.

Mercy

.

.

.

ransomed and exchanged.
and armistices were
established and, for the most part, faithfully observed.
Burial of the dead was
permitted; and graves were unmolested. It was considered wrong and impious to
Prisoners were

to helpless captives.

Safe-conducts

were granted and respected.

Truces
.

make

cut off the enemy's water supply, or to

.

.

use of poisoned weapons.

Treacherous stratagems of every description were condemned
to civilized warfare.

In so far as

as

22

being contrary

23

Rome was

concerned, practices:

[V] aried according as their wars were

commenced

vengeance

to exact

for gross

violations of international law, or for deliberate acts o{ treachery. Their warlike

usages varied also according as their adversaries were regular enemies ... or

and bands of pirates and marauders.

uncivilized barbarians

.

.

.

[T]he belligerent

operations of Rome, from the point of view of introducing various mitigations in

the

field,

and adopting

a milder policy after victory, are distinctly of a progressive

They were more regular and disciplined than those of any other
The ius belli imposed restrictions on barbarism, and
ancient nation.
[Livy tells us] there were laws of war as well
condemned all acts of treachery.
as peace, and the Romans had learnt to put them into practice not less justly than
The Romans [says Cicero 24 refuse to countenance a criminal
bravely.
25
attempt made on the life of even a foreign aggressor.
character.

.

.

.

.

.

The

.

.

.

.

rules of

]

war

both Greece and

in

[Applicable only to

Rome

were, indeed:

civilized sovereign States, properly organized,

a regular constitution;

and not

and enjoying

to conglomerations of individuals living together

an irregular and precarious association. Rome did not regard as being within
the comity of nations such fortuitous gatherings of people, but only those who
were organized on a civilized basis, and governed with a view to the general good,
in

by

a properly constructed

bands of robbers and

system of law.

pirates,

and the

like

.

.

we

Hence

barbarians, savage tribes,

were debarred from the benefits and

relaxations established by international law
practice of war in Hellas,

.

and custom.

.

.

.

[A]s to the general

find remarkable oscillations of warlike policy. Brutal

42
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treatment and noble generous conduct are manifested at the same epoch, in the

same war, and apparently under similar circumstances. At times we hear of
proceedings which testify to the intellectual and artistic temperament of the
Greeks; at other times, we read narratives which emphasize the fundamental
and disregard of human claims prevalent among the ancient races when
hostilities for the most part assumed the
at war with each other. In Homer
form of indiscriminate brigandage, and were but rarely conducted with a view to
cruelty

.

.

.

achieving regular conquests, and extending the territory of the victorious

community. Extermination rather than subjection of the enemy was the usual
Sometimes prisoners were sacrificed to the gods, corpses mutilated,
practice.
.

.

.

and mercy refused to children, and to the old and sickly. On the other hand, acts
The adoption of certain, cowardly,
of mercy and nobility were frequent.
inhuman practices
was condemned. ... In reference to the conduct of war in
.

.

Greece,

it is

.

.

cities

soldier-politician

was between small

each individual was

modern

of the large

who saw

his

that he regarded each

personal adversary.

It

it

whose

States,

an extraordinary degree animated by patriotism and devotion to

their mother-country, that

finally,

.

important to remember that

subjects were to

than are the

.

home,

his

much more

affected by hostilities

States, that every individual

life,

was a

his family, his gods at stake, and,

and every subject of the opposing State

as his

26

has been pointed out that the situation in ancient Greece appears to have

changed somewhat after Homer's time and that by the fifth century B.C., both
27
Euripides
and Thucydides 28 were able to write of the "common customs
(koina nomima) of the Hellenes," which, in regard to the law of war, may be
summarized as follows:
1

The

state of war should

hostilities against

an appropriate

be

foe;

officially

sworn

declared before

treaties

and

commencing

alliances should be

regarded as binding.
2.

Hostilities are

sometimes inappropriate; sacred

truces, especially

those declared for the celebration of the Olympic games, should be observed.
3.

Hostilities

against certain persons

inappropriate; the inviolability of sacred places

and

in certain places

are

and persons under protection of

the gods, especially heralds and suppliants, should be respected.
4.

Erecting a battlefield trophy indicates victory; such trophies

should be respected.
5.

After a battle

it is

request the return of one's dead
6.

A battle

is

right to return
is

tantamount

enemy dead when

asked; to

to admitting defeat.

properly prefaced by a ritual challenge and acceptance

of the challenge.
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Prisoners of war should be offered for

7.

ransom rather than being

summarily executed or mutilated.

Punishment of surrendered opponents should be restrained.
War is an affair of warriors, thus noncombatants should not be

8.
9.

primary targets of attack.
Battles should be fought during the usual (summer) campaigning

10.

season.
29
Use of nonhoplite arms should be limited.
Pursuit of defeated and retreating opponents should be limited

11.
12.

duration.

in

30

By the time of the wars with Persia, the Peloponnesian War, and the changes in
31
the nature of Greek life, these rules were no longer of general validity.
As to the situation in Rome, and as a commentary upon the effects of its
practices, it has been suggested that
[T]he conduct of war

[in

Rome] was

essentially unrestrained. Prisoners could

be

enslaved or massacred; plunder was general; and no distinction was recognized

between combatants and noncombatants. Classical Latin, indeed, lacked even
a word for a civilian. The merciless savagery of Roman war in this sense carried
on into the invasion period of the fifth and sixth centuries. ... In practice
[, however,]
Roman war was not always so savage. But such was the
understanding of Roman war with which medieval theorists of war worked, and
they erected helium Romanum in this sense into a category of warfare which
permitted the indiscriminate slaughter or enslavement of entire populations
without distinction between combatant and noncombatant status. This was a
style of warfare appropriate only against a non-Roman enemy, and in the
Middle Ages this came to mean that Christians ought only employ it against
pagans.

." 32
.

.

In line with the practices described in the
applied in the Islamic world.
there be

Old Testament,

similar principles

The Caliph Abu Bakr commanded

no perfidy, no falsehood

in your treaties with the

his forces "let

enemy, be

faithful to

and noble and maintaining your word and
promises truly." Similarly, the leading Islamic statement on the law of nations
written in the ninth century forbids the killing of women, children and the old
all

things, proving yourselves upright
33

or blind, the crippled and the helplessly insane.

"Muslims were under
both combatants and

34

Moreover, during combat,

legal obligations to respect the rights of
civilians.

may be ransomed

.

.

.

non-Muslims,

[T]he prisoner of war should not be
35

killed,

was considered
that his death would be advantageous to the Muslims, he might be killed,
unless he converted to Islam. Unlike the Old Testament ban on destruction of

but he

or set free by grace."

44
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if it
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the land and

its

Green

products, Islam permitted the inundation or burning of a

city,

36

even though protected persons, including Muslims, might thus be killed.
During the Middle Ages, rules of chivalry applied as between the orders of
knighthood, although these did not operate to protect the foot soldiers or the

yeomenry. By the middle of the fifteenth century, a sufficient number of works

were being written on the rules of chivalry
th

as to

make

possible to say that:

it

had developed a law of arms, the jus
militare, well understood and applied by the military and feudal jurisdictions of
Western Europe. The theoretical bases of that law followed the medieval legal
and theological theories of the hierarchy of legal systems, namely, the Law of
God, the eternal law; the law of nature; the jus gentium, its more practical
The jus militare which governed the
counterpart; and human positive law.
conduct of the members of the honourable profession of arms was considered a
[B]y the 14

century, medieval Christendom

.

.

.

who were

part of the jus gentium, being part of the customs of those

professional

men-at-arms and members of the Orders of chivalry where the standards of
Christian and military behaviour were

meant

to meet.

.

.

.

The jus

militare

being

seen as a part of the jus gentium, the practical legal consequences followed that

it

was a body of rules understood and applied throughout the length and breadth of
Christendom, then subject to the divided regimes of sacerdotium and imperium, of
papacy and emperor. The heralds and older knights were considered periti in the
law of arms, while writers such as

work

.

.

.

Livre des Fays d'Armes et de Chivalerie (1407)

authorities

and cited

woman writer whose

Christine de Pisan, a

in the jurisdictions

.

.

.

[were] regarded as

where the law of arms was applied. 37 In

the Councils of Princes, in military and feudal courts, learned canonists argued

with erudition and

skill

who composed

experienced knights
difficulty,

the complex matters arising out of warfare before the

the military jurisdictions. In cases of

the heralds were consulted as the repositories of learning

on the law of

arms.

These cases were often concerned with claims to ransom, to booty and spoils,
rather than with the enforcement of honourable conduct in warfare. ... So far as
trials of soldiers in enemy allegiance were concerned, we see a universality of
jurisdiction which is not easy to explain. Doubtless the close nexus of the law of
arms with the jus gentium went part of the way to explain this.
The military
calling is seen as a jealous and exclusive one, intimately associated with the
concept of honour.
The bearing of arms is so much a matter of honour that
those who do not bear arms are without honour; it is a matter of honour to be
allowed to bear arms
[W]hat we would today call criminal conduct in warfare
was seen as a violation of that honour upon which the right to bear arms was
38
based. A medieval war crime is a breach of the law of arms, it is more specifically
an act contra fidem etjus gentium.
Honour is the root of the law of arms. Those
who commit acts of dishonour act contrary to the faith and honour of a knight.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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of arms controls and regulates acts of warfare by the professional and

chivalric military classes.

We

can

also discern a universality of jurisdiction to

The law

entertain such allegations of dishonourable acts in warfare.

being the measure of such honour binds

all

those

who

of arms

follow the profession of

arms in Christendom and at all places where Christians perform feats of arms.
The jus gentium of which the law of arms formed part has given us the legacy of
39
universal jurisdiction over war criminality.

As with

condemned

ancient India, the orders of knighthood

the use of

which were not employed in hand-to-hand
encounters between the knights themselves, but which enabled a man not of
noble birth to strike a knight from a distance. In condemnation of such
weapons, the knights found support from the Church. The second Lateran
40
41
Council in 1139 condemned the use of the arc and crossbow as hateful to
God, a view coinciding with the concepts of chivalry, 42 which regarded
weapons that could be fired from a distance by a person not a member of the
profession of arms and out of the potential reach of the intended victim as a
disgraceful and improper act. The third Lateran Council reiterated its
3
anathemization of these weapons, and in 1500 the Corpus Juris Canonic?
certain weapons, especially those

forbade the use of arrows, darts, or catapults, leading Belli to

comment that this

was done "in order to reduce as far as possible the number of engines of
destruction and death." However, "regard is so far lacking for this rule that
firearms of a thousand kinds are the most common and popular implements of
war; as

if

centuries,
lightning,

too few avenues of death had been discovered in the course of

had not the generation of our fathers, rivaling God with
invented this means whereby, even at a single discharge, men

his

are

sent to perdition by the hundreds."

Both

Belli's

comment and

the ideas underlying the approach of the

and Truce of God, have much in
common with the condemnation by Erasmus of the manner in which the
medieval knight decked himself for war:

canonists, as well as the concepts of the Peace

—

Do you think Nature would recognize the work of her own hand the image of
God? And if any one were to assure her that it were so, would she not break out in
execrations at the flagitious actions of her favourite creature?

when

she saw

itself must

man

thus armed against man,

have produced

this

portentous spectacle

creature behold himself in a mirror,

when his mind is no more.
thou canst;

reflect

on

"What new

if

his eyes

I

Would she not say

sight

do

I

would bid

behold? Hell
this

wretched

were capable o( seeing himself

Nevertheless, thou depraved animal, look at thyself,

thyself,

if

thou frantic warrior, if by any means thou mayest

recover thy lost reason, and be restored to thy pristine nature. Take the looking
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glass,

Did

and inspect

How come that threatening crest of plumes upon thy head?

it.

give thee feathers!

I

points,

which appear

Whence

like

horns of

furnished with sharp prickles?

Whence
Whence those

thee?

steel?

Whence

Whence

are thy

those sharp

hands and

those scales, like the scales offish,

those brazen teeth?

thy body?

Whence

that shining helmet?

Whence

deadly weapons of offence?

those plates of brass

Whence

all

feet

upon
over

that voice, uttering

sounds of rage more horrible than the inarticulate noise of the wild beasts?

Whence

the whole form of thy countenance and person distorted by furious
more than brutal? Whence that thunder and lightning which I perceive
around thee, at once more frightful than the thunder of heaven, and more
destructive to man? I formed thee an animal a little lower than the angels, a
passions,

how earnest thou to think of transforming thyself into a beast

partaker of divinity;

no beast hereafter can be deemed a beast, if it be compared with
man, originally the image of God, the Lord of Creation?" 45
so savage, that

As

development of the law of armed
conflict, reference should be made to the Peace of God and Truce of God
movements. It was apparently the violence of the milites raised by feudal lords
to the role of the canonists in the

which:

[F]irst

experienced the impetus to restrain violence in the Middle Ages. That

impetus was the Peace of God movement, whose

initial target was precisely the
and those bands of armed men who lived on the edges of
preying on settled areas. The Peace of God idea originally appeared

bullying milites
civilization,

late in the tenth century;

about a generation later came the

concept generally attached to

and

a

it

first

appearance of a

in historical interpretation, the

Truce of God,

century after that, in 1139, following the ban on crossbows, bows and

arrows and siege weapons issued by the Second Lateran Council. This
directed principally at mercenaries,

who

last

often were organized into fighting units

around one or the other of these highly specialized and destructive weapons.

The

was

.

.

.

beginnings of the Peace of God can be identified at the time of the Council

o( Le Puy in 975

.

.

.

imposing on the

milites

an oath

respect the Church's

'to

—

possessions and those of the peasants'
provisions that were ultimately to
become the core of the idea of noncombatant immunity in late-medieval just war
tradition.

.

.

.

The subsequent

idea of the Peace of God

.

.

.

gradually diminished

the protection extended to peasants and their property while making

more

immunity of ecclesiastical persons and property. ... In the next
landmark statement of canon law on this subject, that in the thirteenth century
explicit the

De Treuga

and their lands had returned to the
category of those who did not participate in war and thus should not have war
made against them. Gradually, other non-Churchly categories of persons were
added to the list of noncombatants, until by the time of Honore Bonet's L'Arbre
des Batailles in the fourteenth century the listing had come to include all sorts of
et Pace,

peasants, their goods,

47
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War

who were noncombatants by

virtue of not being knights ... or

Peasants and clergy alike were defined
noncombatant groups as women, children, the

not being physically able to bear arms.
in the former way, while such

.

.

.

aged, and the infirm belonged to the latter category. ... In the shorter run, the
effect of the

Peace of God was not so

much to protect peaceful noncombatants

.

.

.,

but to mark off who might legitimately resort to arms and for what end. ... [I]n
the long run, the idea of noncombatant immunity contained within the Peace of

God

much more

developed into a

universal

concept with far-reaching

one of the
core ideas around which the jus in bello of just
war tradition developed, and modern humanitarian law of war and moral
argument centering on the concept of discrimination are legacies of this slender
tenth-century beginning
While the Peace of God aimed at protecting certain
kinds of person and their property
the Truce of God [beginning with the
Council of Toulouges in 1027] aimed instead to eradicate the use of arms entirely
namely the Sabbath, and such holy days as Christmas
during certain periods
Still, the Truce of God applied only among Christians, and this
and Lent ].
meant that violence could still be employed by Christians against non-Christians
implications. This

is

.

.

.

.

[

—

.

.

.

.

—

.

during truce periods. In practice this meant that violence could be directed

main groups:

the Crusades; and heretics, as in religious
on crossbows, bows and arrows, and siege
weapons contribute to [limiting violence] ? ... By the twelfth century the typical
mercenary belonged to a well-organized band whose leader sold or bartered their
46
services as a group and then paid his followers. This was the condottori pattern,
which reached its zenith in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. ... In the
was expertise in one or another
Middle Ages, what held these bands together
weapon that could be especially telling in the prevailing kind o( warfare.
Specifically mercenary companies were formed around the possession and skilled
use of bows and arrows and crossbows, neither of which were employed by
knights but which could be devastating when used against knights, and siege
machines, these being so expensive and difficult to transport and requiring so
against two

persecution.

.

.

.

How

infidels, as in

did the ban

.

.

.

much skill to use properly that wealthy nobles preferred not to own their own but
From this it follows easily that
the new-style mercenaries could be controlled by constraints placed on the use of
their weapons. The knightly class in particular had good reason to favor such

hire

mercenary companies specializing in

their use.

was no glory in falling in battle to an arrow shot by a
commoner and since siege weapons represented the only significant threat to a
." 47
nobleman seeking security from attack in his castle.
restraints, since there

.

The

.

what they knew as
affairs and which was

feudal knights were fully aware of the existence o{

the "law of chivalry" or of arms,

48

which regulated

enforced by a variety of Courts of Chivalry

49

their

or specially appointed tribunals.

Thus, in 1474, representatives of the Hanseatic cities tried Peter of Hagenbach
50
at Breisach for administering occupied territories in a fashion "contrary to the
48
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laws of God and of man." His plea that he was only carrying out the orders of his

prince was rejected and he was executed.

Since foot soldiers were not regarded as members of the honorable
profession of arms, the rules of chivalry did not apply to them. However, even

they were not free to pursue their

own fashion of fighting, for this was regulated

by national codes of arms which could be enforced by commanders exercising
"rights of justice."

Among the

promulgated by Richard

II

earliest of

in 1385. This forbade,

on pain of death, any robbery

on

as well as "forcing"

or pillage of a church or an attack

woman.

such codes was the "Articles of War"

a

churchman,

any

also recognized the right of a captor to take his prisoner's parole,

It

although:

any one shall take a prisoner, as soon as he comes to the army, he shall
bring him to his captain or master on pain of losing his part [of the captive's
[I]f

property]

.

.

and that

.;

his said captain or

master shall bring him to our lord the

King, constable or marschall, as soon as he well can, ... in order that they

examine him concerning news and intelligence of the enemy.

may

." 51
.

.

This indicates that war was no longer construed as a conflict between

and

individual

individual, but

between organized forces with prisoners no

longer in a master- and-servant relationship with their captors, but instead,

considered as the "property" of the ruler under whose auspices the captor was
fighting.

Perhaps more significant from our point of view, and foretelling

much of the

present law, were the "Articles and Military Lawes to be Observed in the

Warres" promulgated by Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in 1621.
Art. 85.

He

shall die for

No

Art. 88.

that forceth any

souldier shall set fire

upon any Towne or

commanded by

his Captain: neither shall

They

shall

answer

it

in the Generals

any Captain give

If any

Councell of Warre.

Land

that pillage or steal either in our

without leave, shall be punish'd as for other

Art. 94.

Village in the enemies'

command unless he hath first received it from us or our General: who so

doth the contrary, he

Art. 92.

matter bee proved, he

it.

Land, without he be

any such

woman to abuse her, and the

.

.

or in the enemies,

.

.

.

.

theft.

man give himselfe to fall upon the pillage before leave be given him

so to doe, then

may any

of his Officers

kill

49

him.

.

.

.

The Law
Art. 96.

No man shall presume

to pillage any

and doe harm, from thence; who dares the

fled thereinto

contrary, shall be punished.

No man shall

War

Church or Hospitall, although the
except he be first commanded, or that the Souldiers

Strength be taken by assault;

and Burgers be

of

.

.

.

upon any Hospitall, Church, Schoole, or Mill, or
spoyle them in any way, except he be commanded; neither shall any tyrannize
any Churchman, or aged people, men or women, maides or children, unless they

Art. 97.

first

Art.

set fire

take up arms against them, under paine of punishment.

98.

No

Hospitalls; ...

souldier

no

shall

.

.

abuse any Churches, Colledges,

Schooles or

souldier shall give any disturbance to any person exercising his

sacred function or Ministery,

Art. 113.

.

Our Commanders

that follow their husbandry,

upon paine of death.
shall

and

defend the countrey-people and Ploughmen

shall suffer

none

to hinder

them

in

it.

Whatsoever is not contained in these Articles, and is repugnant to
Military Discipline, or whereby the miserable and innocent countrey may against
all right and reason be burdened withall, whatsoever offence finally shall be
committed against these orders, that shall the severall Commanders make good,
or see severally punished unlesse themselves will stand bound to give further

Art. 116.

satisfaction.

52

In 1639 England had a

full

system of Laws and Ordinances of Warre

regulating the behavior of forces in the

field,

marauding of the countryside, individual

forbidding,

acts against the

53

among other things,
enemy unauthorized

by a superior, private taking or keeping of booty, or private detention of an

enemy

prisoner. Similar codes existed in

Germany and

Switzerland.

54

To some

on
example, those of Ayala, De

extent, these codes reflected the principles to be found in various writings
military matters

and the law of war, including,

for

1447; and even Grotius,

De Re Militari et Belb Tractatus,
1612; Legnano, De Bello, De Represaliis et De Duello,
whose seminal work, De Jure ac Pacis, 1625, is

frequently treated as

were the fountainhead of

Jure

et Officiis et Disciplina Militari,

1663; Gentili, Dejure

Belli,

if it

then-existing international law.

1582;

Belli,

knowledge on the
In the latter work, Grotius emphasizes that war
all

was the normal order of the day. All these to some extent reflected earlier
works devoted to the hoi des Batailles, and nearly all claimed to be declaring the
law that armies were obliged to follow. In many cases, they were mere
abstractions based on existing practice, and it is noticeable how much
agreement there is across the whole spectrum. These principles drawn from
50
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and doctrine are expressive of the customs of war and, to a great
extent, constitute what are now known as the customary law of armed conflict.
Of the codes it has been said that, combined with the customary rules, they
form "le meilleur frein pratique pour imposer aux armees le respect d'un modus
55
legitimus de mener les guerres."
practice

As has been mentioned,
application

capture

the principles of chivalry were of universal

and they frequently confirmed the immunity from attack or

of hospital

However, while

staff,

surgeons

doctors,

or

apothecaries.

on the writings of Bartolus in the
asserted that during war the "persons of doctors may not be

Belli,

fourteenth century,

chaplains,

basing himself

and they may not be haled to court or otherwise harassed, [and]
56
attendants may not search them for the carrying of arms,"
there was no
general recognition of this. To a large extent it depended on the discretion of a
commander whether medical personnel accompanied his forces and often the
only one would be his personal physician. However, Gustavus Adolphus had
four surgeons attached to his regiments and the Armada too carried medical
personnel, but these only looked after their own. By a decree of Louis XIV of
1708, a permanent medical service was established "a la suite des armees et
57
dans les places de guerre." Even before this, during the siege of Metz in
1552-3, Francois de Guise had summoned the French surgeon Para "to succour
the abandoned wounded soldiers of the enemy and to make arrangements for
58
their transport back to their army."
seized,

By the end of the seventeenth century, occasional agreements were being
drawn up between rival commanders for mutual respect towards the wounded
and hospitals. A fairly sophisticated agreement of this kind was entered into
between the French and English at L'Ecluse in 1759, whereby:
[H]ospital

staff,

chaplains, doctors, surgeons

taken prisoners; and,

if they

and apothecaries were not

... to

be

should happen to be apprehended within the lines of

the enemy, they were to be sent back immediately.

The wounded

of the

who

enemy
They

should fall into the hands of the opponents were to be cared for.
were not to be made prisoner and might stay in hospital safely under guard.
" 59
Surgeons and servants might be sent to them under the general's passport

Some twenty

.

years

later,

in

recognition of the principle that the

1780,

Peyrilhe

proposed

.

international

wounded should not be made

war nor enter into the balance of exchanges.

.

prisoners of

60

However, it was not until after
the experiences of Florence Nightingale in the Crimea and the publication of
Henri Dunant's Souvenir de Solferino in 1862, reporting on the horrors he had
witnessed at that battle, that Peyrilhe's proposal
51

came

to fruition, with the

The

Law

of

War

establishment of the International Committee of the
the adoption in 1864 of the
the Condition of the

first

Wounded

Red Cross

Geneva Convention

for the

of Armies in the Field.

in 1863

61

and

Amelioration of

62

Apart from arrangements and developments of this kind, other customs
were evolving. During the Hundred Years War, guerre mortale, war to the
death, was distinguished from bellum hostile, a war between Christian princes

when

ransom themselves, guerre guerriable, fought in
accordance with the feudal rules of chivalry, and the truce, which included a
temporary cessation of hostilities during which the wounded and dead might be
prisoners could

still

collected, with the resumption of hostilities following a truce considered a

continuation of an ongoing conflict, rather than the opening of a

Each had

its

own

rules,

cities

importance and could be effected by surrender or siege and
agreement, the inhabitants were treated in accordance with

were no

one.

but they were rules of honor.

In medieval and later European wars, the capture of

assault, there

new

legal restrictions,

its

was of major
assault. If

terms, but

although churchmen,

if

by

by

women and

children were frequently spared. Siege required peculiar weapons, both

and defensive, 63 but as sieges became less frequent and these weapons
of less value, they tended to fall into desuetude and came to be considered
64
illegal,
only to be replaced by weapons more suited to the newer methods of

offensive

warfare.

These developments were in line with others which had ensued by the time
of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia terminating the Thirty Years War. Members
of fighting units were now mustered in national armies and war was no longer a
matter of personal relations between princely commanders, with the individual
soldier entering into a personal contract with his

are

still

—although there

vestiges within national armies of troops being raised by a particular

nobleman 65
captive.

commander

— and

the individual captor no longer had any rights over his

War was now a matter between sovereigns, and for a legally recognized

armed conflict to exist there had to be a hostile contention between States by
66
means of organized armed forces under a proper disciplinary system. At the
67
same time, the old distinction between just and unjust wars had disappeared,
and it had become accepted that any war conducted by a Christian prince was
68
although both Suarez and Vitoria had reservations concerning
clearly just,
Spanish claims to the colonization of the new world.
It

was not

until the

American

Civil

War

69

that there was the

first

attempt to

conduct of armed forces in the field. Professor
Francis Lieber of Columbia College drew up what became, by order of
President Lincoln, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the US in the

produce a modern code

for the

52
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These were so consistent with what were generally accepted practices

that they formed the basis for similar codes in Prussia, 1870;

The Netherlands,

1871; France, 1877; Russia, 1877 and 1904; Serbia, 1878; Argentina, 1881;

Great Britain, 1883 and 1904; and Spain, 1893.
[M]ilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty

revenge

for the sake of suffering or

.

.

much

person, property, and honor as

.

—

71

that

By the
is,

unarmed

the

States acknowledge

and

and

the infliction of suffering
citizen

as the exigencies of

protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile state

Instructions:

is

is

war

to be spared in
will

admit

.

.

.

The United

the rule

protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion

morality; strictly private property; the persons of the inhabitants, especially

those of

women; and

the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the

contrary shall be rigorously punished

persons in the invaded country ...
place by

main

force, all rape,

All

all

wanton violence committed against

robbery ... or sacking, even after taking a

wounding, maiming or

are prohibited under the penalty of death.

killing of

such inhabitants

Crimes punishable by all penal
codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft,
burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American soldier in a
hostile country against
all

cases in

preferred."

Despite

.

.

inhabitants, are not only punishable as at

which death

is

not

inflicted,

home, but in

the severer punishment shall be

72

number of countries adopting similar codes, no agreed
document acknowledging this existed, although it was generally

the

international

accepted

its

.

that

these

postulates

constituted

principles

amounting

to

international customary law and, to the extent that they were not expressly
rejected by any State, especially a major military power, nor overruled by any
treaty, they are as obligatory as

The

first

any other rules of international law.

international agreement to be generally accepted

came

at the

of the Crimean War with the adoption of the Declaration of Paris, 1856.

was confined to maritime warfare, forbidding the
stating that a blockade

capture to

was only

enemy goods on

legal if effective,

issue of letters of

Geneva Convention on wounded

end

This

marque,

and granting immunity from

neutral ships and neutral goods

unless they constituted contraband.

73

on enemy

ships,

Of more general significance was the 1864
in the field, already mentioned,

which

Red Cross and of personnel
This Convention was amended and revised in a series of

recognized the distinctiveness and immunity of the

wearing

this insignia.

Geneva Conferences extending from 1886

to 1977, with the

Conventions of

1949, as added to by the 1977 Protocols, constituting the current body of

humanitarian law governing the treatment and protection of those hors de
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combat, civilians and other noncombatants. This body of law

Geneva Law.

is

known

as the

74

In addition to the work done

on behalf of those hors de combat, efforts were
taking place to control the means of conducting warfare. The Russians had
invented a bullet which exploded on contact, and in 1867 called a conference
Declaration of St. Petersburg. This forbade the use of

resulting in the
projectiles

weighing less than 400 grammes that were explosive or charged with

fulminating or inflammable substances.
application, applying equally to land

limited since
in

it

The

Declaration was of general

and sea warfare. However,

contained an all-participation clause, rendering

its
it

impact was

inapplicable

any war in which any belligerent was not a party.
Perhaps more significant than the Declaration, was the accompanying

Preamble, which

is

important to the present day:

[T]he progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as
possible the calamities of war; the only legitimate objective

endeavour to accomplish during war

enemy;

men;

for this

purpose

this object

it is

is

to

weaken the

which

much

as

states should

military forces o{ the

sufficient to disable the greatest possible

number of

would be exceeded by the employment of arms which

uselessly

aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; the

employment of such arms would,
humanity.

This document

may be

during armed conflict,

The

be contrary to the laws of

considered the precursor of what

Hague Law, concerned with
1874.

therefore,

75

is

now known

as the

means and methods of conducting operations
which had its origin in a conference called by the Czar in
the

Brussels Protocol

aimed

at revising "the general usages o{ war,

whether with the object of defining them with greater precision, or with the
view of laying down, by a common agreement, certain limits which will
restrain, as far as possible, the severities of war." To this end a Project of an
International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War was
drafted in the hope that "war being thus regulated would involve less suffering,

would be less liable to those aggravations produced by uncertainty, unforeseen
events, and the passions created by the struggle; it would tend more surely to
that which should be its final object, viz., the re-establishment of good
relations, and a more solid and lasting peace between the belligerent States.'"

The

Project failed for lack of ratifications, but

L'Institut

de Droit International drew up

on Land. According to the Preface:
54

its

it

formed the

basis

on which

Oxford Manual of the Laws of War

Leslie C.

Green

[I]ndependently of the international laws existing on this subject, there are
certain principles of justice

which guide the public conscience, which

manifested even by general customs, but which
obligatory

.

.

a treaty, the

[but since

.

it]

it

would be well

to fix

might be premature or at least very difficult

Manual could serve

are

and make
[to

obtain

as the basis for national legislation, as being] in

accord with both the progress of juridical science and the needs of civilized
armies.

Rash and extreme

rules will

not be found therein. 77

sought innovations in drawing up the Manual;
clearly

it

has contented

and codifying the accepted ideas of our age so

allowable and practicable."

The

Institut has

not

itself with stating

far as this

has appeared

78

Appreciating the pressures imposed upon the fighting

man and

the civilian

when there is an actual combat, the Institute called upon States to disseminate
the rules among its entire population.
The Brussels Project and the Oxford Manual, served to inspire the Czar to
call a Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899. This conference adopted a
number of Declarations together with a Convention (which was amended in
1907) that
potentially

constitute the basic law in

still

new means of attack,

hello.

Recognizing the arrival of a

the Conference adopted a Declaration against

the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or other similar

methods.

This

was replaced in

and remains

1907

only

the

existing

on aerial warfare. Further Declarations ban
projectiles, the only use of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious
gases, as well as the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human

international

body.

agreement

79

Most important of the instruments adopted at The Hague is Convention II
of 1899, now IV of 1907, to which is attached a set of Regulations still
constituting the basic statement of the law of warfare on land
although its
principles are now regarded as so fundamental as to amount to customary law

—

relevant in

all

theaters. It

is,

of course, impossible to cover

eventualities or

all

provide for unforeseen developments. For this reason, the parties adopted the

Martens Clause:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued
has-], the

High Contracting

Parties

deem

it

[-

and

it

never

expedient to declare that, in cases

not included in the [annexed] Regulations, the inhabitants and the belligerents

remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations,
as they result

from the usages established among

civilized peoples,

of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.
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somewhat slightly amended form, appears in virtually every subsequent

agreement concerning humanitarian law in armed

At

conflict.

the 1907 Conference, further Conventions, covering the opening of

hostilities,

naval warfare, and the rights and duties of neutrals, were adopted. 81

Since each of these contains an all-participation clause, the Martens Clause,

with

its

clear references to chivalry, humanitarianism

and accepted usages,

assumes increased importance. In addition, to the extent that any of the
provisions

in

the

Conventions

Regulations,

considered to be declaratory

82

of,

Declarations

or

now

are

or having developed into, customary law,

they will be applicable universally and the wording of the Convention will be
83

treated as expressing that law.

Hague Convention IV makes no

provision for personal

the event

liability in

of its breach, but Article 3 provides that "a belligerent party which violates the
provisions of the Regulations shall,

the case demands, be liable to pay

if

committed by persons forming
part of its armed forces." While this is the first "black letter" acknowledgment
of the enforceability of any of the laws of war, it is merely an affirmation of the
compensation.

It

shall

be responsible for

general principle relating to the
tortious

wrongs or acts of

Nuremberg

its

liability

all

acts

of a State for breach of treaty or for

subordinates. Prior to the establishment of the

Military Tribunal

International

in

1945,

84

the

only way of

proceeding against individual offenders was by national tribunals

customary law,

86

its

the Regulations,

87

or, in

national military or criminal code.
offenses against the laws of

88

the case of their

own

Since Nuremberg, nearly

war have made reference

stemming from the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

—

applying

personnel, the
all trials

89

for

to the principles

90

Probably, the most important provision of the 1907 Regulations
defining the scope of application of the Regulations

85

is

Article

armies, militia units,

1

and

commanded by a person responsible for his
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, carry

volunteer forces, provided they are
subordinates, have a fixed

arms openly, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war. This purview of relevant personnel has been widened
somewhat by Protocol I of 1977. However, from the point of view of the serving
their

22 and 23, limiting the means of waging war and the use o{
forbidden weapons (although it may well be difficult for him to know whether a
soldier, Articles

particular

weapon

issued to

him

is

in fact forbidden)

,

as well as forbidding the

imposition of unnecessary suffering, are those most likely to result in personal
liability.

Even since the adoption of the

Protocols, this

is still

largely the case.

While no Conference has been called since 1907 to revise or update the
general laws and customs of war, there have been conventions directed to
56
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specific issues, the protection of cultural property in

armed

conflict,

91

the

prohibition of military or other hostile use of environmental modification

techniques,

92

the use of conventional weapons,

and use of chemical weapons,
to the adoption of Protocols

94

I

93

the production, stockpiling

and, most importantly, the conference that led

and

II

In so far as maritime warfare

is

in 1977.

concerned, in addition to the Hague

Conventions already mentioned, one of which, Convention XII, sought
unsuccessfully to set up an International Prize Court, the Declaration of

London

of 1909,

95

important.

is

The Declaration

"agreed rules" on blockade, contraband, unneutral service,

convoy, and resistance to search.

Though

it

contained

enemy

character,

stated that

unratified,

its

substance was in

accord with generally recognized principles and, by and large, was observed

World War I; 96 as recently as 1960, an Egyptian Prize Court, citing the
Declaration, condemned cargo from Israel on a Greek ship seeking to traverse
during

the Suez Canal.

97

Other agreements
noxious gases,

98

relating to sea warfare, specifically submarines

were adopted in London in 1922, but never came into

and

force,

although the provisions on submarine warfare were confirmed by the London
Protocol of 1936. Pursuant to the Protocol, in their operations against

merchant

submarines are required to conform to the same rules as

ships,

surface vessels.

In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop

summoned,

or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface

vessel or submarine,

may not

vessel without having
safety.

For

this

first

sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant

placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of

purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless

the safety of the passengers and crew
conditions, by the proximity of land,
a position to take

World War

on being duly

II

and weather
or the presence of another vessel which is in
is

assured, in the existing sea

them on board. 99

practice shows that this rule was

more observed

in the

breach

than observance.

Although the

parties at

The Hague dealt with projectiles from balloons,

they

did not appreciate the potential importance of air warfare. Experience in

World War

I

indicated that this was an area which should not be ignored, and
100

Conference of Experts drew up agreed Rules of Air Warfare.
These
Rules, however, have never come into force, although they are generally

in 1923 a

regarded as having had sufficient influence for
extent,

it

to be said that "to a great

they correspond to the customary rules and general principles
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underlying the conventions on the law of war on land and at sea."

was accepted by the Tokyo District Court when considering the
dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The

101

This view

legality of the

Draft Rules of Air Warfare cannot directly be called positive law, since they

have not become

effective as authoritative with regard to air warfare.

However,

international jurists regard the Draft Rules as authoritative with regard to air
warfare.

Some countries regard the

by armed

substance of the Rules as a standard of action

and the fundamental provisions of the Draft Rules are
conformity with international law regulations, and customs at

forces,

consistently in

that time [1945].

102

While the United States Department of the Air Force does not recognize
the Code as customary law, it does in fact often draw attention to the

own rules with those adopted in 1923. 103 Moreover, to the
extent that these Rules may be declaratory of general customary law, they apply

compatibility of

to air warfare,

its

and by Protocol

I

the rules concerning the general protection of

the civilian population "apply to any land, air or sea warfare which

may

affect

They
objectives on

the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land.
further apply to

all

attacks from the sea or from the air against

land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in

armed

conflict at sea or in the air."

104

Although the use of poison has been condemned since classical times,
poison gas was used during World War I. In 1925 the Geneva Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
105
Many countries
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was adopted.
contend that this does not extend to non-fatal lachrymose or nerve gases, while
others

reserve

the

right

to

use

for

it,

example,

to

suppress

prisoner-of-war camps. Others state they will only apply

themselves and belligerents

who have

also ratified the Protocol,

claim the right to use gas against a belligerent

While there

chemical weapons were used by

Italy against Ethiopia,

now be

perhaps during the Gulf War,

as

in

between

and yet others

who has employed it against their

forces or those of their allies.

rebels, and,

it

riots

are reports that gas

it is

and other

by Iraq against Kurdish
Protocol would

likely that the

regarded as declaratory of customary law, at least so

far as first use

is

concerned. Moreover, as recently as 1993, a further Convention sought to
extend the Protocol so as to ban the manufacture, stockpiling, or use of any

chemical weapons.

106

Experience in World

War II made

it

clear that the law as

was no longer adequate, even though,
58

as

it

existed in 1939

pointed out by the Nuremberg

Leslie C.

Tribunal, the rules embodied in

Regulations "were recognized by

Green

Hague Convention IV and

the annexed

nations and were regarded as

all civilized

being declaratory of the laws and customs of war," and as such applicable to
belligerents,

all

whether party to that instrument or not. The same view was taken

War, 107 a finding
108
nor Japan was
that was particularly important since neither the Soviet Union
109
a party thereto, although Japan stated it would abide by its provisions;

of the

Geneva Convention of 1929

Germany contended

that

it

relating to Prisoners of

did not apply to protect Soviet prisoners.

Perhaps the most significant development in the law of war to result from

World War

II

was the promulgation of the London Charter establishing the

International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
against peace,

110

with jurisdiction over crimes

war crimes and crimes against humanity. To the extent that

was merely exercising
Tribunal was not

itself

its

it

jurisdiction in accordance with the Charter, the

creating any law.

While not

directly

concerned with

regulating the conduct of hostilities, perhaps the major innovation was the

holding by the Tribunal that a war of aggression or in breach of treaty was a
crime, though criticism

may be

concluded that the Pact of

directed at the

Paris,

111

manner

whereby the

which the Tribunal
renounced war as an
"aggressive" war an

in

parties

instrument of national policy, had

made

international crime; for the Tribunal,

was "not only an international crime:

it

resort

to

it

is

the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that

it

contains within

itself

the accumulated evil of the whole."

however, none of the accused found guilty of

this

112

Surprisingly,

"supreme" crime, but not

additional "lesser" war crimes, was sentenced to death.

As
little

to

war crimes in the

traditional sense of that term, the Tribunal

added

except to hold that status of the accused, even as head of state or

commander

would not provide immunity from prosecution, and
confirm that superior orders was not a defense to a war crimes charge, but could
be pleaded in mitigation. The other innovation was the concept of crimes
in chief,

against humanity. This offense related to breaches of the law against civilians,

even those of the same nationality as the perpetrator. While there has been a
tendency to assume that this was a major development of a general character, it
should not be forgotten that, as defined in both the Charter and the Judgment,
crimes against humanity were committed only

if

they were part and parcel of

the war of aggression or of war crimes. Moreover, strictly speaking, once the

Tribunal was functus
significance.

113

officio,

this

concept should have become of

less

However, with the development of the law concerning human

and humanitarian law, and in an attempt
prosecuting crimes committed in a noninternational
rights

59

to create a system for
conflict, the application

The Law

of

War

of the concept was widened. Perhaps the most significant statement to this
effect

is

to be found in the Interim Report of the

investigate crimes

If

committed during the

civil

Commission established
war in Rwanda:

the normative content of "crimes against humanity" had remained frozen in

Nuremberg form, then

it

could not possibly apply to the situation in

Rwanda

to

its
.

.

because there was not a "war" in the classic sense of an inter-State or
international

armed

conflict.

—

However, the normative content o( "crimes against humanity" originally
employed by the Nuremberg tribunal for its own specific purposes in connection
with the Second World War has undergone a substantial evolution.

—

.

"[C] rimes against humanity" finds

its

.

.

very origins in "principles of humanity"

invoked in the early 1800s by a State to denounce another State's human
rights violations of its own citizens. Thus, "crimes against humanity" as a
first

concept was conceived early on to apply to individuals regardless as to
whether or not the criminal act was perpetrated during a state of armed conflict
or not and regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. The content

juridical

and legal status of the norm since Nuremberg has been broadened and expanded
through certain international human rights instruments adopted by the United
Nations since 1945.

The Commission

.

.

.

of Experts

humanity" are gross violations
rights

on Rwanda considers 114 that "crimes against
of fundamental rules of humanitarian and human

law committed by persons demonstrably linked to a party to the conflict

as

on discrimination against an identifiable group of
and the nationality of the victims. 115

part of an official policy based

persons, irrespective of war

It

should be pointed out here that

many commentators would today

question

whether such crimes need to be the consequence of a determined policy based

on

discrimination.

would now be considered as part of the law that crimes against
humanity are not confined to an international armed conflict, so we find that
the 1948 Genocide Convention, which deals with acts directed at the
destruction of a defined group qua group, expressly states in Article 1 that
"genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime
116
under international law."
There should, therefore, be no difficulty in
applying this Convention in any conflict, whether international or
Just as

it

noninternational,

when

the acts

with the intention of destroying
against

humanity,

as

defined

condemned

are directed at a defined group

its

group characteristics. Since most crimes

in

the

60

London Charter

or

international
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do not normally amount

to offenses as grave as

should be possible in the future to charge those responsible for

genocide with crimes against humanity, without having to prove "intent" for

genocide

is

clearly the gravest of all crimes against

humanity.

The General Assembly adopted a resolution Affirming the Principles of
117
International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
As
Assembly resolution, it lacks any strict legal force, although it
embodies great political and moral authority. This authority has been
enhanced by the International Law Commission's enunciation of Principles of
118
International Law recognized by the Charter and Judgment.
Principle I
a General

the

affirmed

personal

liability

international law; Principle

condemn

II

anyone

of

committing

under

crime

a

provides that the failure of national law to

remove personal liability for that act under
international law; Principle III prohibits a head of state from claiming
immunity from international criminal liability; Principle IV holds that superior
orders cannot be pleaded when a moral choice was open to an accused;
Principle V entitles war criminals to a fair trial; Principle VI confirms the
criminality of the acts condemned in the London Charter; and Principle VII
a particular act does not

reaffirms the Tribunal's finding that complicity in

any of these acts

These Principles have been reaffirmed by the Commission in
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 119
crime.

From
after

the point of view of the law in

itself

its

a

Draft

the most important development

1945 was the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949.

Conventions
sea,

hello,

is

I, II,

and

—addressing the wounded and
of war—
more than

120

III,

as well as prisoners

are

little

on land and at
reaffirmations and
sick

amendments directed at filling
which became apparent during World War II. More innovative was

extensions of the 1929 Conventions, with
lacunae,

Convention IV concerning the protection of civilians in time of war,
121
particularly in occupied territory,
an issue which had become of supreme
concern in the light of German practice in occupied Europe.

had become obvious that many or most of the conflicts
that had occurred or were likely in the foreseeable future were not
international conflicts in the normal interstate sense, but rebellions,
Further, since 1945

it

revolutions, or struggles for national independence.

Conventions replace the term "war," with

its

It is for this

reason that the

inter-State connotation, by

—

and "enemy" by "adverse party" although the mind boggles
at the idea of an infantry sergeant saying, "Hold your fire until you see the white

"armed

conflict"

of the adverse party's eyes!" In such conflicts, ideological differences frequently
result in atrocities far

more outrageous than any of those normally inherent
61
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an international conflict. In view of this, each of the Conventions has, as its
Article 3, what may be regarded as a minimal code of humanitarian law to be
followed "in the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." In addition,
each contains a definition of those breaches of the Convention which are
122
considered "grave," and which are declared to be criminally punishable,
Parties agree to
offenses.

3

amend

their legal systems to ensure the

However, the relevant

common

never refers to the provisions of Article

article

to the Conventions. But,

if

this Article

follows that disregard of the provisions therein
thus, offenders

punishment of such

is

have any meaning,

to

embodied must be enforceable;

must be punishable. Moreover, the offenses

listed in the

most
offenses which would amount to crimes against humanity and be

Conventions, regardless of the specific Article concerned,
part,

it

punishable as such.

The

listing of particular offenses as

are, for the

"grave breaches" does

not remove the criminal character from other acts which would amount to war
crimes.

Convention in 1949 was still not regarded as
sufficient to satisfy the purpose for which it was promulgated. Therefore, in
1968, the International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran adopted a

Adoption of the

Civilians

Resolution calling for Respect for

Human

Rights in

Armed

Conflicts,

123

although none of its Resolutions carries legal force. However, they introduced
a

new

idea to the effect that those engaged in "struggles" against "minority

racist or colonial regimes"

war or

political prisoners.

resolution

124

should not be treated as traitors but as prisoners o{

This added to the impact of the General Assembly's

confirming the assertion of the 1965 Conference of the Red Cross

on the Protection of Civilian Populations

against the Dangers of Indiscriminate

Warfare:

(i)

the right of parties to a conflict to adopt

means of injuring the enemy

is

not

unlimited;

(ii)

(iii)

it is

prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population, as such;

must be made at all times between persons taking part in the
and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be

distinction

hostilities

spared as

much

as possible.

125

Carrying the proposals further, the Institute of International Law, at

its

Edinburgh Conference of 1969, adopted a Resolution on the distinction
between military and nonmilitary objects, particularly the problems associated
62
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with weapons of mass destruction.

126

In view of the status of the Institute,

views cannot be ignored, even though the United States "does not accept
as

them

an accurate statement of international law relating to armed conflict
customary law

[but] regard [s] as declaratory of existing

principles recognized

.

.

.

[the] general

unanimously adopted by the United Nations

[and]

127

to

made

the Institute

First,

.

.

However, bearing in mind the importance of opinio juris,
the Institute's views must be made.

General Assembly."

some reference

.

its

reference

to

"consequences which the

the

indiscriminate conduct of hostilities and particularly the use of nuclear,

may

chemical and bacteriological weapons,

mankind

as a

whole

.

.

involve for civilians and for

[and went on to enunciate] the principles to be

.

observed in armed conflicts by any de jure or de facto government, or by any
other authority responsible for the conduct of hostilities."

128

It

emphasized that

the distinction between military and nonmilitary objectives, as well as between

combatants and

must be constantly preserved; that neither the

civilians,

nor specially agreed protected establishments may ever be

civilian population

indispensable for the survival of the civilian population or
primarily humanitarian purposes; that

international

armed

conflict law

all

existing protective principles of

[E]xisting international law prohibits, irrespective of the type of

both military

all

civilian populations. In particular,

or

is

is

so great that

it

it

weapon

terrorize the civilian population.

weapons which, by
objectives and non-military

effect of which

the

must be preserved and observed; and that

any action whatsoever designed to
prohibits the use of

may

means
those which serve

regarded as military objectives, nor "under any circumstances"

.

.

.

used,

[and]

their nature, affect indiscriminately

objects, or

both armed forces and

prohibits the use of weapons the destructive

cannot be limited to

specific military objectives

otherwise uncontrollable (self-generating weapons), as well as "blind"

weapons.

means

prohibits

[It also]

all

for the annihilation of

distinction

between armed

and non-military

accepted the principles laid

any group, region or urban centre with no possible

forces

objectives.

The General Assembly

attacks for whatsoever motives or by whatsoever

and

civilian populations or

between

military
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subsequently adopted a Resolution which broadly

down by the

Institute.

However,

it

went somewhat

further, in that, while affirming the principles for the protection of civilians,

asserted that "fundamental
laid

down

armed

human rights,

as

it

accepted in international law and

in international agreements, continue to apply fully in situations of

conflict."

130

understanding, for

it

This appears to be a

new

departure from previous

would normally be thought that
63

as lex specialis the

Hague

The Law

of

War

and Geneva Law overrode the lex generalis of human rights instruments which
might be considered applicable in peacetime, especially as these latter
instruments usually recognize that most, but not

all,

of their provisions are

derogable in time of emergency, including armed conflict.
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Since this Resolution was adopted without any opposition,

it

might be

assumed that the members of the international community thought that the
principles therein enunciated amounted to an expression of customary law,
which would render the United States reservations concerning the Institute's
proposals of less significance than they appear at

first

glance.

There followed the adoption of a Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and their Destruction in 1972, 132 but this was silent as to use.
Difficulties arose in relation to chemical weapons and a further, as yet
unratified,
Convention was adopted in 1993 directed against the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
their Destruction.

133

means and methods of warfare led the
International Committee of the Red Cross to propose amendments to the 1949
Conventions in an effort to meet some of the concerns now apparent. The
Conference that ensued met from 1974 to 1977 and produced two Protocols
supplementing, but not in any way replacing, the 1949 Conventions I on
134
international and II on noninternational armed conflicts.
All these proposals with regard to the

—

Apart from bringing the law up to date, Protocol I makes fundamental
changes in the existing law regulating international armed conflicts and, while
formally concerned with humanitarian law as propounded in the Geneva law,
does in fact add to some of the Hague law concerning means and methods.
Most importantly, recognizing the principles of political correctness and
concerns regarding self-determination, it provides that struggles conducted by
national liberation

movements

in the

name

of self-determination are to be

considered international conflicts and thus subject to the international law of
135
armed conflict. It also changes the definition of combatants on behalf of the
members of such movements, even though they are not wearing recognized
uniforms nor carrying their arms openly save when actually engaged and visible

to the adversary while preparing to engage.
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The

Protocol extends the

protection given to civilian and nonmilitary objects and forbids actions likely to

have

a deleterious effect

defined

"dangerous

upon

civilians.

installations"

Thus,

—dams,

it

forbids attacks

generating stations. Changing long-recognized law,
denies

them

prisoner of war status.

It

and

dykes
it

upon narrowly

nuclear

electrical

defines mercenaries

and

widens the concept of grave breaches
64
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defined in the Conventions, and recognizes
separate acknowledgment. In an effort to

defense as a matter requiring

civil

make

the law clearly understood,

it

requires legal advisers to be attached to military units, without specifying the
level

and expressly confirms the principle of command

of attachment,

responsibility, including the obligation of a

commander

to ensure compliance

with the law by his subordinates by imposing a duty to suppress, repress and

punish offenders.

The

many

Protocol reflects

of the principles adopted by the Institute at

its

Edinburgh meeting, but ignores completely any reference to weapons of mass
destruction other than by implication
the environment or insisting

when

damage

forbidding long- term

to

on the preservation of material

essential to the

The reason put forward

for ignoring the

sustenance of the civilian population.

problems of the nuclear weapon was that

this

was

essentially

an

issue of

disarmament rather than humanitarian law. Nevertheless, when the General
Assembly subsequently asked the World Court for an advisory opinion on the
Use of Nuclear Weapons,

Legality of the Threat or

to give a direct answer,

though

it

137

had some

the Court found

itself unable

difficulty in leaving the issue

completely open.

The Court not having found
customary rule
se, it will

a conventional rule of general scope, nor a

specifically proscribing the threat or use of nuclear

now deal with

be considered as

illegal in

the light of the principles and rules of international

humanitarian law applicable in armed

conflict.

.

.

.

[The] two branches of law applicable in armed conflict

Geneva law

—

]

[

— the

.

.

new means

calling into question the long-standing principles

international law
certain weapons.

The

as international

.

Since the turn of the century, the appearance of

—without

Hague and

have become so closely interrelated that they are considered to

have gradually formed one complex system, known today
humanitarian law.

has

weapons per

the question whether recourse to nuclear weapons must

—rendered necessary some
.

.

of combat

and

rules of

specific prohibitions of the use of

.

cardinal principles constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are [as

The

aimed

population and
between combatants and
non-combatants. States must never make civilians the object of attack and must
consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between
civilian and military targets. According to the second principle, it is prohibited to
follows].
civilian

first is

objects

and

at the protection of the civilian

establishes

the

distinction

65
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of

cause unnecessary suffering to combatants:

weapons causing them such harm or

accordingly prohibited to use

it is

uselessly aggravating their suffering.

[Accordingly,] States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of

weapons they

in the

use.

The Court would

refer, in relation to

which has proved

to be

military technology.

ofl977.

means

these principles, to the Martens Clause

.

.

an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of

A modern version ...

found in Additional Protocol

to be

is

I
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In conformity with the aforementioned principles, humanitarian law, at a very
early

prohibited certain

stage,

indiscriminate effect

types

of weapons

on combatants and

suffering caused to combatants,

that

is

because of unnecessary

civilians or

to say,

a

because of their

either

harm

unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives.

greater than that

an envisaged use of

If

weapons would not meet the requirements of humanitarian
engage in such use would also be contrary to that law.
rules are to be observed

conventions

that

by

contain

them,

because
[

—

they
?

[T]hese fundamental

.

to the applicability of the principles

.

.

and

—

]

intransgressible

....

rules of humanitarian law

.

.

.

shares th[e] view [that] there can be

of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons.

constitute

jus cogens

to a possible threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The Court

.

States whether or not they have ratified the

all

principles of international customary law

Turning now

.

law, a threat to

no doubt

as to the applicability

Indeed, nuclear weapons were

.

invented after most of the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in

had already come into existence; the Conferences of 1949 and
1974-1977 [which drew up the Conventions and Protocols] left these weapons
aside, and there is a qualitative as well as a quantitative difference between

armed

conflicts

nuclear weapons and

from
in

all

conventional arms. However,

this that the established principles

armed

it

cannot be concluded

and rules of humanitarian law applicable

conflict did not apply to nuclear weapons.

Such

a conclusion

would be

incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles
in question

which permeates the

forms of warfare and to

all

Court points

applicability

is

armed

conflict

and

applies to

all

kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the

present and those of the future.

Finally, the

entire law of

to the

.

.

.

Martens Clause, whose continuing existence and

not to be doubted, as an affirmation that the principles and rules

of humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons.
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.

.

.
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Green

applicability of the principles

nuclear weapons
applicability are

.

is
.

.

and

rules of

humanitarian law

... to

hardly disputed, the conclusions to be drawn from this
controversial.

.

.

[N]one of the States advocating the

.

legality of the use of nuclear

weapons under

certain circumstances, including the "clean" use of nuclear, low yield, tactical

nuclear weapons

[

—which,

in view of their radio-activity,

cause "unnecessary" suffering to combatant victims

—

would

still

be

likely to

has indicated what,

]

supposing such limited use were feasible, would be the precise circumstances

such use; nor whether such limited use would not tend to escalate into

justifying

the all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons
significance?

—

].

This being

sufficient basis for a

Nor can

the Court

so,

[

—

is

this

comment

the Court does not consider that

of legal

has a

it

determination on the validity of this view.

make

a determination

upon the

validity of the

view that the

recourse to nuclear weapons would be illegal in any circumstance owing to their

inherent and total incompatibility with the law applicable in armed conflict.
Certainly,

.

.

.

the principles and rules of law applicable in

heart of which

is

armed conflict

the overriding consideration of humanity

of armed hostilities subject to a

—

—make the conduct

number of strict requirements. Thus, methods

and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between
and

military

targets,

which would

or

at the

result

in

civilian

unnecessary suffering to

combatants, are prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear

weapons

.

.

.

the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with

respect for such requirements. Nevertheless, the Court considers that

have

sufficient

elements to enable

it

to

it

does not

conclude with certainty that the use of

nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of

law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstances.

Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every
State to survival, and thus
Article 51 of the Charter,

right to resort to self-defence, in

its

when its

survival

is

at stake.

practice referred to as the "policy of deterrence"

Court?

—

adhered

]

,

for

to

139

[

accordance with

Nor can

—

it

ignore the

a legal issue for a

which an appreciable section of the international community

many years.

.

.

.

Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole

and of the elements of fact

at

its

disposal, the

Court

reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or

weapons by
survival

a State in

would be

is

led to observe that

illegality

at stake.

.

.

.

67

.

cannot

of the use of nuclear

an extreme circumstance of self-defence,
I40

it

.

in

which

its

very

Law

The

As

if

of

War

aware of the somewhat unsatisfactory nature of its answers, the Court

on

referred to the varying views that exist at present

an early conference to settle the entire
o{ the international

this

issue of legality,

community of their

I, it is

reminding the members

obligation to negotiate in good faith.

Having thus seen the Court's comments on the
weapon and its reference to the absence of mention
Protocol

matter and called for

legality of the nuclear

in the

Conventions or

perhaps in order to consider the significance of this instrument.

Although both Protocols constitute an annex

do not
automatically become part thereof and, as such, binding upon Convention
parties. Ratification or accession remains necessary, and there is much debate
as to the extent to which the provisions in Protocol I are declaratory of
customary law relevant to international conflicts and therefore binding
regardless of accession. Perhaps

it is

to the Conventions, they

connection to

sufficient in this

refer to the

Report submitted by General Colin Powell to the Defense Department of the

United States in regard to the Gulf War of 1991 in which the Coalition forces
were under

his overall

command. Many

of the combatants in this conflict,

including both Iraq and the United States, had failed to ratify or accede.

Nevertheless, Powell pointed out that to the greatest extent feasible, the
limitations

imposed by Protocol

impacted by

I

were observed and that "decisions were

legal considerations at every level.

.

.

.

[T]he law of war proved

invaluable in the decision-making process" in regard to action taken.

of contrast, Protocol

II,

as the first international effort to regulate

domestic matter as a noninternational conflict,

Even though there

141

has, as yet,

is

By way
such a

clearly innovative.

been no instrument regulating the

legality of

the use of nuclear weapons, there has been some progress with regard to

conventional weapons, that is to say those not of massive destruction potential,

although they

may

in fact be indiscriminatory. Thus, in 1980, a

Convention

was adopted on the Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or

Have

Indiscriminatory Effects.

prohibits

which

in

142

This comprised three Protocols. The

first

weapons "the primary purpose of which is to injure by fragments
the human body escape detection by X-rays," although it is not

believed any such exist or are likely to be invented in the foreseeable future.

concerned with land mines, booby traps and other similar devices,
its main aim being to protect civilians from such weapons, while at the same
time preventing their use against troops in a perfidious manner, as would be the
Protocol

case

if

II is

they were used in connection with protective emblems

example,

weapons
the primary rather than incidental or consequential outcome. While

corpses. Finally, Protocol
if fire is

or, for

III

prohibits or restricts the use of incendiary

68
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incendiaries have

become

mechanized warfare,

Green

of less significance with the increased resort to

when

particularly

long-distance

(as

compared with

trench or house-to-house combat), incendiaries remain significant

when used

against armored vehicles or aircraft. Consequently, the Protocol excludes from
its

purview.
Munitions which may have incidental incendiary

(i)

tracers,

smoke

effects,

such

as luminants,

or signaling systems;

Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation

(ii)

with an additional incendiary

effect,

such

as

effects

armour-piercing projectiles,

fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined-effects munitions in

which the incendiary

effect

is

not specifically designed to cause burn injury to

persons, but to be used against military objectives, such as
aircraft

This

last

and

installations or facilities.

armoured

vehicles,

143

sub-paragraph leaves one with the impression that the draftsmen were

of opinion that "armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or
in themselves, without any

human

being required to

facilities" exist

make them

militarily

effective.

In 1995, a fourth Protocol was added to these three to control the use of

Blinding Laser Weapons.

employment

As with

incendiaries, the

ban

is

only directed at the

of:

weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of
their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision,
that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices.
Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate military
employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical
[LJaser

.

equipment,

is

.

.

not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol. 144

would seem to remove one of the considerations normally
applicable when construing whether an offense has been committed against
the law of war amounting to a war crime. In most cases, it is now accepted that
if an illegal consequence amounting to a breach was "foreseeable or considered
likely," liability would follow. In this case, however, even though it is very likely
that in using laser weapons against optical equipment blindness may well
ensue, such use is not considered to amount to illegality, even though it is

Interestingly, this

known
It

that this

is

likely to

most of the provisions of the law of war are
the event of an international armed conflict, including such

was pointed out

only applicable in

be the case.

earlier that
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of

on behalf of self-determination, and that
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions does not really carry this
much further, unless one is able to argue that breach of the various provisions
in that Article amounts to crimes against humanity. The 1977 Additional
Protocol II to the 1949 Conventions sought to provide some measure of
humanitarian principles into noninternational conflicts. However, the
threshold for this Protocol to come into effect is so high that it would exclude
almost every noninternational conflict other than one which amounts to a civil
war with the antigovernment forces in effective control of some part of the
national territory, a requirement which is not imposed in the case of a war for
conflicts as

to be

national liberation:

armed conflicts which are not
[elevated by Protocol I into international conflicts] which take place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this

Art.

1

(1)

Protocol.

As

if

This Protocol

.

.

.

shall apply to all

145

to emphasize this high threshold

and

to

make

it

no
government

clear that there

is

undue interference with national sovereignty and the power of a
to deal with opposition and affirm its right to maintain order, the Article

expressly declares that the "Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal

disturbances and tensions, such as

riots, isolated

over part of the national

Further limiting the possible impact of the

and sporadic acts of violence
and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts," 146 and, as we
have just seen, nor would it apply, even if the armed incidents were far more
extensive and serious, if those opposing the government were not in control
territory.

Protocol on the conflict, Article 2 makes clear that the Protocol cannot:
[B]e invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the
responsibility of the

re-establish law

government, by

and order

territorial integrity

all

legitimate means, to maintain or

in the State or to defend the national unity

of the State

.

.

.

and

[nor] as a justification for intervening, directly

or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the

armed

conflict or in the internal or

external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that
conflict occurs.
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While the Protocol makes no attempt to suggest that the decision as to
"legitimate" means of restoring order belongs to any authority other than the
70
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government concerned, it cannot, despite the ban on intervention, inhibit the
Security Council from deciding, as it has in the case of the former Yugoslavia
and of Rwanda, that the situation is so grievous that it amounts to a threat to
international peace warranting action under Chapter VII of the Charter, and
authorizing

action

despite

nonintervention in domestic

The cheapest and most

the

reservations

traditional

concerning

affairs.

easily accessible

weapon

available to those involved

in a noninternational conflict, especially those confronting the governmental
forces, are

mines and booby

but the 1980 Protocol relevant thereto only

traps,

an international armed conflict. However, since mines and booby
traps are so easily made, are relatively inexpensive, and cause extensive injury
applies in

even after the conflict has terminated, when the Convention on
Conventional Weapons was amended in 1993, Protocol II on mines was also
to civilians

amended.
situations

148

By virtue of this amendment, the Protocol was extended
mentioned in Article 3 common to the four Conventions, that is

say to noninternational conflicts

—although the

to
to

reservation with regard to

and the like was preserved, leaving it open to both combatants in such a
situation to behave as indiscriminately in this regard as might please them.
While the ban is applicable to all parties, the reservations with regard to
sovereignty are also preserved. In an effort to reduce the dangers to civilians,
particularly after the end of hostilities, the amended Protocol contains
carefully spelled-out regulations concerning the marking and identification of
mined areas as well as provision for their ultimate removal. The Protocol does
not ban the use of all mines, but only those which are strictly anti-personnel
and which lack self-destructive, self-neutralizing, or self- deactivating
mechanisms or are fitted with an anti-handling device. While it seeks to limit
riots

the use of these mines, the Protocol does not

weaponry

illegal,

make

the obtaining of such

nor forbid their manufacture or supply to those seeking them.

In fact, those countries which are capable of the mass production of mines
tend, at present, to be opposed to any international agreement
their right to

which

will limit

manufacture or use, especially in circumstances of self-defense,

even though they express willingness not to supply them to those countries
seeking

them on the

international market.

This historical introduction to the law of armed conflict has paid most
attention to warfare

upon land

since this

agreements have been designed, while the

were directed to land warfare. Where
reference has been
principles

made

it

is

the region for which most

earliest

beginnings of regulation

has been considered essential, specific

and naval warfare, especially since the
underlying the laws and customs of warfare on land are general in
to

both

aerial
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character and equally applicable, to the extent that is practicable, to operations

and

been said about neutrality.
This is partly due to the fact that in modern war there are few neutrals,
particularly when the States which are neutral are weaker than the belligerents
and therefore have difficulty in asserting their rights against those of the latter.
at sea

in the air as well. Equally, nothing has

Moreover, since virtually
thus

bound

all

members of the United Nations and
149
of the Security Council,
and, since no

States are

to carry out any decisions

military action

legal

is

without Security Council consent or approval,

it

may be

argued that no State can any longer claim to be entitled to the rights
traditionally pertaining to neutrality. This

is

particularly so

when

operations

are undertaken to give effect to a Security Council decision, a matter that

became of some importance during the Gulf War of 1991. 15 °
In addition to any international agreements that

out by the World Court in
the law of armed conflict

—

]

pointed

opinion on The Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
still governed by those "principles of international

is

,

[

—going

back to feudal times and

from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public

,

conscience,"

amount

as

its

law derived from established custom
before

may be relevant,

151

together with such considerations of proper behavior as

to general principles of law recognized by civilized nations

152

and, as

such, rules of international law in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of

the International Court of Justice. Further, there

down any

State from laying

rules regulating the

is

nothing to prevent any

conduct of

its

own

forces,

provided they do not run counter to any established rules and customs of the

law of armed conflict, and, as we have seen, breaches of these rules

may now be

considered as amounting to crimes against humanity, and punishable as such,

whether the conflict

is

character. Equally, since
conflict

is

one that
it is

is

generally accepted that the law concerning

of universal interest, there

many have

in fact done,

international or noninternational in

from passing

is

armed

nothing to stop any individual State, as

legislation granting

its

courts jurisdiction

over breaches of this law regardless of the nationality of the offender or of the
victim.
as

Nor is the geographic location of the offense of any significance.

may be seen with

the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the former

Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
a particular conflict,

Finally,

open to the Security Council, having decided that
whether international or noninternational, amounts to a
it is

potential threat to international peace, to proceed to establish special courts

with power to enforce the law and punish offenders.
In fine, perhaps
effort to

of the

it

might be suggested that the time

is

now

ripe for a further

be made, perhaps under the auspices of the International Committee

Red Cross

or the International

Law Commission,
72

to

draw up

a revised

Green

Leslie C.

and up-to-date statement of what the
are.

153

If this

laws, as distinct

from the customs of war,

should be considered impossible or impracticable, perhaps those

which are of like mind, as for example is the case with the members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or those of the European Community
with the addition of the United States, would work together to draw up an
agreed upon code which will be applicable to their forces and which might
serve as an example to be adopted by others.
States
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HIS

IS

THE STORY of how

a

A. Johnson

United States

sabotage of commercial airliners by

unintended

result of shutting

down

statute,

terrorists,

enacted to combat

produced the completely

a major element of coalition counterdrug

operations in South America for seven months.

It is also

the story of how the

United States Government solved that problem, but left unresolved significant
international law issues concerning the use of force against civil aircraft

suspected of drug trafficking.

Coalition Counterdrug Operations

no doubt that international drug trafficking causes significant harm
to the United States. Illicit drug use by more than a million U.S. citizens creates
crime and other serious social and public health problems, and the huge illegal
There

profits

is

generated by

financial institutions

the U.S.,

it is

illicit

drug trafficking present a threat to the integrity of

and public officials. As bad

infinitely

worse

processed, and transported.

for the nations

as the

where

illicit

The wealth and extreme

have corrupted and intimidated public

officials,

drug problem may be

for

drugs are produced,

violence of drug gangs

distorted national economies,

denied the governments of these nations effective control over their borders

Shooting

and

large areas of their territory,

armed

Down Drug Traffickers
and

in

some

cases provided direct support for

rebellions.

A number of nations in the Caribbean and in Central and South America,
which together supply much of the illicit drugs entering the U.S., have agreed
to cooperate with the United States in coalition counterdrug operations. With
U.S. support, they have carried out some very significant drug suppression
operations, including crop eradication, destruction of processing

with

interference

the

supply

of

precursor

chemicals,

facilities,

interruption

of

transportation networks, seizure of drugs, confiscation of funds, and arrest,

prosecution, and punishment of offenders.

The United

States has provided

and

funds, equipment, training, technical advice, transportation,
to the effort.

Host nations

rely

on such support

intelligence

to carry out operations

involving direct confrontation with suspected traffickers, such as arrest,
search,

and

Our personnel

seizure.

are limited to a support role out of respect,

in part, for host nation sovereignty,

which

monopoly on the

military

exercise of police

and

power within

its

borders.

it

a

The

product of a broader policy against involving U.S. military

restrictions are also a

units in arrests

and

traditionally carries with

seizures,

within U.S. territory.

whether in foreign nations, on the high

seas, or

1

For example, in a number of nations, U.S. military forces have provided and
operated ground-based and aerial radar and communications interception
facilities,

the information from which has been supplied to the host nations.

This information has been used to spot suspected drug trafficking

determine their routes and schedules, locate

airfields,

flights

identify

and

aircraft

(sometimes leading to identification of their crew members and owners), force
aircraft to

land or to leave the nation's airspace, or execute an "end-game" in

which host nation
and other

police or military forces

facilities.

have carried out

In a statement to Congress

Department of Defense "drug

raids

on

airfields

on 10 March 1994, the

czar" said that a shift in counterdrug policy

toward operations in the "source nations" would result in increasing

this type of

U.S. support to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, which were three source nations

who had demonstrated
By
to

early 1994,

shoot

down

the political will to combat narcotics trafficking.

2

both Colombia and Peru had announced that they intended
suspected drug trafficking aircraft whose pilots ignored

directions to land.

On

1

May

1994, the United States stopped providing

Colombia and Peru concerning suspected drug trafficking
flights. There were reports that the Departments of Defense and State
vehemently disagreed on the wisdom of this action, but there appears to be no
intelligence to

80
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dispute that the reason for this change in policy was centered

domestic and international law.

on

issues of

3

The Domestic Criminal Law Issue
The

U.S. domestic law problem had

its

Montreal Convention,
a measure to combat terrorism

origin in the

which was concluded 23 September 1971 as
against civilian airliners. Each contracting State is obligated to either prosecute
or extradite persons found in its territory who are accused of placing bombs on
civil aircraft or of damaging or destroying such aircraft. Under the Montreal
Convention, a State has jurisdiction to prosecute an offender (1) when the
offense was committed in its territory, (2) when the offense was committed
against or on board an aircraft registered in that State, (3) when the aircraft on
board which the offense was committed lands in its territory with the alleged
offender still on board, or (4) when the aircraft was leased to a lessee which has
its permanent place of business in that State. The Convention requires each
Contracting State to make certain offenses punishable under its domestic
criminal law "by severe penalties."

4

In satisfaction of this obligation, and acting partly in reaction to the August

1983 Soviet shoot-down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007
enacted the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, which,

damage
States.

5

(KAL 007),

inter alia,

Congress

makes it a crime

to

or destroy a civil aircraft registered in a country other than the United

Since 1956

it

has been a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 32 to commit similar

acts against aircraft registered or operated in the

provisions of the Aircraft Sabotage

Act were

United

States.

The

material

codified at 18 U.S.C. § 32(b) (2)

After Peru and Colombia announced their shoot'down policies,

officials in

became concerned that 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(2) might make
military members and other government officials and employees subject to U.S.
several agencies

criminal prosecution

if

they supplied intelligence information or other

government knowing that the government concerned
intended to use it to shoot down civil aircraft. Ultimately, the Deputy Attorney
General wrote to the Deputy National Security Adviser that it was
assistance to a foreign

underlying this position

is

stated in a 14 July

6

The analysis
1994 memorandum from the

"imperative" to cut off the supply of the radar information.

Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, the conclusions of which can
be briefly summarized as follows:
(1)

18

U.S.C.

extraterritorially.

32(b)(2)

§

This

is

was

clear from

its

intended

by

Congress

to

apply

language, from the prior existence of a

separate statute that prohibited similar acts within the territory of the United

81
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and from the statute's purpose, which was
under the Montreal Convention.

States,

(2)

The

actors, including

law enforcement

and military personnel of foreign countries such as Colombia and Peru.

officers
(3)

government

statute applies to

to satisfy U.S. obligations

Government personnel who supply

U.S.

government with reason
U.S.C. § 32(b)

to believe

it

will

intelligence

another

to

be used to commit violations of 18

may be subject to prosecution as an aider or abettor under

(2)

18

U.S.C. § 2(a) or as a conspirator under 18 U.S.C. § 371.
(4)

death

If a

results,

the death penalty or

life

imprisonment may be

authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 34.
(5)

U.S.

No exemption was provided in the statute for military members or other

Government

officers or

employees, or for law enforcement, intelligence,

or national security activities.

7

This concern for the possible criminal
military

liability

of U.S.

officials,

members, seems to have been the primary motivation

radar generated information

on

1

May

1994.

including

for the cutoff of

The Governments

of Peru and

8

Colombia objected strongly, and the reaction of members of Congress was no
less heated. The chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere and of the Subcommittee on International
both members of the President's party denounced the
Security

—

—

Administration's position as "absurd."

9

The

Administration's effort to obtain

passage of remedial legislation was greatly hampered by the strongly held

opinion

among many Congressmen

that 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(2) was never

intended to apply to coalition counterdrug operations, and that Congress had

more important

things to

do than

Administration's overcautious

Congress

however,

enacted

to pass a remedial statute to satisfy the

approach to the problem. In any event,
Section 1012 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
interdiction

provision

is

1995,

10

which provided

for

a

drug

exemption once the President makes certain determinations. This
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2291 —4, which reads in part:

employees and agents of the United States
and foreign countries engaged in interdiction of aircraft used in illicit drug
Official

Immunity

for authorized

trafficking

(a)

Employees and agents of foreign countries

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be unlawful for
authorized employees or agents of a foreign country (including members of the
82
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forces of that country) to interdict or attempt to interdict

that country's territory or airspace

that aircraft

(1)
illicit

is

if

—

an

aircraft in

reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in

drug trafficking; and
the President of the United States, before the interdiction occurs,

(2)

—

has determined with respect to that country that

(A) interdiction

posed by

illicit

is

necessary because of the extraordinary threat

drug trafficking to the national security of that

country; and

(B)

the country has appropriate procedures in place to protect

against innocent loss of

life

in the air

and on the ground in

connection with interdiction, which shall at a
effective

means

to identify

and warn an

minimum

include

aircraft before the use of

force directed against the aircraft.

Employees and agents of the United States

(b)

Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

it

shall

not be unlawful

authorized employees or agents of the United States (including

Armed

for

members of the

Forces of the United States) to provide assistance for the interdiction

The
money

actions of foreign countries authorized under subsection (a) of this section.

provision of such assistance shall not give rise to any civil action seeking

damages or any other form of relief against the United States or its employees or
agents (including members of the Armed Forces of the United States)

On

December 1994, the President signed Determination of President No.
95-7, "Resumption of U.S. Drug Interdiction Assistance to the Government of
11
Colombia,"
in which he made the necessary determinations under the
12
statute. On 8 December 1994, a similar determination was signed for Peru.
The United States promptly resumed providing radar information to Colombia
and Peru, and it is reported that in 1995 Peru and Colombia seized or destroyed
1

thirty-nine aircraft carrying drugs, driving drug traffickers to rely almost

exclusively

on land and water means of transport

This seems to be a happy ending, but fans of
careful note of
intentional.

its

First,

two major
it

limitations,

in those countries.

this legislative fix

13

should take

both of which were clearly quite

does not apply to nations for which the necessary

been made. For example, in May 1995
the Mexican government announced that its military aircraft would be used to

Presidential determinations have not
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Both Mexican policy

and U.S.

in this area

Mexican counterdrug operations
will tell

through Mexican

suspected of transporting cocaine

military support for

and only time
Mexico or other

are in their formative phases,

whether Presidential determinations

will

be sought for

The second major limitation is that the statutory exception applies
when the aircraft intercepted "is reasonably suspected to be primarily

nations.

only

engaged in

illicit

drug trafficking."

other assistance to shoot

down

If

a host nation uses U.S. intelligence or

any other purpose, such

civil aircraft for

as

enforcement of other criminal laws, no exception to the application of 18
U.S.C. § 32(b) (2) would appear to be available.
This entire episode demonstrates once again the Iron

Consequences,

as a statute

Law

of Unintended

enacted for an indisputably worthy purpose turns

out to have unfortunate and wholly unintended consequences
language

is

applied in unforeseen circumstances.

International

The
ever

—

international

principal

force

can be used against

law

Law

issue

when

its

plain

15

Issues

is

civil aircraft.

the

question

when

of

The Chicago Convention

1944, which established the legal framework for international

—

if

of

civil aviation,

contains only one reference to the relationship between State aircraft and
aircraft

—

civil

must operate their
16
aircraft.
There is strong

Article 3 (d) provides that the contracting States

state aircraft with

"due regard" for the safety of civil

support for the view that this provision

is

merely declarative of customary

international law, but as with most invocations of customary international law,

there have been sharp differences of opinion as to

its

practical application.

The positions taken by various nations in response to a number of
post- World War II incidents in which scheduled airliners were fired upon
indicate a majority view that there

is

an international

legal obligation

not to

use force against civilian airliners in international service, but that this
obligation
5

1

of the

is

subject to the inherent right of self-defense recognized in Article

UN Charter. The right of self-defense, however,

is

strictly limited

by

and proportionality, and every reasonable
precaution must be exhausted in order to avoid the loss of life. These
precautions include communicating with the aircrew to divert it away from
the

principles

of necessity

sensitive areas, escorting

or

—

as a last resort

—

it

warning shots.

firing

airliner in 1955, Israel shot

Soviet

Union

crippled a

out of national airspace, requiring

down a Libyan

Korean

to land,

When Bulgaria shot down an El Al
airliner

over the Sinai in 1973, the

airliner in 1978,
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destroyed

KAL 007 in 1983, their actions were all roundly condemned. In each
appeared to be an international consensus that the actions taken

case, there

were not

The

A. Johnson

17

justified as self-defense.

(ICAO) was created by the
a policy forum for its member nations and as a

International Civil Aviation Organization

Chicago Convention to serve

mechanism

to

as

promote technical cooperation

for the

conduct of international

After military aircraft of the Soviet Union shot

civil aviation.

on 13 August 1983,

down KAL 007

its

269 passengers and crew, the resulting

international outrage led to the

unanimous adoption by the 152-member

killing

new Article 3

International Civil Aviation Organization of a

Convention, intended to more

specifically

bis

to the

Chicago

address the existence of an

international legal obligation to refrain from using force against civil aircraft:

(a)

The

contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting

to the use of

weapons against

civil

aircraft in flight

on board and the

and

in case of

that,

must not be
endangered. This provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the
rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.
interception, the lives of persons

(b)

The

safety of aircraft

contracting States recognize that every State, in the exercise of

sovereignty,

is

aircraft flying

entitled to require the landing at

above

to conclude that

Convention;

it

its

it is

may

such violations. For

territory

some designated

without authority or

if there

its

airport of a civil

are reasonable grounds

being used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this

also give

such

this purpose,

aircraft

any other instructions to put an end to

the contracting States

may

resort to

any means

consistent with relevant rules of international law, including the relevant provisions

of this Convention, specifically paragraph
agrees to publish

its

(a)

of this Article. Each contracting State

regulations in force regarding the interception of civil aircraft.

comply with an order given in conformity with
To this end each contracting State shall establish
all necessary provisions in its national laws or regulations to make such
compliance mandatory for any civil aircraft registered in that State or operated
by an operator who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in
that State. Each contracting State shall make any violation of such applicable
laws or regulations punishable by severe penalties and shall submit the case to its
competent authorities in accordance with its laws or regulations.
(c)

Every

civil aircraft shall

paragraph

(d)

(b)

of this Article.

Each contracting State

use of any

shall take appropriate

civil aircraft registered in

principal place of business or

measures to prohibit the deliberate

that State or operated by

permanent residence
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any purpose
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inconsistent with the aims of this Convention. This provision shall not affect

paragraph

(a)

The United
ratifications

or derogate from paragraphs (b)

Nevertheless, there

of this Article.

There are two

bis,

is

strong support for the view that

bis

ICAO

expressed in various

is

merely declarative of

to refrain

concerning whether or not the

from using weapons against

remains subject to a right of self-defense.

obligation not to use force

subject to

publications.

no exception

ICAO

—

One view

member

example, there

is

an

that the

regularly issues a

ICAO

publication entitled International

—

is

number of

some evidence of

understanding of applicable international law.

States'

civil

for self-defense

publications that, while not legally binding in themselves, are

the

into effect.

it

19

distinctly different views

obligation stated in Article 3

it is

18

and the number of

well short of the 102 needed to bring

existing customary international law.

aircraft in flight

(c)

States has not yet ratified Article 3
still

is

and

Standards —

For
Rules

of the Air (Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation). This

publication contains provisions adopted by the
time, acting in a "quasi-legislative function,"

ICAO

Council from time to

which creates an expectation that

contracting States will comply within their territories with the standards

approved by the Council unless they
rules.

file

Appendix

when

1

to the Rules of the Air provides standard visual signals for use

civil aircraft are

intercepted by State aircraft. Appendix 2 contains the

following provision, which was added as

by vote of the
1

.

a "difference" concerning particular

20

ICAO Council on

10

Amendment

March

27 to the Rules of the Air

1986:

Principles to be observed by States

1.1

To

achieve the uniformity in regulations which

is

necessary for the safety

of navigation of civil aircraft due regard shall be had by Contracting States to the
following principles

a)

b)

when developing

regulations

and administrative

directives:

interception of civil aircraft will be undertaken only as a last resort;

if

undertaken, an interception

identity of the aircraft, unless

it is

will

be limited to determining the

necessary to return the aircraft to

its

planned track, direct it beyond the boundaries of national airspace, guide it
away from a prohibited, restricted or danger area or instruct it to effect a
landing at a designated airdrome;

c) practice

interception of civil aircraft will not be undertaken;
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and related information will be given to an
by radiotelephony, whenever radio contact can be

d) navigational guidance

intercepted aircraft
established,

e) in

and

the case where an intercepted civil aircraft

required to land in

is

the territory overflown, the aerodrome designated for the landing
suitable for the safe landing of the aircraft type concerned.

The United

This provision has been controversial.

States

to be

and a number of

other members have stated that they consider this action by the
to be ultra vires, in that Article 3(a) of the

is

21

ICAO Council

Chicago Convention

states clearly

that the Convention applies only to civil aircraft, and not to state aircraft.

When

the Council adopted the language, the U.S. informed the

Secretary General that
majority view in the
3 (d) requiring
,

for

the

safety

ICAO Council,

member
of

disapproved of

it

Amendment

27 on

ICAO

this basis.

The

however, was that the provision in Article

States to operate their state aircraft with "due regard"

civil

aircraft,

provided authority for the adoption of

Amendment 27. n
Other ICAO publications are prepared by the Secretariat and are only
advisory in nature. Among these are a Manual Concerning Safety Measures
Relating

Military

to

Operations,

23

and

a

Activities

Potentially

Manual Concerning

Hazardous

illicit

may occur

Aircraft

Civil

Interception of Civil Aircraft.

latter publication describes in considerable detail the

interception

to

24

The

circumstances in which

(including a suspicion that an aircraft

is

transporting

goods) as well as detailed discussions of radio signals, flight plans,

publication of information about restricted areas, position reporting systems,
radar identification,

followed

when

related topics.

enhancement of

radio communications

A

reminder

visual markings, procedures to be

fail,

procedures for interception, and

included that intercepted aircraft

is

may not

comply with the instructions given by ground controllers or by intercepting
aircraft

because of confusion,

linguistic

inability to interpret visual signals correctly,

misunderstanding of radio messages, hypoxia, or because of inability to

comply due

to malfunction, hijacking, or inadequate fuel. Finally, advice

is

given as

to the action to be taken by the intercepting pilot in the event of noncompliance

4.1.2.16 In the event that an intercepted aircraft

fails

to respond to repeated

attempts to convey instructions by visual signals or radiotelephony,

the

intercepting aircraft should continue to observe the intercepted aircraft until

lands or leaves the restricted or prohibited airspace.

A full

report on

it

the incident

should then be submitted to the appropriate authority to the State of registry for
action (see 2.10, Article 3

15

bis).
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Any mention of the possibility of firing a weapon at a nonresponsive aircraft
is

conspicuously absent from this publication. This

published views of the former Director of the
Milde,

who

is

fully consistent

with the

ICAO Legal Bureau, Dr. Michael

has written that an intercepting aircraft

may

use reasonable force

an intercepted aircraft, but not if it involves the use of
weapons against it. One presumes this means that a display of force, including
the firing of warning shots, forms the outer permissible limit of "reasonable
to enforce compliance by
26

force,"

and that weapons

deemed

fire

directed at a noncomplying aircraft will always be

to exceed "reasonable force."

A resolution adopted by the ICAO Council in response to the destruction
by Cuba of two U.S. -registered

civil aircraft

further support for the view that there

weapons

at civil aircraft.

The

is

on 24 February 1996 provides

an absolute prohibition against

firing

relevant paragraphs are as follows:

THE COUNCIL

2.

REAFFIRMS

the principle that States must refrain from the use of weapons

against civil aircraft in flight

and

that,

when intercepting civil aircraft,

the lives of

persons on board and the safety of the aircraft must not be endangered;

4.

REAFFIRMS

flight as

its

condemnation of the use of weapons against

civil aircraft in

being incompatible with elementary considerations of humanity, the

rules of customary international law as codified in Article 3 bis of the

Convention

on International Civil Aviation, and the Standards and Recommended
27
set out in the Annexes to the Convention;

When they adopted this resolution,

Practices

members of the ICAO Council may
the prohibition against using weapons

the

have intended to reaffirm the view that
against civil aircraft is not subject to any exception such

as self-defense.

On the

may have decided the issue of self-defense was not fairly raised
the incident, and therefore it need not be discussed. Cuba

other hand, they

by the facts of

maintained that

it

had acted

"in defense of

its

sovereignty,"

that the previous acts of the Brothers to the Rescue in

28

but

Cuban

it

was clear

territory, the

most egregious of which apparently consisted of dropping subversive leaflets,
were not much of a threat to Cuban national security. Furthermore, there was
88
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no evidence that the planes that were attacked by Cuba had, during that
particular flight, engaged in such conduct, and they appear to have been
outside of Cuban territorial airspace at the time of the attack.

The view
is

that the obligation to refrain from using force against civil aircraft

—the inherent

subject to at least one exception

right of self-defense

—

supported by the broad language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter

is
29

and by the second sentence of paragraph (a) of Article 3 his: "This provision
shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of
States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations." The sentence appears to
have been added to the text expressly to make it clear that Article 5 1 applies. It
is also interesting to read the various commentaries on the Soviet shootdown of
KAL 007; none of them take the absolute position that there could never be a
right to fire weapons in self-defense against a civil aircraft. Rather, they go to
some lengths to demonstrate that there was no factual basis for any argument
that the shoot-down was necessary, and that obvious alternatives that would
30
have avoided innocent loss of life were not exhausted.

The

shoot'down policy can be read
view
there

is
is

who have adopted

U.S. statute authorizing assistance to countries
as relying

on the

rationale of self-defense. This

supported by the requirement that the President

an "extraordinary threat posed by

security of that country."

The

illicit

a

find, inter alia, that

drug trafficking to the national

international law doctrine of self-defense,

however, does not provide a particularly good

fit

for the

drug shoot-down

problem, for the following reasons:
•

First,

there has been a long-standing controversy about whether the right

to use force in self-defense

can

exist in the absence of

argument usually

arises

self-defense, but

clearly has considerable force

it

in

an armed

attack.

This

connection with anticipatory or preemptive

when

the issue

is

whether

can be used against aircraft that in most cases have not displayed or used
armed force, and are not expected to do so.

force

•

Second, while the drug problem as a whole

to the national security of a country,

it

will

may pose an extraordinary

threat

probably be hard to argue that any

individual aircraft flight presents the sort of urgent danger that has traditionally

been considered necessary
•

to trigger the right to use force in self-defense.

Third, the offenders typically are not

members of the armed

31

forces of

armed agents as envisaged in the term
"state-sponsored terrorism." While drug traffickers have cozy relationships
with the governments of a number of nations, they are not generally operating
as proxies for those governments in the execution of national policy. They are
criminals, not actors, on the international political scene.
another

nation,

or

even

32
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In fact, the law of international

civil aviation,

including Article 3

will

bis,

not

many shoot-down incidents when the traffickers are nationals of
the nation shooting them down, when their aircraft are not registered in another
nation, and when their flights do not cross national borders. International law
apply at

all

to

regulates the conduct of nations in their dealings with one another
other's nationals, property,

human

and corporations. With the limited exception of

rights law, international

dealings with

its

quite clear that

of a state's

own

it is

and with each

citizens.

law does not attempt to regulate a nation's

The

negotiating history of Article 3

intended to apply only to "foreign

is

33

aircraft

the nation's domestic law, including

does not display any registration number or

flag

it

aircraft

For such

governing the permissible use of force against a fleeing suspected felon.

an

makes

and not to

aircraft"

own registration engaged in purely domestic traffic.

the primary law to be applied

bis

flights,
its

34

law

Where

and does not

otherwise communicate any claim to be registered in another nation or to be

engaged in an international flight,
by the local authorities that
It is also

it is

it

would be hard to quarrel with a presumption

a domestic flight.

clear that foreign civil aircraft are generally subject to the criminal

The primary

law of any nation in whose territory they operate.
law question

is

international

-how domestic criminal law can be practically enforced against

foreign aircraft.

35

The

ultimate issue becomes whether Article 3

bis

and

customary international law prevent law enforcement authorities of a nation

from using weapons against foreign aircraft in its
of force

is

authorized under

its

territory

even though such use

domestic law.

A nation's interests in a law enforcement situation differ markedly from those
When a nation is primarily concerned with ending

involved in a border intrusion.

an

isolated unauthorized intrusion into

served

if the

out of its

is

fruitless.

is

The

not served by simply escorting individual

territory, especially if that

Reliance on enforcement actions by the

be

territorial airspace, that interest

intruder departs. In a drug trafficking situation, the nation's interest in

suppressing persistent drug trafficking
aircraft

its

result

may be

was the

aircraft's

aircraft's state

intended destination.

of registry will in most cases

that the nation concerned

may have no

enforcement option except to shoot down the suspected drug
to this author that

an attempt to apply Article 3

bis

practical

trafficker. It

appears

and customary international

law in a manner that deprives nations of any practical remedy adequately serving
their vital interests

The

is

doomed

international

to failure.

community should

also recognize that the use of force

against civil aircraft involved in drug trafficking does not necessarily threaten

the safety of legitimate

civil

aviation.

Drug

traffickers

unregistered aircraft, or obscure any identifying markings.
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communicate with ground

flight plans, refuse to

controllers or intercepting

and disregard instructions to land at designated airfields. So long as the
pilot of an innocent aircraft complies with ICAO standards in these areas, it will
be perfectly safe from attack by a nation that follows procedures of the sort
whose existence the President must certify under the U.S. statute. The greatest
contribution of the statute may turn out to be that it requires both the U.S. and
aircraft,

the nations

it

assists to

Accordingly,

focus

most

the

on these

precautions.

promising

approach

international law issues raised by the use of
aircraft appears to

to

understanding

weapons against drug

the

trafficking

be a law enforcement perspective, rather than a self-defense

analysis. If a nation's

domestic law permits using force against a suspected drug

trafficking

that

aircraft

intercepting aircraft, and

refuses
if it

to

comply with instructions

from

an

observes rigorous precautions against mistakenly

attacking innocent aircraft, the use of force in these circumstances should be

regarded as legitimate.
In support of this conclusion, one could argue further that the language of
Article 3

to the effect that the phrase "This provision shall not be interpreted as

bis

modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of
the United Nations," not only preserves the right of nations to use force in
self-defense,

but that

it

also preserves their

immunity from outside interference in

"matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" as

guaranteed in Article 2

(7)

of the Charter.

The

administration of criminal law

within a nation's borders has traditionally been considered such a matter.
Additionally, there

shooting

down drug

is

very

little

likelihood that a nation adopting a policy of

trafficking aircraft will

be subject to serious criticism or

sanctions from the international community.

Drug

champions among the family of nations, and the

traffickers

have no vocal

interests of legitimate civil

aviation will not be threatened as long as appropriate precautions are in place.

In fact, there appears to be

no record

to date that any nation has protested the

shoot-down policies adopted by Peru and Colombia, or the assistance provided
to them by the United States. The only event likely to precipitate such a protest
would be a ghastly mistake in which a planeload of innocents is blown out of
the sky.

Whatever one may think of the urgency of solving the domestic law
issues raised

shoot

down drug

by the U.S. policy of assisting other nations which

trafficking aircraft, they appear to

91

have been solved by the
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at
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22 U.S.C. § 2291-4.

by a drug shoot-down policy are

The international law issues raised

unsettled, but such a policy should be

still

accepted as a legitimate law-enforcement measure so long as rigorous
precautions are in place to prevent the loss of innocent

life.
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(1985), the

Supreme Court ruled that the use of deadly

escape was a violation of the Fourth

Amendment

force to prevent a criminal suspect's

unless the law enforcement officer has

probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the
officer or to others.

The

nation's officials within

its

point has gotten relatively
8.
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J.

U.S. Constitution clearly does not apply to the actions of another
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little

but

it
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to this
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REPLETE WITH EXAMPLES

IS

of what today

we would

consider to be war crimes against humanity, but which in Biblical days

were

common and

accepted acts of war.

Many

statements similar to the

following will be found in the Bible:

Thus we put

to death

all

the men,

women, and dependents

in every city, as

did to Sihon King of Heshbon. All the cattle and spoil from the cities

booty for ourselves.

You

shall

put

we

we took

as

1

all its

males to the sword, but you

may

take the

women, the

dependents, and the cattle for yourselves, and plunder everything else in the
city.

2

That such actions were typical of the time demonstrates the distance that
constraints on war have traveled over the past two millenia.
Probably one of the earliest war crimes
the so-called "Breisach Trial," the

An

trials

trial

we have knowledge
von Hagenbach by

of which

of Peter

is

a

Upper Rhine, including the
town of Breisach, was pledged to the Duke of Burgundy by the Archduke of
Austria to guarantee a debt. As the Military Governor appointed by the Duke

multinational tribunal in 1474.

area of the

War Crimes
Hagenbach instituted a brutal policy that included "murder,
rape, illegal taxation and wanton confiscation of private property" against the
citizens of Breisach and of the surrounding area. Eventually, von Hagenbach
of Burgundy, von

was seized by revolting German mercenaries and the
tried

citizens of Breisach

and

by a tribunal consisting of twenty-eight judges, eight from Breisach and

two from each of the other Alsatian, German, and Swiss towns
defense was "superior orders"
of his master, the

Duke

affected. His

—that he was merely complying with the

of Burgundy.

He was

found

orders

deprived of his

guilty,

knighthood, and executed. Although his acts had been committed before the
actual outbreak of war, the occupation of Breisach resembled a wartime

occupation, and his offenses would
crimes.

now be

considered to have been war

3

There were, undoubtedly, war crimes

trials

conducted in the succeeding

4

we find little documentation in that regard. However,
Belli Ac Pads Libri Tres, published in 1625, Hugo Grotius said:
centuries, but

in

Dejure

must be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights equal
those kings, have the right of demanding punishment not only on account
injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account
injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law
5
nature or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever.

The

fact

to

of
of
of

In effect, Grotius was saying that any sovereign had the right to try violators of
the law of war even though neither he nor his subjects were the victims of the

—the doctrine of

illegal act

universal jurisdiction over war crimes.

During the American Civil
issued by the

Union Army

War

6

(1861-1865), the so-called Lieber Code,

in 1863 as General

Orders No. 100, contained the

following provision:

59.

A prisoner of war remains

answerable for his crimes committed against the

army or people, committed before he was captured, and for which he has
7
not been punished by his own authorities.
captor's

After the war's end, the Federal authorities tried a

Confederates for war crimes committed during the
Several decades

later,

number

hostilities.

of former

8

during the Philippines "pacification" program that

War (1898), war crimes were committed by
both sides. The United States Army tried not only guerrillas who had violated
10
9
the law of war, but also members of its own Army who had done likewise.
followed the Spanish- American
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(1899-1902), the British army tried several war

crimes cases, cases involving both

its

own

personnel and personnel of the

enemy. The 1902 Treaty of Vereeniging, which ended that conflict, provided:
IV.

No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any of the burghers so

surrendering or so returning for any acts in connection with the prosecution of
the war. The benefits of this clause

will

not extend to certain acts contrary

to the

usage

of war which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the Boer generals and

which

shall be tried by court-martial immediately after the close of hostilities.

11

While hostilities were ongoing, the British tried three Australian officers of its
army for war crimes; after the war, a Boer who had misused a white flag was
tried.

During World

War I

were committed and

(1914-1918), violations of the law of war, war crimes,

trials

were conducted by both

caused a furor in Great Britain was the

sides.

One

case which

conviction, and execution by

trial,

Germany of Charles Fryatt, captain of the British merchant vessel S.S. Brussels.
At the outbreak of the war the British Admiralty had instructed all merchant
captains that if approached by a German submarine on the surface, they were
to try to ram it. This happened to Captain Fryatt, who saved his ship by
attempting to ram the submarine which was then forced to depart. A year later
the Brussels was captured by German surface vessels. Captain Fryatt was tried
as

having been an

illegal

order of his government.
British

termed

combatant. His defense was that he had obeyed the

He

this "judicial

was convicted and executed. At the time, the
murder."

As we

shall see, the decision of the

German court is now accepted international law.
One article of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, provided
for the trial of the ex-Kaiser of Germany by an international court "for a
12

supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties."
Today, we would probably designate that offense as falling within the term
"Crimes against Peace."
obtained asylum in

He was

never tried because he had sought and

The Netherlands, which

refused to extradite

demands by both France and the United Kingdom. The Treaty
for the surrender, to the

former Allies for

trial,

committed war crimes during the course of the
the Allies eventually agreed that such

despite

also provided

of individuals alleged to have

hostilities.

trials

him

For political reasons,

should be conducted by the

13

Supreme Court of Leipzig. After a dozen cases had been tried at the behest of
Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, most of which resulted in either
unwarranted acquittals or grossly inadequate sentences, the Allies ceased
sending cases to the German court. This experience demonstrated that the
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trial

by enemy courts of war crimes allegedly committed by members of the

enemy armed

forces, civilian population, or property of the victors

to the problem,
victors.

members of the armed

forces or civilian population against

was not a viable solution

and that more just results could be obtained in the courts of the

14

There were, however, two cases tried by the Supreme Court of Leipzig which
are worthy of mention. Believing that the British were using their hospital
ships, normally exempt from attack, for military purposes, the German
Admiralty announced that such vessels must follow certain prescribed routes;
if they were found in a barred route, they would be subject to attack. Finding
the British hospital ship Dover Castle outside the prescribed routes, a German
submarine sank it without warning.
by the Supreme Court of Leipzig,

When the submarine commander was tried

his defense

was that he had complied with the

Government and his superiors. Despite the decision in the Fryatt
Case, which had held that compliance with an order of one's government was
no defense, he was acquitted. 15
orders of his

The second

case of interest also involved a British hospital ship, the

Llandovery Castle. While sailing across the Atlantic from

Canada

to Great

was sighted by a German submarine. For some unknown reason, the
German submarine commander decided that it was carrying American aviators

Britain,

it

and torpedoed

it.

When

survivors in

life

boats were interrogated,

it

became

who had been aboard were Canadian medical
personnel and the crew. In order to cover up his crime, the German captain
and two of his officers proceeded to machine-gun the lifeboats. One lifeboat
escaped destruction and so the incident became known. At the end of the war,
clear that the only persons

the captain disappeared, but his two officers were brought to

trial.

Their

defense was "superior orders." In this case, the Court held that while

compliance with the orders of a superior was normally a good defense, that was
not so where, as here, "the order

is

universally

known

to everybody, including

the accused, to be without any doubt whatever against the law."

were found to be

guilty of a

war crime.

The accused

16

known
known as

In 1928, the "Pact of Paris," also

as the "Kellogg-Briand Pact" after

the International Treaty for the
and technically
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, was drafted. It was
accepted by forty-four States, including all of the then-major Powers except the

its

progenitors,

Soviet Union. This Pact provided:

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of

Article

1.
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Article
all

2.

S.

and renounce

hevie

it

as

an instrument of national policy

one another.

The High Contracting

Parties agree that the settlement or solution of

disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they

which may arise between them,

shall

may

never be sought except by pacific means.

be,
17

During the course of World War II numerous statements were made by the
members of the Allied Powers to the effect that upon the conclusion of
hostilities there would be trials of those who had violated the law of war,
including those who were responsible for the initiation of the war. Then, on 13
January 1942, nine of the countries at war with Germany signed the
Declaration of

St.

James.

18

The

relevant provisions of that Declaration stated

the signatories:
Recalling that international law, and in particular the Convention signed at

The Hague

and customs of land warfare, does not
permit belligerents in occupied countries to commit acts of violence against
civilians, to disregard the laws in force, or to overthrow national institutions,
in 1907 regarding the laws

(1) affirm

nothing in

that acts of violence thus inflicted

common with

understood by

(3)

place

on the

civilian populations

have

the conception of an act of war or a political crime as

civilised nations,

among

channel of organised

their principal

war aims the punishment, through the

justice, of those guilty

of or responsible for these crimes,

whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them or participated in them.

19

In addition, numerous official pronouncements to the same general effect were

made by individual countries and by the Heads of State. 20 On 20 October

1943,

a conference at the British Foreign Office resulted in the establishment of the

United Nations Commission

for the Investigation of

War Crimes

(this title

was

changed to the United Nations War Crimes Commission); with the
exception of the Soviet Union, all of the European Allies, and China were
later

represented.

21

Germany surrendered

in

May

1945, but even before then discussions had

been entered into concerning the manner in which the punishment of the
European war criminals was to be accomplished. From the beginning, the
United States favored trials for all alleged war criminals, including the leaders.
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The Soviet Union also favored
Kingdom originally favored a
difficulties of a trial

At

a judicial solution to the problem.

political solution for the leaders, citing the

by an international court, but ultimately agreed to a

the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the decision was

would be a

trial.

The United

The

made

trial.

that there

following May, at the organizing meeting for the United

Nations in San Francisco, the United States circulated a draft proposal for such

Government of France, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. Supreme Court Associate Justice
a

trial

to the representatives of the Provisional

Robert Jackson was named

as

Chief Counsel for the United States by President

Truman and immediately began

conferring with

all

concerned.

On

25 June

1945 a conference of the four major Powers opened in London. They signed an

Agreement

which was attached a Charter of the International Military
22
Tribunal (IMT) on 8 August 1945. Justice Jackson had offered Nuremberg, in
the American Zone of Occupation, as a suitable place for the trial and this offer
23
was accepted.
to

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal listed the offenses within
its jurisdiction, some of which were later alleged to be ex post facto. The offenses
listed were:

humanity;

(1)

(4)

crimes against peace;

(2)

war crimes;

crimes against

(3)

conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing; and

by the accused in an organization determined to be criminal.
provision for appeal, the decision of the Tribunal being

membership
There was no

(5)

final.

Two other provisions of the Charter of the IMT are worthy of mention. First,
contrary to prior general custom, but in accordance with the provision o{ the

Treaty of Versailles for the
Article

7.

The

official position

responsible officials in
freeing

trial

them from

of the ex-Kaiser, the Charter provided:
of defendants, whether as Heads of State or

Government Departments,

responsibility or mitigating

Second, following the decision of the

shall

not be considered as

punishment.

German

court in the case of Captain

Charles Fryatt, the Charter provided:

The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his government
superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in

Article 8.

or of a

mitigation of punishment

The

if

the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

24

International Military Tribunal consisted of one judge and one

alternate from each of the four countries.

With each State

participant having a

Chief Counsel of equal rank, the prosecution could only act by agreement.
25
and, on 18
After some difficulties, twenty-four individuals were indicted
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October 1945, arraigned in Berlin. The trial itself took place at Nuremberg
from 30 November 1945 to 31 August 1946, with judgment delivered on 1
November 1946. Twelve accused received death sentences; three received
sentences to imprisonment for life; four received sentences to
26
imprisonment for specified terms; and three were acquitted. The decision
of the Tribunal was unanimous except that the Soviet judge dissented from
the acquittals, the failure to adjudge the death sentence against Rudolph
Hess, and the findings that several organizations were not criminal in
nature.
It

27

was argued that "crimes against peace" had not been an international

offense

and

that, therefore,

The Tribunal found

offense.

was improper to charge the accused with

it

that, in

this

view of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the

making of aggressive war was a war crime which had existed before the
outbreak of World War II and that the accused could, therefore, be guilty of
28
the offense of having committed a crime against peace.

When the Tribunal found that several of the Nazi organizations, such as the
SS, the SD, and the Gestapo, were criminal in nature, that

member

meant that every

of that organization was guilty of a war crime unless he could prove

had not known of its criminal nature when he joined it and that he
personally had never participated in its criminal activities. Inasmuch as the
membership in these organizations numbered in the tens of thousands, the task
of trying them was obviously beyond the resources of the Allied Powers.
Accordingly, this chore was turned over to the German courts, which tried
that he

many thousands
The

trial

iceberg.

of these cases.

29

by the International Military Tribunal was only the

The Allied Control Council,

tip

of the

the central authority for the four zones of

occupation, enacted a law intended to bring some uniformity into the war

crimes prosecution programs of the four zones of occupation of Germany.

The

Governor of the United States Zone of Occupation promulgated an
implementing law. Under this law, the United States tried twelve cases, known
colloquially as the "Subsequent Proceedings," involving 185 high-ranking
government, military, and industrial personnel (of whom 35 were acquitted
and 24 received death sentences); 30 and, under general international law,
United States military commissions sitting in Dachau (a former Nazi
concentration camp) tried 1,062 accused (of whom 256 were acquitted and
31
426 received death sentences). The last two World War II war crimes trials
conducted in Europe were both tried in French courts. In 1987, Klaus Barbie,
who had been the head of the Gestapo in Lyons during the war and who was
responsible for many deportations of Jews and executions, was deported from

Military
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where he had taken refuge and where a previous government had
denied extradition. He was convicted of crimes against humanity and
sentenced to imprisonment for life. (He died in prison in 1991.) Then, in 1994,
Paul Touvier, a Frenchman who had headed a branch of the Milice, the French
police organization which supported (and sometimes outdid!) the Nazi
Gestapo, and who had remained hidden in France for all those years, was tried
Bolivia

for the execution of

seven Jews in retaliation for the assassination of Philippe

Henriot, a rabid pro-Nazi Frenchman.

was not alleged that the Jewish
victims had any connection with the assassination.) Touvier was found guilty
(It

of a crime against humanity and sentenced to

life

Meanwhile, somewhat similar war crimes

conducted in the Far

East.

imprisonment.

trials

programs were being

An International Military Tribunal for the Far East

had been established by a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur,
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Its Charter was very much
similar to that of the International Military Tribunal except that

it

consisted of

eleven judges (one from each of the countries which had signed the Japanese
surrender agreement and one each from India and the Philippines), and

General MacArthur retained a right of review. Moreover, there was only one
chief prosecutor (an American) and an assistant prosector from each of the

other participating countries.

would be named

among

as

The main

an accused.

was

It

question was whether the Emperor

finally

decided that he would not be

the accused, primarily because such action would have

occupation so

much more

difficult

made

the

because of the regard in which he was held

by the Japanese people. There were originally twenty-eight accused, but two

and one was found to be incompetent to stand trial. The
accused were arraigned in Tokyo on 3-4 May 1946, and the trial proper ran
from 3 June 1946 until 16 April 1948. The reading of the judgment did not
died during the

trial

November 1948 and ended on

November. In addition to the
judgment of the Tribunal, there was one separate opinion, one concurring
32
opinion, and three dissenting opinions. There were seven death sentences,
sixteen sentences to imprisonment for life, one to imprisonment for twenty
33
years, and one to imprisonment for seven years.
begin until 4

Here, too, there was a multitude of

United States

tried cases in Manila,

12

trials

by military commissions. The

Yokohama, Kwajalein, Guam, and China.

Kingdom, France, China, Australia, the Netherlands
34
and the Soviet Union all tried war crimes cases in the Far East.

Additionally, the United

East India,

As would be expected, in addition to the claim of ex post facto, there were a
number of legal problems presented in the prosecution of all of these war
crimes. Probably the provision

which caused the most dispute was that
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to the receipt of evidence. Article 19 of the Charter of the International

Military Tribunal stated:

The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence.

It shall

adopt and

apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and nontechnical procedure

and

The

shall

admit any evidence which

charters for the other Tribunals

or similar provisions.

it

deems

and

to

have probative value.

military commissions

American lawyers, accustomed

rules of evidence applicable in the

all

had identical

to the stringent technical

common law system,

often argued that this

was unfair to the accused. They overlooked the facts that civil law countries,
which do not have these technical rules of evidence, were equally involved and
that the circumstances of war crimes

may be thousands
Accordingly, the

have made many

trials

of miles away in their

full

application of the

trials

are such that victims

home

and witnesses

countries by the time of

common

trial.

law rules of evidence would

impossible. In order to ensure fairness, the Tribunal

would be admissible, but that the opposing
party could challenge the affidavit and demand the production of the affiant as
a live witness. Strange to relate, in the only statistics available on the subject, in
adopted the rule that

the

291

first

seven

trials

affidavits

of the "Subsequent Proceedings," the prosecution offered

affidavits while the defense offered 3,098.

The

prosecution challenged 40

of the defense affidavits while the defense challenged 84 of the prosecution
affidavits (64 of the latter challenges

When

were in one

case!).

35

the Secretary-General of the United Nations drafted a proposed

Statute for an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons for Serious
Violations of the International Humanitarian

Law Committed in the Territory

of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, a Statute that was approved without

change by the Security Council, Article 15 thereof provided that the Judges of
the International Tribunal adopted Rule 89(C),

Chamber may admit any
value;"

it

deems

to

have probative

and Rule 89(D) which provides that "A Chamber may exclude

evidence

if its

a fair trial."

The

relevant evidence which

36

The Judges of
which provides that "A

the Tribunal could adopt rules for the admission of evidence.

probative value

is

substantially

outweighed by the need to ensure

37

fact that the action

charged

as a

war crime had been performed

pursuant to the order of a superior was advanced in almost every case.
Frequently the evidence established the validity of the claim. Under Article 8
of the Charter, quoted above, and
regulations, this

its

equivalent in other war crimes laws and

was not a defense. However, in such cases where the accused
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was found to be

his

guilty,

sentence would frequently be considerably

mitigated.

When

the International

Law Commission formulated

Charter and judgment of the IMT,

its

and 4 paralleled Articles 7
every case where the denial of the

Principles 3

and 8 of the Charter. Nevertheless, in
defense of "superior orders" has been proposed
conventions drafted since World

the principles of the

War

II,

for inclusion in

law of war

the proposal has been rejected.

38

However, the Secretary-General did include such a provision denying the
"defense" in the Statutes he prepared for the International Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, and the Security Council retained them. 39
Similarly, the Code of Conduct on Politico- Military Aspects of Security,
adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, includes
the following provisions:

30.

Each

armed

and

conflict

will

individually accountable

31.

with

The

armed forces personnel in
conventions and commitments governing

participating State will instruct

international humanitarian law,

rules,

ensure that such personnel are aware that they are

under national and international law for

participating States will ensure that

command authority exercise

as international

its

it

armed

their actions.

forces personnel vested

in accordance with relevant national as well

law and are made aware that they can be held individually

accountable under those laws for the unlawful exercise of such authority and
that orders contrary to national and international law must not be given.

The

responsibility of superiors does not exempt subordinates from any of their individual

responsibilities*

The responsibility of the commander for the issuance of illegal orders and for
violations of the law of war by his subordinates has also

been a major problem.

This question arose early in the war crimes program after World

War

II

when

Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita was tried in Manila in October 1945,

charged with the responsibility

committed by

his troops

for

innumerable violations of the law of war

during the battles for the recovery of the Philippine

was that he took no action to
terminate these war crimes and punish the offenders, because he was unaware
of the fact that they were being committed. What the military commission
Islands by the United States. His defense

which

tried him,

and the boards and courts which reviewed the case on appeal,

when a commander knew, or should have known, that
command were committing war crimes, he had a duty to end

held was, in effect, that
troops under his

such actions and to punish the perpetrators.
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commander

for violations of the

and of the 1977 Additional Protocol
Articles 86(2) and 87 of the latter. They provide:
Convention

43

42

I

are

1949 Geneva

now

set forth in

Article 86. Failure to act

2.

The

fact that a

committed by

breach of the Conventions or of

a subordinate does

this

Protocol was

not absolve his superiors from penal or

disciplinary responsibility, as the case

may

be,

if

they knew, or had information

which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time,
that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not
take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.
Article 87.

1

Duty of Commanders

The High Contracting

Parties

and the

Parties to the conflict shall require

commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their
other persons under their control, to prevent and, where
necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the
Conventions and of this Protocol.
military

command and

2.

In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties and

commensurate with their level of
responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under their
command are aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this
Parties to the conflict shall require that,

Protocol.

The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require
any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his
3.

control are going to

commit or have committed

a breach of the

Conventions or

of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations
of the Conventions or this Protocol,

and, where appropriate,

to

initiate

disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof.

The
was the

International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, mentioned above,
first

tribunal for the trial of war crimes not established by the victor or

victors. Its judges are elected

by the United Nations. Composed of two Trial

Chambers of three judges each and an Appeals Chamber of five judges, it is the
first war crimes court in which there is a right of appeal. In the Tadic Case, the
accused challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, but the Appeals

determined that

Chamber

was properly established and did have jurisdiction to try
cases involving violations of the law of war which had occurred in the former
it
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At the time of this writing, although the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia has now been in existence for four years, it has tried only

Yugoslavia.

two

cases. In the

Erdemovic Case there was a guilty plea. (The defendant has

an appeal based on the ground that his ten-year sentence is too severe!) In
1997, the Appeals Chamber decided the Tadic Case on the merits, convicting

filed

the accused.
In 1994 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 955
establishing a similar Tribunal to try genocide
in

Rwanda

Tribunal

is

Yugoslavia.

or in neighboring States by

and other war crimes committed

Rwandan

citizens.

The

Statute for this

Former
function for both

identical, mutatis mutandis, to that of the Tribunal for the

The Appeals Chamber

already established will

Tribunals.

For

many

years the International

Law Commission

has been charged with

the task of drafting a Statute for an International Criminal Court. In a Draft
Statute prepared in 1993, the jurisdiction of the Court included,

among others,
1949 Geneva

and grave breaches of the four
Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocol I. 44 It would also have jurisdiction
over crimes of aggression where the Security Council of the United Nations
"has first determined that the State concerned has committed the act of
45
aggression which is the subject of the charge." The Draft Statute is still in an
embryonic stage. It was the subject of the work of a preparatory committee and,
unless there are developments to the contrary, a diplomatic conference will be
convened in 1998 to draft a convention establishing an international criminal
the crimes of genocide

court.

46

recent action of the United States in this area occurred on 21
47
August 1996 when the President approved the "War Crimes Act of 1996." It

The most

provides:

War

§2401.

(a)

crimes

OFFENSE. Whoever, whether

commits

a grave breach of the

described in subsection

Geneva

(b), shall

any term of years, or both, and

if

inside or outside the

United States,

Conventions, in any of the circumstances

be fined under

this title or

imprisoned

for life or

death results to the victim, shall also be subject

to the penalty of death.

(b)

CIRCUMSTANCES. The circumstances referred to in subsection

that the person committing such breach or the victim of such breach

of the

Armed

denned

is

a

(a) are

member

Forces of the United States or a national of the United States (as

in section 101 of the Immigration

106

and Nationality Act).
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(c)

DEFINITIONS. As used
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in this section, the

Geneva Conventions" means conduct defined

term "grave breach of the

as a grave

breach in any of the

international conventions relating to the laws of warfare signed at

August 1949 or any protocol
is

to

Geneva 12

any such convention, to which the United States

a party.

Heretofore,

when

a nation tried

one of its own personnel

the law of war such as a grave breach of one of the 1949
as in the Calley Case,

it

Geneva Conventions,

has not been considered to be a war crimes case,

although, in fact, that was what

concerned, such a

for a violation of

trial will, in

was. Insofar as the United States

it

is

the future, unquestionably be a war crimes case.

Apparently, Congress did not consider

it

necessary to include the commission

of such offenses by non-nationals of the United States, whether committed
against

American or

foreign personnel.

There can be no doubt that they are

already war crimes within the jurisdiction of the United States.

On

19 October 1996, the President approved an Act which includes the

following provision:

Sense of The Congress.

§ 2.

It is

the sense of the Congress that United States

possession of records about individuals

war crimes should make these records

who

Government agencies

are alleged to

public.

have committed Nazi

48

This Act was considered necessary because of the overly
that

many government

in

strict

construction

agencies are following in application of the

Freedom of

Information Act.

The

laws against war crimes, like

all

penal laws, have two purposes:

1) to

discourage their commission; and 2) to punish offenders. During the past
half-century the international

community has

failed in

both of these

areas.

The

rare possibility of trial after the termination of hostilities does not greatly

discourage the commission of further offenses during the course of hostilities;
the complete failure to punish individuals for the commission of war crimes

even

after the termination of hostilities certainly

commission in the next conflict that occurs.

49

It

does not discourage their

remains to be seen whether the

action of the Security Council of the United Nations in the Former Yugoslavia

and
will

in

Rwanda, and the

have any

possible creation of

lasting effect.
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an International Criminal Court,
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probably a major reason for their objection to denying

Moreover, the national representatives

at

Diplomatic Conferences probably

it

fear,

with reason, that military discipline would be adversely affected, as
to refuse to obey

39.
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2. The official
Government or as
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a responsible

Government

official, shall

Head

of State or

not relieve such person of

criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.

3.
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anyone of the

acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present statute
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if
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an order of a Government or of a
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considered in

the International Tribunal determines that justice so

requires.
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The

Freedom of Navigation Program:

U.S.

Policy, Procedure,

and Future

Dennis Mandsager

HE

U.S.

FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION

(FON)

nearly two decades, repeatedly demonstrated

PROGRAM

its utility

has, for

in furthering U.S.

national interest in maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight on, over,

and under the oceans. Indeed, other maritime nations should consider adoption
of such a program, either unilaterally or cooperatively with the United States, in

order to ensure the stable and predictable law of the sea regime that facilitates
effective naval operations. This article analyzes the

on the
ships

FON Program, with a focus

operational assertions of navigation and overflight rights by U.S. military

and

The

1

aircraft.

FON Program seeks to encourage coastal States to conform their ocean

claims to international law through peaceful exercise of navigation and

ocean areas where such States have made excessive or
illegal maritime claims. The program, which began in 1979, is a joint effort
of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State

overflight rights in

(DoS).

2

It

operates

on three

levels:

operational

assertions,

or

FON

operations, by military units; diplomatic protests of excessive claims or other

diplomatic representations by the DoS; and

DoS/DoD

consultations with

representatives of other States in an effort to promote stability and consistency

The US. Freedom

of Navigation

Program

3

in the law of the sea. Since 1979, over 100 diplomatic protests

and over 300 operational

assertions

have been conducted.

have been

filed

4

Legal Divisions of the Sea

To grasp
is first

the relationship between excessive claims and

FON assertions, it

necessary to understand the legal divisions of the sea and of navigation

and overflight rights in its various zones. 5 All maritime zones are measured
from "baselines." Baselines normally follow the low-water mark along the
In very limited geographic situations,

coast.

coastlines, a series of straight baselines

such

as

deeply indented

may be employed by connecting

appropriate points.
All waters inside baselines are internal waters, where the coastal State
exercises near absolute sovereignty. Except in limited distress situations,

foreign ships and aircraft

must have permission

Immediately beyond the baselines

seaward to a
area

is

maximum of 12

lies

to enter internal waters.

the territorial sea, which

may extend

nautical miles. Coastal State sovereignty in this

subject to the right of innocent passage,

expeditious surface transit through

it.

i.e.,

continuous and

Aircraft overflight and submerged

passage in territorial waters are not permitted, without coastal State
permission.

When

international

transiting in or over territorial seas that are part of

strait,

ships

and

aircraft

may engage

in

an

continuous and

expeditious transit passage in their "normal mode." For example, formation

steaming, flight operations, and submerged transits are permitted

when

in

transit passage.

A

special regime exists for archipelagoes. Archipelagic, or island, nations

may draw baselines which connect

their islands, subject to certain limitations,

and create sovereign archipelagic waters. These waters are subject to the right
of archipelagic sea-lanes passage (essentially the same as transit passage) in all
routes normally used for international navigation or overflight and in sea-lanes
designated by the archipelagic State. Innocent passage applies in archipelagic

waters outside these and normal routes.
All waters seaward of the territorial sea are international waters where the
ships

and

overflight.

aircraft of all States enjoy the
6

International

waters

high seas freedoms of navigation and

include

the

contiguous zone,

exclusive

economic zone (EEZ), and high seas. A State may enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary laws in a contiguous zone, which may extend as far as
24 miles from the baseline. It may also exercise sovereignty over resources on
its continental shelf and in its EEZ. The EEZ may extend to 200 miles from the
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baseline, whereas the continental shelf extends to

depending in

its

between 200 and 350

miles,

topography. Subject to the resource-related rights of the

and overflight in the EEZ, or above
the continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 miles are the same as on the
high seas. Other than the aforementioned rights, coastal States do not exercise
coastal State, the freedoms of navigation

sovereignty over international waters.

Excessive Claims and International

As

United States depends in

a maritime nation, the national security of the

great part

on the

ability to exercise

the freedoms of navigation and overflight in

and over the world's oceans. Coastal States often
sovereignty,

jurisdiction,

or

Law

other

rights

assert

that

maritime claims of
inconsistent

are

with

international law. These excessive claims attempt to restrict the United States'
ability,

to exercise

its

rights at sea, including the

conducting of military exercises

and operations. Examples of excessive claims include:
•

Territorial sea claims in excess of 12 nautical miles

•

Exclusive economic zone claims that purport to restrict military exercises

•

Improperly drawn straight baselines that purport to convert

areas or international waters

(EEZ or high

territorial sea

into internal waters, or

seas)

international waters into territorial waters
•

Claims requiring advance notification or permission

for

innocent passage

of warships through the territorial sea
•

all

Archipelagic claims that do not permit archipelagic sea-lane passage in

normal routes of navigation or overflight
•

passage, including overflight of military aircraft
transits,
•

do not permit transit
or submerged or surface

Territorial sea claims in international straits that

without prior notice

Security zones in international waters that exclude or restrict entry by

warships and military aircraft. 7

The

FON

Program's response to excessive claims

is

based on fundamental

international law principles. If maritime nations acquiesce in an excessive

claim by failing to exercise their rights, then the claims

may

eventually be

considered to have been accepted as binding law. Examples of change in the

law of the sea through acquiescence include the extension of the

territorial sea

from three nautical miles to twelve, and general acceptance of the EEZ. Given
the normative import of acquiescence, both diplomatic protests and the
exercise of rights are necessary to preserve operating freedoms.
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Military Strategy

War era,

In the post-Cold
threat to
strategy

and U.S.

Interests

the U.S. strategic focus has shifted from a global

new challenges. Nevertheless, key elements of our traditional military

—forward

presence and a

apply. In National Military Strategy,

are

Program

of Navigation

described

crisis

response capability

—continue

to

the principal threats to America's security

dangers

regional

as

9

(potential

conflicts

among

States),

asymmetric challenges (unconventional challenges using means the U.S.

cannot match in kind, such

as terrorism), transnational threats (emergencies,

extremism, ethnic disputes, crime,
wild cards (future developments).

and other challenges), and

illegal trade,

further describes four strategic concepts

It

meet the demands of the environment:
the timely employment and sustainment of military power;

that govern the use of U.S. forces to
strategic agility,

overseas presence, the visible posture of U.S. forces in or near key regions;

power projection, the

ability to rapidly

deploy and sustain forces; and decisive

resolution.

commitment of sufficient military power to achieve the right
Each depends on the traditional freedoms of navigation and

overflight

in

force,

the

and over international waters,

international

straits,

archipelagic sea-lanes, as well as innocent passage through territorial seas
archipelagic waters.

Without freedom of navigation, the

ability

and
and

of the United

States to project military power, provide logistics support, maintain forward

presence,
assistance,

and accomplish missions such
and noncombatant evacuations,

move

strategy requires the ability to

disaster

as

will

relief,

humanitarian

be severely hampered. U.S.

forces quickly

and without the advance

permission of coastal States through the Straits of Singapore, Malacca, Bab

Mandeb, Hormuz, and
other key

areas.

Transit

submerged submarine
Generally,

it is

Gibraltar, the Philippine

and Indonesian

sea-lanes,

el

and

must include surface navigation o{ warships,
and

transit,

air transit

by military

in the best interests of both coastal

aircraft.

and maritime States that

the coastal State not be faced with a decision as to whether or not to permit
transits.

For example, after certain

NATO

allies

denied permission to cross

their land territory in April 1986, U.S. military aircraft overflew the Strait o(

Gibraltar to conduct air strikes against targets in Libya in response to a

Libyan-sponsored
States

terrorist attack

—Spain and Morocco,

on U.S.

in particular

military personnel.

—were not required

The

coastal

to "vote"

on the

propriety of the self-defense mission by consenting (or not consenting) to
transit passage

through their

territorial seas

Similarly, during Operations Desert Shield
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transit passage

enabled U.S. and Coalition forces to transit the

Mandeb and Hormuz without

straits

of Bab

el

formal coastal State authorization.

An example from National Security and the Convention on the Law of the Sea 10
demonstrates the importance of mobility in the

movement

of a conventionally

powered, six-ship carrier battle group from Yokosuka, Japan, to the Persian
Gulf. If transit through the Strait of Malacca, the Indonesian archipelago,

and

the Torres Strait were denied, rerouting around Australia would be necessary.

This would delay the arrival of the battle group by sixteen days and result in
$2.9 million additional fuel costs.

11

Albeit unlikely, the scenario offers a clear

and specific picture of the potential monetary and opportunity costs of mobility
restrictions.

In addition to transit rights, traditional high seas freedoms underlie the
ability to

conduct robust naval operations. For instance, they permit military

forces to engage in flight operations, exercises, surveillance
activities,

and weapons

testing.

and

intelligence

Other lawful uses of the oceans important

to

U.S. military interests, albeit not directly related to navigation, include laying

submarine cables, hydrographic surveys, telecommunications

activities,

and

the collection of marine weather and oceanographic data.

In sum, an effective forward defense requires that U.S. forces be available

when and where needed

commitments and

to respond to

integrity of an alliance or coalition. This position

Marines Corps service doctrine. In
Operations and the

Commandant

.

.

.

From

is

to preserve the

reflected in U.S.

the Sea, the

Navy and

Chief of Naval

of the Marines Corps have stated:

Naval expeditionary Forces are:
[u]nrestricted by the need for transit or
overflight approval from foreign governments in order to enter the scene of
action. The international respect for freedom of the seas guarantees legal access
up to the territorial waters of all coastal countries of the world. This affords Naval
Forces the unique capability to provide peaceful presence in ambiguous
.

situations before a crisis erupts.

.

.

12

In addition to military uses, the United States has myriad other diverse and

Guaranteed access to resources within the high
seas, in the exclusive economic zone, and on the continental shelf foster
economic well-being. Resource management and environmental protection

vital interests in the oceans.

are key elements in preserving these resources.

depends on

its

freedom to conduct marine

The

scientific

scientific research.

community

Of course,

the

on commercial sea-lanes as the trade routes. Disruptions in
the flow of commerce have the potential for devastating effects on the global

U.S.

relies

heavily

economy.
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U.S. Oceans Policy and the

Law

of the Sea Convention

The 1982 United Nations Convention on
Convention)

central to U.S. oceans policy

is

Program

Law

the

and the

FON

provides a detailed framework for use of the oceans.

Convention

maximum

specifies the

of the Sea

13

(LOS

Program, for

it

In particular, the

breadth of each maritime zone and the

and duties therein, defines the standards for establishing baselines,
guarantees freedom of navigation and overflight on, under, and over
international waters, and codifies the rights of innocent passage, transit
rights

passage,

and archipelagic sea-lanes passage

for

both commercial and military

users.

In 1982, President Ronald Reagan announced that the United States would

LOS Convention due to objections to various deep seabed mining
14
in Part XL
The next year, the President issued an ocean policy

not sign the
provisions

statement in which he declared that the U.S. would comply with the

non-seabed mining provisions of the Convention because they "generally
confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all
15

He

announced that the U.S. would
navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on
the Convention
[but] will not
consistent with
states."

"exercise

also

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

seas uses."

16

community

in navigation

and

assert

a worldwide basis
.

acts of other States designed to restrict the rights

international

and

overflight

.

.

its
.

.

acquiesce in unilateral

and freedoms of the
and other related high

This statement reaffirmed the Freedom of Navigation Program,

which had existed since 1979.
In 1994, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin repeated the central oceans policy

theme when he stated that "[t]he armed forces continue to be the instrument
for the United States to exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights
and freedoms consistent with the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention." Secretary
Aspin further stated that

"it is

necessary for maritime nations ... to protest

excessive claims through diplomatic channels and to exercise their navigation

and

overflight rights in the disputed regions.

this responsibility as

Department
Program."

of

The United

an important tenet of national

Defense

maintains

an

active

States has accepted

policy. Therefore, the

Freedom of Navigation

17

Secretary of Defense William Perry reiterated this view in 1994: "[t]he
nation's security has
over, under,

because

it

depended upon our

and on the oceans.

We

ability to

conduct military operations

support the [1982

LOS] Convention

confirms traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight;
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it

through international

details passage rights

and

straits;

with coastal states during operations."

for disagreements

The LOS Convention came
Fortunately, earlier in

it

reduces prospects

18

on November 16, 1994.
1994, UN-sponsored negotiations had resulted in an
into force for

its

parties

agreement that reforms the deep seabed mining provisions of the LOS
Convention to address longstanding objections of the U.S. and other
industrialized nations.

19

Removal of those objections has opened the way

U.S. acceptance of the

LOS

for

Convention. In October 1994, the President

transmitted the Convention and the U.N. -sponsored agreement to the Senate
for

its

advice and consent.

20

In 1997, Secretary of Defense William

Cohen

previous administrations and Secretaries: "The
rules

.

.

.

theme of

reiterated the

LOS Convention

.

.

establishes

.

regarding freedoms of navigation and overflight essential for

maintaining the global mobility, presence, and readiness of U.S. armed forces

The United States

.

.

.

has

much to gain by becoming a party." 21 He further stated

that "despite positive developments in the law of the sea,

maritime nations,

like the

United

remains necessary for

it

States, to protest excessive claims

diplomatic channels and to exercise

.

.

.

rights in disputed areas.

The

.

.

.

.

.

.

through

Freedom

of Navigation Program has challenged excessive claims to counter any argument
that such claims are valid due to acquiescence over time."

On

22

balance, U.S. oceans policy has been effective. United States forces

generally have

operated consistent with the

significant repercussion.

Most

LOS Convention

criticism of U.S. operations

is

without

based on a

misunderstanding of the nature of the operations. For example, military
surveys in an

EEZ

—

scientific research,

a high seas

freedom

which is subject

misunderstanding results

when

warship apparently violating

its

—sometimes

are mistaken for marine

to coastal State consent.

Another common

a coastal State observes a military aircraft or
territorial seas

international strait in a transit passage mode.

when it is

actually transiting

When queried

the aircraft or ship responds with a simple explanation, such

as to its purpose,
as:

Navy aircraft in transit passage." The response generally satisfies

The

success of the existing policy, however, does not

military strategy

is

an

"This
all

is

a U.S.

concerned.

mean

that U.S.

best served by the U.S. remaining a non-party to a

comprehensive, widely accepted convention governing the world's oceans.

On

LOS Convention reflects not only existing custom,

but

the contrary, the 1982
fairly

balances the competing interests of coastal and maritime States.

The

Convention provides a solid framework for environmental protection, and
enhances the ability to study and to protect the marine environment. By
becoming a party, the U.S. will be in a better position to influence law of the sea
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developments in related

such

of Navigation

Program

Maritime Organization
(IMO) and regional fishing organizations. Moreover, universal adherence
fora,

as the International

movement

promises stability and predictability for the
while guaranteeing, through

economic

As

activity off

to the

reduce

its

FON

its

EEZ

its

Program, a widely accepted Convention should, over time,
be

claims beyond those permitted by

enforce,

coastal state control of

shores.

stressors, for States will

stable than

provisions,

of commercial cargo,

far less likely to

provisions. After

its

customary international law, which

and malleable. The

law's constant evolution

is

all,

or enforce

ocean

treaties are

more

often vague, difficult to

rules are easier to identify

than with customary

through claim and counterclaim. (Indeed, the U.S.

LOS Convention

position that the

make

represents customary law has been

questioned by some nations.) In addition, the Convention provides more detail

and

than customary law. The

clarity

permitted during innocent passage

of activities permitted and not

listing

one of many examples.

is

Ultimately, the Convention regime provides the best avenue to order and
stability in the

solid

law of the

sea. Its

navigation and overflight provisions provide a

oceans framework for the execution of military strategy and a clear legal

framework

for the

mechanism is

execution of the

FON Program, while its dispute resolution

generally less politically

and practically costly than confrontation

or acquiescence.

Freedom of Navigation Operations

in Practice

FON assertions are directed in operation orders that specify procedures and
approval authority for the commander.

The

orders generally delineate

when

the participating ship or aircraft will enter and exit the area o( the excessive

claim and

when

the unit will enter and exit the U.S. -recognized territorial sea

or other ocean zone involved in the assertion.

plotted

on

charts

and reviewed

for

FON

assertion tracks are then

accuracy by navigation

Operation orders may also provide detailed guidance on

how

specialists.

to respond to

coastal State queries concerning the ship's or aircraft's presence.

Rules of engagement (ROE) provide guidance on the use of force in
self-defense in the unlikely event a coastal State responds by force to the assertion.

Intelligence estimates of threats, to

the order.

which the

The DoD Maritime Claims

many

are tailored, are included in

Manual provides commanders a
23
coastal nations. The Manual also

Reference

detailed listing of the maritime claims of all
lists

ROE

instances in which the United States has protested excessive claims

or conducted operational assertions against them. Particularly useful
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Commander s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 24 which provides
commanders and staffs a ready reference concerning the legal divisions of
oceans and airspace and the corresponding rights and duties of the coastal and
other States therein.
Effective operations require

comprehensive training and a multidisciplinary

approach. Fleet units must conduct routine training and exercises that include

law of the sea and rules of engagement concepts to ensure compliance with

and U.S. oceans policy. Thereafter, operators, planners,
intelligence specialists, and legal advisors must work together to ensure that
operations are conducted in an efficient, effective, and safe manner, consistent
international law

with international law.

To document

the operation, each unit provides an after-action report to

superiors in the chain of

command. Subsequently, the

Secretary of Defense

publishes an unclassified annual report of assertions conducted during the previous
fiscal year.

25

It is this listing

which places the international community on notice of

U.S. actions demonstrating non-U.S. acquiescence in excessive claims.

With diplomatic

of excessive claims,

protests

operational assertions are needed at

diplomatic

might

protests

acquiescence in an

all.

suffice

illegal claim.

After

all,

protect

to

one might query why

in strict legal terms, timely

technical

against

legal

Nevertheless, there are compelling policy

reasons for conducting operational assertions.
First

and foremost, protests without operations give the coastal State exactly

—

on our mobility and a change in our behavior
consistent with the illegal claim. For example, North Korea purports to exclude

what

it

wants

restrictions

foreign military forces from

its

The

50-nautical-mile security zone.

U.S. has

protested the claim, but failure to operate within the zone would play into

North Korea's hands by effectively respecting the claim.
Government of the Philippines claims that all waters within

Similarly,
its

the

archipelagic

baselines are internal waters not subject to archipelagic sea-lanes passage.

Again, protest alone

deny U.S. forces the

An

illegal

claim cannot be permitted to

ability to transit critical sea-lanes that

mariners for centuries.
signal

not enough.

is

Of course,

than diplomatic protests,

have been used by

operational assertions send an even stronger

for protests alone

seldom provide a

incentive to impel relinquishment of the claim. Moreover,

if

sufficient

assertions or

routine exercises of rights are not conducted in normal times, the political cost

of an assertion during a
regularly transit the

there in times of

crisis is likely to

Taiwan

Strait

be

far higher.

For instance, failure to

would complicate the

crisis.
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Frustrations, Challenges,

While

policy guidance

commander headquarters
Program

is

is

Program

and Successes

published in the Pentagon and at senior military
in

top-to-bottom fashion,

traditional

implemented using a

bottom-up procedure.

reverse,

the

FON

Periodically,

higher authority will issue a letter or message that encourages the operating
forces to

conduct

assertions. Rarely,

if

ever,

is

a specific assertion directed.

26

On

Navy ships or aircraft begin with a proposal
commander or a subordinate command. Many

the contrary, most assertions by

developed by a numbered

fleet

are later canceled by higher authority for reasons impossible for the subordinate

command

to

have foreseen, often

expended great energy
results.

To

assertions

after the operating forces

command

has

in planning the assertion. Understandably, frustration

help alleviate this problem, Pentagon policy makers should direct

from time to time, particularly in the case of long, unchallenged

claims; those

who

direct cancellation of

and share

earliest possible notice

an assertion must

also provide the

their rationale with those in the field.

one or more of the players in a FON assertion will
misunderstand the program and oppose it as provocative. The nay-sayers at
times include U.S. embassy officials, military commanders, staff officers, and

More

significantly,

DoS and DoD officials
the program.

The

—many

only answer

of whom have had
is

no previous experience with
education and training. The program merits

27
and requires continuous explanation.

At

times, assertion opportunities are missed

due to erroneous perceptions

that the coastal State will use force to prevent
action. In fact, rarely

is

it

there any type of response.

or take other retaliatory

FON

action officers must

study the historical record of assertions to ascertain the likely response.

and country

Intelligence officers

specialists

information concerning coastal State

The high tempo
available ships

and

can serve

as

important sources of

sensitivities.

of current operations and the shrinking numbers of

aircraft are practical

challenge for the action officer

is

to

impediments to some

know

all

assertions.

The

of the excessive claims in the area

of responsibility, and to take advantage of any units that might be operating in
the vicinity of such a claim. Generally, given the worldwide operation of U.S.

and aircraft, at some point in time, a ship or aircraft
conduct the assertion with little or no additional costs

be close enough

ships

will

to

in time or

money.

In the end the frustrations and challenges are outweighed by the success
stories.

As

a result of the routine

and frequent exercise o{ navigation and

around the world, law of the sea concepts such as innocent
passage of warships, transit passage, and archipelagic sea-lanes passage are well
overflight rights
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established in customary international law, a

number of

coastal States have

28

withdrawn excessive claims, and the right to conduct military operations with
due regard for resource related activities in the EEZ of coastal states is widely
understood and respected. The returns benefit not only the U.S., but all
nations interested in promoting maritime mobility.

may prove beneficial. Recall the Black Sea
"bumping incident of February 1988, when two U.S. ships entered the Soviet
territorial sea in the Black Sea during a FON operation. The subsequent
Even the

instances of friction

"

"shouldering" by two Soviet warships led to a U.S. diplomatic protest.
Ultimately, the two governments reached a consensus

innocent passage

is

expressed in the

LOS Convention,

29

that

that the law of

all ships,

including

warships, enjoy the right of innocent passage, that neither prior notice nor

authorization

is

required prior to innocent passage, and that internal coastal

State laws should conform to this uniform interpretation of the applicable legal

regime. Optimally, future assertions will produce similar results.

The

FON

Program has provided one clear benefit to the operating forces
and operational commanders and their staffs. Planning and conducting the
assertions have caused a greater understanding of law of the sea principles and
their effect

on

When

military operations.

conducting or approving the

must know with specificity in
which ocean zone the ship or aircraft will be operating, and understand its
corresponding rights and duties. Real world operations demand a much more
intense focus than that needed in training or academic environments; mistakes
can be politically embarrassing for the United States.
and

assertions, operators

their legal advisors

Future
There was no question as to the need for a FON Program in an international
environment that lacked a widely accepted law of the sea treaty. But as the
LOS Convention becomes widely accepted, will a FON Program still be
needed? The answer
First,

is

"yes."

excessive jurisdictional oceans claims will likely always exist.

Even

Convention may enact domestic legislation or regulations
inconsistent with its provisions. Such threats to the Convention regime should
remain a focus of the FON Program.
parties to the

Second, the U.S.

is

not yet a party to the Convention.

their position that certain navigation

Convention

and overflight

are available only to parties.

Some

States persist in

rights articulated in the

An active FON

Program

to preserve those rights for the U.S. in the face of that position.
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Third, while the Convention

of Navigation

Program

the result of remarkable

is

efforts,

it

is,

and compromises. There are ambiguities
and gaps some unintentional, some intentional, some creative, and some the
product of a lack of agreement. Such ambiguities and gaps, coupled with
nevertheless, a product of committees

—

pressures for restrictive changes, particularly in the environmental arena,

mandate

a continuation of the

program in some form. In that regard, consider

the following:

Marine scientific research (MSR) is subject to coastal state jurisdiction in
the EEZ, but the LOS Convention fails to define the term, a particular problem
because hydrographic surveys and the collection of marine environmental
•

information for military purposes are considered by the U.S. to be high seas

freedoms that are not subject to coastal state jurisdiction, even

conducted in the EEZ.

when

30

The Convention does not address flight information regions (FIRs) or air
defense identification zones (ADIZs) Coastal States sometimes demand prior
•

.

notice

zones

or

—even

not enter
passage.

31

permission

prior
if

an

aircraft

flying

territorial airspace, or

To provide advance

an adverse precedent
•

is

for

There

U.S.

military

aircraft

under due regard vice

is

transiting

these

ICAO procedures, will

in transit passage or archipelagic sea-lanes

notice under these circumstances would create

for restrictions

on mobility and

flexibility.

are several U.S. interpretive positions applicable to the transit

passage regime that are not specifically addressed in the Convention. For

example,

it is

waters of the

the U.S. position that transit passage extends not only to the
straits,

but also to the normally used approaches; that transit

passage applies to a corridor that extends from shore to shore; and that the

regime applies to

all straits

capable of being used for international navigation.

32

While these interpretations are reasonable and tend to promote navigational
safety and efficiency, they are not necessarily accepted by all coastal States.
Convention
requires that "all normal passage routes" be included. Coastal and maritime
States tend to disagree on designations. Routine use of these routes and
•

If an

archipelagic State designates sea-lanes or air routes, the

operational assertions against excessive claims will preserve

The

flexibility.

and archipelagic sea-lanes passage regimes permit
ships and aircraft to operate in their normal mode. While not specifically
spelled out in the Convention, the U.S. position is that submarines may
transit submerged. Further, all ships and aircraft may transit in a manner
consistent with sound navigational practices and the security of the force, to
include formation steaming and the operation of radars and other sensors, as
examples. Again, the Convention does not specifically articulate these rights.
•

transit passage
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Consistent with the

•

LOS Convention

(Articles 42, 95, 96, 110,

U.S. military ships and aircraft enjoy sovereign immunity.

33

and 236)

Nevertheless, they

demands or requests to submit to searches or inspections.
The FON Program can demonstrate a clear sovereign immunity policy needed
to ensure these demands are resisted to avoid erosion of this principle.
A widely ratified Convention represents the best available path to oceans
are often subjected to

All nations should carefully balance any objections to the reformed

stability.

Convention against the significant gains that would be achieved through
acceptance. The FON Program has served and will continue to serve U.S.
interests well. In the future, an effective FON Program will have U.S. forces
exercise their rights to ensure that practice under the LOS Convention is
consistent with customary international law and operational requirements.
Other maritime States which have benefited from the U.S. program, should
modified to meet their specific
consider the adoption of such a program
needs

—

—

to ensure their law of the sea rights are preserved. States with similar

maritime interests could clearly benefit from a coordinated

FON program.
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VII
The Framework in

the Founding Act for

NATORussia
Joint Peacekeeping Operations

Myron H. Nordquist

A

T THE MINISTERIAL MEETING of the North Atlantic Council held at

NATO

Headquarters in Brussels on 10 December 1996, Secretary

General Javier Solana was tasked with developing an agreement on a new

NATO-Russia

relationship.

The foundation

previous "16 plus 1" discussions; that

Russian Federation.

The

is,

for the consultations

the sixteen

participation

of the

members

of

was based on

NATO plus the

Russian Federation in the

and in contributing troops to the
Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina were cited as favorable
Partnership

for

Peace

programs

NATO ministers envisioned a fundamentally new
European security era in which NATO and Russia's relationships would deepen

factors for this initiative.

The

and widen. Agreement was to be explored on a "framework of
development" expressed in a "document or
Charter."
.

.

its

future

.

Founding Act
The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between

NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in Paris on 27 May

1997.

On one

The Framework

side,

in the

Founding Act

the signatories were the Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, Javier

Solana, and

NATO Heads of State such as President William Clinton,

and on

The

the other side, the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin.
signatories stressed the historic significance of the

Act that was heralded

beginning a "new chapter of Euro-Atlantic security."

1

At

the Act's signing

ceremony, repeated references were made to the end of the Cold
the notion that the

Act was

laying the foundation for

as

War and

NATO-Russia

to

collective

security cooperation in the twenty-first century. President Clinton spoke

enthusiastically both about a

new

Russia and about building a

new NATO.

President Yeltsin, not to be outdone, expressed at least equal enthusiasm for

the Act. Indeed, the euphoria of the Russian President was such that he

unexpectedly announced at the end of the ceremony:
signed the
is

aimed

document am going to make the

Clinton were
President's

still

today, after having

following decision. Everything that

at countries present here, all of those

warheads removed. (Applause.)"

"I,

weapons

are going to

have their

A few hours later, spokesmen for President

2

seeking "clarification" about the meaning of the Russian

"impromptu remark." 3

The matter of detargeting or deactivation of Russian missiles is only one of
many significant international security issues that requires clarification as a
result of the signing of the Act. The long-term ramifications in the Act for
either classic peacekeeping or new enforcement action operations involving
forces

from both NATO and Russia

is

another important area that merits study.

In this latter case in particular, professional military experts must look for

guidance about joint operations conducted by the combined military forces of

NATO

and Russia.

The Founding Act
framework

is

an umbrella document

that, at best, lays

for concrete action. Practical as well as

out a general

conceptual problems are

immediately presented. And, with such far-reaching consequences,
predictable that differing interpretations of the Act's
surface, probably sooner rather

advanced

in this essay

is

A

reporter

later.

When

numerous provisions
this

is

will

happens, the view

document itself must be the
In fact, this point already arose on the day the Act
asked President Clinton's Press Secretary, Mike

that the language in the

starting basis for analysis.

was signed.

than

it

McCurry, whether he was "convinced now that Boris Yeltsin understands the

way that the United States understands
the Russian role and the rest of NATO does?" McCurry responded: "I don't
think he [Yeltsin] ever had any understanding but what was in the document

Russian role

[in

the Act] in the same

that he signed a short while ago."

4
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Interpreting the Founding

Act

Significant implications flow from adopting McCurry's position.

Common

sense as well as traditional legal practice supports the proposition that the

language actually embodied in the text of the Act
intentions of the signatories.
certainly entitled to

The

is

the best evidence of the

actual words agreed to by the signatories are

more weight than

are the speculations of third party

observers or the perception spin given by interested parties to the media.

An

initial step in selecting rules to interpret

document

is

to determine

Founding Act,

this

is

not

its

status

the text of a multilateral

under international law. In the case of the

as straight

forward as one might expect. Recall that

the Ministerial guidance provided to

NATO's

Secretary General was vague

about the form in which the agreement might be expressed.
obviously chose to call the final

document an

"act."

The

signatories

This deliberate decision by

the nations concerned merits a brief examination.

The term "act"

is

usually "reserved for a multilateral convention concluding

on important questions that lays down the law between them
An example is the "Concluding Act of the Negotiation on

a session of States
for the future."

5

Personnel Strength of Conventional
Helsinki

on 10

July 1992.

6

Armed

Forces in Europe" signed in

In Section VIII of this instrument,

it is

explicitly

provided that the "measures adopted in this Act are politically binding." This

Act dealing with Conventional Forces was an outgrowth of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act concluded in Helsinki on 1
August 1975, that was also a legally non-binding document. 7 The question of
whether a Final Act is a "treaty or merely a machinery arrangement to be
8
utilized by the parties depends upon its interpretation." The problem with this
observation is that it begs the question of what rules of interpretation are to be
selected to interpret?

The Founding Act
specific

an international agreement embodying a number of
commitments that is signed by sixteen Heads of State or Government.
is

These officials are sophisticated people who are well advised by legal experts.
Such officials must be presumed, for example, not to have chosen to call the
document a "joint declaration" or to select a similar label that clearly connotes
noncontractual obligations. In international law practice, a joint declaration

is

announcement by several States that expresses a common
policy outlook without taking on the character of a contractual or legal
obligation. Towards the other end of the international obligation spectrum is
typically a public

the formal treaty that embodies the solemn consent by a sovereign State to

accept binding legal commitments.

The Founding Act was
131

also not called a

The Framework

"treaty,"

in the

and that too must be presumed

political leaders of the signatory States.

view, that

is

unfortunate, for

be unnecessary.

The

if

the

Founding Act

to be a deliberate choice of the leading

Considered only from a process point of

Act were

rules to interpret the

a treaty, this examination

meaning of the Act's

international law would, without doubt, be found in the

on the Law of Treaties.

9

It is

an "Act" does not mean that it
in the

mean

is

chose to

document

fails

call

on

this "treaty

the

document

not a treaty for the purposes of using the rules

Vienna Convention. Moreover, the "Act"
that the

text under

Vienna Convention

noteworthy, however, that, even in

treaties," the fact that the signatories consciously

would

to

label does not necessarily

meet the requirements

for a treaty

under the

domestic law of the United States.

The Vienna Convention provides that the definition of "treaty" in the
international law sense may be different from the domestic law sense. Use of
terms in the Vienna Convention sense
terms or to the meanings which

any State."

10

to

them

in the internal laws of

This safeguard takes into account the different internal

Commission about
many

"without prejudice to the use of those

may be given

ratification processes of -States.

In

is

The comment by

this point in the

Law

the International

Vienna Convention

reads:

countries, the constitution requires that international agreements in a

form considered under the internal law or usage of the State to be
be endorsed by
Accordingly,

the legislature or

it is

have

a "treaty"

their ratification authorized by

essential that the definition given to the

must

it.

.

.

.

term "treaty" in the

way the

present articles should do nothing to disturb or affect in any

existing

domestic rules or usage's which govern the classification o( international

agreements under national law.

11

The Vienna Convention is not in force

for the

United States, and the treaty

interpretation rules therein are, strictly viewed, not governing for a non-party.

But the

rules

of interpretation in the Vienna Convention do represent

"generally accepted principles
to accept

them

and the United States has

despite differences of nuance

also

and emphasis."

12

appeared willing

While courts

in

the United States are generally more willing than those of other States to look
outside the instrument, at the travaux preparatories, in most cases, both the U.S.

and Vienna Convention approaches lead
the Vienna Convention

is

needed to

to the

satisfy

same

result.

13

A closer look at

our quest for what rules are

appropriate to interpret the meaning of the Founding Act.

A treaty

is

defined in article 2 of the Vienna Convention as follows:
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means an international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
.

.

"treaty"

.

designation

.

.

.

(emphasis supplied).

On its face, the Founding Act is an international agreement in written form
evidenced by being signed by a number of Heads

concluded between States

as

of State or Government.

The

international organization,

i.e.,

fact that

NATO,

one signatory was the head of an

consisting of virtually

all

the States

commitments of
some significance were being made for Russia, as well as for NATO and its
member States. In its own right, NATO is generally accepted in the modern
involved, only adds weight to the impression that important

practice of international law as a proper subject to be governed by international
law.

Along the same

line,

one may

safely

assume that the Secretary General

possesses full powers to represent the organization in concluding treaties or

other international instruments involving binding commitments of various
kinds.

The government

signatories, also prima facie,

have

full

powers to act

as

representatives for the purpose of expressing the consent of their respective
States to be

bound by the instrument. 14 Thus, from

Act as executed could have
Vienna Convention.

The
the

fact remains,

Act as

qualified as a treaty

a formality standpoint, the

under the definition in the

however, that the drafters consciously chose not to treat

a treaty. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the negotiation

and

execution of the document suggest that high-level political rather than legal

commitments were contemplated. Political obligations differ in important
respects from legal obligations. While political obligations are not enforceable
strictly speaking, they may be more significant in practical impact. Political
commitments are usually more comprehensive in scope and carry greater
long-term implications than do legal obligations. This would appear to be a fit
characterization of the Founding Act. The Act was signed at an unusually high
level with great public fanfare. Moreover, there was no provision for domestic
ratification included in the document. Without ratification, most States,
including the United States, do not contemplate undertaking binding treaty
obligations.

Those analyzing the Act and the meaning of its text are accordingly still left
with the practical task of interpreting an international instrument containing
important commitments for which there are no universally accepted rules. To
deal with the problem, this writer decided to adopt the following approach: the

Founding Act

will

be treated as a treaty for the limited purpose of applying the

widely accepted rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention to analyze
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in the

the meaning of the text. This decision

is

Founding Act

justified because, looking at the entire

context, the Vienna Convention rules are the best choice for legal guidance

given their global acceptance. Indeed, the writer cannot think of better rules to
evaluation of this document. Considering the Act as a

facilitate a disciplined

treaty for the limited purposes of interpretation obviously does not

the

Act is equivalent

mean

to a treaty

embodying binding

legal

that selection of such a disciplined approach

is

mean

commitments.

more

that

does

It

likely to lead to

conclusions consistent with the elevated status of the signatories whose direct
participation indicates that the exact wording of the

Act was intended

to be

taken very seriously.
In the case of the United States, there

is

no evidence that President Clinton

intended the Act to be a formal treaty in the sense contemplated by the U.S.
Constitution.

Had

that been his intent, he would have planned to seek the

advice and consent of the Senate. There

is

great

wisdom

in consulting the

Senate early and often on important foreign policy matters, but nothing
indicates that the President

Act

wanted

to present the difficult issues raised by the

Given that the Senate is controlled by
the opposition party, the President was probably content at this stage to rely
upon his inherent powers as Head o{ State and Commander in Chief of the
to public debate in the Congress.

Armed
treaty
its

Forces as the sources of his authority to

is

act.

Of course,

the fact that a

not perfected in the municipal law sense does not relieve the State of

obligations under international law.

Confusion sometimes

arises

on

this

point because while the domestic and international law spheres are related,

they are often quite distinct. This duality of legal regimes can be quite handy. In
this case for instance, President

Clinton probably achieved exactly what he

wanted for both his domestic and international law purposes. That is, the
United States intends to honor the political commitments to other nations
made by the President in the Act under international law but is not bound by
legal obligations in the Act under domestic law.
In light of the foregoing, the legal status of the Act under either domestic or
international law
principles
its

and rules

language. In

all

unaffected merely by using the treaty interpretation

is

in the

Vienna Convention to help ascertain the meaning of

events, interpreters use either implicit or explicit rules to

reach conclusions about the meaning of

Convention

rules are

text.

In this study, the Vienna

expected to provide some guidance.

Proceeding on that

basis, Article

31(1) of the Vienna Convention

first

provides the general rule that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith by

according ordinary meaning to
object and purpose."

16

its

terms "in their context and in light of

The context

its

expressly includes agreements relating to
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the treaty. In the case of the Founding Act, this category covers

many

treaties

and other forms of international agreements that are cited with favor or
directly incorporated by reference. Examples include the UN Charter and the
Helsinki Final Act.

Paragraph 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention deals with the
subsequent practice of States that is to be taken into account with the context.

Sub-paragraph 3(a) identifies subsequent agreements between the parties
interpreting the treaty or applying its provisions as part of this subsequent
practice.

Sub-paragraph 3(b) references "any subsequent practice in the

application of the treaty

regarding

its

which

establishes the

agreement of the parties

interpretation." Thus, subsequent practice includes

both words

and deeds.

The primacy of the written text itself over external context is demonstrated
by the Vienna Convention's interpretative rules with respect to supplementary

Supplementary means of interpretation may be sought in the
preparatory work leading up to the document text and the circumstances of the
sources.

But recourse to supplementary means of interpretation is
two limited purposes. Supplementary sources may be consulted

treaty's conclusion.

allowed for

meaning of the text itself or to determine the meaning
ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result "manifestly absurd or

either to confirm the

when the text is
unreasonable."

17

The North

Atlantic Treaty

Before examining the text of the Founding Act in light of the rules of
interpretation in the

Vienna Convention,

it is

necessary to understand the

North Atlantic Treaty that created NATO. Certainly there is no argument
about applying the Vienna Convention's rules of interpretation to this treaty in
an effort to ascertain the legal parameters governing NATO.
Entering into force in 1949 at the outset of the Cold War, the North

NATO

an organization to provide for the
collective defense of its members; that is, an armed attack on one is an attack
on all. The operative language is contained in one long sentence in Article 5 of

Atlantic Treaty established

as

the Treaty:

The
or

Parties agree that

North America

an armed attack against one or more of them

shall

be considered an attack against them

consequently they agree that,

if

in

Europe

all;

and

such an armed attack occurs, each of them,

in

exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article
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in the

51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Founding Act

will assist the Party or Parties so

attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such
action as

it

deems necessary, including the use of armed

maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The

text of Article 5

is

force, to restore

and

18

unmistakable about where the armed attack must

occur against a Party: the attack must be in Europe or North America. Article 6

even more geographically specific by expressly citing the "territory of any of
the Parties in Europe or North America, ... on the occupation forces of any
Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this
19
area of any of the Parties."
is

The

question that immediately arises for an essay concentrating on

North Atlantic Treaty for NATO
to initiate peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Where was the
armed attack against a Party as required by Article 5 ? And even if the Article
51 concept of self-defense was construed to deem that an armed attack
occurred, did it take place on the territory of any of the NATO members as
concretely defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty?
The express mention of Article 51 in Article 5 leaves no room for argument
about the point that NATO was conceived as an Article 51 self-defense
organization under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The North Atlantic Treaty
was also formally ratified by its Parties (including the Senate of the United
States) as a Chapter VII entity. The reason was plain fifty years ago and is plain
now. Had NATO been established as a regional collective security arrangement
to undertake enforcement actions under Chapter VIII, it would be subject to a

peacekeeping

is

where

is

the authority in the

Soviet veto in the Security Council. Article 53 of the Charter explicitly
provides

"no

that

enforcement

action

shall

be

taken

under regional

arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council.

.

.

."

To

give the Soviets a veto over

NATO actions would defeat the

purpose of an organization established to defend against an armed attack by the
Soviet

Union

or

its allies

in the

North Atlantic

territories of the Parties.

An argument can be made that while the ordinary meaning of the terms and
conditions in Article 5 do not allow

NATO

action outside the territory of the Parties, the

according to

NATO

procedures.

The

to initiate affirmative military

member States agreed

reasoning

is

that this

is

to

proceed

subsequent

makes non-self defense,
out-of-area operations legal. On the international law plane, this argument has
some validity. Recall that the Vienna Convention recognizes subsequent

practice manifesting agreement by the Parties

and

this

practice as part of the context to interpret a treaty or to apply
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The North

Atlantic Council did authorize

operations and

all

sixteen

NATO's

out-of-area peacekeeping

member States have manifested their consent to

the

peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the highest levels in

many

ways.

But there
perspective.

is

a

problem with

As explained

this line of

Law

above, the Vienna Convention accords primacy to

the ordinary meaning of words in the text.
all if

reasoning from a Rule of

What is

the value of a treaty text at

context in the form of subsequent practice can conflict directly with the

ordinary meaning of the words? Strained interpretations of context, as a matter

amending plain treaty language. The
text, and the rules embodied in it, must be honored for the interpretation
process has good faith limits. Black cannot be white no matter how strong the
political will to declare it so. If the text of a treaty is bad, then the remedy is to
of principle,

amend
itself to

may not be

a subterfuge for

the language as provided by

its

Law does not lend
needs of political expediency. The

terms.

"picking and choosing" to meet the

The Rule

of

North Atlantic Treaty that there is no ambiguity
about the point that NATO is an Article 5 1 self-defense organization under
Chapter VII and not a regional enforcement organization under Chapter VIII of
the Charter. Agreed subsequent practice, admittedly based on the consent of
all the parties, cannot be ascribed the same legal stature as an amendment to
the clear terms of a treaty. An argument on the subsequent practice context
has to be fashioned in a mode that is at least compatible with the plain meaning
of the terms in the treaty. Moreover, in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty,
there is an agreed process for making amendments which requires using the
same ratification procedures that were used for formalizing the original text.
However much one sees the practical and political value of using NATO for
activities beyond its constitutional limits, adherence to the Rule of Law is a

language

is

so plain in the

higher imperative.

The

short-term gains in ignoring the law cannot outweigh

the long-term benefits of following

it.

This seems elementary but

it

must be

said

in this case.

Confusion about the Articles 5 and 6 problem may stem from international
law being based on the consent of sovereign States. Essentially, States

may do

between themselves whatever they agree to do. Third parties seldom have legal
standing to complain. Thus, in the sphere of international law, there is no
effective legal

remedy

for

an

ultra vires

charge with respect to

NATO's

out-of-area peacekeeping operations in the absence of the treaty-mandated

armed attack. Who has standing to call the sovereign States to task? There is
no obligation on a Member State to look behind the ostensible authority of
senior representatives in the North Atlantic Council who approve the actions.
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Lack of remedy or effective enforcement, however, does not mean lack of law
and the obligation to obey the law. There is a duty to obey law on the
international plane even in the face of imperfect enforcement. And this
philosophical issue is by no means limited to interpretation of the North
Atlantic Treaty.

Of course,

the enforcement issue

is

quite different under U.S. domestic law

where the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Both the President and
Congress can be held accountable to obey the Law of the Land. Courts do
enforce the Constitution and this is at the heart of why the United States
promotes the Rule of Law in the former Warsaw Pact nations. Under the
domestic law of the United States, the treaty ratification processes of the

and when
somehow found

Constitution must be satisfied

North Atlantic Treaty
the current

NATO

is

if

a case

is

presented.

If

the text of the

to admit of the interpretation that

peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina were

contemplated within the four corners of the

treaty, the

Court may consider

supplementary sources such as are found in the debates at the time the Senate
gave
is

its

advice and consent in 1949. However, this avenue of possible support

unlikely to provide

much

aid or comfort for the proponents of the current

unaware today that NATO is
conducting out-of-area peacekeeping operations that go beyond Article 51
action.

20

This

is

not to suggest that the Senate

is

self-defense. Clear evidence of notice to the Senate

appropriates funds to support

provided

is

NATO's peacekeeping

when Congress

operations in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. This formal act suggests political approval by the U.S. Congress,
including the Senate. However, use of these implied methods of approval

is

not

the same as adhering to the advice and consent procedures expressly required

by the Constitution.

When NATO

peacekeeping operations out-of-area,
legal authority to carry

than

lives are

as

being put at

amend

risk.

funded by Congress to conduct

NATO

activities.

ought to have unquestionable

This

is

The proper way

true
for

no other reason
American officials to
if

for

North Atlantic Treaty as provided in that instrument
required by the U.S. Constitution. Compliance with the Rule of Law in

proceed

and

out those

is

is

this case

to

the

may engender

a politically distasteful public debate about the proper

NATO in the post-Cold War era. Such are the costs of Democracy and
respect for the Rule of Law. Since the admission of new members to NATO
role for

must be considered in formal advice and consent processes anyway, the Senate
has an appropriate opportunity, if it so chooses, to revisit the authority of
NATO to act under Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

How

might out-of-area peacekeeping

under another

treaty,

e.g.,

the

UN
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UN

to

peacekeeping

under "Chapter VI and a half

as falling

" 21

conveys the

notion of activities that go beyond peaceful resolution of disputes but stop short
of armed self-defense responses.

and one half activities

UN

the legitimacy of

Under

Chapter VI

treaty interpretation rules,

are seen as subsequent practice. Unlike the

peacekeeping operations

is

NATO case,

derived from a context of

subsequent practice that does not violate any express language in the Charter.

To

take the comparison one step further, the recent

and Herzegovina could be characterized

The

idea

is

that

"self-defense" of

NATO's peacekeeping
member's

as

NATO

actions in Bosnia

"Chapter VII and a half missions.

efforts there clearly

territories in the

go beyond the

UN

Chapter VII sense of the

Charter but stop short of being international enforcement actions in the

Chapter VIII sense.

By

its

North Atlantic Treaty also must be interpreted as
," 22
any way the rights and obligations under the Charter.

express terms, the

not affecting "in

Modern

.

.

international law prohibits States from using military force unless the

actions are in conformity with the

of military force

is

UN Charter. Under the UN Charter, the use

accepted as legitimate for peacekeeping under Chapter VI

and a half, for self-defense under Chapter VII, and for enforcement under
Chapter VIII. As just noted above, the international community may now be
on the verge of accepting Chapter VII and a half as State practice in
circumstances such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the terms of the Charter,
UN peacekeeping and enforcement by regional collective security organization
actions

require

approval

by

the

Security

Council

As
NATO-Russia

any joint

is

aside

the

where the Russian
discussed below, Russia would also have a veto in

controversial Uniting for Peace Resolution debate)

Federation has a veto.

(setting

23

military operations

undertaken pursuant to the

Founding Act.

Preamble to Founding Act
With

the framework governing the use of force in the

North Atlantic Treaty
the preamble to the

we turn to the first important point stressed in
Founding Act that pertains to future NATO-Russia
in mind,

peacekeeping operations. This

undertaken

UN Charter and the

is

that the political

commitments

at the highest political levels to signify the start of a

in the

Act

are

fundamentally

between NATO and Russia. The Act is said to define "the
goals and mechanisms of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and
joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between
NATO and Russia." 24

new

relationship
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Reference

made

is

the Alliance revised

NATO Summit Conference in Rome where

to the 1991

strategic doctrine to take

its

The Act then

Soviet Union.

Founding Act

in the

account of the collapse of the

explicitly states the goal of taking

missions of peacekeeping and

management

crisis

on "new

in support of the

United

(UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
." As explained below, what is
(OSCE), such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
noteworthy about this political commitment is that Russia has a veto about

•Nations

.

.

undertaking peacekeeping operations under either

A vague reference

is

also

made

in the

UN or OSCE sponsorship.

Preamble to addressing "new security

The meaning

challenges" with other countries and international organizations.

of this sentence

is

sufficiently

ambiguous that

a candidate for contextual

it is

interpretation or even interpretation by supplementary sources. For the

can be noted that the reference appears to be broad
enough to encompass out-of-area peacekeeping operations.

purposes of this essay,

it

mention is made of NATO's
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).
Specific

efforts to

Atlantic Cooperation Council

(NACC)

Partnership for Peace (PFP) program

concerned with peacekeeping and

is.

is

."

.

.

develop the "European

In this connection, the North

not cited in the Preamble, while the

NAAC,

Unlike the

fifteen

PFP

the

PFP program is

countries are participating in

Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
started at the January 1994

NATO

Summit Meeting,

25

The

PFP,

joins 27 mostly Central

and Eastern European States (including Russia) with sixteen NATO members
A specific PFP goal is to "create an ability to operate with NATO forces in such
," 26
Within the PFP framework, peacekeeping field
fields as peacekeeping.
exercises are undertaken with joint planning facilitated by liaison officers
stationed at NATO Headquarters and a "Partnership Coordination Cell" at
27
Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe in Mons, Belgium.
.

Next, the

(EAPC)

is

.

to

initiative

establish

a

noted in the Preamble to the Act. The

1997 and replaces the
participating in

NACC.

PFP can

All former

a

security situation

inaugurated in

members and all countries
the EAPC. Other OSCE members

EAPC principles may join by joining the PFP.

commitment is made that
NATO's Strategic Concept "to ensure

new

EAPC was

NACC

automatically join

that are willing and able to accept
Lastly,

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

NATO
that

it is

member

States will

fully consistent

examine

with Europe's

and challenges."

By comparison with the

lofty

new

goals espoused for

NATO,

characterization of Russia in the last paragraph of the Preamble

the deadpan
is

much more

down to earth. The Russian Federation is portrayed as "continuing the building
of a democratic society and the realization of
140

its

political

and economic

Myron H. Nordquist
transformation."

commitments

Its

military

cutbacks

"to further reducing

cited

are

favorably,

and

Herzegovina"

contributions

its

are,

under

"multinational forces

to

its

conventional and nuclear forces."

its

Russia's active participation in peacekeeping operations

auspices

are

as

however, referred to in a positive vein.

in

UN

or

OSCE

Bosnia and

28

body of the Founding Act was provided expressly at the
Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council Ministers in December 1996.
The content for a new NATO-Russia agreement was identified in Paragraph 10

The

outline for the

of their Final

Communique

as follows:

•

the shared principles that will form the basis of our relationship;

•

a broad set of areas of practical cooperation in particular in the political,

military,

economic, environmental,

nonproliferation, arms control

and

scientific,

civil

peacekeeping,

emergency planning

armaments,

fields;

and ad hoc consultations; and

•

mechanisms

for regular

•

mechanisms

for military liaison

and cooperation.

Principles

The opening

principle in Section

I

of the Founding

Act

is

that the

NATO

nations and Russia share an interest in the security of the Euro- Atlantic area.

on Middle Eastern and Asian countries as well.
Despite occasional calls to make NATO a worldwide peacekeeping
organization, the principles in the Founding Act make it clear that
NATO-Russian peacekeeping operations do not extend beyond NATO's
traditional geographical sphere of concern in North America and Europe.
Russia, of course, borders

The

primary

role

of the

OSCE

as

only

the

organization for regional security cooperation

is

stressed as a principle.

and Russia undertake to enhance the operational
regional security. Indeed, the parties

cooperation
of stability

commit

among participating States
and

security

in

of the

Europe.

The

operational capabilities in peacekeeping

development of
for the

The

its

Common

is

pan-European security

capabilities of the

NATO

OSCE for

to seeking the "widest possible

OSCE"

to create a

common area

strengthening of the

OSCE's

seen as consistent with the

and Comprehensive Security Model

for

Europe

Twenty-First Century.

NATO

and Russia recognize that there are new
threats, e.g., aggressive nationalism, terrorism, and territorial disputes. These
new threats are different in kind, and not just in degree, from the threat of
armed attack against the parties' territories described in Articles V and VI of
the North Atlantic Treaty. The response to these new risks and challenges will
representatives of
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have to be entirely

likewise

Founding Act,

Founding Act

in the

And

different.

while not mentioned in the

predictable that a pubic debate

it is

is

inevitable about the

awkward question of whether NATO is properly constituted to deal with these
new threats. The Founding Act is premised, of course, on the principle that
NATO is the organization to meet the new threats.

The

signatories reaffirm the principle that the

UN Security Council retains

the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

unmistakable

envisioned

role

comprehensive
cooperation in

organization
this area

and

for

OSCE

the

"as

is

as a regional

inclusive

decision-making

consultation,

for

the

The
and
and

arrangement under Chapter VIII of

the United Nations Charter."

A tangled web of relationships exists with respect to the prospective roles in
regional peacekeeping for

Union ("WEU")

vis-a-vis

European

Western European
the Founding Act stops short of

entities

NATO. And

such

as the

slamming the door on the WEU being authorized in the future to function as a
Chapter VIII collective security entity with NATO or Russian participation.
What the Founding Act is crystal clear on is that NATO-Russia peacekeeping
operations will either be directly mandated by the Security Council or
authorized by the

OSCE

Chapter

as a

VIII regional organization. This policy

decision had to be a key inducement for obtaining a Russian sign-off

on the

Founding Act. One very good reason is that Russia has control over military
operations with its veto in both the Security Council and in the OSCE (which,
by the way, operates by consensus).

The

result

that

is

bound by the express terms of the Founding Act not
of force

operations

Federation

is

without Russian consent.

likewise bound.

The veto

NATO

is

politically

to engage in offensive use

In

fairness,

the

Russian

point was emphasized differently by

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, as each attempted to put the most favorable
press spin for their respective audiences.

In the United States, domestic critics of the Administration strongly object
to the concept of a Russian veto over

NATO

military operations.

The

fundamental distinction between self-defense and enforcement actions gets
lost in the clamor. The Administration's emphasis is on the non-binding nature
of the Founding

Act and the continued

unilateral action by
as far as

it

NATO

goes, but critics

is

can

legally justified.
still

NATO

self-defense role

This aspect of the debate

where
is

true

probably complain that the American public

was given one impression on the veto issue and the Russian public quite
29
another. It would be difficult to deny, however, that the Russian veto over
offensive measures by NATO was a major selling point within the walls of the
Kremlin as a justification for signing the Founding Act. From a NATO
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is

nothing new. In December 1992, the

NATO

Council decided that the Alliance had a mandate to support peacekeeping

United Nations and of the OSCE. As stressed above, the

activities of the

justification for out-of-area

enforcement actions by

NATO

itself

legal

under the

North Atlantic Treaty remains open to question. One practical possibility was
to remove the authority of the WEU to engage in peacekeeping. However, the
January 1994 NATO Summit endorsed the notion that Europe should develop
a peacekeeping capacity. In addition, the principle was endorsed that the
collective assets of the Atlantic Alliance would be made available for WEU
operations.

developing

As
its

of early 1998, the

continues in the early stages of

military operational capabilities

on the Danube, and most

in the Adriatic,

while the

WEU

WEU

and has taken credible actions

recently in Albania. Interestingly,

could have based these actions on Articles 52 and 53 of

Chapter VIII, Article 48 in Chapter VII was cited as a basis for its action. Russia
is not, of course, a member of the WEU and thus the WEU was not a realistic
option for selection as a Chapter VIII regional security organization in the

Founding Act.

Another principle stated is that in implementing the Founding Act, NATO
and Russia will observe in good faith their international legal obligations. In
addition to the UN Charter, specific mention is made of the "Helsinki Final
Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the
documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE Summit." The Charter of Paris was
signed in November 1990 by the OSCE Heads of State or Government
(including those for NATO and Russia) Among many other important matters
in the Paris Charter was a vision for more structured co-operation among all
participating States on security matters. Perhaps this is part of the reason why a
specific reference was made to the Paris Charter in the Principles of the
Founding Act. At the December 1996 OSCE Summit on European Security
issues in Lisbon, a Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security
Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century was adopted. The mention in
the Principles of the Lisbon Summit serves to remind the signatories that the
NATO-Russia Founding Act is simply a part of a much larger scheme to create
a more secure Europe.
.

A number of general principles, not all of which are directly pertinent to the
focus of this essay

on peacekeeping, were

cited to achieve the aims of the

Founding Act.

One

NATO. This is

probably a very important status issue for the Russians,

sensitive

to the

is

the notion of an equal partnership between Russia and

who

are

extreme about their diminished military might and are

understandably concerned about the strength of their economy. This principle
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an equal on the political level
Acceptance of the principle by NATO was wise in that the only

recognizes that that the Russian Federation

with

NATO.

country outside

This

about

NATO that could challenge NATO militarily

something that American

is

is

political figures

is,

in fact, Russia.

tend to neglect in the debate

NATO expansion.

Another principle noted is the relationship between economic well-being
and stability, as well as the role that democracy plays in fostering a secure
environment. In this context, it is well worth recalling that democracies do not
wage war on one another. Specific acknowledgment is made to the principle of
refraining from the use of force contrary to the UN Charter and the Principles
in the Helsinki Act.

A

related principle refers to respect for the territorial

and the peoples' right of self-determination. Several
principles then deal with the idea of mutual transparency, especially for defense
policy and military doctrines. With a Russian physical presence at NATO
Headquarters, one can envision considerable transparency on the part of
integrity of

NATO.

States

all

It is less

easy to see

how NATO plans equal access

to the formulation of

Russian defense policy and military doctrines.

The
.

last principle cited that is directly related to this

.

.

support,

on

study reads:

a case-by-case basis, of peacekeeping operations carried out

UN

under the authority of the

Security Council or the responsibility of the

OSCE.

The

NATO

shared commitment of

operations

(all

and Russia to support peacekeeping

of which are case by case)

not new.

is

The NATO-led

multinational force (IFOR) established to implement the military aspects of the

December 1996 and was replaced
Force (SFOR). The Russian contingent in IFOR

Bosnia Peace Accord completed

by a smaller Stabilization

numbered some 2,000 troops
1997 was around the 1,400

at

its

its

level.

work

in

height and
30

Of

its

participation in

ground force of 35,000.

or 8,000 of the total allied

31

The Bosnia peacekeeping venture demonstrates
military forces

can be successfully integrated in the

least in a marginally hostile

also

apparently able

late

the thirty-six nations with forces in

make up about 25 percent

Bosnia, the U.S. forces

SFOR in

to

NATO

and Russian

field in joint

operations at

that

environment. Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton are

resolve

The Founding Act

successfully

reasonably difficult political

example of the willingness of these
two world leaders to compromise towards one another's positions. But too
much can be read into the ability of NATO and Russian forces to integrate
militarily, based on the Bosnia experience. The modest successes to date do not

problems.

is

a striking
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NATO Russia operations

warrant jumping to the conclusion that joint
division

levels

can work successfully in a

truly

hostile

at the

environment.

Peacekeeping operations based on host State consent with a token five percent
Russian troop involvement
actual

combat

situations

quite different from enforcement operations in

is

where there might be a substantially

large percentage

Many thorny interoperability problems are unresolved
command and control, intelligence sharing and the like. The

of Russian troops.
pertaining to

professional military

make more

must guard against the pressure from

of the Bosnia experiment than

is

political figures to

there.

The NATORussia Permanent Joint Council
Section

II

of the Founding

with European security
to carry out the

Act

issues.

establishes yet another organization to deal

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council

mandates in the Act and "to develop

common

European security and to political problems." Considerable
implied by this latter phrase.

The

demonstrates the bureaucratic evolution of NATO from a

detail

certainly

mandate further

some

kind.

One

is

about the nature and even direction of this

no constituting treaty framework or a
of the end result being pursued. This is not

evolving entity at this stage, as there
clearly articulated strategy

is

strictly self-defense

military organization to a broader political organization of

handicapped to comment in

approaches to

latitude

loose language of this

is

is

necessarily unfavorable criticism because the current process has the virtue of

being flexible and pragmatic.

no agreed

It

may

also

be largely unavoidable

to

new Council is

is

to provide concrete

enhance consultation and cooperation between the two

appropriate instances, joint decisions and joint action
issues.

Again, the meaning of this language

this

to be

is

there

vision to follow.

In any event, the central objective of the

means

when

done without extending

is

vague.

sides. In

may be taken on security

What is

clear

is

that

to the "internal matters of either

all

NATO,

NATO member States or Russia." As expected, no definition is given of what
an internal matter and what is not. Presumably the decision
internal or non-internal

is

of

is

to label a matter as

an internal matter.

Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher and former Secretary of
Defense William J. Perry recently acknowledged the value of the Act's
provisions,

political

but went on to opine that the "military provisions are

problematic and more important."

32

They

see the object of the

Act

less

to create

"permanent, institutionalized military relationships modeled on those forged in
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Bosnia. ..."

And

in the

Founding Act

practical cooperation with the Russian military

"more important than meetings and councils."

is

seen as

33

Paragraph 3 of the section in the Act setting up the Council mechanism
consistent with the former Secretaries' "action versus talk" emphasis.

and Russia

are not only to identify but also to "pursue" as

The

for "joint action" as possible.

Permanent Joint Council
crisis

is

talk part

or "for any other situation affecting peace

is

NATO

opportunities

not neglected, however. The

"the principal" venue of consultation in times of

power of appointment must be taken
that

is

many

is

and

security."

seriously, for there

Such

a singular

can only be one entity

"the principal" location for such weighty matters as discussion of an

inter-party crisis or "any other" security situation. In particular, in addition to

regular meetings, extraordinary meetings of the Council are to be promptly

convened if a member perceives
independence or security."

a "threat to

its

territorial integrity, political

The next paragraph is apparently directed toward less
reference is made to "the principles of reciprocity and
notion
will

is

frenetic activities as

transparency."

that through the on-going contacts in the Council,

The

NATO and Russia

keep one another informed of their respective security threats and what

each has in mind to do about them.
Sentence one in paragraph
of place.

six of this

mechanism section seems almost out

An objective observer might think the sentence is a statement of the

obvious, except for the fact that the impression given by the Clinton

administration to the public

is

that the statement represents an important

accomplishment. The sentence reads:
Provisions of this

Act do not provide

NATO

or Russia, in any way, with a

do they infringe upon or restrict the
or Russia to independent decision-making and action.

right of veto over the actions of the other nor
rights of

The

NATO

foregoing sentence

binding treaty and even

is

if it

technically accurate: the

were, there

is

no

Act

is

not a legally

right oi veto for Russia in the

Founding Act as such. Russia would have a veto on actions if it were a Party to
the North Atlantic Treaty; all NATO members have veto power since NATO
operates

by consensus.

Likewise,

all

fifty-three

members of the OSCE

(including Russia) have a veto because that regional organization also operates

by consensus. Perhaps the statement means that the above commitment,

making the Permanent Joint Council "the principal" venue of consultation,
does not "infringe" upon independent decision-making or action. One cannot
help but wonder what the purpose of consultation is if it is not to "infringe"
upon one's actions? The plain language in the sentence is that neither Russia
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is

given a veto in the Act. True enough, but as explained above, this

somewhat misleading with respect to peacekeeping operations. The reason is
that Russia and three members of NATO are permanent members of the UN
Security Council. All are also members of the OSCE. And as elaborated fully
is

above, peacekeeping operations will be carried out only under the authority of

OSCE. The veto on peacekeeping operations
was simply not provided by the Founding Act.

the Security Council or the
there for Russia;

it

is

would be equally accurate, but apparently not as politic, to stress that the
inherent right of self- defense upon which NATO is founded and which is
enjoyed by Russia and the United States alike, truly does not allow a veto by
any other State or organization. That point is not in the Act but may belong
there as much as the sentence quoted above. At the same time, there may be a
host of non-use of force actions that could have been made subject to a veto
and were not. If forbearance to do so is the reason to emphasize the lack of veto,
then one cannot quibble. But the impression should not be left that there is no
Russian veto on the non-self-defense use of force by NATO. Control over the
use of force is what the Security Council is all about and is the hard core
foundation for both the creation, as well as the continued relevance of the
United Nations.
It

The schedule

Permanent Joint Council (PJC)
mirrors those of NATO: Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Chiefs of
Staff each meet twice annually, while ambassadors/NAC representatives and
military representatives meet monthly. The possibility of Heads of State and
Government meeting is not excluded but not expressly scheduled. The
Council is authorized (like NATO) to establish either permanent or ad hoc
committees or working groups and meetings of military experts may be
convened, as appropriate. Given the priority on peacekeeping operations, it is
predictable that a committee or working group will soon be established for that
of regular meetings for the

topic.

The Permanent Joint Council has,
Secretary General of

NATO

and another

a representative of one of the

third

is

The

first

in principle, three joint chairs.
is

One is the

a representative of Russia.

The

NATO member States on a rotation basis.
on 18

Joint Council meeting held

presented with a disagreement over

who

July

1997 was immediately

should chair the meetings.

A

compromise was worked whereby the Russian Ambassador and Secretary
General Javier Solana are permanent co-chairmen and a representative of the
ambassadors from NATO's sixteen member States will rotate the other position
34
for three-month periods.
The disinformation campaign in the West on the
veto issue continued with the Agence France Presse reporting: "The council
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on NATO policy without exercising a
35
right of veto in its affairs, notably in its peace-keeping role."
An American
writer commented: "The NATO-Russia council is the centerpiece of the
so-called Founding Act
conceived as a way to soothe Moscow's hostility
toward NATO's eastward expansion plans and to encourage the Russians to
36
play a more cooperative role in European security. He added: "... the United
States and its allies insist Russia will only have a voice in, not a veto over,
enables Russia to take part in discussions

.

NATO policies."

.

.

37

A significant bureaucratic innovation
Act: agreement

is

is

also provided in this section of the

expressed that Russia will establish a Mission to

NATO (not

unlike a Mission to the United Nations) headed by a representative at the rank

of Ambassador. Part of his Mission will include a senior Russian military
representative and his

staff.

The

possibility

is

provided for an appropriate

NATO presence in Moscow, but is not spelled out.
Insofar as the candidates for NATO expansion are concerned, the Russians
won the race to reach NATO Headquarters before they did. Once accepted,
new members will,

the status of the
the veto
internal

of course, be quite different.

They will have

NATO members enjoy and they will be full participants
NATO meetings. Yet, if the UN Headquarters' experience
all

be few secrets that the Russians

in

all

is

an

now

example, there

will

that they are at

NATO Headquarters. That, in itself, may be the best reason of

all for

will

not hear about

the Russians to have a physical presence in the heart of

enemy's military

command

its

former

center.

The agenda for regular sessions of the Permanent Joint Council are being set
jointly by NATO and Russia. At this writing some organizational arrangements
and rules of procedure for the Council have been worked out. At the inaugural
meeting Council ambassadors held in Brussels on 11 September 1997, the
exact purpose intended was achieved but the results were "very disagreeable."

Ambassador Vitaly Churkin,
critical of "the aggressive

mission.

.

.

."

He

Russia's representative to

new Western approach

strongly

to the Bosnia peacekeeping

reportedly said the "intolerable" use of force directed against

the Bosnia Serbs was incompatible with the
rules of

NATO, was

engagement.

38

NATO-led peacekeeping

A senior NATO diplomat

is

quoted

force's

as saying this

"was

work of the NATO-Russia council." A
different atmosphere apparently prevailed a few weeks later when the first
meeting of the Council's Foreign Ministers convened in New York. NATO's
Secretary General reported a successful launch of a new NATO-Russia
40
"partnership."
Indeed, he cited agreement on a work program which
envisioned a range of NATO-Russia cooperation, including peacekeeping. He

not a good

omen

3

for the future
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highlighted discussion of the present situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as

more general topic of peacekeeping operations." He stressed that
was to get the work moving and translate the words of the Founding

well as "the

the "idea

Act

into reality."

common
The

41

He

action ..."

also

made

a cryptic reference to the "potential for

NATO.

between Russia and

Founding Act

Permanent Joint Council
will engage in three distinct activities. The first is to consult on any political or
security issue both sides agree to discuss. This is an extraordinarily broad
mandate with virtually no qualifications on topics, and is additional evidence
of

text of the

NATO's

specifies that the

turn towards being a political forum.

develop "joint initiatives" on which
parallel.

The second

activity

is

to

NATO and Russia agree to speak or act in

Again, there are no conditions and the wide latitude expressly given

NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. It
is noteworthy that no distinction is made here between traditional blue helmet
operations under the direct authority of the Secretary General and
certainly includes planning for joint

enforcement operations under the direct authority of the Security Council.
Indications that the signatories

had

in

mind joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping

operations of all varieties are provided by the third category of activities cited.

Once consensus

(another term for veto)

the Permanent Joint Council
take "joint actions"

on

is

.

.

."

Of

make

"joint decisions"

a case-by-case (code in the

and preparation of

operations.

reached between NATO and Russia,

authorized to

operations) basis. Pointed reference

planning

is

for

to

peacekeeping

then made to participation "in the

is

including

operations,

joint

Act

and

peacekeeping

course, the built-in reminder of the mutual veto

is

highlighted again with the statement that the peacekeeping operations must be

UN

"under the authority of the

OSCE."

And

sentence

is

just to

Security Council or the responsibility of the

be sure that there

added that any

actions,

i.e.,

is

no room

for misunderstanding, a

use of force undertaken by

Russia together or separately, must be pursuant to the

UN

NATO or

Charter and the

OSCE governing principles.
The unmistakable

impression gained from examining the "three distinct

activities" identified in

Council

is

Section

to discuss, plan

II

of the

and present

Act

is

that a priority activity of the

to higher authority, joint

NATO-Russia

peacekeeping operations.

Areas for Consultation and Cooperation
Planning for joint peacekeeping operations
areas

upon which

NATO

is,

of course, only one of

and Russia are expected
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to focus in building

many
a new

The Framework

cooperative relationship. In Section
to consult

and

strive to cooperate,

issues in the Euro-Atlantic area,

in the

III

Founding Act

of the Founding Act, the signatories are

not only across a wide spectrum of security
but also on concrete

crises,

including the

NATO

and Russia to the resolution thereof. In the realm of
conflict prevention, the roles of the United Nations and the OSCE are once
again expressly referenced. Significantly, no mention is made in this section of
a role for the WEU or, for that matter, any other European organization in
conflict prevention or crisis management. The sides are to discuss "joint
contributions of

operations, including peacekeeping operations,

a case-by-case basis

under

UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE

the authority of the

A specific reference
Joint

on

is

made

Task Forces (CJTF)

The CJTF concept

to

NATO-Russia "early"

participation

if

"

Combined

are used in peacekeeping operations.

arose out of the 1994

NATO

Summit

in Brussels to

provide a mechanism for rapid deployment of peacekeepers. Under the
political

umbrella of the North Atlantic Council, the

NATO members willing

and support CJTFs undertake operations such as those restoring stability
Albania in 1997. The Founding Act clearly provides a political and legal

to lead
in

framework within which

NATO

and Russia could develop and plan

joint

CJTF approach. Russia is already participating in the
Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council and in the Partnership for Peace program.
The Permanent Joint Council, however, is an independent springboard to
prepare joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations.
initiatives utilizing the

One

of the

first

planning for possible joint

NATO

and Russia must take in the preliminary
peacekeeping operations is to exchange information

steps that

on each side's existing approaches to military operations. The experience
gained on each side from the ongoing peacekeeping operation in Bosnia,
despite the tendency to puff too

much about its success,

is

obviously invaluable.

Multinational training exercises such as the week-long peacekeeping exercise
in Kazakstan, led by the

from Russia and

five

United States in mid-September 1997 with troops

other nations, generated additional knowledge and

experience indispensable for planning future NATO-Russia joint operations.

This

latter exercise,

43

sponsored under the Partnership for Peace program,

reportedly had heavy involvement by Russian military officers in the planning

—

most welcome development. 44 The framework in the Founding
Act explicitly targets exchanges between NATO and Russia on strategy,
defense policy, and military doctrine. Exchanging information and conducting
processes

a

joint exercises are necessary, in part, because they help identify similarities as

and doctrine. NATO has had
work on promoting commonality among its members.

well as expose differences in military approaches

many decades

to
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NATO-Russian commonality will take

money, and tolerance
on both sides. This is anticipated in the Founding Act, in which the PJC is
tasked to coordinate an expanded program of cooperation between their
Establishing

time,

respective military establishments.

Political'Military Matters

Section IV of the Founding Act
that

issues

part

are

context within which NATO-Russia joint

of the

peacekeeping operations must
section

is

that current

NATO

addressed to broad political-military

is

The

fit.

members

important declaration in

first

state that they are

not planning to

deploy nuclear weapons or to establish nuclear weapon storage
territories of

NATO's

new members.

Indeed, no need

is

this

sites

on the

seen to change any aspect of

nuclear policy by the addition of new members.

The

text stops short of a categorical statement that there are

carefully crafted

no circumstances

under which deployment of nuclear weapons or their storage could occur in the
territory of

new members

of

NATO. While

NATO

the Russians undoubtedly pressed

went a long way toward
assuaging Russian fears that expansion was moving NATO's nuclear
capabilities closer to Moscow.
such categorical assurances,

for

The next issue

tackled was adapting the

leaders

CFE Treaty to

the changed political

and military circumstances in Europe. The urgency of this issue was recognized
by an undertaking to conclude "an adaptation agreement as expeditiously as
possible. ..." The first step for NATO members and the other State Parties to
the CFE Treaty is to conclude a Framework Agreement with the basic elements
of an adapted CFE Treaty. At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, it was
announced that NATO had advanced a comprehensive proposal for
adaptation of the CFE Treaty on the basis of a revised Treaty structure of
national and territorial military equipment ceilings. This was consistent with

NATO's members

previously stated intention to reduce significantly the future

aggregate national ceilings for Treaty-Limited Equipment. These are to be

and at
Section of the Founding Act, NATO and

codified as binding limits in the adapted Treaty, reviewed in 2001
five-year intervals thereafter. In this

Russia encourage the Parties to the

CFE equipment
States of
forces
are,

CFE Treaty

to consider reductions in their

entitlements to achieve lower equipment levels.

NATO

and Russia "commit"

and deployments

The member

to exercising restraint with respect to

to avoid diminishing the security environment.

in addition, to develop

They

measures to prevent threatening build-up of

conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, to include "Central and
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Eastern Europe." Consultations on the evolution of the conventional force
postures are to occur "in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council." 45

To

ensure that Russia understands

activities in the future,

operations in the

NATO

its

reiterates

intent with respect to military
its

modern approach

new European security environment.

to military

A cautionary note

is

in

order after the foregoing discussion directed at confidence-building measures

and the reduction of conventional forces. The reminder required is that NATO
still has a military mission to perform, which may require responding to threats
of aggression or peacekeeping assignments.

member

Whether defending the

States or conducting military exercises,

NATO

territory of

stresses that

it

must

ensure "interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather

than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." This
strategy

is

based on the premise that

NATO now faces a multiplicity of smaller

threats as contrasted with the monolithic threat of the

Cold

War era.

It is

also

combined joint task forces that are more
rapidly deployable than are larger, more static forces. Lastly, the approach is
compatible with the prevailing political sentiment among NATO members to
spend a lower percentage of their gross national product on military defense
and to make up the difference by multinational burden-sharing through
combined joint forces. 46 While infrastructure compatible with this new
approach must still be developed, the hope is that through agreed transparency
consistent with the perceived need for

measures, such reinforcements will be properly understood. Russia
exercise "similar restraint in

One

of the four

meeting in Brussels

its

is

to

conventional force deployments in Europe."

main points

cited by the Ministers at the 1996 Council

for inclusion in the

new NATO-Russia

relationship,

was

to

mechanisms for military liaison and cooperation. This was
implemented through the Permanent Joint Council's expanding consultations
and cooperation via an "enhanced dialogue between the senior military
authorities of NATO and its member States and of Russia." Both sides are to
significantly expand military activities and practical cooperation "at all levels."
This enhanced military-to-military dialogue includes regularly scheduled
reciprocal briefings on mutual military doctrine, strategy, and resultant force
structure. Specific reference is also made to discussing joint exercises and
training. Broad authority is given in the Act for NATO and Russia to establish
establish

military liaison missions at various levels.

The

value of practical activities

and

direct

cooperation,

which was

highlighted by former Secretaries Christopher and Perry earlier in this essay,

the unmistakable focus of the last paragraph in the Founding Act.
deliberate placement of this point at the very
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end of the Act serves

to
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emphasize rather than to diminish the importance of the paragraph
afterthought.

—

it is

no

NATO and Russia's respective military authorities are directed to

"explore the further development of a concept for joint

NATO Russia

peacekeeping operations," building upon "the positive experience of working

The

together in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

lessons from the peacekeeping

operations there are to be "used in the establishment of Combined Joint Task
Forces."

Of course, agreement on a new command structure to enable all Allies

to participate fully will

have to emerge

if

the CJTF concept

is

to be advanced.

The plans must be flexible enough to allow for the preparation and conduct of
WEU-led operations as well.
The Ministers meeting held under NAC auspices at the end of 1997 also
stressed the importance of practical cooperation

Council.

NATO

and Russia were

security

issues,

including

the

peacekeeping operations. In

said to

situation

under the Permanent Joint

have made significant progress on
in

Bosnia and the conduct of

this latter instance,

encouraging progress was

on peacekeeping. Again, reference was made to
European security relations" and the "potential of the

cited in the working group

"opening a new era in

Founding Act." 47

The most important message
highest authorities in the

"NATO

military forces are directed to
adversaries.

cultures

The

of the

in the

Founding Act, that

16 plus Russia

become

allies

1," is

is

reinforced by the

that their respective

rather than to continue as

implications of such a profound change for the military
respective

sides

reach well beyond NATO-Russia joint

peacekeeping operations. But that is evidently where the Heads of State expect

As we have seen in this study, this is
Founding Act on Mutual Relations,

to start the process of military integration.
to occur within the

framework in the

Cooperation and Security between

NATO

and the Russian Federation. It
remains to be seen how much is potential and how much is practical. The
reader is reminded that a wounded bear is far more dangerous than a healthy
one. And it is no overstatement to end this essay with the sobering observation
that global security in the twenty-first century
failure of the

may hinge upon

the success or

grand experiment outlined in the Act.
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Guarding the Coast:
Alien Migrant Interdiction

Operations at Sea

Gary

W.

Palmer

HE INVOLVEMENT OF THE COAST GUARD
is

extensive.

Its

in immigration matters

wide variety of roles and missions includes:

•

Protecting the safety of life at sea, regardless of immigration status;

•

Preventing the entry of undocumented migrants into the United States

through at-sea interdiction;
•

Facilitating parole into the

United States by the Immigration and

Naturalization Service (INS) for prosecution, or turnover to another nation

with criminal jurisdiction over the matter, of aliens found committing criminal
acts at sea;
•

Seizing

conveyances and arresting alien smugglers,

and gathering

evidence in alien smuggling cases to help ensure the successful criminal
prosecution of those involved, and/or
•

Inspecting vessels and

facilities

civil forfeiture

of their vessel;

subject to Coast

Guard

jurisdiction in

cooperation with the INS to ensure that any aliens being employed are engaged
in activities consistent with their immigration status;

Guarding

Detaining

•

jurisdiction,

aliens,

who have

the Coast

when encountered on

entered the United States

instructions are received from the INS;

and requests

status

for political

Coast Guard

illegally, until

disposition

and

Complying with appropriate procedures

•

vessels subject to

for

handling claims to refugee

asylum made during the course of Coast Guard

operations.

Despite these roles and missions, the Coast Guard

is

neither the architect of

national immigration policy nor even the lead federal agency for immigration

law enforcement. However, the task of enforcing U.S. immigration laws at sea
rests

almost exclusively with the Coast Guard. This paper first surveys the basic

legal authority for

encountered

Coast Guard interdiction and repatriation of illegal migrants

at sea,

then looks at

how

that legal authority

is

exercised within

the factual context of several different types of alien migrant interdiction
operations.

Basic Legal Authority

On

Code was enacted into
positive law. For the Coast Guard, a key provision was 14 United States Code
(USC) §89, which authorized the Coast Guard to
14 August 1949, Title 14 of the United States
1

.

.

.

make

inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures,

upon the high

seas

and waters over which

and

arrests

the U.S. has jurisdiction, for the

prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States.

For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty

on board of any

officers

may

at

any time go

vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or operation o( any law, of the

United States, address inquiries to those onboard, examine the ship's documents
and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary
force to

compel compliance.

USC

2
.

.

.

3

§89 was initially enacted in response to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Maul v. United States, 4 which affirmed the jurisdiction of the
Coast Guard over U.S. flag vessels under former §3072 of the Revised Statutes
for violations of laws respecting the revenue. However, Justice Brandeis, in his
14

concurring opinion, expressed his concern that more explicit statutory
authority would be required to authorize seizures of vessels for violations of

laws other than those pertaining to collection of revenues. Congress responded
to that suggestion by adopting essentially the language that exists in 14

§89 (a) today.
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USC

§89 articulates the extent of the Coast Guard's law
enforcement authority and who may exercise it, 14 USC §2 defines the Coast
Guard's law enforcement mission in more general terms. It states:

While 14

The Coast Guard

shall enforce or assist in the

enforcement of

applicable

all

and over the high seas and waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States; shall engage in maritime air surveillance or
interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United
States; shall administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for the
promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States covering all matters not
specifically delegated by law to some other executive department;
federal laws on, under,

.

.

.

By virtue of the powers conferred by this statute and 14 USC §89, the Coast
Guard is the principal federal maritime law enforcement agency of the United
States. It is in this role that the Coast Guard performs the mission of alien
migrant interdiction operations at

sea.

Despite the broad statutory authority conferred on the Coast Guard by 14

USC the Supreme Court has held that ".

an Act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
5
remains." And, under both Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
6
(High Seas Convention) and Article 92 of the 1982 United Nations
.

.

Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), 7 a
seas

is

subject solely to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag

United States
both

treaties

High Seas Convention, these provisions in
maritime law and practice and are a codification

a party only to the

is

confirm existing

of existing customary international law.

There

are,

8

however, several exceptions to the principle of exclusive

state jurisdiction.

grounds to suspect
broadcasting, or that

warship.

authority

This

is

solely

flag

The most commonly relied upon exception permits a warship

to board any vessel not entitled to complete

9

on the high
state. While the

vessel

it

it is

known
for

engaged in

is

immunity

piracy,

slave

as the "right of visit." It

there are reasonable

trading,

is

is

as the

a limited exercise of

purpose of verification of the

circumstances. Unless the vessel

unauthorized

same nationality

a stateless vessel or of the

the

if

aforementioned

determined to be the same nationality

as

the warship, a stateless vessel, or a vessel engaged in piracy (or other universal
crimes), any further exercise of complete criminal jurisdiction requires a
separate, independent basis.

10

In immigration matters, this normally

an affirmative waiver of exclusive jurisdiction by the
consent by the

flag state to

an exercise of jurisdiction
159

is

found in

and express
11
by the United States.
flag state
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This waiver and consent to jurisdiction

may be sought and

given on a

case-by-case basis or take the form of a standing special arrangement pursuant
to treaty,

exchange of diplomatic notes, or executive agreement.

In October 1994, President Clinton forwarded the 1982 United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea

and consent. In so

to the Senate for advice

doing, the President recognized reliance

on

consent as a basis for

flag state

jurisdiction in immigration matters by stating:

.

.

.

the United States and other

developed procedures

for

members of the

international

resolving problems

that have

community have

arisen

in

certain

when States

contexts, including drug smuggling, illegal immigration and fishing,

are unable or unwilling to exercise responsibility over vessels flying their flag.

These procedures, several of which

are contained in international agreements,

typically seek to ensure the flag state gives expeditious permission to other States
for the

purpose of boarding, inspection, and where appropriate, taking law

enforcement action with respect to

Thus, 14

and

USC

its

vessels (emphasis added).

12

§89 does not authorize the Coast Guard to conduct searches

seizures of foreign flag vessels carrying illegal migrants

without the consent of the

flag state.

13

However,

if

this

Coast Guard may then stop the vessel on the high

on the high

consent
seas,

is

seas

obtained, the

search for

illegal

migrants, and take appropriate action consistent with United States law.

Under 14 USC §89 (b), Coast Guard officers acting pursuant to their general
law enforcement authority are deemed to be agents of those executive agencies
charged with administration of a particular law.
migrant interdiction operations, the Coast Guard

When

relies

on

conducting alien
this

agency theory

and Nationality Act on behalf of
the INS and the Attorney General. More specifically, the Coast Guard
enforces 8 USC §1 185(a) (1), which states, inter alia, that it is unlawful for an
alien to ".
enter ... or attempt to
enter the United States except under
such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations
and exceptions as the President may subscribe." The Coast Guard also enforces
the provisions of 8 USC §1324 which make it a crime to knowingly bring, or
attempt to bring, an alien into the United States at other than a designated
to enforce compliance with the Immigration

.

.

.

.

.

port of entry.

Coast Guard interdiction policy
goals

and Presidential

directives.

is

The

determined largely by national security
current strategy calls for focusing United

States maritime interdiction operations as far at sea as possible.

which these operations
combination of many

are

factors.

conducted, however,

The primary ones
160

is

are:

The manner in

dependent upon a
(1) the nature and

Gary

magnitude of the
(3)
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and number of resources

threat, (2) the type

available,

and

the applicable law.

The remainder

of this article examines the application of both the law and

Coast Guard resources to specific migrant interdiction operations. It focuses on
Coast Guard efforts to interdict Haitian, Cuban, Dominican, and Chinese
migrants attempting to enter the United States

unseaworthy
illustrated

craft.

The

and magnitude of migrant
is

directly influenced by

aliens

it

attempts to show

as well as

activity,

how

the nature

Coast Guard interdiction

changes in law and policy.

The Immigration and
"It is

overloaded and

peculiar difficulties of each type of interdiction are

with factual examples. Finally,

operations,

illegally in

Nationality Act of 1952

undoubtedly within the power of the Federal Government to exclude

from the country." 14 However, prior to the passage of the

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,

15

Illegal

aliens

who

resided in the United States or arrived at the border were accorded certain

procedural rights under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (IN A)

Those

before being excluded or deported.

were subject to deportation only
arriving at "ports of the

residing illegally in the United States

after a formal evidentiary hearing.

17

Aliens

United States" who did not appear to the examining

immigration officer to be clearly entitled to land were subject to a

less

formal

exclusion proceeding by which they too were eventually subject to removal.

Whether an

alien

is

16

18

"excluded" or "deported" turns upon whether they have

"entered" the United States.

19

who have made an "entry" are entitled to
those who are seeking admission but who have

Aliens

deportation proceedings, while

not made an "entry" are afforded only an exclusion proceeding.

Other

aliens could be

prevented from entry by Executive actions that did

not trigger any procedural

rights.

In Haitian Refugee Center,

Inc. v.

Gracey, the

District court stated:

The Immigration and

Nationality

Act has

established procedures for the

exclusion of aliens, including the entitlement to a hearing. See 8

Those

rights,

however, are reserved

for aliens arriving "by

water or

USC

air at

within the United States from any place outside the United States." Id

§1226.

any port
Again,

because those "exclusion or deportation" proceedings are restricted to aliens
arriving "at any port within the

United States," 8

interdicted Haitians are entitled to
rights,

none of these

including the right to counsel.

20

161

USC §1221,

it is

clear that the

statutorily-created procedural
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In either a deportation or exclusion proceeding, an alien could seek asylum
as a political refugee.

21

INA provided:

Section 243(h)(1) of the

The Attorney General

shall

not deport or return any alien

Attorney General determines that such

alien's

life

... to a

country

or freedom

if

the

would be

threatened in any such country on account of race, religion, nationality,

membership

in a particular social group, or political opinion.

Congress thereby intended

on the Status of Refugees

24

23

to incorporate the provisions of the 1951

as

1.

-

Convention

amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status

of Refugees (the Convention),

Article 33

22

2

Article 33 of which provides:

Prohibition of expulsion or return ('refoulement')

No contracting State shall expel or return

whatsoever to the frontiers of

('refouler') a refugee in

where

territories

his life or

any manner

freedom would be

threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion.

2.

The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee

whom

there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of

the country

in

which he

is,

or who, having been convicted by a final

particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the

judgment of a

community of that country

(emphasis added).

The

text of Article 33 does not apply by

beyond

its

its

terms to actions taken by a country

borders. In fact, the language of Article 33.2 suggests that an alien

must be located within the territory of a
contracting state. As a result, the Supreme Court determined that since INA
§243 was intended to incorporate the provisions of the Convention, and
entitled to the benefit of Article 33.1

neither suggested any extraterritorial application, §243 applied only in the

context of the domestic procedures by which the Attorney General determined

whether

to deport or exclude

an

alien.

26

Since 1980, the Coast Guard has been involved in operations to prevent
illegal

migrants from entering the United States and, thereby, from implicating

any statutorily-created procedural entitlements.

Haitian Migrant Interdiction Operations

The near

economy

and early
1980s under the repressive regime of then "President-for-Life" Jean Claude
total collapse of the Haitian
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Duvalier resulted in a flood of economic migrants from Haiti attempting to

reach the United States by boat.

27

In response, President Reagan delegated express authority to the Coast

and return illegal aliens on the high seas. He did this by
28
promulgating Executive Order 12,324, which was signed in September of
1981 in response to what he characterized as a "serious national problem" of
29
"continuing illegal migration by sea." It was promulgated pursuant to the
authority of the President under 8 USC § 1182(f) and his inherent authority
30
under the foreign affairs power of the Constitution to suspend entry or impose
restrictions on entry of aliens. The Order directed the Secretary of
Transportation to issue instructions to the Coast Guard to enforce the
suspension of the entry of undocumented aliens into the United States by sea.
It also authorized the Coast Guard to interdict certain defined vessels for this
purpose if they were suspected of being involved in the "irregular transport of
31
people," or other violations of United States law on the high seas (including,
but not limited to the IN A), and to return the vessel and transport its
passengers to the country from which they came. The defined vessels included
"[vjessels of foreign nations with whom [the United States has] arrangements
32
authorizing the United States to stop and board such vessels." By its terms,

Guard

to interdict

the Executive Order authorized these actions only outside the territorial waters
of the United States.

The United

and Haiti had entered into a bilateral agreement on 23
September 1981, six days before Executive Order 12,324 was signed. That
agreement applied to private Haitian vessels on the high seas when there was
reason to believe that such vessels were involved in the irregular carriage of
passengers outbound from Haiti. It gave the United States permission to board
such vessels to determine their registry, condition, and destination, as well as
the status of those on board. When the circumstances suggested that a
violation of U.S. immigration laws had been or was being committed, the vessel
and persons on board could be detained and returned to Haiti upon prior
States
33

notification to the Haitian government. Haiti also gave assurances that

interdicted Haitians

would not be prosecuted

Interdiction of migrants at sea
arrival

may be accomplished in departure,

However, forward deployment of available Coast Guard
opposed to waiting to interdict at or near landfall in the United

is

preferred for several reasons. First, the vessels used by migrants are

usually grossly overloaded, unseaworthy,
trip

transit, or

zones.

resources, as
States,

for illegal departure.

and incapable of making the 700-mile

from Haiti to the United States without risking substantial

Second, aliens residing

illegally in

loss

of

life.

the United States or arriving at the border
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were entitled under former §243 (h) of the IN

The

A to a deportation or exclusion

between exclusion and deportation, and the varying
procedural protections attached to each, depended upon whether the alien
had made an "entry" into the United States. 34 Aliens making an entry were
entitled to deportation proceedings. Those seeking admission upon arrival, but
35
prior to "entry,"
could have their status determined at an exclusion
36
proceeding. Since §243 did not by its terms have extraterritorial application,
migrants interdicted at sea were not afforded access to either of these
hearing.

processes.

The

differences

37

best reason to interdict migrants at sea, however,

Without the nearly constant presence of

is

that

it

saves lives.

Guard cutter in relative
proximity to the territorial sea of Haiti, many migrants bound for the United
States would die. Haitian migrant vessels are typically crude, handmade,
wooden-hulled
vessels

of

30-50

wooden-hulled
large

vessels.

38

feet

Primarily, they are lateen or sloop-rigged sailing

aft.

length,

in

freighters,

deck house

a Coast

The

or

more

substantial

double-decked,

50-80 feet in length, with high, upswept bows, and a
latter are generally

powered by unreliable engines

Most do not carry charts, compass, or navigational
instruments of any kind. Navigation is based primarily on following the
prevailing winds, wave patterns, and changes in water color along the Bahama
Bank until the loom of light from Miami is seen on the night horizon. Due to
the large number of people on board (some may carry as many as six to eight
persons for every foot of deck length) and complete lack of sanitary facilities,
conditions on the vessels are typically appalling. Cooking, if any, may be done
over open charcoal fires, and some vessels even carry live goats as provisions.
The vessels usually have little freeboard due to their overloaded condition, and

prone to mechanical

constant flooding

failure.

results.

After the migrants are removed, the vessels normally cannot be towed, due
to either their physical condition or the presence o( large

on the Coast Guard

cutter.

Rather than be

left adrift as

numbers oi migrants
derelicts, where they

could constitute a potentially deadly hazard to navigation, these vessels are
usually destroyed.

The vessels

are at times unsinkable with gunfire or

ramming,

because the inherent natural buoyancy of their wooden construction often
keeps them floating just below the surface despite the infliction of major

damage. As a

result,

most cutters

resort to burning the vessels to the waterline,

then breaking up the remains by ramming or other means to minimize the

size

of the debris.

Executive Order 12,324 expressly prohibited the return of any refugee
39
without their consent. As a result, migrants interdicted on the high seas
164
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pursuant to the Executive Order had to be screened for colorable claims to

on patrol in the
Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti initially had INS agents and
Creole-speaking interpreters assigned. When a cutter came upon an
overloaded and unseaworthy Haitian vessel bound for the United States, the
migrants were taken on board the cutter, given an abbreviated medical
examination, issued a blanket, and fed a meal (typically of beans and rice) Due
to space limitations, the migrants were normally kept on the flight deck,
40
The cutter's crew would attempt to rig
forecastle, or fantail of the cutter.
refugee status. For that purpose, Coast

Guard

cutters

.

awnings to shelter the migrants as best they could from the

effects of wind,

weather, and the hot Caribbean sun beating on the steel decks of the cutter.

The

cutters

also

carried

or

improvised portable

attempted to treat the migrants with as

much

toilets,

and otherwise

dignity as possible.

Under Executive Order 12,324, the migrants were individually interviewed
by INS agents while onboard the cutter to determine if any had potentially
valid claims to refugee status. This process often took days. While their status
was being decided, the cutter remained at sea and out of sight of land. As time
wore on, the migrants sometimes became impatient. With overcrowding,
discontent, boredom, and the prospect of an imminent return to Haiti rather
than the promise of arrival in Miami, some migrants even became belligerent. 41
Disturbances sometimes broke out on Coast Guard cutters that in a few
instances had to be quelled through the use of physical restraints, fire hoses, or
chemical agents such as

CURB 60 42 or pepper spray.

After the interview process was complete, those

who were determined

to be

economic migrants were "screened out" and repatriated. Repatriations usually
took place dockside in Port au Prince, where the Haitians were turned over to
the Red Cross. Those who made a colorable claim of status as a political refugee
were "screened in" and transported to the United States so that they could file
a formal application for political asylum.

Between 1981 and 1991, approximately 25,000 Haitian migrants were
interdicted by the Coast Guard. Then, on 30 September 1991, a military coup
succeeded in overthrowing the Aristide government. In response to the

and torture of hundreds of Haitians who opposed the
military regime, a flood of migrants bound for the United States soon
overwhelmed both the existing operational posture of the Coast Guard and the

subsequent

killing

ability of the

INS

to screen the migrants for potential refugee status as required

by Executive Order 12,324.
Executive Order 12,324 was superseded by Executive Order 12,807 on
23, 1992.

The primary

difference

May

between the two was that Executive Order
165
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12,807 no longer contained a requirement to screen migrants interdicted at sea
for refugee status. In addressing a challenge to the

ground, the Supreme Court
During the

months

six

new Executive Order on this

said:

after

October 1991, the Coast Guard interdicted over

many

34,000 Haitians. Because so

interdicted Haitians could not be safely

processed on Coast Guard cutters, the Department of Defense established

temporary

facilities at

the United States Naval Base at

Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba,

accommodate them during the screening process. Those temporary facilities,
however, had a capacity of only about 12,500 persons. In the first three weeks of
May 1992, the Coast Guard intercepted 127 vessels (many of which were
considered unseaworthy, overcrowded, and unsafe); those vessels carried 10,497
undocumented aliens. On May 22, 1992, the United States Navy determined
that no additional migrants could safely be accommodated at Guantanamo.
to

With both

the

Guantanamo and available Coast Guard cutters
number of Haitian emigrants in unseaworthy craft

facilities at

and with the
(many had drowned as they attempted the trip to Florida), the
Government could no longer both protect our borders and offer the Haitians
even a modified screening process. It had to chose between allowing Haitians
into the United States for the screening process or repatriating them without
giving them any opportunity to establish their qualifications as refugees. In the
judgment of the President's advisors, the first choice would not only have
defeated the original purpose of the program (controlling illegal immigration),
but also would have impeded diplomatic efforts to restore democratic
government in Haiti and would have posed a life threatening danger to
thousands of persons embarking on long voyages in dangerous crafts. The second
choice would have advocated those policies but deprived the fleeing Haitians of
saturated,

increasing

any screening process.

On May 23,

.

.

1992, President Bush adopted the second choice. After assuming

President Clinton decided not to modify that order;

office,

today.

.

it

remains in effect

44

The terms

of Executive Order 12,807 provided for the repatriation of

undocumented

aliens

without the benefit of any screening process.

stated that the "non-refoulement"

45

It

also

obligations of the United States under

Convention Relating to the Status of
persons located outside the United States. The

Article 33 of the United Nations
46

do not extend to
Executive Order again directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue
appropriate instructions to the Coast Guard to enforce the suspension of the
entry of undocumented aliens by sea and to interdict defined vessels carrying
Refugees
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These instructions were to include directives to "return the vessel
and its passengers to the country from which it came, or to another country
provided, however, that the Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion,
such

aliens.

.

may

decide that a person
4-

consent.

who

is

.

.

a refugee will not be returned without his

"47

There have been a number of legal challenges to the Coast Guard's
interdiction and repatriation of Haitian migrants at sea under both Executive
Orders. In 1985, the District Court for the District of Columbia denied such a
challenge to Executive Order 12,324, finding that §243 (h) of the INA applied
48
The next
only to those Haitians who were already in the United States.
challenge came in 1991, alleging that the Government had failed to establish
and implement adequate procedures to protect Haitians who qualified for
asylum. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that since Executive
Order 12,324 did not limit the discretion of INS officials, migrants interdicted
49
at sea could not obtain judicial review of INS decisions. That court also held
that the

INA did not

apply extra-territorially.

President Bush's promulgation of Executive Order 12,807 precipitated

another round of legal challenges. The Supreme Court resolved those
by holding that repatriating migrants to Haiti without

challenges

first

determining whether they qualified as refugees was not prohibited by either

§243 of the

INA or Article

the Status of Refugees.

had

50

33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to

The

court found that since neither of those provisions

extra-territorial application, migrants interdicted at sea

were not entitled

to either deportation or exclusion hearings. Therefore, there

is

nothing in

domestic or international law which prevents the President or the Attorney

General from involuntarily repatriating undocumented aliens interdicted
sea.

at

51

During
migrants.

fiscal

year

In response

commenced on

1992 the Coast Guard interdicted 37,618 Haitian
to

the Haitian exodus,

15 June 1993 and was, at that time, the largest single peacetime

operation in the history of the Coast Guard.

Guard

Operation Able Manner

It

involved virtually every Coast

and Gulf coasts. Today, Haitian migration has
stabilized at an average of about 150 to 300 migrants a month, with occasional
peaks in excess of those amounts. On 24 November 1997, 416 Haitians on an
80-foot wooden-hulled freighter were intercepted approximately six nautical
unit along the Atlantic

Miami Beach. 52 The vessel refused to stop until shouldered
by the Coast Guard Cutter Maui, a 1 10-foot patrol boat, which prevented the
miles southeast of

migrants from entering the United States. This was the largest single group of
migrants interdicted since

November

1995. All were repatriated to Port au
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except for a pregnant, nineteen-year-old female suffering from

Prince,

dehydration and possible pneumonia,

who was brought

to

Miami

for

medical

treatment.

Despite the fact that there has been no formal agreement in place since
1994,

when

according to

the
its

1981 Agreement was terminated by President Aristide

terms, Haiti continues to permit repatriation of

all

Haitian

migrants interdicted by the Coast Guard at sea. Since the original interdiction

agreement was entered into by the totalitarian Duvalier regime and abrogated
by the democratic government of Aristide, any new standing interdiction
agreement appears unlikely in the near future. United Nations peacekeeping
were tainted by fraud,
leaving Haiti without an effective government since the resignation

forces assisted in recent elections in Haiti, but the results
essentially

Nations peacekeeping forces on

1

53

With

the departure of United

December 1997,

a refusal by the Haitian

of Premier Rosny Smarth in June of 1997.

government to accept the return of migrants for any reason could precipitate
another mass exodus and have far-reaching consequences for both the United
States and the Coast Guard.

Cuban Migrant

When

Interdiction Operations

opened the port of Camarioca in 1965, over 6,000
Cubans fled to the United States. 54 After one of the vessels capsized, President
Lyndon Johnson commenced eight years of "Freedom Flights," in which over a
quarter million Cubans immigrated to the United States.
Fidel Castro

more than 100,000 Cubans

In 1980, the Mariel Boatlift brought
shores.

These Cuban migrants enjoyed

to U.S.

a special status that the Haitian

Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act 55
permanent resident status to Cuban

migrants did not. Unlike the Haitians, the

permitted the Attorney General to grant
citizens present in the

United States

for at least

one

year. President Carter

permitted the "Marielitos" to enter the United States, and Castro took
political
ill

advantage of this opportunity to

persons,

rid

and others that he considered

Cuba

full

of many criminals, mentally

to be undesirable elements.

In the years after the Mariel Boatlift, migrant attempts to evade

Cuban

on a small scale, but one
which progressively increased in magnitude. Then, on 8 August 1994, Fidel
Castro announced that the Cuban government would no longer forcibly
authorities

prevent

and reach the United States

Cuban

citizens

persisted

from emigrating by boat. This policy precipitated a

homemade

and boats attempting to negotiate
ninety treacherous miles across the Gulf Stream to the United States. In two
flood of "balseros" aboard

rafts

168

Gary

W. Palmer

weeks, more than 2,700 Cubans were rescued by the units of Operation Able
Vigil,

with the rate of rescue at times reaching nearly 750 per day.

56

Many were

lost at sea.

In a press conference on 19 August 1994, President Clinton stated:
In recent weeks the Castro regime has encouraged Cubans to take to the sea in
unsafe vessels to escape their nation's internal problems. In so doing,

it

has risked

the lives of thousands of Cubans, and several have already died in their efforts to
leave. This action

and

is

a cold-blooded attempt to maintain the Castro grip

to divert attention

to the

from his

United States the

on Cuba,

communist policies. He has tried to export
and economic crisis he has created in Cuba, in

failed

political

defiance of the democratic tide flowing throughout this region. Let

me

be

clear:

The Cuban government will not succeed in any attempt to dictate American
immigration policy. The United States will do everything within its power to
ensure that Cuban lives are saved and that the current outflow of refugees is
stopped.

57

In order to stem the tide of Cuban migrants and prevent further loss of life,
the policy that provided for permanent resident status was terminated.

Guard to interdict Cubans at sea and
transport them to Guantanamo Bay, where they received treatment similar to
Haitian migrants interdicted at sea. From there, the United States engaged in a
President Clinton also ordered the Coast

program of voluntary repatriations while negotiating with other countries to
accept migrants into safe havens. By the end of

38,560 Cuban migrants were interdicted.

58

fiscal

year 1994, a total of

This exceeded the total number of

Haitians interdicted during the mass exodus of fiscal year 1992.

Cuban government resulted in a joint
communique between the United States and Cuba on 2 May 1995. 59 In this
communique, the United States agreed to allow Cuban migrants to enter the
Further negotiations with the

United States only by applying
Interests Section in

Havana.

It

for a visa or refugee status at the

further permits 20fi00

United States

Cubans per year

to enter

the United States legally. This agreement has facilitated the direct repatriation
of approximately 75 percent of

all

Cubans intercepted

at sea,

60

with the

remainder going to Guantanamo or to the United States at the direction of the
INS.

61

It

also reaffirmed a

commitment

to

hvcountry processing of refugee

claims through the United States Interests Section in Havana. This policy has

achieved

its

purpose of deterring dangerous migration from

offering a safe alternative.

62

Since the 2

May

1995 accord,

from Cuba has been significantly reduced and remains
thirty to fifty migrants per

month.

63

169

Cuba by boat by
illegal

migration

relatively stable at

about

Guarding the Coast

A

legal challenge

temporarily given safe

was asserted to determine whether Cuban migrants
haven at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo

Bay could assert rights under the INA and Article 33 of the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
64
Appeals rejected the argument that leased military bases in foreign countries
(such as

Guantanamo Bay)

States" for purposes of the

INA.

to provide

haven did not
the deprivation of which would require the
also held that granting safe

It

create a protected liberty interest,

government

United

are ports of entry or otherwise "within the

due process of law.
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Dominican Migrant Interdiction Operations

A

relatively

operations

is

new development

in

Coast Guard alien migrant interdiction

Dominican Republic as a major source of
Puerto Rico lies sixty miles beyond the east coast of the

the emergence of the

undocumented aliens.
Dominican Republic. Migrants navigate the Mona Passage in small, open,
wooden boats known as "yolas," powered by outboard motors. They are often
camouflaged, covered with tarps, and drift during daylight hours to avoid
detection.

Many of these

attempts to enter the United States

illegally

through

Puerto Rico are organized alien smuggling ventures. Organizers can receive

more than $40,000

for a single run.
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With the decline in Haitian and Cuban migrants after 1994, the Coast
Guard was able to dedicate more resources to patrolling the Mona Passage.
Between 1994 and 1995, the number of undocumented aliens interdicted by
the Coast Guard in the Mona Passage increased by more than 800 percent,
67
from 371 to 3,375. Since that time, the Coast Guard has been patrolling the

Mona

Pass with a nearly constant presence of several cutters and aircraft.

These

efforts resulted in the interdiction of

1996.

When a yola is

Dominican Republic,

Navy

6,273 Dominicans in

fiscal

year

intercepted, the migrants are typically repatriated to the

and transfer to the Dominican
the Dominican Republic.

either by rendezvous

or by direct dockside repatriation in

A recent case illustrates the role of the Coast Guard in the Mona Passage.
On 5

February 1997, the Coast Guard cutter Courageous was participating in

Operation Frontier Shield

68

in the

Mona Passage. They spotted an overloaded,

50-foot yola approximately 35

miles west of Puerto

immediately launched both of

small boats.

its

Rico.

The

cutter

While they were handing out

lifejackets to the migrants in preparation for their transfer to the cutter, the

yola capsized, and 108 persons ended up in the water.
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One drowned, and three
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were reported missing. The others were transferred to the INS in San Juan,
Puerto Rico, three days

later.

The four Dominicans who coordinated the smuggling venture were indicted
on 12 February 1997

The

illegally.

for

attempting to bring aliens into the United States

indictment

charged

them

with

§1324(a)(l)(A)(i), §1324(a)(l)(B)(iv), and 18

without

and

bail,

Court

USC

§2.

69

of

8

USC

They were held

convicted, the four defendants could possibly receive the

if

death penalty. As of this writing, the case
District

violations

for the District of

is

pending

in the

trial

United States

Puerto Rico.

Chinese Migrant Interdiction Operations

Some rime
aground on

after

a

midnight on 6 June 1993, the

MA^

Golden Venture ran

sandbar approximately 100 yards off Long Island. State and

began arriving
Some of the 286 Chinese migrants on board were

federal law enforcement agencies, including the Coast Guard,

en masse soon thereafter.

observed

on the beach, with others attempting to swim ashore in the
About 100 remained on the ship awaiting rescue. About 30 made it
ounding community. The others were detained in the custody of

iraing

r

Q

53 F wate
into the

s

the INS. Exclusion proceedings were brought against the detainees,

whom

applied for political asylum.

was whe he

The

many

of

by those proceedings

legal issue raised

the Chinese were entitled to a deportation hearing by virtue of

:

having "entered" the United States. In resolving the claims of those on board
the

MA^

Golden Venture, the Court of Appeals in Yang

despite the fact that

appreheis

I

purposes of

d,

Maugans 10 held that

some migrants were walking ashore though the

a person does not

INA

v.

make an

surf when

"entry" into the United States for

deportation hearing entitlements until they are physically

present on "dry land."

Another case

illustrates the

problems involved in repatriating Chinese

migrants interdicted on the high seas. Based on information obtained by an

undercover agent

Guard

for the

INS during

a

complex

cutter Reliance intercepted the V17V Xing

sting operation, the

Da on

2

Coast

October 1996. The

was approximately 130 miles northeast of Bermuda, and, in addition to
26 crew members, had 83 illegal Chinese migrants in the ship's cargo hold. The

vessel

migrants had been in the cargo hold of the rusty, 220-foot freighter since

Guang Zhou province more than

it left

months previously on a voyage
planned rendezvous in the Atlantic Ocean via Africa's Cape of Good
Hope. A fishing vessel was then to embark the migrants and land them
somewhere near Boston. 71

China's
to a

171

three
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When the M/V Xing Da was first hailed on the radio by the Coast Guard,
person purporting to be the master consented to a Coast Guard boarding.

a

The

no flag but had markings on the hull indicating the home port of the
vessel was in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The "master" also claimed
to be a PRC citizen. Documents were found on board which, while

vessel flew

inconclusive, gave indications that the vessel might be validly registered in the

PRC. Therefore, the Coast Guard requested through diplomatic channels
the

that

PRC government confirm the registry of the vessel and grant permission for

United States authorities to take any action necessary to insure the

safety of

those onboard.

Some

of the migrants were severely dehydrated and water had to be brought

to the vessel.

The decks were

also plagued with
filled

littered

with debris and garbage.

mechanical problems, had no

electricity,

The

and

its

vessel

was

bilge

was

with fuel that had leaked from the tanks. Soon after the Coast Guard

boarding team came aboard, the migrants began setting
the hull in an apparent attempt to sink the vessel.

fires

and banging on

was believed that the
trouble was incited by enforcers called "snake heads," who hoped to force the
72
Coast Guard to bring them ashore in the United States. These migrants
It

frequently pay up to $30,000 for their transportation and, in return, must
liquidate their debt by working for the organizers at rates often below

wage

for as long as 10 years.

minimum
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The PRC government had some

information about a vessel with the same

name, but claimed they needed additional time to confirm the vessel's
nationality as PRC. They did, however, give their consent for the United States
to take whatever action was deemed necessary to ensure the safety of those on
board in the interim. The government of Bermuda reluctantly permitted the

Coast Guard to anchor the vessel temporarily as long as the migrants were
removed from Bermuda as soon as possible. Consistent with the consent
granted by the
transported to

PRC

to ensure the safety of those

Guantanamo Bay

PRC by way of Wake

Island.

for processing

on board, they were

and eventually returned

to the

74

PRC

government did not intend to
unequivocally confirm the vessel's registry. The United States then informed
them that unless they objected within a certain time, the vessel would be
75
declared stateless and seized under United States law. Approximately two
It

soon became apparent that the

weeks
vessel

was assimilated to a stateless
jurisdiction of the United States.

after the initial interdiction, the vessel

and became subject

to the full

Because of the distances involved, interdiction o{ Chinese migrant vessels
are often resource intensive and come at a very high cost. The M/V Jung Sheng
172
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on 27 June 1995, nearly 1,000 miles southeast of Hawaii.
The interdiction operation involved three Coast Guard cutters, a C-130
aircraft, an H-65 helicopter, and numerous land-based support personnel. The
operation took forty-five days and covered 6,000 miles. The 147 migrants were
transported to Wake Island, where a Joint Task Force had to be established to
facilitate the return of the migrants to the PRC. It is estimated that the total
first

sighted

cost of the interdiction of these 147 migrants exceeded $11 million.

On

76

12 August 1997, the 150-foot merchant vessel, Lapas No.

3,

was

San Diego with sixty-nine illegal Chinese
migrants on board. The vessel had weathered three typhoons and was nearly
out of food and fuel. Coast Guard units stayed on scene for more than two
weeks providing food, water, and medical assistance. The Mexican
government eventually agreed to tow the vessel to Mexico, where the migrants
intercepted 200 miles south of

were then repatriated to China.

The

Illegal

Immigration Reform

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

On

30 September 1996, President Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 77 The entire
system for deportation and exclusion of aliens was substantially modified.

The

concept of "entry" was replaced by "admission," which means the lawful entry
of an alien into the United States after inspection by an immigration officer.

IIRIRA §304 replaced both deportation and exclusion hearings with a
streamlined "removal proceeding."

single

78

Section 302 establishes a summary screening program which permits an
officer to

determine an alien inadmissible and order him or her removed from

the United States without further hearing or judicial review.
indicates

asylum

INS

an intention

officer

to

to apply for asylum, the case

conduct a "credible

determine whether there

is

If

such an alien

must be referred

fear of persecution"

to

an

screening to

a significant possibility that the alien could

establish eligibility for asylum.

Under §302 an alien "present in the United States" is entitled to a removal
proceeding which results in either admission, asylum, or removal. 79 But,
determining whether an alien

is

"present in the United States" by using the

may not provide clear
determining when an alien may be repatriated

"dry land" standard adopted by the court in Yang

guidance to the Coast Guard in

and when they have acquired

a right to a

173

removal proceeding. For example,
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on board
ashore and then
aliens

a

moored

who disembark onto a pier,
their vessel, may not be on "dry

vessel,

later return to

or

who come

land."

Certain provisions of the IIRIRA have the potential for significant impact

on Coast Guard

alien migrant interdiction operations. For example, 8

USC

and (d) make the owner or commanding officer of a vessel or aircraft
bringing an alien into the United States personally responsible for transporting
an alien to the foreign country to which they are ordered removed. It also
makes the owner or commanding officer financially responsible for the costs of
both detaining and repatriating the alien. The statute does not explicitly
provide for an exception to this requirement for public vessels. This mandate
could place a large potential burden on the limited financial and operational
resources of the Coast Guard. It could also discourage good Samaritans from
complying with their legal obligations under both 46 USC §2304 and
customary international law to render assistance to those in peril on the sea.
Requiring a good Samaritan to bear the financial burden of detention and
repatriation would unfairly penalize him or her for undertaking a rescue of
anyone whose immigration status is uncertain. A direct result of this
disincentive could be a greater demand on Coast Guard resources for search
and rescue operations.
§ 1 23 1 (c)

"Expedited removal"

is

another provision of IIRIRA, which could have the

on Coast Guard alien migrant interdiction
80
operations. It was created by §302, which amends 8 USC § 1 225 to provide for
a streamlined removal procedure of "applicants for admission" who are deemed
inadmissible by an immigration officer. This procedure took effect on 1 April

potential for significant impact

1997. Applicants for admission include aliens brought into the United States
after

having been interdicted at

inadmissible

for

attempting

to

sea.

81

enter

An

applicant

United

the

may be deemed
States

through

misrepresentation, fraud, or without valid travel and/or visa documents.
applicants for admission

may be removed without

Such

further hearing, appeal, or

an intention to apply
Once ordered removed,

judicial review unless they affirmatively indicate either
for asylum, or a fear of persecution if returned.

82

removal must take place within ninety days.

The IIRIRA also includes mass migration provisions in §372 which provide:
In the event the Attorney General determines that an actual or imminent influx of
aliens arriving off the coast of the

United

States, or near a land border, presents

urgent circumstances requiring an immediate federal response, the Attorney

General

may

authorize any State or local law enforcement officer ... to perform or

exercise any of the powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this chapter

or regulations issued hereunder

upon

officers or

174

employees o( the Service.

83
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Section 372 could help avoid backlogs in the removal process during mass

and Cuba, by ensuring that sufficient
making admissibility determinations when

migrations, such as those from Haiti

resources are

made

available for

necessary.

From the Coast Guard's perspective, expedited removal could help reduce the
resource burden during alien interdictions by obviating the need for cutters to be

used as holding platforms.

become an

Once

saturated with migrants, a cutter ceases to

and must focus all its efforts internally on
and security of the migrants. Using the expedited removal
could bring or transfer aliens into the United States for further

effective operational unit,

the care, feeding,
provisions, cutters

return to their country of origin by another agency without implicating

comprehensive and burdensome hearing entitlements. This would enable the
cutters to perform their primary mission in their area of responsibility for longer

periods of time, rather than merely acting as an inadequate holding facility with

migrants on board for extended periods awaiting disposition and transportation.

Whether or not these new procedures
be seen.

If

an interview

is

are expeditious in practice remains to

required to determine whether an applicant for

admission has a credible fear of persecution, the applicant

may request review

by an immigration judge. This review must occur within seven days. While the
immigration judge's decision
decisions have generally

may be

is

intended to be

been held

such administrative

final,

to be subject to judicial review. Litigation

required to resolve this issue and could delay or prevent

full

implementation of the expedited removal procedures. In addition, another

mass migration by sea could create a backlog of applicants burdening the
system. This might

make

it

impossible to

meet the established timelines

in the

and create political pressure from adversely affected communities.
Except where the time and distance involved in direct repatriation is
extraordinary, transportation of migrants interdicted at sea back to the United
States for expedited removal by forward deployed Coast Guard cutters may be
more resource intensive, logistically burdensome, and result in no net tactical
regulations

As a result, expedited removal appears best suited for those
migrants who manage to elude at-sea interdiction but for some reason arrive at
advantage.

a port of entry. It does not appear likely to replace the

Coast Guard operations to interdict and repatriate

need

illegal alien

for

continuing

migrants at sea.
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artificial reef.

title

to

Seizing the

Bermuda and finance

the cleanup of the vessel.
76.

Data obtained from Commandant, U.

S.

Coast Guard, Office of Law Enforcement,

Migrant Interdiction Division, Washington, D.C.
77. Pub. L. 104-208,

110

Stat.

3009 (1996).

8U.S.C. §1229a (1996).
§1225(1996).
80. Pub. L. No. 104-208
78.

79. 8 U.S.C.

81.

Cuban citizens

arriving by aircraft at a port of entry are

exempt from expedited removal.

8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(l)(F) (1996). This exemption also technically applies to other countries in
the Western Hemisphere with which the United States does not have normal diplomatic
relations.

82. This limitation

on

judicial review

may be

subject to challenge

83. 8 U.S.C. §1103(a)(8)(1996).
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on due process grounds.

The Maritime Claims Reference Manual
and the Law of Baselines

Ashley Roach

J.

Origin of the Maritime Claims Reference Manual

IN 4

MAY

1982, Captain Jack Grunawalt was called to the cabin of

Admiral Bob Long, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command,
Camp Smith, Hawaii, and asked why the Soviets would be ordering USS
Lockwood (FF-1064) to leave waters of the Soviet Union when the ship was
1

operating on the high seas more than 12 miles from land and outside Peter the
2

Great Bay. Jack,

knew

who had been

USSR

that in 1957 the

off-island

when

the operation was approved,

had claimed Peter the Great Bay

as historic

internal waters of the Soviet Union, defining the bay closing line as the line

connecting
promontory.

the
3

estuary

However,

of the
in

Tyumen-Ula River and the Povrotny

examining the chart

illustrating

Lockwood's

approved operating area, Jack observed that the closing line had been drawn to
a point further inside the bay than claimed by the Soviets. He noted that the

on U.S. nautical charts of the area or
publications available to an assistant who had cleared

location of the baseline was not indicated

otherwise illustrated in

Maritime Claims/Law of Baselines

on the

command had no

plan. Further, he observed the

ready authoritative

source listing the coordinates of the claimed bay closing line against which to
verify the location of the closing line.

protest of this incident, as

the

mouth

it

The United

did not recognize the Soviet historic bay claim and

of the bay far exceeded the

closing line.

States rejected the Soviet

maximum

permissible length of a bay

4

Long sent an urgent message to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff QCS) recommending the Department of Defense (DoD) develop
a manual containing a complete description of the maritime claims made by all
nations, particularly a list of the coordinates of all claimed baselines and closing
lines, that would be available to all the operating forces. The JCS and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense agreed with that recommendation and thus began
work on what has become the DoD Maritime Claims Reference Manual, 5 now in
Thereafter, at Jack's urging, Admiral

its

third edition.

The

MCRM, as it known world-wide, contains summaries, or
is

in the case of baselines, full texts, of all the maritime claims

of the world. In addition,

it

also indicates the

United

made by

the nations

States' diplomatic

and

operational reactions to those claims which are inconsistent with the law of the
sea

—hence

the term "excessive maritime claims."

numerous to catalog
the measurement of all maritime

Jack's other contributions to the law of the sea are too

here.

But

zones,

it

as baselines are the

foundation for

seems appropriate that

this tribute present the official

United States on the law of baselines,

as

views of the

based on the Commentary on the

Law

of the Sea (LOS) Convention attached to the Secretary of State's letter of 23

September 1994, submitting the Convention and the Part XI Agreement to the
6
President for transmittal to the Senate for its advice and consent. Because of
the desirability
rules,

—ne

necessity

—of achieving

a uniform interpretation of those

annotations have been added by the author to provide the rationale for

those views.

7

Background

A

State's maritime zones are

measured from the

baseline.

drawing baselines are contained in Articles 5 through

LOS Convention.

8

11, 13,

The

rules for

and 14 of the

These rules distinguish between normal baselines (following
the low-water mark along the coast) and straight baselines (which can be
9
employed only in specified geographical situations). The baseline rules take
into account most of the wide variety of geographical conditions existing along
the coastlines of the world. Baseline claims can extend maritime jurisdiction
significantly seaward in a manner that prejudices navigation, overflight, and
182
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Objective application of the baseline rules contained in the

Convention can help prevent excessive claims in the future and encourage
11
governments to revise existing claims to conform to the relevant criteria.

Normal Baseline
The normal

baseline used for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea

the low-water line along the coast as
charts.

12

"Low-water

line" has

been defined

low water with the shore. The
recedes at low-water."

purposes

is

known

The

State's official large-scale

as "the intersection of the plane of

which the sea

line along a coast, or beach, to

actual water level taken as low- water for charting

as the level of

Normal baseline

marked on the

is

Chart Datum.

13

claims must be consistent with this rule. Excessive normal

baseline claims include a claim that low-tide elevations, wherever situated,

generate a territorial sea and that
(e.g.,

by Egypt and Saudi Arabia).

Reefs. In the case of islands situated

the normal baseline

is

artificial islands

generate a territorial sea

14

on atolls

or of islands having fringing reefs,

the seaward low-water line of the drying reef charted as
15

While the LOS Convention does not
address reef closing lines, any such line must not adversely affect rights of
passage, freedom of navigation, and other rights provided for in the

being above the level of chart datum.

Convention.

Straight Baselines

Purpose*

The purpose

coastal State, at

its

of authorizing the use of straight baselines

is

to allow the

discretion, to enclose those waters which, as a result of their

have the character of internal waters. By
using straight baselines, a State may also eliminate complex patterns, including
enclaves, in its territorial sea, that would otherwise result from the use of
normal baselines. 16 Properly drawn straight baselines do not result in extending

close interrelationship with the land,

the limits of the territorial sea significantly seaward from those that would
result

from the use of normal baselines. 17

With

the advent of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the original reason

for straight baselines

(protection of coastal fishing interests)

disappeared. Their use in a
overflight,

manner

and communications

has

all

but

that prejudices international navigation,

interests runs counter to the thrust of the

Convention's strong protection of these

interests. In light of the

183

modernization
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of the law of the sea in the Convention,

Convention

it is

states, straight baselines are

sparingly, and,

not normal baselines, should be used

where used, should be drawn conservatively

rationale for their use that
simplification

reasonable to conclude that, as the

is

one

to reflect the

consistent with the Convention, namely the

and rationalization of the measurement of the

other maritime zones off highly irregular coasts.

and

territorial sea

18

—

Areas of Application. Consequently, international law permits States in
limited geographical circumstances
to measure the territorial sea and other
national maritime zones from straight baselines drawn between defined points

—

The United

of the coast.

States accepts that the two specific geographical

may employ

circumstances under which States
described in Article

paragraph

1,

7,

paragraph

deeply indented and cut into, or

is

fringe of islands along the coast in

its

baselines joining appropriate points

from which the breadth of the

no

are as

Article 4,

of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention:

In localities where the coastline

If

LOS Convention and

of the

1,

straight baselines

immediate

vicinity, the

may be employed

territorial sea

if

there

a

is

method of straight

in drawing the baseline

measured.

is

the portion of the coast being examined does not meet either criterion, then

straight baseline

segment may lawfully be drawn in that

locality,

and the other

rules (on permissible basepoints, the vector of the putative straight baseline in

and the

relation to the coast,

enclosed)

may not be

invoked.

requisite quality of the waters that
19

Further, the coastal State

requirements of one test or the other, and

example, a State
that

it

may not claim that

a locality

is

own terms.

which the

If

the requirements. For

indented, though not deeply, and

in that locality. Either test selected

a coastal State cannot establish that

straight baseline

islands in the

immediate

straight baselines, for

none

a baseline in that locality

is

the

fulfill all

has some islands, though they do not constitute a fringe, and claim

draw straight baselines
its

may not mix

must

would be

its

it

may

must be met entirely on

coastline in the locality in

sought is deeply indented and cut into or fringed with

vicinity,

it

may not proceed

are authorized to be
its

to identify appropriate

drawn there. Rather,

low-water mark. Failure to meet

it

must use

as

this preliminary

geographical test in one locality does not preclude establishing

it

in another.

°

Even

if

the basic geographic criteria exist in any particular locality, the coastal

State

is

not obliged to employ the method of straight baselines, but

may

(like

the

United States and other countries) instead continue to use the normal baseline

and permissible closing

lines across the

mouths of rivers and
184
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Localities

Where

the Coastline

Ashley Roach

is

Deeply Indented and Cut Into. "Deeply

indented and cut into" refers to a very distinctive coastal configuration.

United States has taken the position that such a configuration must fulfill
the following characteristics:

1) in a locality

least three

The
all

of

21

where the coastline

deep indentations;

is

deeply indented and cut into, there exist at

22

23

and

2) the

deep indentations are in close proximity to one another;

3) the

depth of penetration of each deep indentation from the proposed straight

baseline enclosing the indentation at

its

entrance to the sea

is,

as a rule, greater

24
than half the length of that baseline segment.

The

"coastline"

is

mean low-water

the

"localities" refers to particular

segments of the coastline.

Fringe of Islands Along the Coast in
along the coast in

its

immediate

to other features that

line along the coast;

its

Immediate Vicinity. "Fringe of islands

vicinity" refers to a

number of islands and not

do not meet the definition of an island contained
26

The United

position that a such a fringe of islands

must meet

Article 121(1) of the

requirements:

1)

LOS

Convention.

the most landward point of each island

miles apart from the island from

3) the islands, as a whole,

Criteria for

States has taken the
all

locality.

lies

no more than 24 miles from the

mask

which the

at least

is

to be

drawn

is

straight baseline

not more than 24

is

drawn;

29

and

50 percent of the mainland coastline

in

30

Drawing Straight Baseline Segments. The United States has taken

the position that, to be consistent with Article 7(3) of the
straight baseline

1)

of the following

28

each island to which a straight baseline

any given

LOS

Convention,

segments must:

not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the

coastline,

in

27

mainland coastline;

2)

the term

25

by reference to general direction

exceed 60 miles in length;

31

185

lines

which

in

each

locality shall

not
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2)

not exceed 24 miles in length;

3) result in sea areas situated

and

landward of the straight baseline segments that are

sufficiently closely linked to the land

internal waters.

domain

to be subject to the regime of

33

Minor Deviations.

Straight baselines

drawn with minor deviations from the

foregoing criteria are not necessarily inconsistent with the Convention. 34

Economic

Interests.

Economic

particular straight baselines.

35

interests alone

cannot

justify

In determining the alignment of particular

segments of a baseline system which

straight baseline

indented or fringing islands

the location of

satisfies

the deeply

may be
region concerned, and only when

only those economic interests

criteria,

taken into account which are peculiar to the

the reality and importance of the economic interests are clearly evidenced by

long usage.

36

Basepoints.

noted in Article 7(4) of the LOS Convention,
straight baselines must be located on land territory and

Except

basepoints for

all

as

on or landward of the low-water line. No straight baseline segment
may be drawn to a basepoint located on the land territory of another State. 37
situated

Use of Low-Tide Elevations as Basepoints
low-tide elevation

is

a naturally

in

a System of Straight Baselines.

A

formed land area surrounded by water and
38

which remains above water at low tide but is submerged at high tide. Low-tide
elevations can be mud flats or sand bars. In accordance with Article 7(4), only
those low-tide elevations which have had lighthouses or similar installations
39
built on them may be used as basepoints for establishing straight baselines.
Other low-tide elevations may not be used as basepoints unless the drawing of
40
baselines to and from them has received general international recognition.
The United States has taken the position that "similar installations" are those
that are permanent, substantial, and actually used for safety of navigation and
that "general international recognition" includes recognition by the major

maritime users over a period of time.

Effect

State

on Other

may not

41

States. Article 7 (6) of the

LOS Convention

apply the system of straight baselines in such a

off the territorial sea of

addition, Article 8(2)

provides that a

manner

as to cut

another State from the high seas or an EEZ.

of the

LOS Convention

42

In

provides that, where the

establishment of a straight baseline has the effect o( enclosing as internal
186
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waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of

innocent passage

as

Article 35(a) of the

43
provided in the Convention shall exist in those waters.

LOS

right of transit passage

Unstable Coastlines.

Convention has the same

through

Where

with respect to the

straits.

the coastline, which

into or fringed with islands in

effect

its

immediate

is

deeply indented and cut

vicinity,

is

also highly unstable

because of the presence of a delta or other natural conditions, the appropriate

may be

basepoints
line.

The

located along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water

straight baseline

segments drawn joining these basepoints remain

notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water

effective,

line, until

the baseline segments are changed by the coastal State in accordance with the
international law reflected in the

LOS

Convention. 44

Other Baseline Rules
Low'Tide Elevations. The low-water line on a low-tide elevation may be used as
the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea only where that
elevation

is

situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of

the territorial sea measured from the mainland or an island.
elevation

is

Where

a low-tide

wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the

sea from the mainland or an island, even

from a straight baseline or bay closing

if it is

line, it

territorial

within that distance measured

has no

territorial sea

of its own.

45

Combination of Methods. A coastal State may determine each baseline
segment using any of the methods permitted by the LOS Convention that suit
the specific geographic condition of that segment, i.e., the methods for drawing
normal baselines, straight baselines, or closing lines. 46

Harbor Works. Only those permanent man-made harbor works which form an
integral part of a harbor system,

breakwaters, and sea walls,
the

territorial

sea.

47

such

may be used

as jetties,

moles, quays, wharves,

as part of the baseline for delimiting

Offshore installations and

artificial

considered permanent harbor works for baseline purposes.

River Mouths.
the baseline
points

is

If a river

is

are

not

flows directly into the sea without forming an estuary,

a straight line

on the low-water

baseline

islands

48

drawn

across the

line of its banks.

49

If

mouth

of the river between

the river forms an estuary, the

determined under the provisions relating to juridical bays. 50
187
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Bays and Other Features
Juridical Bays.
a

A "juridical bay"

is

a bay meeting specific criteria.

Such

well-marked indentation on the coast whose penetration

proportion to the width of
constitute

more than

bay unless

juridical

whose diameter

area

a line

is

as to

is

such

in

is

is

contain land-locked waters and

mere curvature of the

a

its

mouth

its

a bay

coast.

An

indentation

is

not a

as large as, or larger than, that of the semicircle

drawn

across the

mouth

of that indentation.

For the purpose of measurement, the indentation

is

51

that area lying between

mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the
low-water mark of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence
of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semicircle shall be
drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the
the low-water

different

mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included

as if they

were

part of the water area of the indentation for satisfaction of the semicircle test.
If

52

the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points

of a juridical bay of a single State does not exceed 24 miles, the juridical bay

may be

defined by drawing a closing line between these two low- water marks,

and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters. 53
Where the distance between the low-water marks exceeds 24 miles, a straight
baseline of 24 miles shall be drawn within the juridical bay in such a manner as
to enclose the

length.

maximum

area of water that

is

possible within a line of that

54

Historic Bays.

exempt

The

Territorial

Sea Convention and the

LOS Convention both

so-called historic bays from the rules described above.

5

To meet

the

standard of customary international law for establishing a claim to a historic
bay, a State

must demonstrate

its

open, effective, long-term, and continuous

exercise of authority over the bay, coupled with acquiescence by foreign States
in the exercise of that authority.

States in such a claim

is

An actual showing of acquiescence by foreign

required, as opposed to a

mere absence of opposition.

Charts and Publication. Baselines are to be shown on large-scale nautical
charts, officially recognized by the coastal State. Alternatively, the coastal

State must provide a

datum.

56

Drying

reefs

list

of geographic coordinates specifying the geodetic

used for locating basepoints are to be shown by an

internationally accepted symbol for depicting such reefs

The

coastal State

is

on

nautical charts.

required to give due publicity to such charts or

geographical coordinates, and deposit a copy of each such chart or
188

list

lists

57

of

with the
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Secretary-General of the United Nations.
semicircle test
listed

must be given due

geographic coordinates.

Islands, Article 121(1) of the

58

Closure lines for bays meeting the

by chart indications or by

publicity, either

59

LOS

Convention defines an island

formed area of land, surrounded by water, which

is

above water

as a naturally
at high tide.

on islands, and maritime zones are measured from
the same way as on other land territory. In addition, as

Baselines are established

those baselines in

previously indicated, there are special rules for using islands in drawing straight
baselines

and bay closing lines, and even low

not

to the status of islands)

rise

tide elevations

may be used

(which

literally

do

as basepoints in specified

circumstances. These special rules are not affected by the provision in Article

121(3) that rocks which cannot sustain
their

own

shall

human

have no EEZ or continental

Artificial Islands

and Off-shore

and structures

(including

habitation or economic

life

of

shelf.

Installations. Artificial islands, installations,

such

man-made

objects

oil-drilling

as

navigational towers, and off-shore docking and oil-pumping

facilities)

rigs,

do not

and may not be used to establish baselines, enclose
internal waters, or establish or measure the breadth of the territorial sea, EEZ,

possess the status of islands

or continental shelf.

protect

artificial

60

Safety zones of limited breadth

islands,

navigation in their vicinity.

Roadsteads*

installations

may be

established to

and structures and the

safety

of

61

Roadsteads normally used for the loading, unloading, and

anchoring of ships, and which would otherwise be situated wholly or partly

beyond the outer
sea.

62

limits of the territorial sea, are

Roadsteads included within the

charts by the coastal State.

included within the territorial

territorial sea

must be

Only the roadstead

clearly

marked on

territorial

itself is

sea;

roadsteads do not generate territorial seas around themselves; the presence of a

roadstead does not change the legal status of the water surrounding

lmost

fifty

63
it.

years ago, the International Court of Justice stated that

.delimitation of straight baselines "cannot be

the will of the coastal State as expressed in

its

dependent merely upon

municipal law

of the delimitation with regard to other States depends
189
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law."

64

However, what nations do

with international law
[WJhere

a baseline

is

is

crucial.

in the face of baseline claims inconsistent

As two noted

British scholars

clearly contrary to international law,

which have objected

will

it

have

stated:

not be

valid,

though a State which has
might be estopped from
later denying its validity. In border-line cases
for example, where there is doubt
as to whether a State's straight baseline system conforms to all the criteria laid

certainly in respect of States

accepted the baseline

down

in

(for

example in a boundary

customary and conventional

—
law — the

acquiescing in or objecting to the baseline

determining

its

MCRM

The

validity.

to

it,

treaty)

attitude of other States in

is

likely

prove crucial in

to

65

and the views of the United States have

continue to materially

assist,

all

assisted,

and

will

States in achieving the harmonization of

domestic with international law envisioned by Article 310 of the

Law

of the

Sea Convention. Jack Grunawalt can be proud of the what he has done over
the past twenty-five years in that regard. We all are in his debt and renew our

commitment

to that end.

Jack, fair winds

and following

seas forever.
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.

A/CONF.62/122

(1982), reprinted in 21 1.L.M.

OFFICIAL TEXT, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5, 1983 (entered into force Nov.
LOS Convention]
9.

The

baseline provisions of the 1982

Oceans Affairs and the Law of the

1982, U.N. Doc.

10,

12614354 (1982) and in THE

LOS Convention

Sea,

LAW OF THE SEA:

16, 1994) [hereinafter

examined

are

United Nations, The

in

OFFICE FOR

Law of the

Sea:

BASELINES (U.N. Sales No. E.88.V.5*, 1989) [hereinafter U.N., BASELINES]. OFFICE FOR
Oceans Affairs and the law of the Sea, United nations, Baselines: National
LEGISLATION (1989), and ATLAS OF THE STRAIGHT BASELINES (Giampiero Francalanci et a\.
eds., 1986) also detail the baseline claims of the coastal and island States.

As noted in the Introduction to the recent UN study on baselines, " [historically viewed
of vessels, products and people
the new law of the sea
as a body of law regulating movement
the assertion of national claims to large
has become increasingly a law of appropriation
10.

—

—

—

portions of the earth's surface covered by the oceans." U.N., BASELINES, supra note 9, at
11.

In depositing

declared

"A

instrument of ratification of the

its

claim that the drawing of baselines ...

only be acceptable

if

such

lines

.

.

.

is

LOS

vii.

Convention, the Netherlands

in accordance with the

Convention

will

have been established in accordance with the Convention."

Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, The Law of
the Sea: Declaration and Statements with Respect to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and to the Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part xi of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Division for

SEA OF 10 DECEMBER

1982, at 36, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.3 (1997). In depositing

LOS

of accession to the

statements not in conformity with articles 309 and 310 include
baselines not

its

instrument

Convention, the United Kingdom declared that "declarations and

those which relate to
drawn in conformity with the Convention." U.N. Law of the Sea web site, Status of
.

.

.

the Convention, Declarations (last visited Feb. 3, 1998) http://www.un.org/DeptsAos.
12.
3,

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva, Apr. 28, 1958, art.
1606, T.I.A.S. No. 639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, [hereinafter Territorial Sea

U.S.T.

15

Convention];
13.

LOS

Convention, supra note

Definition 50,

in

8, art. 5.

Consolidated Glossary of Technical Terms used in the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea, International Hydrographic Bureau Special Pub. No. 51, A
Manual on Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,
Part I, reprinted in UN, BASELINES, supra note 9, at 58 [hereinafter Consolidated Glossary].
14.

Robin R. Churchill & Alan V.Lowe, The Law of the Sea 46 (2drev.ed.

1988).

15.

LOS

24.

Convention, supra note

8,

art.

6;

U.N., BASELINES, supra note

9,

11

The

Working Group on Technical Aspects of the Law of
ring-shaped reef with or without an island situated on it

International Hydrographic Organization

the Sea describes an "atoll" as "a

surrounded by the open
or coral

reef

which

as "a reef

immediate
16.

sea, that encloses or nearly encloses a lagoon"; a

either reaches close to the sea surface or

is

exposed

at

"reef as "a mass of rock

low

tide";

and

a "fringing

attached directly to the shore or continental land mass, or located in their

vicinity."

Consolidated Glossary, supra note 13, app.

U.N., BASELINES, supra note

&

9,

HI 35

I,

definitions 9

& 66.

& 38.

&

17. Id., HI 38
LOWE, supra note 14, at 33 (while in some situations it
39; CHURCHILL
would be impracticable to use the low-water line, "the effect of drawing straight baselines, even
strictly in

accordance with the

waters"). Professors

baseline claim

is

to

rules,

is

often to enclose considerable bodies of sea as internal

Reisman and Westerman warn, "the chief practical effect of a
augment the areas of internal and territorial waters within state

When individual baseline segments are very long,
191

straight

control.

however, significant areas of continental shelf

Maritime Claims/Law of Baselines
and exclusive economic zone are also gained." W. MICHAEL REISMAN &GAYL S. WESTERMAN,
Straight Baselines in International Maritime boundary Delimitation 105 (1992)
18. U.S. Commentary, supra note 6, at 8; JOHN R. PRESCOTT, THE MARITIME POLITICAL
BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 50 (1985); REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 17, at xv.
19. REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 17, at 77.
20.

Id.

at 90-91.

Commentary, supra note

21. U.S.

6, at 9.

The LOS Convention does not

22.
locality

specify

how many deep

indentations must exist in any

on the coastline. Nevertheless, there must be noticeably more than one deep indentation
would apply. While U.N., BASELINES, supra

in the locality, otherwise the juridical bay criteria

note

9,

H 36, suggests "several," three should be the

situation from bays.

There may

also

minimum

necessary to distinguish the

be one or more shallower cuts into the

locality of the

coastline.

The LOS Convention does not define "locality." This criterion, which combines the "cut
and "deep indentation" requirements, coupled with the definition of "localities" infra,
describe a "locality" where straight baselines may lawfully be drawn. The point at which the
23.

into"

prescribed geographical criteria ceases to exist constitutes the limit of that particular "locality."

The LOS Convention does not

24.

Article 10

A bay

on bays.

is

define "deeply indented" except by comparison with

defined as a "well-marked indentation" of a specified proportion (the

semi-circle test, see infra). Logical interpretation suggests that "deeply indented" sets a stricter

geographical standard than that for a juridical bay. This criterion

is

designed to prevent shallow

bays which do not meet the penetration criterion for juridical bays from being the basis for
establishing a series of straight baseline segments in a particular locality (although

indentations not being juridical bays in the locality of the deep indentations

may

some shallow
in the process

also be closed off as "cuts into" the coastline), while ensuring recognition that the purpose of

straight baselines

39.

It

not "to increase the

is

should be noted that the

states that there

25. Neither

is

unduly." U.N., BASELINES, supra note

territorial sea

9,

11

sentence of paragraph 36 of U.N. BASELINES, incorrectly
,

general agreement that each of the several indentations must be juridical bays.

term

U.N., BASELINES.

last

is

defined in the

The term

LOS Convention

or in the

"coastline" as used in Article 7

is

IHO

Glossary appended to

clearly referring to the

normal

baseline defined in Article 5 as the "low-water line along the coast." U.N., BASELINES, supra note
9,

11

9,

notes that "the low-water line

"Localities"

is

defined to

make

is

the intersection of the plane of low water with the shore."

clear that each baseline

segment

is

related to a particular

geographic location.
26. Article 7 of the

LOS Convention does not define a "fringe," or how close the islands must

be to the mainland in the

made up

vicinity, or

how

close together the islands

of islands; low-tide elevations,

installations are

Convention

is

artificial

islands,

must be. The

reefs,

fringe

must be

roadsteads, or off-shore

not islands. The definition of island found in Article 121(1) of the

"a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which

is

LOS

above water

at

high tide." Professors Reisman and Westerman suggest that a fringe of rocks which cannot
sustain

human habitation or economic life of their own

a fringe of "islands," although they

basepoints.

REISMAN

27. U.S.

would permit rocks within the

& WESTERMAN, supra note

Commentary, supra note
in the vicinity. "In

should not qualify as

fringe of islands to be used as

17, at 85.

6, at 9.

28. This first criterion addresses the

from the coastline

[see Article 121 (3)]

its

maximum
immediate

permissible seaward distance of the islands
vicinity" clearly suggests that the distance

exceed 24 miles since (a) open areas of high seas would lack the "close link" to the
mainland necessary to justify a conversion to internal waters required by Article 7(3) of the LOS
will rarely
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J.

Convention;

(b) Article 8(2)

preserves the right of innocent passage in waters closed off by

straight baselines which had not previously been considered as such; and

(c)

Article 10(5)

whose mouth is
STATES: ARCHIPELAGIC

authorizes the use of a 24-mile straight baseline to enclose most of a juridical bay

wider than 24 miles. Accord

REGIMES IN THE

MUHAMMAD MUNAVVAR, OCEAN

LAW OF THE SEA

121 (1995).

29. This second criterion addresses the

maximum

distances between islands to

make up

a

Given the linkage to territorial waters described in the preceding endnote, it follows that,
as a rule, no straight baseline segment should exceed 24 miles. Two 12-mile arcs drawn from
appropriate low-water marks would be tangent at exactly 24 miles. A close spatial relationship
between the various islands produces a barrier between the actual coast and the open sea and
fringe.

constitutes the justification for drawing a straight baseline in that locality.

each

far

A scattering of islands,

from the other, along a smooth and otherwise undistinguished coast does not

qualify.

Neither would a close constellation of an island cluster in a single place warrant a straight
baseline.

What is

required

they fringe the coast.

is

a distribution of islands close

REISMAN

& WESTERMAN, supra

enough

to

each other to warrant that

note 17, at 86-87.

meeting these two

criteria will necessarily essentially parallel the coast. See

supra note 9,

and REISMAN

11

43,

& WESTERMAN, supra note

A

fringe of islands

U.N., BASELINES,

17, at 86.

drawn from paragraph 45 of U.N., BASELINES, provides an objective
if the islands actually mask the coastline in the vicinity. "Masking" can
be more objectively determined if the islands mask the majority of the mainland coastline in any
given locality. Professors Reisman and Westerman believe the quantitative test for the number
of islands should be "very high," approximating that found in the Norwegian skjaergaard.
30. This criterion,

criterion for determining

REISMAN

& WESTERMAN, supra note 17 at 86.

3 1 Limits in the Seas No. 106, Developing Standard Guidelines for Evaluating
Straight Baselines 30-32 (1987).
32.

The

24-mile

maximum segment

length

is

implied from a close reading of the relevant

LOS

Convention. Article 7(1) speaks of the "immediate vicinity" of the coast.
Article 7(3) states that "the sea areas lying within the line must be sufficiently closely linked to
the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters." In both of these descriptions, the
articles of the

implication
sea. It

is

is

strong that the waters to be internalized would otherwise be part of the territorial

difficult to

envision a situation where international waters (beyond 12 miles from the

appropriate low-water line) could be

somehow

"sufficiently closely linked" as to

be subject to

conversion to internal waters.

This implication

is

reinforced by Article 8(2), which guarantees the right of innocent passage

in areas converted to internal waters by straight baselines. Innocent passage

applicable to the territorial sea (with a

maximum breadth of 12

is

a regime

miles). Preservation of innocent

passage carries over pre-existing rights in waters that were territorial in nature before the
application of straight baselines.

Given this theme of linkage to territorial waters, it follows that, as a rule, no straight baseline
segment should exceed 24 miles. Two 12 -mile arcs from appropriate low-water marks would
exactly overlap at 12 miles. Article 10(5) lends even further strength to this rule. Even in the
case of a bay that meets the semicircle test, a closing line under Article 10 may not be drawn at
the natural entrance points if those points are more than 24 miles apart. Article 10 permits only a
24-mile straight baseline within such a bay. This emphasizes the overriding importance of the
24-mile rule, even after satisfaction of the semicircle

Accord Finland Decree No. 464, Aug.
not longer than twice the width of the

test.

18, 1956, art. 4(2), (straight baseline

territorial sea), translated in

193

segments

shall

be

LIMITS IN THE SEAS No. 48,

Maritime Claims/Law of Baselines
STRAIGHT BASELINES: FINLAND

(1972). Cf. the demarches by

European Union (EU) and endorsed by the acceding States

Germany, on behalf of the
and Sweden):

(Austria, Finland,

Thailand concerning the announcement by the Prime Minister's Cabinet on August
its straight baselines and internal waters in area 4 {reprinted in U.N., LOS BULL. No.
25, June 1994, at 8), in which the EU stated that "even if the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea does not set a maximum length for baseline segments, the segments determined
(a)

to

17, 1992, of

by Thailand are excessively long. They are in fact 81 miles long between points
long between points 2 and
at

3,

1 and 2, 98 miles
and 60 miles long between points 3 and 4." U.N., LOS BULL. No. 28,

31 (1995); and
(b)

to Iran to the

found in

No. 31,

id.,

LOS

at

effect.

U.N.,

LOS BULL. No.

30, at

60 (1996).

Convention, Article 7(3),

6, at 9.

The

may be

specifically

Sea Convention, Article 4(2) and
provide that straight baselines must not depart
Territorial

"to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast,"

must be

Iran's reply

38 (1996).

Commentary, supra note

33. U.S.

the

same

"sufficiently closely linked to the land

domain

and the sea areas they enclose

to be subject to the regime of internal

Reisman and Westerman note that the coastal State must prove this linkage,
and propose that it may be met through proof of geographical proximity, practice through time,
and intensity of use. REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 17, at 99-100.
34. This criterion recognizes that hard and fast rules will not always be acceptable for

waters." Professors

drawing straight baselines.
35. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 12,
7(5); U.N.,

BASELINES, supra note

9,

U 58.

art. 4(5);

The economic

LOS Convention, supra note 8,
interests test

is

available only

if

art.

the

preliminary geographical requirements have been met. Thus, with the exclusive economic zone
jurisdiction

now

available to

all

coastal States,

no economic

rationale

can alone

justify a straight

baseline claim.
36.

LOS

Convention, supra note

8, art. 7(5); Territorial

4(4). Consequently, the coastal State

must advance

Sea Convention, supra note

historic

economic data

12, art.

to establish this

exception. Clearly, Article 7(5) does not refer to potential economic interests. Professors

Reisman and Westerman suggest a test combining geographic proximity, practice through time,
and intensity of past use. REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 17, at 100-101.
37. U.N., BASELINES, supra note 9, 11 51. Article 7(1) of the LOS Convention provides that
the straight baseline segments must join "appropriate basepoints." Those basepoints will be
appropriate only if the segments drawn satisfy the delimitation rules of paragraphs 2 through 6 of
Article 7. The Convention nowhere authorizes the use of abstract points at sea, described in
terms of coordinates of latitude and longitude but otherwise failing the requirements of the
Convention,
38.

LOS

as basepoints.

Convention, supra note

8, art. 13(1); Territorial

Sea Convention, supra note

12,

10(1).

art.

39.

The same

rule appeared in the Territorial

Sea Convention, supra note

12, art. 4(3).

40. This second exception is new and not contained in Territorial Sea Convention, Article
4(3). Professors Reisman and Westerman argue that this new authority cannot be used unless

and

until there

is

a substantial demonstration of the existence oi widespread international

recognition of the particular low-tide elevation lacking a lighthouse as a basepoint.

WESTERMAN
41. U.S.

See

Commentary, supra note

MUNAVVAR,
42.

REISMAN

&

supra note 17, 93-94.
6, at 10;

REISMAN

& WESTERMAN, supra note

17,

93-94.

supra note 28, at 125.

The comparable

provision in the Territorial Sea Convention appears in Article 4(5).

example of state practice complying with

this rule

194

is

An

the French baseline decree of October 19,

Ashley Roach

J.

Monaco with unrestricted oceans
STRAIGHT BASELINES: FRANCE

1967, which provides for noncontinuous segments leaving

seaward. 7 I.L.M. 347 (1968); LIMITS IN

THE SEAS No.

37,

The Spanish enclaves of Cuela and Melilla and the Islas Chafarinas almost completely
enclosed within Moroccan straight baselines are another example. FARAJ ABDULLAH AHNISH,
the international law of maritime boundaries and the practice of states in
the Mediterranean Sea 190-193 (1993).
43. The same rule appeared in the Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 12, art. 5(2). An
(1972).

example of this situation
island of the

high

is

the Piombino Channel between the Italian Island of Elba (the

Tuscany archipelago) and the

seas, while lying entirely

Italian

mainland, which connects two parts of the

within Italian internal waters as defined by

baseline decree. Tullio Scovazzi,

Management Regimes and

with Special Reference to the Mediterranean Straits, 19
44.

LOS

Convention, supra note

8,

art.

main

Italy's

1977 straight

Responsibility for International Straits,

MARINE POL'Y

137, 151 (1995).

7(2). Applicable deltas include those of the

and Nile Rivers, and the Ganges-Brahmaputra River in Bangladesh. U.N.,
WESTERMAN, supra
9, 11 50; PRESCOTT, supra note 18, at 15; REISMAN

Mississippi

&

BASELINES, supra note
note 17, at 101-102.

45. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 12, art. 11;
13.

LOS

Convention, supra note

8, art.

,

46.

LOS Convention,

Territorial

supra note

8, art. 14.

There

is

no corresponding provision

in the 1958

Sea Convention. Article 14 does not permit a coastal State to draw straight baselines

in a locality not meeting the required geographic criteria; in those circumstances, the low-water

must be followed. See U.N., BASELINES, supra note

line

9,

1111

31-32. Closing

lines are discussed

infra.

47. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 12, art. 8; LOS Convention, supra note 8, art.
IHO Definition 38, in U.N., BASELINES, supra note 9, at 56; U.N., BASELINES, supra note 9,

11

1 1

76.

Reisman and Westerman would add a prohibition against the use of atolls and fringing
basepoints for straight baseline segments along the coast or around the islands. REISMAN

Professors
reefs as

& Westerman,
48.

LOS

supra note 17, at 94.

Convention, supra note

8, art. 11.

49. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 12, art. 13;

The

fact that the river

must flow

LOS Convention, supra note 8,

"directly into the sea" suggests that the

art. 9.

mouth should be

well

marked.
50. See the

1956 I.L.C. draft of what became Article 13 of the Territorial Sea Convention

LOS Convention), U.N. Doc. A/3159, II Y.B.I.L.C. 1956, at
IHO Definition 54, in U.N., BASELINES, supra note 9, at 59. An estuary is the tidal
mouth of a river, where the tide meets the current of fresh water. IHO Definition 30, in id at 54.
(the predecessor of Article 9 of the

253, 271, and

The Conventions do not
should be placed.

through

deltas,

No

such

state exactly where, along the

special baseline rules

as the Mississippi,

for river entrances

Conventions place no

limit

estuaries, the closing points

have been established

for rivers entering the sea

normal or

straight baseline principles

either the

(i.e.,

above may apply) or

banks of

dotted with islands.

on the length of river

address ice coast lines, where the ice coverage

The

Territorial

Sea and

closing lines. Further, the Conventions

may be permanent

51. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 12, art. 7(2);

LOS

do not

or temporary.

LOS Convention, supra note

8, art.

8, art.

10(2).
52. Territorial

Sea Convention, supra note

12, art. 7(3);

LOS Convention, supra

Sea Convention, supra note

12, art. 7(4);

LOS Convention, supra note 8,

note

10(3).
53. Territorial

10(4).
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art.
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54. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 12, art. 7(5);
10(5).

The

LOS Convention, supra note 8,

waters enclosed by a baseline of a wide-mouth bay need not meet the semicircle

art.

test,

since the wide mouth bay as a whole must meet that test to be a juridical bay. In this case, there is
no requirement to draw the closing line between prominent points; they can be fixed on smooth
coasts. PRESCOTT, supra note 18, at 60. Historic bays, bays bounded by more than one State, and

bays converted to internal waters by straight baselines under Article

7,

are not covered by Article

10.

55. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 12, art. 7(6);

LOS Convention, supra note 8,

art.

10(6).

56.

LOS Convention,

baselines.

Under the

supra note

Territorial

8, art.

16(2). This rule applies to both

normal and

straight

Sea Convention, Article 4(6), only straight baselines were

required to be clearly shown.
57.

LOS

Territorial

58.

Convention, supra note

8, art. 6.

There

is

no corresponding provision

in the 1958

Sea Convention.

4(6) (straight

The

Sea Convention also required due publicity in Articles
baselines) and 9 (roadsteads). See U.N., BASELINES, supra note 9, 1111 2-8, 29

Id., art.

16(2).

Territorial

&

94-102.
59.

LOS

Convention, supra note

60.

Id., arts.

61.

The

arts. 60,

62.

11, 60(8), 147(2)

8, art. 16.

& 259.

criteria for establishing safety

zones are set out in

LOS

Convention, supra note

177(2) and 260.

LOS

Convention, supra note

8, art. 12.

64.

Commentary,
6, at 13.
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, (U.K.

65.

CHURCHILL

63. U.S.

supra note

& LOWE, supra note

14, at

v.

Nor.) 1951

46-47.
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X
The

Principle of the Military Objective
in the

Law of Armed Conflict

Horace B. Robertson,

Jr.

THEIR COMMENTARY on the two 1977 Protocols Additional
the
INGeneva
Conventions of 1949, Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch, and
to

the late

Waldemar A.

Solf remark that the definition of the "military

objective" in the sense of targets for attack had, until adoption of Article 52
of Additional Protocol

1

"eluded

I,

2

acceptable solution." This

is

all

efforts

to arrive

two "cardinal principles" of the law of armed
itself,

a generally

surprising in that the principle of distinction,

from which the principle of the military objective
distinction

at

is

derived,

conflict.

3

The

is

one of the

principle of

although an inherent part of both customary and

conventional law governing the conduct of war, did not receive precise
articulation in a treaty

which

states in Article

document

until

adopted in Additional Protocol

48 that:

In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish

between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.

I,

Military Objective

Development and Articulation of the Principle
of the Military Objective
Despite some embryonic intimations of the emergence of the principle in the
period of medieval

Canon law, 4

the chivalric codes of the international order of
5

knighthood, and the early war codes of certain European States, the modern
articulation of the principle of distinction

had

its

origins in the late 19th

and

under the influence of Rousseau's proclamation
between States and not between peoples.

early 20th centuries, probably

that

were

wars

disputes

Consequently, military operations were to be conducted exclusively between

combatants in uniform, and unarmed
persons and property.

The

civilians

were to be spared in their

6

principle of distinction

had

its

first

formal recognition as such in

Professor Francis Lieber's Instructions promulgated to the Federal Forces in

the United States Civil
provisions

is

War

by President Lincoln.

a recognition that in

7

Included

among

its

remote times the universal rule was, "and

continues to be with barbarous armies," that civilians and their property were
subject to any privation the hostile

commander chose

to impose.

8

But the

Instructions also recognize that as civilization has advanced,
so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in

war on

land, the distinction

and the hostile
country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more
acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and
9
honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.
between the private individual belonging

The

to a hostile country

Declaration of Petersburg of 1868

stating in

its

10

tacitly

recognized the principle,

Preamble that "the only legitimate object which States should

endeavor to accomplish during war

is

to

weaken the

military forces of the

enemy." This sentiment was also expressed in the Final Protocol of the Brussels

Conference of 1 874.

n

The Oxford Manual
not admit of acts
States."

that

12

An

" [t]his

'armed

"The state of war does
of violence, save between the armed forces of belligerent
of 1880, in

its first article,

states,

explanatory statement immediately following the article notes

rule implies a distinction

force' of a State

and

its

between the individuals who compose the

other ressortissants [nationals]."

13

Despite these

advances toward adoption of the principle of distinction in a conventional

Hague Conventions of 1907 gave only limited and implied
the principle. Without specific reference to the principle of
or the concept of the military objective, a number of provisions

instrument, the
respect to
distinction

198
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explicitly require respect for the

Jr.

person and property of noncombatants.

Annexed

Hague IV 14

bombardment
of undefended places in land warfare, as does Article 1 of Hague IX for naval
15
bombardments. In both land and naval bombardments, the commander
ordering the bombardment is normally required to give notice prior to the start
16
of the bombardment. In both cases, the commander must take all necessary
Article 25 of the Regulations

to

prohibits

steps to spare, "as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or

charitable purposes, historic

and wounded are

The

17

Proscriptions against harming inhabitants

and taking

explicit reference to the "military objective" as a concrete rule of

found in the Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923.

is

sick

18

first

warfare

and places where the

without compensation are found in a number of places in

their property

IV.

hospitals,

collected, provided they are not being used at the time for

military purposes."

Hague

monuments,

19

Article 24(1) of

the Rules states:

Aerial
that

is

bombardment

to say,

is

legitimate only

when

directed at a military objective,

an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a

distinct military

advantage to the belligerent.

Although the Hague Rules were never adopted in a treaty instrument,
Lauterpacht states that they are regarded "as an authoritative attempt to clarify
and formulate rules of law governing the use of aircraft in war and they will
doubtless prove a convenient starting point for any future steps in this
direction."

20

in the rules

At
is

least insofar as the definition of "military objective"

concerned, Lauterpacht's prediction was, as

we

contained

shall later see,

prescient.

Although the international community undertook a major effort in 1949 to
bring up to date the international rules for the protection of the victims of
armed conflict, the project was directed primarily to the protection of the
victims of war and did not include an attempt to modernize the Hague Rules or
21
other conventions dealing with the means and methods of warfare.
As a
consequence, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in an
effort to

conflict,

fill

what

it

believed was a gap in the humanitarian law of armed

prepared Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the

Time

The Draft Rules were submitted to the
XlXth International Conference of the Red Cross in New Delhi in 1957, which
Civilian Population in

of War.

approved them in principle. 22
draft, the

ICRC,

at the

When

governments

XXth Conference
199

in

failed to follow

Vienna

in 1965,

up on the

proposed the

Military Objective

which were adopted

reaffirmation of certain basic principles,

Resolution XXVIII.

The

resolution provided, inter

as

Conference

alia:

All governments and other authorities responsible for action in
conflicts should

must be made

members

at least to the following principles:

at all times

between persons taking part

.

.

.

armed

that distinction

in the hostilities

of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as

as possible.

Soon

conform

and

much

23

Assembly of the United Nations became
interested in the efforts of the ICRC and adopted a series of resolutions along
the lines of Resolution XXVIII, the most significant, insofar as our subject is
concerned, being Resolution 2675 (XXV). It stated that the General Assembly
affirmed certain basic principles of the law of armed conflict, including:
thereafter the General

2. In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction
must be made at all times between persons actively taking part in the hostilities
and civilian populations.

4.

Civilian

operations.

populations as such should not be

the

object

of military

24

These movements toward

a codification of the principle of distinction

and

defining the military objective received further impetus from a resolution

adopted by the Institute of International Law

at

Edinburgh in 1969. This

Resolution reaffirmed the "fundamental principle" o( the obligation of parties
to observe the principle of distinction

and defined

military objectives as only

those objects,
which, by their very nature or purpose or use, make an effective contribution to
military action, or exhibit a generally recognized military significance, such that
their total or partial destruction in the actual circumstances gives a substantial,
specific

and immediate

destroy them.

military advantage to those

who

are in a position to

25

The culmination of efforts by the ICRC and others to modernize and amplify
the 1949 Geneva Conventions was the Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts (CDDH) convened by the Swiss Government
,
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The Conference met in four annual sessions and in 1977 adopted two
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August of 1949. The
in 1974.

armed conflicts and the second to
non-international armed conflicts. Only the former is of interest to us in that it
contains explicit provisions concerning the principle of distinction and the

first

applicable

is

international

to

concept of the military objective.

As

26

a result of the deliberations of the

has for the

first

CDDH,

community
and explicit

the international

time in a treaty document adopted a specific

articulation of the principle of distinction

and

military objective. Additional Protocol

(as

I

its

derivative principle of the

now

of September 1997) has

entered into effect for 148 States.

Although some aspects of the two
articles in

27

Additional Protocol

Article 48, set forth above,

Article 52

I,

principles are reflected in a

they are expressly set forth in two

and Article

52.

The

articles,

latter reads as follows:

General protection of civilian objects

-

Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian

1.

objects are

2.

all

objects

which are not military objectives

Attacks shall be limited

as

defined in paragraph

strictly to military objectives.

nature, location, purpose or use

and whose

total

2.

In so far as objects

are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects

which by

their

make an effective contribution to military action

or partial destruction, capture or neutralization,

circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

It is

number of

in the

28

noteworthy in the foregoing articulation of the definition of the military

objective that

it

follows closely the definition contained in Article 24 of the

1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, although
reflecting

particularly

the

additional

it is

ideas

amplified in several respects,

expressed in the

Resolution of the Institute of International Law.

29

Edinburgh

Article 52, in essence,

The
make

provides a two-pronged test for whether objects are military objectives.
first

an

prong

is

that they must, by their "nature, location, purpose or use,"

effective contribution to military action.

partial

destruction,

capture

or

The second

neutralization

must,

is

that their total or

in

the

prevailing

circumstances, offer a definite military advantage.
It

should also be noted that in Additional Protocol

I,

the words "whose total

or partial destruction, capture or neutralization" have replaced "destruction

and injury," and the words "substantial, specific and immediate" of the
Edinburgh Resolution have been replaced by the less specific "definite."
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The term "attacks" is
in military parlance,

also used in a broader sense

where the term was generally used

an offensive

military force in

against the enemy.

than

is

traditionally

to describe the use of

action, particularly the launching of

As defined

in Article 49,

"

'Attacks'

meant

means

weapons

acts of violence

against the adversary, whether in offense or in defense."

Although the section of Additional Protocol
not apply to naval warfare, except insofar

concerned with attacks does

I

as attacks

from the sea or

affect the civilian population, individual civilians, or civilian objects

many modern
attacks

air

on

may

land,

30

navies have the capability and are often employed to conduct

on land

targets

by naval

Protocol

this section of the

artillery or missiles or

by their

air

arms. Thus,

explicitly applicable to this aspect of naval

is

warfare.

For armed conflict at sea generally, however, there has been no modern
counterpart to the codification effort reflected in the events leading up to and
the convening of the Diplomatic Conference which resulted in the two

Additional Protocols of 1977. Consequently, there has been no explicit
incorporation of the principle of the military objective into conventional law
applicable to

been the

armed

series of

conflicts at sea.

The

Round Tables convened by

Humanitarian Lav/ of San Remo,

Italy,

approach to that process has

closest

the International Institute of

from 1988 to 1994, whose purpose was to

provide a contemporary restatement of international law applicable in armed
conflicts at sea.

31

The Manual

that resulted from the deliberations of the

Round

Tables was not envisaged as a draft convention but was viewed by participants in
the

Round Tables

Naval

War

as a

modern equivalent of the Oxford Manual on

the Laws of

Governing the Relations between Belligerents adopted by the

Institute of International

Law

at

Oxford

in 1913.

32

The San Remo Manual

essentially in haec verba the definitions of the principle of distinction

military objective

found in Additional Protocol

I.

The

adopts

and the

relevant provisions are

included in a section entitled "Basic Rules" and provide that:

39

Parties to the conflict shall at

all

times distinguish between civilians or

other protected persons and combatants and between civilian or exempt
objects

40

and

military objectives.

In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those
objects

which by

their nature, location, purpose or use

make an

effective

contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.
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strictly to military objectives.

civil aircraft are civilian objects

vessels

unless they are military objectives in

accordance with the principles and rules set forth in

The

Merchant

this

document.

Principle of the Military Objective

as a Part of the

Customary Law of War

Since the United States has not ratified Additional Protocol

Remo Manual does not of itself have any binding effect on States,

I,

and the San

it is

necessary

examine whether the principles of distinction and the military objective
have become rules of customary international law and, in particular, whether
the United States recognizes them as such. To state the proposition another
way, are the provisions of Additional Protocol I and the San Remo Manual
articulating the principles of distinction and the military objective declaratory
of international law? If they are, then they are binding on States not party to
the Protocol, not as treaty obligations but as customary norms of identical
to

content.

According to the Restatement, customary international law
concurrence of two elements:

and

(2) a

sense of obligation

(1) a

on the

With respect to the first element
practice

include

diplomatic

statements of policy.
State.

34

The

part of States to adhere to the practice.
,

which may constitute State
public measures, and official

also include acquiescence in acts of

practice required to establish a
It

norm

another

of customary law must be

should reflect "wide acceptance
35

As

to

Commander s Handbook on

the

the states particularly involved in the relevant activity."

deviations from the practice, the U.S. Navy's

Law

33

(practice) acts

general, but not necessarily universal.

among

from a

general and consistent practice of States;

instructions,

They may

results

of Naval Operations states:

Occasional violations do not substantially affect the validity of a rule of law,
provided routine compliance, observance, and enforcement continue to be the

norm. However, repeated violations not responded to by protests, reprisals, or
other enforcement actions may, over time, indicate that a particular rule is no
longer regarded as valid.

With

36

respect to the second element (sense of obligation or opinio juris),

explicit

evidence of a sense of obligation

helpful.

Some

is

not necessary, but

is

certainly

of the same "acts" that demonstrate a general practice also serve

to indicate that a State

is

acting out of a sense of obligation and not just as a

matter of courtesy or habit. 37

With

respect to the law of

203
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inclusion of a rule in a State's military manuals

State regards the rule as obligatory.

38

is

persuasive evidence that the

Statements by government

those spoken in their private capacities, are helpful.

A

officials,

even

noted authority and

judge of the International Court of Justice has stated:

The

firm statement by the State of what

it

considers to be the rule

is

far better

evidence of its position than what can be pieced together from the actions of that
country at different times and in a variety of contexts.

39

A number of statements, both official and unofficial, by spokesmen for the
United States Departments of State and Defense, spoken primarily in the
context of an examination of Additional Protocol
to ratify

and the

it,

have suggested that the U.

military objective,

international law.

as

S. regards

I

and the U.S. decision not

the principles of distinction

articulated in the Protocol,

as

customary

40

Most persuasive

insofar as the

United States

is

concerned

is

the opinion of

the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, concurred in by the

Army,

Navy, and Air Force Judge Advocates General, that the United States
recognized as "declaratory of existing customary international law" the general
principles of the law of

2444.

41

Those

That
such, and
(b)

(c)

That

it is

General Assembly Resolution

prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as

a distinction

must be made

and members of the

be spared

As we have
indication

conflict stated in

principles include:

in the hostilities
civilians

armed

much

as

at all times

between persons taking part

civilian population to the effect that the

as possible.

42

seen, incorporation in national military

that

a

international law.

43

normative

principle

has

manuals

matured

into

is

a strong

customary

Here, too, the strong indications from military manuals are

that the principle of the military objective, as formulated in Articles 48 and 52

of Additional Protocol

recognized as a
military

norm

I

and paragraphs 39 and 40 of the San Remo Manual,

of customary international law.

The

current

German

manual provides:

441. Attacks,

i.e.,

any acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence

or in defence, shall be limited exclusively to military objectives.
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—including paratroops descent
— and objects
but not crew members parachuting from an
442. Military objectives are armed forces

in

aircraft in distress

which by

their

nature,

purpose

location,

or

use

make an

effective

contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite
military advantage.

The Australian

44

Operations

Law Manual for

air

commanders contains

similar

provisions:

An

aerial attack

must be directed against

objectives are those objects

an

which by

military objectives.

effective contribution to military action.

To

Draft

Manual

objective essentially verbatim.

.

Military

make

45

also adopts the Protocol definition of military

It

provides:

Military objectives are combatants

and

in so far as objects are concerned,

military objectives are limited to those objects

purpose or use

.

be lawful, any attack on such

objective should result in a definite military advantage.

The Canadian

.

their nature, location, purpose or use

make an effective

which by

their nature, location,

contribution to military action and whose total

or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at

the time, offers a definite military advantage.

Two

United States manuals are

46

also pertinent to

Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard.
actual signing of Additional Protocol

I

by one year,

our inquiry, those of the

47

Although predating the
the United States Air Force

manual apparently took into account the ongoing negotiations
the CDDH, for its provisions on the principle of distinction and the military

operational law
in

objective are taken almost verbatim from the final provisions of the Protocol.
provides:

In order to insure respect and protection for the civilian population and

must at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly direct their operations only against military
objectives. Attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives. Insofar as
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by
their own nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization
civilian objects the parties to the conflict

in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage.
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The Navy /Marine Corps /Coast Guard Manual,
which

is

the most recent revision of

dated 1995, although pointing out that the United States
49

to Additional Protocol

I,

Law

not a party

nevertheless has also adopted, with one variation,

the Protocol formulation of the principle of the military objective.

chapter entitled "The

is

It states,

in a

of Targeting":

Only military objectives may be attacked. Military objectives are combatants
and those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively
contribute to the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total
or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite
military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the
attack.

50

The emphasized

part

of the

considerable debate in the San
it

foregoing

quotation was

the

who

of

Remo Round Table, which specifically rejected

in favor of the formulation in article 52 of Additional Protocol

Louise Doswald-Beck,

object

I.

As

stated by

acted as rapporteur for the sessions of the

Round

Table and was the editor of the "Explanation" of the San Remo Manual,

The

majority [of the

Round

Table]

felt

that the

Handbook does not take into

account developments in the law relating to target discrimination since the

Second World War. In
easily

be interpreted to

particular, they feared that "war-sustaining" could too

justify

unleashing the type of indiscriminate attacks that

annihilated entire cities during that war.

An

51

annotation to a previous edition of the Commander's Handbook stated

contained in Additional Protocol

that, "This variation of the definition

Article 52(2)

is

not intended to

alter its

meaning, and

States as declarative of the customary rule."

52

is

accepted by the United

In the

new

revision of the

Annotated Supplement, the annotation is revised to state that, "This definition
accepted by the United States as declarative of the customary rule."
inference that one
States

(at

may draw from

least its

this

I,

change in wording

is

5

is

The

that the United

naval arm) has rejected the presumptively narrower

definition contained in Article 52 of Additional Protocol

I

in favor of one that,

and products. In
justifying this position, the Annotated Supplement cites the American Civil
War-era decision of the United States with respect to the destruction of raw
cotton within Confederate territory, the sale of which provided funds for
almost all Confederate arms and ammunition, as well as the twelve "target sets"
54
The text of the
for the offensive air campaign of Operation Desert Storm.
Handbook itself states that, "Economic targets of the enemy that indirectly but
at least arguably,

encompasses

a broader range of objects
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and sustain the enemy's war-fighting

capability

may

also be

55

which the
United States concurs, that the principle of the military objective has become a
part of customary international law for armed conflict at sea, as well as on the
land and in the air. We shall in the next section examine what objects the term
"military objective" embraces and attempt to discern whether the variation in
terminology in the U.S. naval manual does in fact suggest a broadening of the
the foregoing,

it

would appear that there

is

a consensus, in

scope of permissible targets for attack.

The "Reach"
In earlier centuries,

of the Term, "Military Objective"

when wars were generally fought with limited objectives

and the cleavage between armed forces and the civilian population was clear,
the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects was reasonably
apparent. Only in the immediate vicinity of the battle was the civilian populace
put in jeopardy by the fire of the contending armed forces. The problem of
protecting objects which were not legitimate military objectives could be met
by prohibitory rules exempting particular categories of objects, buildings, or
installations

such

as churches,

scientific purposes, etc.

example.

In

modern

hospitals, buildings used for charitable or

This was the pattern followed in the Hague Rules, for

warfare, however, with the tremendous increase in the

range and sophistication of weapons and with the mobilization of the populace
in support of modern armies, navies,

and

air forces,

the cleavage

is

not nearly so

two World Wars of this century, the economies of all of the
major parties involved were completely mobilized in support of the war effort.
Nearly all industries were converted to war production; all power-generating
stations provided power for war industries; and the bulk of the adult population
distinct. In the

was engaged in some

activity

connected with the war

effort.

At

the same time,

enemy

the capabilities of the contending forces to strike targets deep in
territory, primarily

through their

air forces,

were vastly expanded. As a

result,

both Allied and Axis powers conducted "strategic" bombing campaigns against
the industrial bases of their enemies which, because of the limitations at that

time on the accuracy of nighttime and high- altitude bombing, could hardly be
said to

have discriminated between valid military objectives and the

civilian

population and civilian objects in the vicinity of the military objective that was
the target of the bombing.

57

Nevertheless, most twentieth-century international conflicts, particularly
those occurring since

World War

II,

have not been of the magnitude and
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geographic scale of the two World Wars. Most were undeclared and fought

with limited objectives. Although geographically confined to relatively small
areas, the fighting

was

two World Wars. The Korean,
which the United States was engaged were
if any physical effect on populations and objects

just as intense as in the

Vietnam, and Gulf Wars in

had little
outside the immediate area of conflict. The Falklands/Malvinas war between
Great Britain and Argentina was likewise limited. The differences in the
intensity and scope of conflicts have led some commentators to suggest that
certainly intense but

there should be a flexible definition of the military objective, allowing

expand and contract "according

to the intensity, duration, subjects,

it

to

and

58

Both Additional Protocol I and the San Remo
Manual reject this idea, providing that the same criteria apply in general and
limited wars, although the San Remo Manual "Explanation' recognizes that "the
application of these rules to the facts should result in a more restrictive
location of the

armed

conflict."

approach to targeting in limited

conflicts."

59

Rather than follow the traditional pattern of establishing prohibitory rules
setting forth

what

objects were to be protected from hostile action, however,

the conference at which the 1977 Additional Protocols were negotiated

adopted a formula that provides

criteria

commander can determine, under
which objects

by which a responsible military

the circumstances existing at the time,

are legitimate targets for attack.

As we have seen

earlier, this

resulted in the two-pronged test of Article 52, namely, that, to constitute
military objectives, objects must, by their "nature, location, purpose or use"

make an

effective contribution to military action

and that

their total or partial

destruction, capture, or neutralization must, in the prevailing circumstances,
offer a definite military advantage. Since this

approach was a departure from

the traditional practice of writing prohibitory rules specifying which objects

were to be spared,
negotiations in the
inclusion of the

it

met considerable opposition

CDDH.

first

codification pattern,

is

60

at

the outset of the

This opposition was eventually overcome by

sentence of Article 52, which, in the traditional
prohibitory in nature, albeit without listing

exempt

The second sentence, upon which we shall focus our
the commander a two-prong test for determining which

objects specifically.
discussion, gives

targets are legitimate.

The first prong of the Article 52
conditions

—

test, as

well as the

nature, location, purpose, use

contribution to military action,

make an

—which,

if

they

states four

make an

effective

object a military objective.

objects, "by their nature," are military objectives

regardless of their location or use.

San Remo test,

and remain so

at

all

Some
times,

Examples of such objects include enemy
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warships, military aircraft (unless

those

as

applicable

to

combatant personnel.

61

Jr.

exempt under some

such

specific exception

medical transports), stocks of ammunition, and

On the other hand, the vast majority of objects become

military objectives only during the time that their particular location, purpose,

or use provides an effective contribution to military action. Civilian buildings,

example,

for

may become

military objectives

troops for shelter. Their "location"

obstruct the field of fire for attack

making

if

may make them

military objectives

on another valid military objective.

goods are not normally military objectives, but

civilian

converted to manufacture war goods, their purpose and use

The ICRC Commentary

military objectives.

present function."

Civilian transportation hubs

military transportation links,

and

exempt them from becoming

may

is

if

they

Factories

if

they are

may make them

suggests that "purpose

with the intended future use of an object, while that of use
62

enemy

they are being used by

is

concerned

concerned with its
important

also be

their dual use (civilian/military) does not

military

objectives,

although under these

circumstances the time of attack should be taken into account to minimize
civilian casualties.

63

Bothe

The objects classified
much more than strictly

et

al.

state succinctly:

as military objectives

under

this definition include

military objects such as military vehicles, weapons,

munitions, stores of fuel and fortifications. Provided the objects meet the

two-pronged

test,

under the circumstances ruling at the time

hypothetical future

time),

objectives

military

include

(not at

activities

some

providing

and logistical support to military operations such as
transportation and communications systems, railroads, airfields and port
facilities and industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the armed
administrative

conflict.

64

The second

aspect of the

first

prong of the

test

which must be examined

is

whether the nature, location, purpose, or use of the object makes an effective
contribution

"military

to

As we saw above,

action."

the

U.S.

naval

Commander's Handbook substitutes the phrase "enemy's war-fighting or
war-sustaining capability" for "military action."
difference in meaning, or

Any
the

difference

term

is

there an actual substantive

there merely a difference in perception?

come down to
Commanders Handbook. The term

between the two formulations would seem

"war-sustaining"

"war-fighting"

On

is

Is

in

the

equivalent to the Additional Protocol

I

to

term "military action."

the other hand, "war-sustaining" implies something not quite so directly

connected with the actual conduct of hostilities.
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The San Remo Round Table

specifically addressed the issue of

whether

to adopt the formulation used in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol

that contained in the Commander's Handbook.

Handbook's phrasing was too broad and might

on

entire cities.

65

The

It

I

or

concluded that the

justify indiscriminate attacks

suggestion that the latter formulation might justify

on entire cities seems to be an exaggerated claim. Nowhere in the
Commander's Handbook is there any suggestion that this phrasing would
open the way for unrestricted attacks on cities or other population centers.
In discussing what objects are included within its definition, the Manual
attacks

states that in addition to targets

objectives

enemy

may

having obvious military value, military

include:

lines of

communication used

for military purposes, rail yards, bridges,

rolling stock, barges, lighters, industrial installations

products, and power generation
indirectly but effectively support

may

also be attacked.

This

explanation

not

does

Economic targets of the enemy that
and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability

differ

must make an

from

materially

interpretation of Article 52(2) by Bothe et

Military objectives

producing war-fighting

plants.

al.,

who

the

authoritative

suggest:

"effective contribution to military action."

This does not require a direct connection with combat operation such as
implied in Art. 51, para.

3,

with respect to civilian persons

immunity from direct attack only while they "take

Thus

a civilian object

may become

who

is

lose their

a direct part in hostilities."

a military objective

and thereby

lose

its

immunity from deliberate attack through use which is only indirectly related to
combat action, but which nevertheless provides an effective contribution to the
66
military phase of a Party's overall war effort.

The San Remo Manual, although adopting

the Article 52(2) phrasing,

nevertheless acknowledged that a civilian object
objective

and thereby

lose

its

may become

a military

immunity from

which is only indirectly related to combat action,
but which nevertheless provides an effective contribution to the military part of a
deliberate attack through use

party's overall war-fighting capability.

67

Probably the only point of difference between the San

Remo

formulation

(which adopts the Article 52(2) phrasing) and that in the Commander's
Handbook is with respect to attacks on exports that may be the sole or principal
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source of financial resources for a belligerent's continuation of its war

the Confederacy during the
68

American

In

Commander s Handbook

support of the possible legitimacy of such attacks, the
cites the denial of claims for destruction of

effort.

British-owned cotton exports from

Civil

War

by an Anglo-American

whether Iraq's attacks on
tankers carrying oil from Iran during the 1980-88 Gulf War may have been
justified under the same theory, although it admits that the law on this subject
arbitration tribunal.

"is

not firmly settled."

It

also raises the question

69

The San Re mo Round Table, however,

firmly rejected the broadening of the

military objective to include such targets, "because the connection

the exports and military action would be too remote."

The second prong

between

70

of the two-part test provided in Article 52(2)

—

that the

total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization of the object, in the

circumstances

advantage

ruling

—although

at

the

incorporated

time,
in

offers

a

military

definite

haec verba in the various national

manuals and the San Remo Manual, has received little attention from
commentators. Bothe et al. provide the seminal commentary on the subject,
stating:

The term

military advantage involves a variety of considerations, including the

security of the attacking force.
result

Whether

a definite military advantage

would

from an attack must be judged in the context of the military advantage

anticipated from the specific military operation of

which the attack

is

a part

considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or particular parts of that
operation.

It is

not necessary that the contribution made by the object to the

Party attacked be related to the advantage anticipated by the attacker from the
destruction, capture or neutralization of the object.

71

Although Article 51, paragraph (l)(b) and Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii)
use the more restrictive term "concrete and direct" military advantage, the
documents of the CDDH do not disclose the reasons for using different
72
expressions.
Examining the context of the expressions in the three articles,
however, it appears that the purpose of using the arguably more restrictive
phrase, "concrete and direct," in Articles 51 and 57 was to provide a less
subjective test for applying the rule of proportionality where there was a danger
73
of civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects in a projected attack. On
the other hand, Article 52, paragraph 2 is concerned only with defining what
objects are military objectives. Of course, should the attack on a legitimate
military objective involve the possibility of collateral damage to civilians or
civilian objects, the arguably more stringent restriction would apply.
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The

Application of the Principle of the Military Objective
to

As we have seen

Armed

Conflict at Sea

above, the term "military objective" received no precise

document until 1977, when Additional Protocol I
included one for armed conflict on land (and for attacks on land targets by
74
naval or air forces). Although this definition does not apply of its own force to
definition in a treaty

States not party to the 1977 Protocol,

we have

also seen that the principle of

the military objective, essentially as articulated in the Protocol, has been

acknowledged to have been assimilated into customary international law. 75
There also seems to be no question that it is also a principle of the law of armed
76
conflict applicable to armed conflict at sea.
Despite

relatively recent articulation in

its

its

present terminology as a

77
concrete principle of the law of armed conflict at sea, the concept of the

military objective, often referred to as the "law of targeting" or a subdivision
thereof,

78

is

reflected in

many of the customary rules that have developed in the

conduct of naval warfare over the past two centuries
apply to what has

come

to be

known

as

—

particularly those that

economic warfare.

whether a person or object is a
legitimate object of attack or is protected from attack depends, in the case of
persons, on whether they are combatants or noncombatants (or civilians in the
words of Additional Protocol I), and in the case of objects, on whether or not
Just as in land warfare, in warfare at sea,

they

make an

effective contribution to the

enemy's war

effort (military action

words of Protocol; war-fighting or war-sustaining capability in the words
of the Commander s Handbook) Prior to the twentieth century, the distinction
was relatively clear. Warships and naval auxiliaries were legitimate objects of
attack. Merchant ships and their crews, whether enemy or neutral, were not.
in the

.

On

the other hand, private property at sea had never had the protection

from seizure by the enemy that it enjoyed in land warfare. Under the doctrines
of blockade and contraband, goods destined for (and in the case of blockade,
being shipped from) an enemy port were subject to capture and condemnation
by prize courts.
a suspect

The traditional method of enforcing these doctrines was

merchantman and

exercise the right oi visit

and search. Only

if

the

and search, was sailing in an enemy convoy, or attempted
blockade was it subject to attack.

vessel resisted visit

run a

to stop

The advent

to

of the submarine and aircraft and the measures adopted by the

adversaries to counteract these

new means

of naval warfare changed the

and irrevocably. Neither submarines nor aircraft were
capable o( conducting visit and search in the traditional manner. As a
traditional law forever
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consequence, in World
aircraft)

attacked

War

I,

enemy and

Allied forces in turn

armed

Jr.

German submarines (and

to a limited extent

neutral merchant ships without warning.

their

The

merchantmen, formed them into escorted

convoys, and generally incorporated their merchant fleets into the war

effort.

During the interwar period, the former Allied States sought to outlaw the use
culminating in

commerce raiders through a series of diplomatic moves,
79
the London Protocol of 1936, which purported to apply the

same

submarines that were applicable to surface warships. These

of submarines as

rules to

diplomatic efforts proved
of the practices of

manner.

As

War

fruitless,

World War

I

in

War II saw a repetition

an even more widespread and cruel

80

a result of the practices of

II,

however, and World

both the Axis and Allied powers in World

and the assessment of those practices by the Nuremberg Tribunal

the case of Admiral Karl Doenitz,

81

a consensus seems to have

in

been achieved

among publicists and national military manuals that although the 1936
London Protocol retains its validity, the realities of modern warfare,
particularly global warfare, make it inapplicable in most situations. This
consensus is perhaps best expressed in the recent San Remo Manual, which
provides that enemy merchant ships may be attacked only if they have
become military objectives and states that the following activities may render
them military objectives:
(a)

engaging in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy,

e.g.,

laying mines,

minesweeping, cutting undersea cables and pipelines, engaging in

visit

and

search of neutral merchant vessels or attacking other merchant vessels;

(b)

acting as an auxiliary to an enemy's

armed

forces, e.g., carrying troops or

replenishing warships;

(c)

being incorporated into or assisting the enemy's intelligence gathering
system,

e.g.,

command,

under convoy of enemy warships or military

(d)

sailing

(e)

refusing

(f)

engaging in reconnaissance, early warning, surveillance, or

control and communications missions;

an order to stop or actively

aircraft;

resisting visit, search or capture;

being armed to an extent that they could

inflict

damage

to a warship; this

excludes light individual weapons for the defense of personnel,
pirates,

and purely

deflective systems such as 'chaff;
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otherwise making an effective contribution to military action,

(g)

carrying military materials.

Other manuals

somewhat

state the rules

similar standards.

being armed from the

list

explicitly states that the
for attack.

in that

merchant vessels:
effort

85

of activities rendering

.

search,

visit,

vessels separately, excluding

them

and capture.

fact that a neutral vessel

U.S. manual

is

"If integrated into

.

and compliance with the

and

military objectives
84

The Manual

armed does not provide

the most permissive of the manuals

is

includes, as a final activity, authorizing attack

it
.

mere

The

merchant

treats neutral

adding refusal to stop or resisting

examined

but in essence prescribe

differently,

83

The San Remo Manual

ground

e.g.,

82

on enemy

the enemy's war- fighting/war- sustaining

1936 London Protocol would, under

rules of the

the circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to

imminent danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment." 85 This
has been subjected to severe criticism by Frits Kalshoven,

latter provision

points out that the adoption of Additional Protocol

I

in 1977 vindicated the

view, at least for land warfare, that contribution to the "war effort"
test for

who

is

too broad a

determining whether an object has become a military objective.

suggests that the

same should be

true in naval warfare.

He

87

When the development of aircraft technology reached the point at which air
transportation

became

community attempted

to adopt the

same

merchant ships. This was

applicable to

of Air Warfare,

applicable to

88

merchant

military

ships.

89

civil aircraft, closely

mimic the

have influenced the development of the law in

manuals generally follow the pattern established

those that would

make merchant

activities

activities will

it

laying

or

They

also convert

Remo Manual

render them military objectives:

monitoring

acoustic

e.g.,

enemy
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forces;

laying mines,

sensors,

electronic warfare, intercepting or attacking other

providing targeting information to

as

provides that aircraft engaging in

engaging in acts of war on behalf of the enemy,

minesweeping,

this field,

in 1923.

would

into military objectives. Again, turning to the San

any of the following

rules

conducted by them similar to

ships military objectives

the typical manifestation of this pattern,

(a)

manifested in the 1923 Hague Rules

Although the Hague Rules were never adopted

have likewise adopted the view that

civil aircraft

commerce, the international

principles for civil aircraft that were

first

which, with respect to

in binding form, they

and the

a factor in international

civil

engaging

in

aircraft,

or
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(b)

acting as an auxiliary aircraft to an enemy's

Jr.

armed forces,

e.g.,

transporting

troops or military cargo, or refueling military aircraft;

(c)

being incorporated into or assisting tbe enemy's intelligence -gathering
system,

command,
(d)

flying

engaging in reconnaissance, early warning, surveillance, or

e.g.,

control and communications missions;

under the protection of accompanying enemy warships or military

aircraft;

(e)

refusing an order to identify

itself,

divert from

its

track, or

proceed

for visit

and search to a belligerent airfield that is safe for the type of aircraft
involved and reasonably accessible, or operating fire control equipment
that could reasonably be construed to be part of an aircraft weapon system,
or on being intercepted clearly manoeuvring to attack the intercepting
belligerent aircraft;

(f)

(g)

being armed with air-to-air or air-to-surface weapons; or
otherwise making an effective contribution to military action.

Because attacks on civil
civilians,

which

airliners are likely to

cause injury or death to embarked

they are exempted from attack while in

their

s

conduct

we have

is

clearly hostile.

flight,

except in situations in

91

seen, the principle of the military objective,

.coming to recognition

90

as articulated in

though slow

Additional Protocol

I

in

and

current military manuals, has been imbedded in the law of armed conflict for
several centuries.

It

appeared in numerous nineteenth and twentieth century

documents in the form of prohibitions against attacks against certain categories
of persons and objects such as undefended towns, churches, hospitals, historic
buildings, noncombatant personnel, and combatant personnel who were hors
de combat. The 1977 Protocol led the way in converting the principle from a list
of prohibited targets to a more usable concept for a military commander in
appraising whether a particular object or person could be lawfully attacked.
Both the old-style negative list of prohibited targets and the new-style
permissive principle of defining the military objective have their drawbacks.
The former allowed the literal-minded commander to assume that unless a
prospective target was on the prohibited list, he could attack it, perhaps
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downplaying the related principles of collateral damage, avoiding causing
unnecessary suffering, etc. The two-prong test of the latter gives the

commander

more

a great deal

and requires the commander

discretion

to

balance the value of the target against the military advantage to be gained from
its

destruction or capture, obviously importing the relative question of

proportionality into the equation.

It

must be remembered, however, that the

new standard

of

They remain in effect in the various Hague Conventions

of

old prohibitions have not been excised by the adoption of the

the military object.

Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the treaties for the protection of
92
scientific, and historic monuments and institutions.
When properly

1907, the
artistic,

an additional layer of protection to those
objects and persons who should not and do not constitute legitimate military
applied, the two-prong test adds

objectives.

The

general acceptance of the principle of the military objective into

customary international law, essentially

as articulated in

Additional Protocol

marks a step forward in promoting the humanitarian goals represented
law of armed conflict.

I,

in the
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backup for military purposes and were used for Iraqi propaganda); Strategic Integrated
Air-Defense System; Air Forces and Air Fields; Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons
Research, Production, and Storage Facilities; Scud Missile Launchers and Production and
Storage Facilities; Naval Forces and Port Facilities; Oil Refining and Distribution Facilities;
Railroads and Bridges; Iraqi Army Units; and Military Storage and Production Sites. Id.
54.

Id.,

Production

55.

Id.

note

11.

Facilities;

para. 8.1.1.

The annotation further

states that,

"Whether

this rule

war-sustaining cargo carried in neutral bottoms at sea, such as by Iraq

exported by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war,
targets

is

likely to

is

not firmly

be reserved to higher authority."

settled.
Id.

at

permits attacks

on the tankers

carrying

on
oil

Authorization to attack such

note 11. In

this respect,

Ms.

San Remo Round Table "indicated that the sinking
during the Iran-Iraq War, albeit not as frequent as those during the Second World War, should
not be seen as the most significant precedent for an assessment of contemporary law, in view of
the extent of violations of international humanitarian law during that conflict generally and the
Doswald-Beck

states that participants in the

protests that ensued." Doswald-Beck, supra note 51, at 200.

56. See,
57.

e.g.,

Hague

IV, supra note 14, art. 27;

According to a 1940

Hague

British study of the

IX, supra note 15, art. 5.

Royal Air Force Bomber

Command

night

AIR FORCE
PAMPHLET, supra note 48, para. 5-4d. Even the so-called "precision" daylight bombing by the
U.S. Eighth Air Force was precise only in comparison to the night bombing by the British bomber
force. According to an Eighth Air Force study, for the September to December 1944 period, only
22 percent of all visually dropped bombs hit within 1,000 feet of their aim point, while only two
percent of bombs dropped using blind navigational techniques or radar bombing fell within 1,000
feet of their target. RICHARD HALLION, STORM OVER IRAQ: AIR POWER AND THE GULF WAR
11-12, note 26 (1992), quoting USAAF, AAF Bombing Accuracy Report #2 (Eighth Air Force
operations, "two-thirds of

all

aircrews were missing their targets by over 5 miles."

Operational Research Section, 1945), Chart

2,

"Distribution of Effort and Results."

Hamilton DeSaussure, conference remarks, in Sixth Annua/ Conference, supra note 40, at
512; see a/50 Burrus Carnahan at 516. The United States Air Force manual seems to give some
credence to this idea, at least with respect to attacks on civil aircraft, stating, "As a practical
matter, the degree of protection afforded to civil aviation and the potential military threat
58.

represented, varies directly with the intensity of the conflict."
48, para. 4-3b.
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Jr.

59. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICT AT SEA "EXPLANATION" 116

SAN REMO MANUAL "EXPLANATION"].
BOTHE ET AL, supra note 2, at 322. The San Remo Round Table was also initially divided
between those members who wished to provide a general definition of military objectives and
those who wished to provide a list either of vessels and objects that might be attacked or of those
(Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter
60.

which were exempt. Their eventual solution was to proceed with a general definition, but to
supplement it with a limited list of those vessels and aircraft which were exempt from attack,
either by virtue of their status (e.g., hospital ships) or their employment (e.g., vessels engaged in
missions

granted special protection such as cartel vessels).

"Explanation," supra note

See

SAN REMO MANUAL

59, at 114-16.

61. "Military objectives" obviously includes combatants, although there

statement in Additional Protocol

I

to that effect.

As

stated by

is

no

explicit

BOTHE ET AL.:

The term "military objectives" is used in different senses in the clauses declaring the
two basic principles. In regard to the first clause [of article 48] dealing with the principle of
distinction the term "military objectives" is used in contrast to "civilian objects," and
"combatants" is used in contrast to "civilians." In the last clause, however, "military
objectives"

is

used as the sole permitted object of the military operations.

course, be manifestly absurd to conclude from this

somewhat imprecise

It

would, of

drafting that

combatants are not a legitimate object of attack. In any event, the context of Arts. 37, 41,
42, 43(2), 51(3) and 52(2) makes it clear that combatants, as well as objects having
military value, are included within the

term "military objectives"

as

used in Protocol

I.

BOTHE ET AL., supra note 2, at 285.
The ICRC COMMENTARY confirms this view, stating that "the definition is limited to objects
but it is clear that members of the armed forces are military objectives. ..." ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 635.
Two of the military manuals that have been examined have explicitly incorporated
"combatants" into their definitions of "military objectives." See, e.g., COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK,
supra note 36, at para. 8.1.1; CANADIAN DRAFT MANUAL, supra note 46, at para. 516.
62. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 636.
63.

Id.

64.

BOTHE, ET AL., supra note 2, at 324-5 (emphasis in original text).
SAN REMO MANUAL "EXPLANATION," supra note 59, para. 40.12;

65.

L.

Doswald-Beck,

supra note 51, at 199.
66.

AL.

BOTHE ET AL.,

refer, inter alia, to

supra note

2, at

324. In a footnote supporting this statement,

BOTHE ET

the U.S. denial of claims for destruction of British-owned cotton in the

War, not on the ground that raw cotton had any value as an implement of war, "but
because 'in the circumstances ruling at the time' it was the Confederacy's chief export and thus
the ultimate source of all Confederate weapons and military supplies." Id. at note 15.
67. San Remo Manual "Explanation," supra note 59, para. 40.12.
68. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 52, para. 8.1.1, note 11, citing 6 Papers Relating
to the Treaty of Washington (Report of U.S. Agent) 52-57 (1874).
69. Id. The San Remo Round Table also states that
Civil

The

doctrine of contraband

is

not applicable to exports from enemy

territory.

With

regard to the latter point, there was a division of views whether measures other than
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may be used to block exports that by sale or barter sustain the enemy's war effort.
a number of participants supported the view that today the doctrine of
contraband may be applied to exports from enemy territory, the Round Table at this stage
blockade

Even though

felt

unable to extend the traditional law to that

the authority of the

effect.

That, however, does not prejudice

UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

San remo Manual "Explanation," supra

note 59, at 216.

70. Id. at para. 67.27.
71.

BOTHE ET AL., supra note

Allied attacks

on the Pas de

2,

The

at 324-5.

authors illustrate their point by describing the

Calais area of France prior to the

Normandy

was not the reduction of German military strength
deceive the Germans as to where the invasion would take place. Id.
military advantage

72.
73.

The

ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 22, at 637.
Id., at 683-5; BOTHE ET AL., supra note 2, at 365.

74. See notes
75. See Sect.
76.

invasion of 1944.

in that area but rather to

and 2 supra and accompanying

1
II

text.

above.

Id.

77. As far as have been able to determine, the U.S. Navy's 1955 LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE
MANUAL (NWIP 10-2), which was the immediate predecessor to the current COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK (NWP 1-14M, previously designated NWP 9), does not mention the term "military
objective" nor is the term found in the index of ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND
I

NEUTRALITY AT SEA

Law

International

(50

Studies,

1955),

which

was

published

contemporaneously and includes the 1955 manual
78. See,

36;

e.g.,

ch. 8,

as an appendix.
"The Law of Targeting," of the COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note

TARGETING ENEMY MERCHANT SHIPPING,

Grunawalt
Attack, in

Mallison

ed., 1993); Sally

(65 International

& William Mallison,

THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,

79. Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of

Law

Studies, Richard

supra note 38, ch. IX.

Submarine Warfare Set Forth

in Part

more

IV of the

Schindler

&

detailed accounts of the progression of events recounted here, see Mallison

&

Treaty of London of 22 April 1930, 173 L.N.T.S. 353-37 (1936), reprinted
Toman, supra note 1, at 881-82.
80. For

J.

Naval Targeting: Lawful Objects of

in

Mallison, supra note 78; J. Jacobson, The Law of Submarine Warfare Today, in THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 78, at 205; L.F.E. Goldie, Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping:
An Overview of Law and Practice, in TARGETING ENEMY MERCHANT SHIPPING, supra note 78, at

& William Mallison, The Naval Practices of Belligerents in World War

2; Sally

Mallison

Criteria

and Development,

in id. at

Merchant Shipping: Bridging

the

87;

Horace

Gap Between

B. Robertson,

Conventional

Jr.,

II:

U.S. Policy on Targeting

Law and

State Practice, in

id.

Legal

Enemy

at 338.

meaning of the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal in Admiral
Doenitz's case with respect to the status of the law governing submarine and air attacks on
merchant ships, see D. P. O'Connell, International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations, 44
81. For assessments of the

BRIT. Y.B. INT'L

L.

52 (1970) Sally Mallison
;

& William Mallison, Naval Practices, supra note 80,

and Comments on the Mallisons' essay by Mark W. Janis and William J. Fenrick,
and 110 respectively.
at 87;

82.

SAN REMO MANUAL,

id.

at

104

supra note 31, para. 60.

Law of
OF
ROUND-TABLE
OF
THE
PROCEEDINGS
Naval Warfare, in REPORT, COMMENTARIES AND
EXPERTS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT
83. See William

J.

Fenrick, The Military Objective and the Principle of Distinction in the

SEA, Ruhr-Universitat Bochum, Nov. 10-14, 1989, 31-37 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg
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ed.,

Horace B. Robertson,

Jr.

1991), for a comparison of the rules contained in the Canadian, French, Australian and United
States Manuals.

The

subsequently issued

German manual conforms

84.

GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 44, at para. 1025.
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 31, at para. 67.

85.

Id.

86.

COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK,

listing.

essentially to the

same

supra note 36, para. 8.2.2.2. See also para. 8.3.1 which

enemy merchant ships by submarines.
Comments on H. B. Robertson's Paper: U.S.

contains regard to attacks on
87. Frits Kalshoven,

Merchant Shipping: Bridging

ENEMY MERCHANT
88.

the

id.,

arts.

Conventional

Policy

Law and State

on Targeting Enemy

Practice, in

TARGETING

SHIPPING, supra note 78, at 358, 362.

Hague Air Rules,

89. See

Gap Between

supra note 19, at 207.

49-60.

SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 31, para. 63.
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 31, paras. 53 and 56. Compare COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 36, para. 8.2.3; GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 44, para. 1036;
CANADIAN DRAFT MANUAL, supra note 46, para. 628. For a more extensive discussion of the
90.

91. See

status of civil aircraft in

Armed

Conflict,

92. Treaty

_

armed conflict, see Horace

ISR. Y.B.

I'NTL L.

B. Robertson,

Jr.,

The

Status of Civil Aircraft in

(1998) (forthcoming).

on the Protection of Artistic and

Scientific Institutions

(Roerich Pact), Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, reprinted

in

and Historic Monuments

Schindler and

Toman,

737; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
14, 1954,

249 U.N.T.S. 216,

reprinted in Schindler
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Armed

and Toman, supra note

1,

Conflict,

at 745.

1,

at
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XI
Crafting the Rules of Engagement
for Haiti

Stephen A. Rose
There was

ROE—not

a lot of pressure

on the SJA

to

only working with the local staff

directly with the

come up with the

—but in

Department of Defense. But the

real

working

this case,

burden that

SJA is advising the commander and providing the means
commander to translate ROE for that Marine on the ground.
the

right

falls

on

for the

— Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni
Marine Corps Gazette
February 1996

D

URING THE COURSE OF A MILITARY CAREER, most
least

one occasion to stand

at a crossroad of history

an event that might someday be studied
turn came in 1994. The event was Haiti.

directly in shaping

history books.

My

—

of us have at
to participate

in tenth grade

my tour as Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for the U.S. Atlantic
Command (USACOM) which then included the Caribbean in its geographic
By lucky timing,

,

area of responsibility, began in the spring of 1994

timing,

I

— about the same time when

had begun for military intervention in
was fortunate in two other ways.

serious planning

Haiti.

Aside from good

Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti

First,

the

USACOM Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Paul Miller, believed in

member

of the inner circle

early entree

As

SJA became a charter
tasked with developing the campaign plan. This

using his legal staff in a proactive mode.

was useful when it became time

a result, the

to craft rules of engagement

(ROE)

embodying the commander's intent. What could not be foreseen, however, was
that the ROE for Haiti would require rapid retooling as the mission shifted from
a

nonpermissive,

forcible

entry

to

permissive

a

involving cooperation with Haitian forces. This

campaign proved

to be a harbinger of some of the

encountered during the

later

UN

walk-on

administrative

phase of the Haiti

initial

ROE conundrums

that were

withdrawal from Somalia and the problems

currently being encountered in Bosnia.

My second
an

slice

ROE mentor

of good fortune was in having Professor Jack Grunawalt as

—both during my time

when

and, since then, on an informal basis for aid
interpretation

and precedent

especially adept at blending

challenges. His thousands

arise.

Naval

War College,

difficult

questions of

as a student at the

He has long been my "pragmatics"

teacher,

ROE theory with practical solutions for real-world
of hours of teaching ROE issues have influenced

several generations of operational lawyers involved in military campaigns.

Those who have read

this far will recognize that

content from other materials in

amicorum.

this liber

Grunawalt, part analysis of selected

ROE

took place behind the scenery during the
Several excellent synopses of the Haiti
goal

is

complement these

to

About 90 percent
the

Haiti

realize

—

Every

rules

a

issues,
initial

ROE

It is

part

dialogue

DoD

homage

to Jack

and part reportage of what

phase of the Haiti campaign.

have already been written.

studies by digging deeper along

of the internal

—

my essay differs in tone and

unmined

1

My

veins.

deliberations over the final language of

often

more

than

spirited

commentators

arose from 10 percent of the draft text.

ROE

package has a handful of clauses that serve

fulcrums for an operation. In essence,

connecting the National
in harm's way.

ROE

ROE become

Command Authorities (NCA)

as tone-setters

and

the umbilical cord

to the lowliest Private

also serve as a reliable barometer, especially in military

operations other than war, for gauging whether political goals and military

means

are

properly

synchronized.

If

Clausewitz were

reviewing recent

operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, he would likely be astonished by the
2

which the U.S. military calibrates its ROE. What follows are
two vignettes illustrating what happened behind the planning curtain when
lawyers, operators, and policy makers sought to conjure up optimal ROE for the

finicky degree to

beginning of the Haiti campaign.
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Friend, Foe, or Freelance?

In the spring of 1994,

USACOM

activated Joint Task Force (JTF)180,

spearheaded by the XVIII Airborne Corps, to develop an operational plan

(OPLAN

2370) for forced entry into Haiti.

It

was unclear how much armed

opposition could be expected from the military junta then running the country,

but the JTF 180 plan relied on surprise and overwhelming force to reduce U.S.
3

casualties by minimizing the period of actual

annex

for this plan

One

A draft of the ROE

was ready by mid-June.

cornerstone of the proposed

of Haiti as "hostile"
first

engagement.

—

i.e.,

ROE was

designation of the armed forces

they were subject to attack

on recognition without

having to commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent against U.S.

forces.

The troublesome phrase

underlying this concept turned out to be "on

armed forces. They
consisted of the Forces Armees D'Haiti (FADH) and its auxiliary, the

recognition."

It

was

relatively easy to categorize Haiti's

well-armed National Police,
Haitians were

As

the

known as

the

FRAPH. For ROE purposes,

all

other

deemed noncombatants.

summer of 1994 wore

on, however, this distinction

between Haitian

By August, U.S. intelligence reports
noted that many members of the FADH had begun wearing civilian clothes
under their uniforms, and almost all of the FRAPH had discarded their police
uniforms in favor of mufti while on duty. Reports also identified the formation
of a civilian militia loosely organized by the FADH. This militia had no uniforms
or distinctive badges, but was expected to be issued weapons in advance of
perceived hostilities and to function as a kind of Haitian Volkssturm to defend
armed

forces

and

civilians

began to

blur.

the country.

In reaction to this development,
clarifying

ROE planners

at

USACOM began to

language to identify "hostile" Haitian forces

—now

draft

running the

—

gamut from regulars (FADH) to paramilitary (FRAPH) to civil militia in terms
of weaponry rather than apparel. This attempted refinement also proved to be
problematic. In mid-August, the U.S. Defense Attache at Port au Prince
4

estimated that Haitian civilians possessed at least 40,000 firearms. Given the

chronic violence and vigilantism that plagued the country, most Haitians

could afford to do so had armed themselves.
consisted of machetes, a shotgun or

rifle,

The

who

typical family arsenal

several handguns,

and sometimes

automatic weapons and grenades. Another factor fueling the potential for
violence was continuing antagonism between the Haitian upper classes, which

supported

the

military

junta,

and
227

the

followers

of

exiled

President

Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti

Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
clique in

economic and

who

thirsted to settle their grievances with the small

power.

political

Thus, U.S. planners had to anticipate that the

initial stages

of a forcible

entry might encounter armed elements of the Haitian populace pursuing
different goals:

some ready

American

to engage

some eager

forces;

to take

advantage of a chaotic situation to carry out acts of political revenge or looting;

and some trying to defend families and property. All were likely to be armed,
and most would be in civilian attire.
In such a confused environment, choice of ROE serves to allocate risk.
Status-based ROE, in which pre-declared enemy forces are declared hostile and
may be shot on sight, minimize the risk to U.S. troops but may lead to
significant civilian casualties

enemy

if

forces are not readily distinguishable

from the general populace. Conversely, conduct-based ROE, which

typically

authorize force only in response to hostile acts or intentions, tend to reduce
civilian casualties while increasing the risk to U.S. forces.
political controversy swirling

United States could

Haiti, the
it

Given the domestic

around the proposed military intervention in
afford

ill

American

casualties; but neither could

permit a humanitarian intervention, only reluctantly sanctioned by the

United Nations, to

result in a

bloodbath

In early September, the legal

staffs at

Joint Chiefs of Staff s office continued

status-based and conduct-based

for Haitians.

USACOM and in the Chairman of the

work on ways

to bridge the gap

between

ROE for Haiti. The challenge was to develop a

engagement criterion that balanced the risk of casualties and had clear
meaning for the troops involved. The two legal staffs began at opposite ends of

basic

the

ROE spectrum but eventually converged

USACOM
hostile

(i.e.,

continued to press
status-based

to a shared solution.

for declaration of

Haitian armed forces as

ROE) but recommended

that identification of

adversary forces be pegged to weapons rather than to uniforms, badges, or

other customary indicia.

couched

The

operative sentence of our recommendation was

in terms of a presumption:

You may presume

that civilians in public armed with crew-served weapons,
or National
rifles or shotguns are members of the

FADH

automatic weapons,

and therefore may be treated

Police,

The

as hostile.

Joint Staff favored conduct-based

phase and proposed that the

final

ROE

phrase in the

even

for the initial hostilities

USACOM draft be modified to

and dealt with
accordingly using all measures short of force if possible." In essence, this was a
self-defense regimen dressed up with some extra adjectives and adverbs to
read:

".

.

.

and therefore should be treated

as potentially hostile
6

convey a more assertive tone.

USACOM
228

continued to press the

issue.

Stephen Rose

The

Joint Staff then offered other modifications to stiffen the self-defense

language:

.

.

.

and therefore should be treated

as potentially hostile.

A. Where hostile acts or intent are observed, deadly force

B.

Where no

hostile intent or acts are observed, all

force, consistent

employed.

is

authorized.

measures short of deadly

with mission accomplishment and security of the force,

may be

7

Albeit self-defense with an attitude,

on the whole

this

was

still

self-defense.

8

USACOM continued to press.
As

USACOM's

contingency measure, discussion shifted to refining

a

proposal for a weapon-based rule. Since
the Haitian populace lawfully

it

was known that a

sizable portion of

owned and openly carried firearms,

it

was

clearly

armed civilians encountered in public areas as
hostile. At the same time, it was equally clear that persons armed with
crew-served or automatic weapons could reasonably be presumed to be
members of the Haitian armed forces. The real debate arose over how to treat
Haitians armed with shotguns and rifles.
overreaching to declare

This became

USACOM's

known

all

in joint legal circles

original position

had been

the adversary identification matrix.
justification,

as

to include

The

the "long-gun" dispute.

and shotguns in
concluded, with some

both

Joint Staff

rifles

range rather than length of weapon should be

that

USACOM

determining factor.

the

planners yielded, but fretted that U.S. troops

would be hard-pressed to distinguish rifles from shotguns in time to apply
hostilities ROE to the former and self-defense ROE to the latter, especially in
the uncertain light of the first hours of a pre-dawn assault.
Three days before the scheduled attack date on 19 September, the NCA
approved the final ROE package for a nonpermissive entry. The relevant rule is
a hybrid of options

debated during the preceding fortnight:

You may presume

that civilians in public

automatic weapons, or
paramilitary groups,

is

are

members of the FADH, National

and therefore may

armed with shotguns or
force

rifles

pistols are

armed with crew-served weapons,

treat

presumed

them

Police, or

as hostile. Civilians in public

to be potentially hostile, but deadly

not authorized unless such persons use or threaten to use armed force

against U.S. troops, U.S. citizens, or designated foreign nationals.
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In retrospect,

it is

probably fortunate that a last-minute agreement with the

Haitian leaders eliminated the need to use these ROE. 10

need

model real-world

To be

effective,

such

and choices. Despite weeks of
discussion, the judge advocates involved in crafting the ROE for a pre-dawn
airborne assault on Haiti were never fully satisfied that they had captured the
fractal messiness of what lay ahead. The tradeoffs built into the final package
strongly supported mission accomplishment
rapid elimination of armed
resistance in Haiti
while fixing a reasonable, if somewhat artificial,
breakpoint to distinguish noncombatants. Although OPLAN 2370 belongs to
the dustbin of history, the ROE issues that surfaced during its construction were
not unique and continue to challenge U.S. planners in current operations.
rules

to

activities

—

—

The

On 18 September

Specter of Mission Creep

1994, U.S. forces were primed for a nonpermissive, forced

entry into Haiti using hostilities ROE.

The

following day, pursuant to the

Carter Agreement, they entered Haiti permissively under peacetime ROE.

Their basic mission was to preserve essential civic order and establish a secure

environment

for the restoration of Haiti's legitimate

government.

11

In this effort to maintain public order, U.S. forces had an unlikely partner,
their

erstwhile

adversary of the

Agreement had reserved

previous

the

day,

a significant role for the

FADH. The

FADH

Carter

to continue routine

police duties during the transition period. Direct involvement in foreign law

enforcement was a task that U.S. military planners were loathe to

tackle.

Recent experience with "mission creep" in Somalia reinforced the notion that
law enforcement responsibilities in a shattered country often become an
operational tar baby for military units.

On

the eve of the

makers were

American entry

comfortable

treating

into Haiti,
"essential

requirement to prevent widespread chaos and

it

appeared that U.S. policy

civic

loss of life

order"

as

a

macro

within the indigenous

population rather than as a guarantee of U.S. protection for individual citizens.

On

20 September, however, one of the more notorious incidents of the Haiti

campaign ended up trumping, at least temporarily, DoD's deep-rooted anxiety
about mission creep. Using brute force, Haitian police dispersed a crowd o(
pro-Aristide demonstrators which had gathered in a festive mood at the edge of
a marshalling area for arriving U.S. units. Also on hand were numerous
representatives from the media, who videotaped a street vendor being clubbed
to death while U.S. troops stood by passively. Newspapers and television
networks reported the incident extensively, lambasting policy makers and
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military planners for crippling troop effectiveness with inadequate

When new ROE

ROE. 12

cards appeared the next day, authorizing U.S. forces to

intervene to prevent death or serious injury to Haitians, news reports

understandably attributed this modification to the media uproar of the day
before.

The

13

irony

is

that this "change" in

ROE had

on

already been set into motion

and had anticipated the
sort of incident that actually happened. Unfortunately, staffing delays held up
execution of the policy shift and dissemination of the change in ROE until a day
stemming from the
after the fatal beating. In part, this delay was procedural
laborious nature of the review process for modifying engagement rules of
national importance. In part, the delay was substantive
a by-product of an
ongoing debate about the role of the FADH during the interregnum period and
the need to disarm Haitian society. To understand how all these variables
interacted to create the new ROE card that appeared on 20 September, it is
worth a short tour inside the ROE "sausage factory" that existed at the time.
18 September, before the

first

soldier set foot in Haiti,

—
—

From the

beginning, military planners had recognized that the issue of

Haitian-on-Haitian crime would be crucial. By June 1994, the
designed

for

both

the

hostilities

and

post-hostilities

ROE

phases

nonpermissive, forcible entry plan, Operation Uphold Democracy

cards

of

the

(OPLAN

2370 for JTF 180), contained explicit guidance for the troops:
Detain persons suspected of committing a serious criminal act (any act

H-hour that would constitute the offense of homicide,
aggravated assault, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or larceny if committed in the
United States). Use the minimum force necessary, up to and including deadly
force. Use only non-deadly force to detain civilians suspected of committing a
committed

after

serious criminal act that does not pose a serious threat to
larceny).

human

life

(e.g.,

14

The analogous card for the permissive entry plan, Operation Maintain
Democracy (OPLAN 2380 for JTF 190), contained no such guidance, which
explains why U.S. forces looked on passively as the Haitian police administered
a five-minute fatal beating to the vendor on 20 September. The closest
approximation was a rule allowing intervention in a defensive mode.

You may

and detain members of the Haitian
military, police, other armed persons, or other persons committing hostile acts or
showing hostile intent. Stop and detain other persons who interfere with your
mission.

use necessary force to stop, disarm,

15
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In this context, the range of what could be protected was set out in a prefatory

note to the soldier card:
Nothing

in the

ROE limits your right to

use necessary force to defend yourself,

your fellow servicemembers, your unit, other JTF personnel, key
property designated by your commander.

Armed

with these ROE,

them on D+l
is

would have taken

OPLAN

rule

which covered a range of

card,

commander

to interpret

2370 was more bellicose due to

same intervention

focus as a forced entry plan; the
post-hostilities

a bold

OPLAN 2370 and OPLAN 2380?

disconnect arise between

misleading to suggest that

and

Haitian nationals.

as including protection of

how did the

So,

it

facilities,

16

showed up

primary

in the

civil-military

OPLAN 2380.
of OPLAN 2370.

its

It

2370

operations

equivalent to those being dealt with in

Part of the answer

the rigorous compartmentalization

Although the two plans

were developed in
not share

JTF 180 team fleshing out

days before the execution date.

17

USACOM
ROE

they developed, but overlooked the
before

the

expected D-Day.

September did not

set off

working expectation
control during the

alarm

had

bells

visibility

of the difference in early

within the

was that

over both plans as

difference until about two weeks

realization

First

at that time

first

in

OPLAN 2370 could
190 counterparts preparing OPLAN 2380 until a few

parallel, the

ROE with its JTF

lies

USACOM

OPLAN

staff,

since the

ROE would
ROE team at

2370/JTF 180

stages of any incursion. Nonetheless, the

USACOM began to draft a request to the Joint Staff to crosswalk relevant JTF
180 rules into JTF 190.

At

this

point,

approximately

September,

10

matters

bogged down.

USACOM and JTF 190 quickly agreed on the need for authority to intervene in
Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Both sides concurred that deadly force was
appropriate,

wanted

if

to go

necessary, to prevent death or serious physical injury.
a step further,

CJTF 190

however, and suggested that the original

formulation, allowing only non-deadly force to detain Haitians committing

property crimes, might be too
a distinction

was made between fleeing looters (who could not be engaged with

deadly force) and looters
detain

weak to control looting. After further discussion,

them (deadly

who posed

a threat to U.S. personnel seeking to

force authorized in self-defense,

if

necessary). In essence,

neither side was eager to push for a rule of engagement permitting thieves to be

shot in the back.

18

A similar question arose regarding disarmament. USACOM directed JTF 190
an assertive weapons control program to reduce the potential for
violence. Haitian law generally allowed its citizens to be armed in public,

to develop
street
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ROE specified that a soldier "may use necessary force to

but JTF 190's approved
stop [and] disarm

Advocate

for

.

.

.

19
armed persons."

JTF 190 sent

me

On

10 September, the Staff Judge

a fax seeking clarification

on the degree of force

that could be used to execute a disarmament policy.

This

command

[JTF 190]

is

highly concerned about possible limitations

ability to disarm the population. Specifically,

necessary,

when an armed

This question

on

its

deadly force be used,

our attempt to disarm?

civilian flees during

revisits in

may

if

20

another guise the fleeing looter scenario discussed

above. By suggesting that continued possession of a

weapon might per

se

be a

threat to either the security or mission of the force, JTF 190 was seeking a return
to status-based

ROE for a limited category of individuals. A few days later,

USACOM Deputy CINC,

same issue with the
existence of an ROE-mission mismatch:

CJTF 190

raised this

For instance,

if

a small patrol

a Haitian ten yards

is

the

arguing the

comes around a corner in Port-au-Prince and there

away with

a

rifle

deadly force to stop him. Thereafter,

all

who then

runs, the patrol

cannot use

Haitians with weapons will run, and the

disarmament mission cannot be accomplished.

21

For several days more, discussion continued over the best way to calibrate
the

ROE

to critical sub-tasks such as disarmament, curfew enforcement,

deterrence of looting,

all

of which supported the main mission of establishing a

secure and stable environment. By D-2, 17 September,
Staff

its

and

package of recommended

ROE

USACOM sent the Joint

changes to "insure a seamless

22
hand-over between CJTF 180 and CJTF 190." The Chairman, serving

as

USACOM on D-Day,

19

interlocutor for the Secretary of Defense,

23

messaged

September, that the changes had been approved as submitted.

24

In a nutshell,

deadly force was authorized to detain persons observed committing crimes
involving death or serious injury; non-deadly force was available to control

property crimes, enforce curfews, stop looting, and disarm Haitians.
later,

USACOM signaled

approval to

25

Hours
26
JTF 180 and JTF 190 headquarters, and

dissemination to troops in the field took place during the next 24 hours, but not
in time to prevent the beating

On first reflection,

this

death on

D+

1.

one-day dissemination period may seem to be slow,

but the implementation process involved training deployed troops to cope with

an expanded

set of responsibilities. Explaining

whether robbery, which

is

a

crime involving the taking of property from someone by force, authorized a
deadly or non-deadly intervention response was one of several adventures that
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new ROE

the JTF 190 legal advisors faced in sorting out the

commander and
rule

troops.

can plague

that

27

This overall episode aptly

ROE

—on

development

illustrates the

controversial

for

their

50 percent

issues,

each

successive review level tends to use up half of the remaining time before

D-Day. As a

result,

deliberations,

often creating a frantic scramble

most of the available time

dissemination to the trigger-puller in the

gets absorbed in policy

when

it

comes time

for

field.

seems that the long debate about mission creep led to
compromises that were more lawyer-friendly than troop-friendly. As Jack
In retrospect,

also

it

Grunawalt always hammered home in his lectures, ROE should be written for
field use, not CNN consumption. Before Haiti, I had always believed that the
primary function of ROE was to guide the behavior of the mythical Private

Smudlap in the field. I realize now that draft ROE also exert pressure on the
other end of the chain of command by forcing senior commanders and the

NCA to come

to closure regarding their policy for use of force.

The two vignettes described in this essay reflect the tensions that typically
arise when crafting ROE for a highly visible, contentious operation. For
example, at what point does the push for thoroughness and certainty in the

end up undercutting an on-scene commander's flexibility to deal with
unexpected situations? Conversely, when does too much flexibility become
unwelcome ambiguity? 28

rules

These

murky world of peace
There can be no universal recipe, since

tradeoffs are especially challenging in the

operations.

ROE is both art and science.

the rules always need to be tailored to a specific context; even so, the basic

ROE

themes and ingredients transcend geopolitical atmospherics. The lessons
learned in Somalia served as a useful head start for those of us working up the
Haiti

ROE.

Similarly,

the choices

made

for

Haiti,

both successful and

unsuccessful, have added to the accumulation of experience available for
future planners.

Notes
1.

See

Army Center for Law and Military Operations, Law and Military Operations in Haiti,

1994-95: Lessons Learned forjudge Advocates 29-38 (Oct.

3,

1995

draft) [hereinafter

CLAMO

Study]. See also Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry),

Operation Uphold Democracy, Multinational Force Haiti After- Action Report, 29 July 1994 to
13 January 1995, at 5-6
2.

(May 1995)

[hereinafter 10th

Mountain AAR].

Karl von Clausewitz's classic precept of war as a continuation of politics by other means

an era when nations treated war as a reasonable and even noble attribute of
sovereignty. In one sense, the elaborate attention which the United States gives to formulating
detailed rules of engagement for its military forces is the full flowering of Clausewitz's principle.
was coined

in
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At

the same time, Clausewitz might view our preoccupation with the rule of law as excessive and

sympathize with the pungent conclusion of one recent commentator that "[a]ttempts to bring

our wonderful, comfortable, painstakingly

humane

drunk with blood and anarchy constitute the
Revolution,
3.

PARAMETERS, Summer 1995,

For the record,

it

on broken countries
end of imperialism." Ralph Peters, After The

ass

laws and rules to bear

at 13.

should be noted that

the intervention plans for Haiti called for a

all

multinational force. Eventually, more than 3,000 personnel from 32 other countries joined the

U.S. effort in Haiti. During the crucial period from April-September 1994, however, the military

planning and
4.

initial

execution phase of the intervention were almost exclusively a U.S. project.

Held by Civilians (161839Z Aug
for

Weapons Commonly

Message, U.S. Defense Attache Office, Port au Prince, Haiti, Subj:
94).

5. Fax Memorandum from Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Atlantic Command, to Legal Advisor
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Sept. 6, 1994).
6.

Fax Memorandum from Legal Advisor

Advocate, U.S. Atlantic
7.

Command

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Staff Judge

for

(Sept. 7, 1994).

Notes taken by Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Atlantic Command, of telephone

Legal Advisor for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Sept.
8.

The

6,

phrase "consistent with mission accomplishment and security of the force"

kind of equivocation that gives commanders a headache. Seen in the best
provide

flexibility to

—

9.

e.g., if

commander

from

such

that his judgment will be questioned

if

is

the

qualifiers

seem

to be

matters go

there had been substantial U.S. or Haitian casualties.

CLAMO

See

light,

deal with unforeseen contingencies. Seen in the worst light, they

weasel words cueing the
badly

call

1994).

Study, supra note

1,

G

at app.

for the text of the

JTF 180

ROE

card for

nonpermissive entry.
10.

at 11 (discussion of the

Id.

agreement signed on Sept

19, 1994,

by former President

Carter and Emile Jonaissant, the military-appointed president of Haiti) [Carter Agreement]
11. See U.S. Atlantic

Command, Operation Uphold Democracy: U.S. Forces in Haiti (May
USACOM command historian as after-action report of Haiti

1997) (monograph prepared by
operations 1994-96), at 16-19.
12. See,

Forced
13.

The

to

Police Savagely

Watch,

and

the "Rules of

17.

Sept. 21, 1994, at

Headquarters, Joint Task Force 180,

16. Id.

The

entire

WASH. POST, Sept.

to

Death

21, 1994, at

at Port; Disgusted G.l.'s

Al.

HOUSTON CHRON., Sept 22,

Tab F

(draft

civil-military operations) to

CLAMO Study, supra note 1, at app.

See 10th

Beaten

1994, at Al;

Engagement," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1994, at A13.

G (draft ROE card for
OPLAN Qune 13, 1994).
See

Man

Troops Cleared for Deadly Force,

Tab

15.

Club Demonstrators;

HOUSTON CHRON.,

See, e.g., U.S.

G.l.'s

14.

Haitian Police Attack Crowd: U.S. Troops Watch,

e.g.,

Al; Haitian

1,

card for hostilities phase) and
to

Annex C

to

JTF 180

I.

ROE card was reprinted on

Mountain AAR, supra note

ROE

Appendix 8

23 Sept. 1994 in

THE WASH. TIMES

at

A20.

at 5.

18. The one exception to this rule was "mission-essential property" designated by the
commander, which could be protected with deadly force. The definition of mission-essential
property usually encompassed weapons, explosives, cryptological equipment, classified material,
etc.

19. See

20.

Fax

USACOM,

CLAMO Study, supra note
Memorandum from
at

1

1,

at app.

I.

Staff Judge Advocate,

(Sept. 10, 1994).

235

JTF 190

to Staff Judge Advocate,
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Memorandum from Commanding

Fax

21.

Chief,

USACOM,

22.

General, JTF 190 to Deputy

Commander

in

at 3 (13 Sept. 1994).

USACOM,

Message, Commander-in-Chief,

Subj:

ROE

Request Serial

One (170008Z

Sep 94).
23. Technically, the chain of

command

for

approval of national-level

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his staff
operational matters between the CINCs and the Secretary.
In practice, the

25.

runs from a

CINCUSACOM, directly to the Secretary of Defense.

geographic commander-in-chief, such as

24. Message, Chairman,
(190450ZSep94).

ROE

serve as a coordinating

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subj: Approval of

ROE

filter for

Request Serial

One

ROE modifications were only one aspect of the larger debate over mission creep. In early

September,

USACOM

developed the following matrix of

activities to

summarize the

level of

military involvement in various police functions, during the period before the legitimate
government of Haiti was scheduled to return:

Police Activity

Current Haitian

U.S. Military Involvement

Police Involvement
(Apolitical)

Only

to support military mission

Traffic control

Yes

Domestic disputes

Yes

No

Minor crime

Yes

No

(Shoplifting)

Major property crime

Only when observed, non-deadly

Yes

force

authorized to detain perpetrator

(larceny, burglary)

Personal violence crime

Only when observed,

Yes

deadly force

authorized to detain perpetrator

(homicide, aggravated
assault, arson, robbery)

(Civil Disorders)

Peaceful demonstrations

Yes

Violent demonstrations

Yes

No
Yes,

if

required for force protection or

mission accomplishment

Major

civil

disorder

(riots,

Yes

Yes

looting)

(Special Situations)

Yes,

subject

on protected persons

Hostage rescue

Yes

Detention

Yes

Yes

Forensic investigations

Yes

No

Prisons/Jails

Yes

No
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26. Message,

Sep

USACOM,

Subj:

ROE

Change

Serial

In addition to the obvious training challenge, the physical act of printing

27

new

Commander-in-Chief,

One

(19082 1Z

94).

and distributing

ROE cards to every service member in the JTF during the first day in a foreign country was,

by itself, a feat requiring considerable energy and coordination. See

CLAMO Study, supra note

1,

at 33.

ROE

28.

have multiple "users"

—

policy makers, military

commanders,

troops,

and curious

onlookers such as the media. Ideally, the troops want clear, simple rules stacked

commandments on
flexible

a 3"x5" card.

whole without loose ends or gaps
wants

Commanders want

framework. Operational lawyers want the

all

—

i.e.,

a product

a well-equipped

ROE

ROE

like

tool kit inside a

package to be a thorough, seamless

not requiring intricate

glosses.

The

NCA

of the above, plus rules that translate into useful sound bites for the inevitable media

grillings.
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XII
Clipped Wings:
Effective

and Legal No*fly Zone

Rules of Engagement

Michael N. Schmitt

Y7*
M REED
J-L

OF THE STALEMATE

that resulted from opposing bipolar

superpowers wielding off-setting veto power in the United Nations

Security Council, the enforcement regime envisioned by the drafters of the

becoming a reality. One of the tools that has been
coercively compel desired norms of international behavior is the

Charter in 1945
fashioned to
no-fly zone.

UN

2

Its

is

1

slowly

use has challenged traditional notions of sovereignty, while

clarifying the operational

code regarding those actions which are appropriate

responses to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression.

how

3

and legal rules of
engagement (ROE) for no-fly zones. Rules of engagement are the means
governments use to set forth the circumstances in which their military units
and personnel are authorized to use force, and, if so, how. 4 They represent the
intersection of policy, law, and operational concerns at the most fundamental
level of international relations. This is particularly true for no-fly zone ROE,
which govern operations intended to deny a sovereign State the use of its own
This

article will explore

airspace.

best to craft effective

Clipped Wings

new enforcement mechanism, two

Before exploring this relatively
caveats are in order.

First, it is

brief

not the purpose here to assess the legitimacy of

such zones under international law, either generally or

as to specific operations.

Doing so would necessitate an in-depth analysis of the UN Charter and
customary international law that is well beyond the purview of this article.
Rather, the goal is to highlight factors which may contribute to safe, successful,
and legal enforcement, assuming, arguendo, that a zone is established lawfully.
Second, because the rules of engagement for no-fly zones implemented since
5
1991 remain classified, the play of ROE in actual operations will be referred to
only rarely. Instead, the article articulates broad principles which apply to
no-fly zones

wherever situated.

It is first

necessary, however, to set the stage by

describing no-fly zones themselves.

No'Fly Zones

A no-fly zone

is

a de facto aerial

occupation of sovereign airspace in which,

absent consent of the entity authorizing the occupation, only aircraft of the

enforcement forces may

6

fly.

Violators

may be

forced out of the zone

or, in

down. No-fly zones should not be confused with aerial
operations designed to enforce economic sanctions against a target State. For
instance, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations
imposed an embargo on Iraq and Kuwait that eventually encompassed the
extreme

cases, shot

7

aerial regime.

Such an action only

prohibits transit of aircraft carrying cargo

into or out of a designated area. In other words,

certain aircraft

may not cross;

restricts flight within a

the restriction

designated area.

Its

is

it

delineates boundaries

linear.

coverage

By contrast,

is

a

which

no fly-zone

three dimensional.

Enforcement of a no-fly zone presupposes the possible use of force in
response to a violation. As the most severe sanction available in international
law, the circumstances under which it may be resorted to are highly
circumscribed. By a restrictive interpretation of the

UN Charter, there are but

two.

The

8

first is

pursuant to a Chapter VII mandate. Under Article 39 of that

chapter, the Security Council determines whether a "threat to the peace,

breach of the peace, or act of aggression"

exists.

9

When

it

does, the Council

may "call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures
10
It need not do so, however, and may
as it deems necessary or desirable."
proceed directly to the imposition of "measures not involving the use of armed
11
force," such as interruption of aerial "means of communication." In the event
the Security Council determines that non-forceful measures would be or have
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proved

inadequate,

organizations, or

may

it

member

security
air, sea,

.

.

may be

regional

article

is

"such action by

air, sea,

or

necessary to maintain or restore international peace and

[including]

.

Nations,

States to use force under Article 42 to restore or

maintain peace. Specifically cited in the
land forces as

United

the

authorize

.

.

.

demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by

or land forces of Members of the United Nations."

12

It is

Article 42 that

provides the specific legal basis for the use of force in the mission accomplishment
rules of

engagement

for no-fly zones.

13

Should the Security Council decide to authorize military action under
Chapter

may do

VII, it

Helmets,"

i.e.,

so in one of three ways. First,

national forces under

it

may send

UN command and control

in "Blue

(C2); certain

United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operations in the former
Yugoslavia, for example, were eventually conducted under Chapter VII.
Alternatively,

it

may

defer to a regional organization to take the lead in

enforcement action. For instance, the
Force (IFOR) replaced

Agreement

in 1995.

14

15

NATO- controlled

UNPROFOR following
Finally, the Security

Implementation

execution of the Dayton Peace

Council may authorize member

States to take action individually or collectively to

implement a particular

mandate. The most notable example of this approach was Operation

DESERT

16

STORM.
The second basis

for the use of force

attack. This authorization

might not be

action

self-defense in response to

an armed

found in Article 51 of the Charter.

is

visionary, the drafters of the Charter

VII

is

were
or

feasible

realists.

likely

17

Albeit

Understanding that Chapter
in

all

circumstances,

they

acknowledged the inherent right of States to defend themselves, and other
States, until

such time

legal

for

basis
•

operations.

as the Security

self-defense

rules

Council acted. Article 5 1 provides the

of engagement

in

during no-fly

effect

18

A liberal interpretation of the Charter would allow for a third use of force,
non-consensual intervention into another State for humanitarian purposes.

The

legality of

issue, for

integrity.

humanitarian intervention in international law

it flies
19

It is

in the face of traditional notions of sovereignty

particularly controversial

the Security Council.

20

When

if

is

an unsettled

and

territorial

conducted without the blessing of

authorized by the Council on the ground that

the internal actions in question constitute a threat to or breach of international

peace

under Article

39,

humanitarian

intervention

contentious, although not universally accepted.

have been

justified in part

on

this basis.

22
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The

is

somewhat

less

no-fly zones over Iraq

Clipped Wings

Since 1991, there have been three no-fly zone operations.

were the products of the way the Gulf

War

Safwan, the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Iraq's Ministry of

informed that

aircraft

He

The

first

two

ended. In the cease-fire talks at

would not be permitted to

prohibition extended to helicopters.

23

fly,

Defense, on being

queried whether the

argued that due to the conditions of

the roads and bridges following the highly effective Coalition air campaign,
helicopter flights were necessary for transport of Iraqi

Norman Schwarzkopf
restricted

them from

Soon after the
revolted.

25

helicopters

A

cease-fire,

were

mountainous

agreed to permit the use of helicopters, although he

flying in areas

brutal

General

officials.

occupied by Coalition forces. 24

Kurdish groups in the north and Shi'as in the south
of both

suppression

used

extensively.

uprisings

The Kurds

terrain along the Turkish-Iraqi border.

international pressure to

come

in

which

the

harsh

followed,
fled

into

Faced with mounting

to their assistance, in part the product of a

perception that the Kurds and Shi'as had acted in reasonable expectation of
Coalition support,

27

the Security Council adopted Resolution 688.

It

labeled

the suppression of the Kurds a threat to "international peace and security in the
region," insisted that Iraq allow humanitarian relief into the area,

demanded
goals.

and

that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to realize these

28

Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT

resulted,

and

in April 1991 relief flights

began dropping supplies to the Kurds as forces of a 13 -country coalition
entered northern Iraq and established a security zone from which the Iraqis
29
were directed to withdraw. In order to provide relief to Kurdish groups under
attack and ensure the security of troops on the ground, a no-fly zone was
30
established by the Coalition within Iraq north of the 36th parallel. The 36th
parallel

was an

territory in

easily

understood demarcation that incorporated

which the Kurds

lived.

31

Iraqi forces

much

of the

were notified of the zone by

whether fixed-wing or helicopter,
entering the area without prior authorization risked being shot down.

demarche. Thereafter, any

Iraqi aircraft,

Aircraft of Turkey, France, the United

Kingdom, and the United States

began flying from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey to enforce the no-fly zone. In
August 1996, fighting between the two largest Kurdish groups broke out, with
32
the Iraqi military overtly supporting one faction. Since Operation PROVIDE
COMFORT had initially been designed in part to protect the Kurds from the
Iraqis,

the specter of Kurds turning to the Iraqis for assistance caused

rethink the viability of the operation.

Soon

thereafter, the

to

humanitarian

element of the mission was terminated, the French pulled out, and
COMFORT was renamed NORTHERN WATCH. 33
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No

comparable humanitarian

plight of the Shi'as

was

less

was mounted in the south. The

one of starvation or exposure to the elements than

was of brutal suppression.

it

relief effort

Iraqi helicopter operations against the Shi'as

when Operation SOUTHERN WATCH was
34
zone south of the 32N parallel. As in PROVIDE

continued until August 1992,
activated to enforce a no-fly

COMFORT,

the operation was based on Security Council Resolution 688.

response to Iraqi military involvement in the inter-Kurd

35

In

the no-fly

hostilities,

zone was extended northward to the 33rd parallel in September 1996.

36

SOUTHERN WATCH is conducted by aircraft of the United States,

Operation

United Kingdom and France operating from bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and
the United

Arab Emirates.
Resolution

Interestingly,

688

neither

mentioned

specifically authorized establishment of no-fly zones.

no
is

affirmative action. Further, neither

a classic

Chapter VII operation

to aggression by

Chapter

On its face,

it

VII

nor

authorized

NORTHERN nor SOUTHERN WATCH

as envisioned in the Charter,

i.e.,

a response

one State against another. Instead, they more closely resemble

humanitarian intervention mounted by multinational forces in response to a
threat to international stability.

Despite the difficulty of fitting either operation into a neatly framed

Charter-based scheme, legal justification for them has been based on Security

Council Resolutions 678, 687, and 688. 37 Resolution 678 was the
of authority to use force against Iraq under Chapter VII.

38

initial

grant

Subsequently,

Resolution 687 set forth the terms of the cease-fire, specifically reaffirming 678
in the process.

39

Thus, so the argument goes, the 678 use of force authorization

remains intact to effectuate even subsequent resolutions, including 688. This
being

so,

and because 678 authorized member States to act on

their

own, they

were entitled to mount operations to ensure compliance with 688. The

results

PROVIDE COMFORT and SOUTHERN WATCH. With the
demise of the humanitarian component of PROVIDE COMFORT, NORTHERN

were Operations

WATCH

is

a bit

more

difficult to

plug directly into this equation because of the

absence of direct linkage to the 688 circumstances. Nevertheless, the no-fly

zone continues as a de facto limit on

Saddam

Hussein's options against the

Kurds. Moreover, his involvement in Kurdish internecine conflict, repeated
interference with
assassinate

UN

weapons

George Bush,

etc.,

inspectors, alleged involvement in a plot to

arguably justify keeping the pressure on

him

in

order to limit the extent of his defiance. Resolution 688, considered in light of
the cease-fire resolutions and Iraqi acceptance of their terms, provides a
colorable legal basis for doing so in the form of no-fly zones.
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Much

cleaner from a legal point of view

established

over

September 1992,
facilitate

the

At

Bosnia-Herzegovina.
it

was agreed that

delivery

the no-fly zone that was

is

London Conference

the

as a confidence-building

of humanitarian

Bosnia-Herzegovina would be banned.

40

measure, and to

military

assistance,

over

flights

Nevertheless, such flights continued.

them

In response, the Security Council adopted Resolution 781 prohibiting

UNPROFOR

and authorizing

observers at military airfields.

41

compliance through placement of

to track

In support of the

Warning and Control System (AW ACS)
and passing data

it

collected to

UN

in

effort,

aircraft

NATO Airborne Early

began monitoring the zone

authorities.

March 1993 the Security
authorized member States:

Violations by the Bosnian Serbs continued. In

Council upped the stakes with Resolution 816.

4.

•

.

take,

It

.(A)cting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to

under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close

coordination with the Secretary-General and

UNPROFOR,

necessary

all

measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event
of further violations to ensure compliance with the ban

on

flights

proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of the

It

.

.

.

and

flights.

also requested:

5

(T) he

Member States concerned,

the Secretary-General and

UNPROFOR to

coordinate closely on the measures they are taking to implement paragraph 4
above, including the rules of engagement

The

42
.

.

.

.

resolution specifically cited Chapter VII of the Charter as the basis for

authorization.

Paragraph 4

is

Chapter

in accordance with

VIII of the

UN

Charter, which

allows the Security Council to seek the assistance of regional organizations in
43
enforcement actions. The response came from

the

DENY FLIGHT.

form of Operation

reconnaissance

aircraft,

NATO the following month in

Starting

with

fifty

fighter

over time the operation grew to more than 200

operating from bases in Italy and aircraft carriers in the Adriatic.

FLIGHT continued
operations

—ground,

until
air,

December

and sea

—was

with the Dayton Peace Agreement.
the responsibility of the IFOR,

JOINT ENDEAVOR,

and

46

a

45

1995,

when

transferred to

44

responsibility

NATO

in

all

became

force tasked with executing

the peace implementation operation.
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DENY

47

In

December
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1996,
to

IFOR transitioned into

conduct

aerial operations

the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

from bases in

Italy.

Thus, of the three no-fly operations, only

DENY FLIGHT

authorized in a Security Council resolution. However,

Charter and the authority

SFOR continues

48

all

was

explicitly

three look to the

vests in the Council for legitimacy. Since no-fly

it

zones violate traditional notions of near absolute sovereignty over one's
territory, a

exactly

what

mandate

the

—

49

authorizing the zone
military flights,

and

made

falling

or

so, it is essential to

—

implicit

DENY FLIGHT,

whenever

is

the resolutions

quite clear that the prohibitions were limited to

specifically those in the airspace

Bosnia and Herzegovina.

not

it

That being

explicit

considering no-fly zones. In the case of

zones)

own

zone not at least arguably grounded in the Charter regime would be

unlikely to survive international scrutiny.

query

UN

Any

over the Republic of

other use of force (at least vis-a-vis the no-fly

within these narrow boundaries would, therefore, be

questionable under international law.

The

sole exception

is

acts in self-defense

pursuant to Article 5 1 of the Charter. In the cases of the zones over Iraq, far
greater interpretive

acumen

is

required, for the

Before turning to the rules of engagement,
the use of force in no-fly zones

is

far

mandate

is

implicit.

important to emphasize that

it is

from an academic question. Violations of

the zones have occurred periodically, often drawing a forceful response. In

December 1992, an Iraqi MiG-25 fighter south of the 32nd parallel was
downed by a SOUTHERN WATCH F-16 Fighting Falcon. 50 The next month,
another F-16 shot down an Iraqi MiG-23 fighter which had crossed the 36th
51
parallel into northern Iraq.
Less than a year later, NATO jets downed four
which violated the
Enforcement aircraft in all of the
Galebs

(AAA)

anti-aircraft artillery

no-fly

zone

over

no-fly operations

Bosnia-Herzegovina.

have taken ground

or surface-to-air missiles (SAM), in

fire

many

52

from
cases

on the AAA or missile site in question.
More seriously, during DENY FLIGHT, a French Mirage crew was taken
53
prisoner after ejecting and an American F-16 was downed by a SAM. The

necessitating an attack in self-defense

gravity of no-fly zone
tragic incident over

enforcement

is

perhaps best illustrated by the horribly

northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, in which two U.S. F-15

Eagles mistakenly shot

down

a pair of U.S.

Army

Black

Hawk

helicopters.

Twenty-six U.S., UK, French, Turkish, and Kurdish personnel on board
perished.

The

54

use of force in each of these incidents was governed by the rules of

engagement then

in effect. In the aftermath of the Black

Hawk

shoot-downs,

the President of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board concluded that, in
.his

opinion, Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT
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"personnel did not receive
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comprehensive

had a thorough
understanding of the USEUCOM-directed ROE. As a result, some aircrews'
understanding of how the approved ROE should be applied became
55
over-simplified."
ROE problems were not the sole cause of the tragedy, but
consistent,

training

they certainly contributed to

it.

to

ensure

As should be

they

apparent, carefully drafted rules

of engagement are essential to ensure compliance with national policy,
international law, and sound and safe tactical practices.

Rules of Engagement
Underlying Bases of ROE. Rules of engagement are directives from national
authorities which "delineate the circumstances and limitations under which
[forces of a country] will initiate and/or continue

other forces encountered."
bases that operate in

56

combat engagement with

Properly designed, they have three underlying

tandem and

synergistically

—

policy, law,

and operational

concerns.
First,

and most fundamentally,

Command

Authorities

(NCA)

express their intent as to
objectives.

They

how

57

ROE

(or

are the

means by which the National

comparable authority in other countries)

force will

and

will

not be used to achieve

are the realization of Clausewitz's classic

policy

maxim that war is

true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried

"a

on by

NCA cannot be in the cockpit of aircraft monitoring

other means."

58

a no-fly zone,

ROE allow them to express their intent regarding the use of force

to those

The

who

Since the

are.

engagement must, therefore, be carefully written so as to
preclude actions that might run counter to national policy. The process
requires sensitivity to the distinction between purpose and means. A no-fly zone
is nothing more than one means to effectuate a national (or international)
purpose, such as mounting a humanitarian relief effort or keeping feuding
rules of

parties apart.

59

At

times, this subtle, yet critical distinction

is

lost in the

rush to

design an impermeable no-fly zone. However, the proper measure for success

is

not the extent to which violations occur, but rather the congruency of the
operation's execution with its underlying political purpose. Those who view it
as

existing in a political

vacuum

risk failure

Clausewitzian principles into planning.

evidence of the need to be able to

consequences of one's ROE.

The proper

inability

to factor

The Black Hawk shoot-down
live

is

apt

with the political and policy

°

on how rules of engagement can shape and bound the
comport with the underlying purpose of the mandate. For

focus

use of force to

by their

is
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instance,

resolution

if
is

the purpose of a vaguely drafted no-fly zone Security Council

simply to ensure safe delivery of relief supplies or to keep ground

attack aircraft from giving in to the temptation to strike
place by a cease-fire, then

it is

A

not necessary in the

enemy

ROE

forces held in

to permit

unarmed

downing would evoke an international
outcry certain to endanger continuance of the operation. By contrast, if the
policy goal is to keep intense pressure on a rogue State by denying it the use of
its own airspace, then perhaps a comprehensive ban is merited.
civil aircraft to

be engaged.

civil

Much as rules of engagement are intended to help ensure that use of military
force furthers national policy, so too

the second structural element of

do they ensure that use

ROE

—

is

lawful.

61

This

is

international law. Indeed, in the

Department of Defense Dictionary of Defense and Associated Terms, the
entries "rules of engagement" and "law of war" are cross-referenced, the only
cross-reference in either definition.

The

determinative effect of law

62

is

reflective of

both the

jus

ad helium,

i.e.,

which governs when States may resort to the use of force in their
relations, and the jus in hello that law which limits how force may be used once
resorted to. As to the former, it has been noted that a no-fly zone is usually a
that law

,

non-consensual

aerial

occupation of another sovereign State's airspace by

Absent consent of the nation in whose airspace the zone is established,
ongoing hostilities in an international armed conflict, or some form of Security
Council authorization, a no-fly zone would constitute a breach of the enforcing
State's obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States. It would likely be
characterized by the international community as a breach of the prohibition on
63
the use of force found in Article 2 (4) of the Charter. Moreover, even if an
implicit or explicit mandate existed, enforcement exceeding the scope of
authorization would be unlawful. Thus, intentionally shooting down a civil
aircraft in a no-fly zone for military aircraft or enforcing the zone beyond its
geographical boundaries would violate international law.

force.

It is

also possible that the actual execution of a lawful decision to resort to

force to enforce a no-fly zone could violate jus in hello prescriptive norms,
especially proportionality or necessity.

The

fact that these

two principles are

applied in a no-fly zone does not affect their substantive content.
militarily necessary or proportionate in a particular

Military necessity

destructive

advantage.

64

or

is

context or

it is

An

act

is

not.

the principle of the law of armed conflict that prohibits

harmful acts that are unnecessary to secure a military

Before an action can be taken, the actor must be able to articulate

the direct military advantage that will ensue therefrom. In other words,

destruction

may not be wanton

or of marginal military value,
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motivations must underlie

65
it.

Issues of military necessity are rare in no-fly

zone enforcement because specific approval
other than in self-defense.

When

is

usually required to strike targets

authorization

provided,

is

it

tends towards

selection of traditional military targets directly related to zone enforcement. 66

Whereas

military necessity

is

raw assessment of overall military advantage,

a

proportionality expands analysis by balancing the advantage gained against the

incidental injury to civilians or collateral
results.

67

prohibits

It

or

injury

advantage secured by the action.

from the middle of a

village,

it is

its

weapons engagement zone (WEZ), 68

The

if

a no-fly zone intended to foreclose ground attacks
aircraft, it

among the

villagers,

attack would be disproportionate. Similarly,

should generally not be

presence of military

the military

but poses minimal risk to the operation, or there

certain to result in significant casualties
hit.

to

To illustrate, if a mobile SAM site is operating

it

aircraft

to civilian objects that

damage disproportionate

are clear alternatives to flying through

and attacking

damage

is

limited to forbidding the

would be disproportionate

to destroy a military

with no offensive capability transporting civilians across the zone.

Military (actually political advantage sought by the mandate) advantage

outweighed by the incidental
the

requirements;

injury.

minimum,

at

The proper remedy in this case
parties

violations will be dealt with by force.

Both these

principles

rules of engagement.

mandate

itself

to clarify

should be warned that further

69

must be factored

The

is

is

in as the

mandate

is

translated into

only exception to their applicability occurs

when the

which would otherwise be unnecessary or
the Security Council resolution on which the

authorizes acts

disproportionate. After

authority for the zone

all,
is

ROE

based has actual legal valence; the

merely

As an example, the Security Council could authorize an
aircraft of no military value to the target State or threat to

interpret the mandate.

attack

on

civil

enforcement

aircraft (necessity),

would ensue, simply by

To justify

this

even

if

civilian casualties (proportionality)

implicitly or explicitly including

them

in

its

mandate.

departure from the traditional law of armed conflict,

it

must

be understood that Chapter VII permits what would otherwise be in violation
of the law

if

performed by States acting without Council sanction.

70

Article 39

allows the Security Council to conduct a balancing test between whatever

enforcement actions

it

deems necessary and the threat

to

which they respond.

Moreover, the Charter, a treaty based in the original consent of the
generally controlling over existing customary law;

71

provides for the supremacy of Charter obligations.
It

can be argued that in certain extreme

cases,

as to treaty law, Article

is

103

72

such

as direct

on

targeting

against civilian objects or personnel, the prohibition
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become jus cogens, a peremptory norm
73
However, the very
law which admits of no deviation.
74
Any action pursuant to a
cogens norms is controversial.

than customary international law;
of international
existence of jus

it

has

Chapter VII determination by the Security Council that the measure

will

contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security would be
unlikely to

fall as

violative of jus cogens.

even questionable uses of force, law quickly fades
before policy. A policy decision will have to be made regarding whether or not
traditional jus in hello prescriptive norms will yield to a weightier policy interest

Theory

aside, in cases of

The

effectuated via Chapter VII.

harm

potential

decision

may

on

well turn

to enforcement against likely international

obvious reasons, an act violating the traditional jus

in hello

a balancing of

condemnation. For

normative paradigm

should only be approved in the most extreme circumstances.

From

must be understood that both necessity
and proportionality are principles of the law of armed conflict, a body of law
which only applies in international, as distinct from non-international, armed
conflict.

armed

a technical point of view,

75

No-fly zones

may

it

may not

or

take place in a state of international

conflict. Fortunately, the difficulty of

drawing the complicated

legal

between international and non-international armed conflict is
eased by the policy decision of many States to have their forces apply the law of
armed conflict irrespective of the characterization of the conflict absent
distinction

instructions otherwise.

Therefore, as a matter of policy,

ROE must generally

of no-fly zone

The

76

centrality of legal

norms

in

comport with these

ROE

should by

if

not law, execution

principles.

now be

apparent. Although

ROE can never address every possible legal issue that might arise
complex

as to

(lest

be rendered completely incomprehensible) effective
,

they be so

ROE

will

cover those most likely to arise in the context of a particular operation, as well
as those

most

difficult to analyze in

characterizes aerial operations.

the legal aspects of

ROE
11

It is

the split-second decision-making that

also important to

tend to be seen as

understand that although

restrictive,

law also allows

ROE

to

most true in the case of self-defense. Recognition
that the use of force is always an act of national policy causes some flyers to
hesitate to use force, even when reasonable to defend themselves, their troops

act as force enahlers.

This

is

or other appropriate assets.
for the

The

ROE can help

78

An

counter

component of

understanding of the international law basis

this

dangerous propensity.

—

engagement complementing
policy and law
is operational soundness. ROE may comport with policy and
fall within the limits of the law, but if they do not make sense from the
perspective of the pilot in the cockpit, they are unacceptable. As an example,
third

—

effective rules of
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consider a no-fly zone in which there have been multiple incidents of intruder
aircraft

launching missiles at enforcement

would require a violator

aircraft.

A rule of engagement that
an
weapons engagement

to be visually identified (VID) by enforcing aircraft,

act only possible at a distance well within the violator's

zone (WEZ), would be foolish at best, possibly

suicidal.

Combat

capable

must be engaged beyond visual range (BVR) if the zone is to be
enforced safely. Of course, fairly complex identification ROE (or guidance on
the rules issued by the commander) will need to be developed to guard against

violators

mistaken engagements.
This example
operate

illustrates the

tandem and

in

international law

79

point

made

earlier that the three bases of

The

synergistically.

principle

ROE

of distinction

in

requires a degree of pre-engagement certainty that helps

prevent mistaken downings

likely to

undermine

policy objectives.

At

the same

and as will be discussed more fully below, the law of self-defense allows
enforcement aircraft to take whatever actions are tactically prudent to defend
themselves and others should a situation not specifically accounted for in the
ROE arise. The default right of self-defense permits ROE driven by policy and
law to remain operationally credible to those who might contest the zone.
time,

Credibility gives rise to the deterrent effect the declaration of the no-fly zone

was intended to achieve in the

first

place.

80

A healthy focus on the bases of ROE will also act to identify defective rules of
engagement.
inversely,

81

Only

rules

responsive to

all

three are acceptable. Stated

any rule of engagement that hinders achievement of policy aims,

is

unsound
must be rejected. Understandably, then, ROE are best drafted by a team
82
consisting of a judge advocate and an operator, and must be reviewed at an
unlawful or

is

likely to result in

unlawful actions, or

is

operationally

appropriate policy level.

Mission Accomplishment and Self-Defense Rules. Rules of engagement come
mission accomplishment and self-defense. Although it is
in two varieties

—

critically

mistake

important that

made

in drafting

this distinction

be recognized, the most

ROE is the blurring of the

two.

When this occurs,

the

who

are

likelihood of inadvertently frustrating the mission or placing those

tasked with

its

execution at

risk tends to

common

be high.

Mission accomplishment rules are the easiest to understand and execute for
the operator but present the greatest challenge to those responsible for drafting

ROE. As the tether

to the specific policy objectives the no-fly zone

intended

and procedures used by enforcement
are lawful and operationally sound. Mission accomplishment rules also

to achieve, they help ensure that tactics
aircraft

is
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allow the

NCA

the opportunity to provide direction

on important

policy

questions regarding the use of force not explicitly addressed in the initial
political

mandate.

here that the actual rules for enforcing the zone are set forth. Unlike

It is

self-defense rules, mission

accomplishment

rules are operation specific.

They

do not apply outside the context of a particular no-fly zone enforcement effort.
Reduced to basics, mission accomplishment ROE set forth who may do what to
whom, and how, when, and where that action may occur.
Mission accomplishment rules are

difficult to

develop because of the need to

ensure consistency with each of the three bases of ROE. For the sake of
illustration, consider a

which

seemingly straightforward Security Council mandate

states that military aircraft are

term "military

aircraft"

mean?

Is it

not to

in a set zone.

fly

limited to

armed

military helicopters? Military transport aircraft?

aircraft?

What
Does

What

such as the transport of
if

about military

Are

civil

officials

involved in cease-fire negotiations? Does

it

military aircraft are transporting civilians because the civil air

relief supplies

83

Are

military aircraft delivering

included in the ban? Are military medical aircraft exempt?

The problem is
likely to

performing civilian functions,

aircraft

transport system in the country has collapsed?

is

include

conducting reconnaissance for military purposes considered to be

"military aircraft"?

matter

it

Whose military aircraft? What

of civil aircraft contracted to carry military supplies and personnel?
aircraft

does the

that the political

mandate

directing enforcement of the zone

be very broadly drafted because of the

agreement on minutiae, however important the

difficulty of Security

details

may

be.

Council

The dynamics

of consensus-building, particularly in a multi-national environment, drive

mandates towards generalities. In some cases, even the no-fly mandate itself
must be inferred, as in the case of the Iraqi zones. Mission accomplishment

ROE fill in the gaps for those

in the cockpit

who cannot be expected

to resolve

and legal issues as they receive a radar return from an incoming violator.
Therein lies the dilemma. ROE drafters are expected to put policy and legal
flesh on a skeleton that was not the product of their own labors and which may
be understood differently by the various States involved. In extreme cases, this
may result in differing, even conflicting, mission accomplishment ROE during a
policy

combined operation consisting of multiple national contingents. 84

engagement are much easier to draft, but pose far
greater interpretive problems. While ROE governing the use of force to
accomplish the mission must be precise enough to safeguard against exceeding
Self-defense rules of

the

policy

mandate,

falling

short

of

it,

or

violating

international

self-defense rules are intentionally drafted broadly in order to pass as
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The burden

discretion to the operator as possible.
drafter to the cockpit; the desire

any

to avoid

is

of decision shifts from the

possibility of a

crew hesitating

ROE are not directly on point. Therefore, whereas
ROE should anticipate scenarios, self-defense ROE

to defend itself because the

mission accomplishment

should

clarify standards.

ROE

For very practical reasons, self-defense
enforcement.

armed

85

conflict

Such zones are most
and peace, where it

likely in the
is

netherworld lying between

who

often unclear

Moreover, they are non-consensual in

friendly.

are at the heart of no-fly zone

fact, if

and who

is

is

not by law. Even

not

when

technically consensual, there will be powerful incentives to violate the no-fly

zone. If not, there

What

this

means

would be

is

little

need

enforcement with combat

for

that crews enforcing such zones regularly

fly

aircraft.

into a highly

dangerous environment armed with only a contingent right to use force,
contingent on whether the zone has been violated or whether there
act in self-defense. Effective

which

is

ROE

will allow

them

is

a

i.e.,

need

to

to exercise the latter right,

the foundation of a State's willingness to engage in such operations, to

the fullest extent permissible under international law.

There

are four types of self-defense,

51 of the Charter.

defending

one's

self-defense

is

sans plus.

86

On

each deriving

the macro level

country

and

its

legal basis

national self-defense, the act of

is

national

self-defense plays

existence of hostile forces renders
role in no-fly self-defense

little

The second form

of self-defense

i.e.,

them

subject to attack
targets.

National

ROE.

individual

is

national

Generally,

interests.

accomplished by declaring forces "hostile,"

The mere

from Article

self-defense

defending oneself. Complementing individual self-defense

is

— the

act of

the third type,

an action taken to defend other personnel or units of one's
own military forces. Finally, political authorities may extend a defensive

unit self-defense,

umbrella to other States or their military personnel. This

must be approved

at the highest level

Collective self-defense

is

—

in the

an essential element

collective self-defense

United States, the NCA.

87

in a combined no-fly zone

operation during which aircraft of a particular nation typically perform set
functions, such as reconnaissance, relying

on

aircraft

from another nation

for

protection. Article 5 1 legitimizes this cooperative approach.
It is

be characterized by two elements
that,

must
Beyond

well established under international law that an act in self-defense

each State defines the

self-defense.

The United

—

and proportionality.
under which its forces may exercise

necessity

criteria

States takes a relatively liberal view of the right.

used in the self-defense rules of engagement,

from the

88

89

necessity

jus in hello principles of military necessity

252

and proportionality

As

differ

and proportionality discussed
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earlier.

when

90

and necessity in the context of self-defense

Proportionality

may be

force

resorted to.

By

ROE are about

contrast, in the jus in hello context, military

and proportionality are basic principles regarding how force may be used;
they apply to both mission accomplishment and self-defense ROE.

necessity

When used as
in

which a

intent."

91

an element of self-defense, necessity

is

defined as a situation

"hostile act occurs or a force or terrorist unit exhibits hostile

"Hostile act"

and

"hostile intent" are

basis for a use of force in self-defense

is

ROE terms of art. The cleanest

in response to a hostile act.

It is

described as an:

[A]ttack or other use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit [organization or
individual] against the

US citizens,

United

their property,

forces, foreign nationals

US

and

US

and in certain circumstances,
commercial assets, and other designated non-US
States,

forces,

their property. It

is

also force

US

preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of
recovery of US personnel and vital
is

used directly to

forces, including the

US Government property. When a hostile act

in progress, the right exists to use proportional force, including

self-defense by

attacker or,

if

all

necessary

means

armed

force, in

available to deter or neutralize the potential

necessary, to destroy the threat.

92

In the context of a no-fly zone, hostile act means that someone

is

shooting at

you or at someone else involved in the enforcement operation. As a matter of
law and policy, the right to defend oneself in the face of a hostile act is
universally accepted.
It is

with the concept of hostile intent that most

forces, hostile intent

difficulties surface.

For U.S.

is:

[T]he threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or

terrorist unit, or

US national interests, US forces, and in
certain circumstances, US citizens, their property, US commercial assets, or other
designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their property. When hostile
organization against the United States and

intent

is

present, the right exists to use proportional force, including

in self-defense

attacker or,
exists

and

if

by

all

necessary

means

requires the use of proportional force in self-defense

Simplified, hostile intent
else

is

force,

A determination that hostile intent

necessary, to destroy the threat.

convincing evidence that an attack

armed

available to deter or neutralize the potential

imminent.

means someone

is

must be based on

93

about

to

shoot at you or someone

involved in the enforcement operation. Unfortunately, the policy and legal

underpinnings of

ROE may seem

to conflict with their operational basis

seeking to understand self-defense ROE.
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no action is taken until the requisite threshold for
self-defense under Article 51 has been reached, the operator is concerned
about one thing being shot down. These two very different cognitive
paradigms can lead to confusion over the meaning of self-defense ROE. The
most common misunderstanding turns on the distinction between "threaten"
and "threat." The mere fact that something is a threat to an enforcement
aircraft does not mean it has demonstrated hostile intent. It must first threaten
the aircraft, i.e., it must engage in an act that is hostile or evidence an intent to
commit a hostile action. The best way to think of the distinction is as the
difference between a verb and a noun; because the standard is one of intent,
the actor, even though posing a threat (noun), must act (verb) to suggest his
intent in some way.
policy

maker want

to insure

—

To

consider a combat aircraft flying at high speed and altitude

illustrate,

Armed

towards a no-fly zone

line.

"high-fast flyer"

potent threat to enforcement

a

is

non-fighters such as tankers.

with long-range air-to-air missiles,
aircraft,

more

it

poses and the

crosses the line. Yet,

it

has done nothing that suggests hostile

threatened no one. Instead, the high-fast
it is

particularly

The longer enforcement aircraft wait to engage

the greater the threat

sovereign airspace, as

this

difficult

flyer

clearly entitled to

it

will

be to counter
intent', it

has merely flown within

its

it,

if it

has

own

do under international law. Unless

commits an act that in some way reveals malevolent intent, it may not be
engaged until it has crossed the line, a point at which mission accomplishment

it

ROE intercede to govern the response. This is a difficult distinction to make for
a

crew member

who must

fly

in the face of a threat

which has not yet

threatened.

Even with

definitional clarity, hostile intent

practice because

it is

is

difficult to ascertain in

both subjective and contextual.

sense that unless there
of the opposing forces,

is

It is

reliable intelligence information regarding the intent

it is

exceedingly difficult to determine intent until a

hostile act actually occurs. For instance,

if

a target State fighter approaching

the no-fly zone illuminates an enforcement aircraft with
("locks on"),

it

may

or

subjective in the

may not be

its fire

control radar

intending to take a missile shot. Perhaps

it

only aims to frazzle enforcement aircrews, demonstrate resolve against the
operation, or desensitize enforcement aircraft in order to catch

when it

really

does intend to shoot.

95

Or perhaps

them

off-guard

it is

about to launch a deadly

a

demonstration of hostile

air-to-air missile.

Each determination

is

intent in certain scenarios

also contextual.

may not be

What

is

in others. Being locked-on in the

Sidra by a Libyan fighter, for example,

is
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far

more

Gulf of

likely to constitute hostile
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intent than being locked-on in the

Hudson Bay by Canadian

assessing context, the following factors are often telling:

The

•

current political context.

What

is

When

aircraft.

96

the level of tension between the

enforcing States and the State over whose territory the zone has been

Have

established?

there been any recent statements or acts indicating the

an attempt to test the resolve of the no-fly forces? Is there any
reason to believe now would be an opportune time to do so? For instance, have
there been any recent indications of cracks in the coalition enforcing the zone

possibility of

or slippage in international support for
•

Prior practice.

97

it?

Have there been prior violations and/or uses of force against

what circumstances? By ground or airborne assets?
What tactics were employed, and do they resemble those the aircrew is
observing now?
enforcement

•

aircraft? In

Indications

and warning

Have

intelligence.

there been any deployments of

threat systems that might suggest a greater capability or willingness to engage

enforcement

aircraft?

For

have

example,

surface-to-air missile systems or aircraft

moved

additional

come

more capable
Have SAMs been

or

into the area?

undetermined locations, thereby raising the

to as yet

possibility of a

98

"SAMbush"? Has there been an increase in air-to-air training? Has there been
an unexplained stand-down (period of little or no flying) that might suggest
99
preparation for an engagement?
Have there been unusual movements of
ground forces that indicate a possible military action likely to be accompanied
by

support?

air
•

Does the

Capabilities.

engage at

much

aircraft or missile

this distance or altitude?

of a threat

is

system have the capability to

With what

likelihood of success?

the missile (or other weapon)

if

the possible hostile intent

matures into a hostile attack? In other words, are the enforcement
defensive systems, such as electronic-counter measures
100

flare,

easily

effective against this particular threat or

maneuver

The

fact

to "defeat" the threat?

that

contextual renders

the
it

list

is

and

subjective

amount

of acts which

to

If

aircrew nevertheless reacts forcibly, the response
violation of the prohibition
justifying a response
best,

aircraft

an act contained on the list does not rise to the
intent given the circumstances in which it is occurring, and the

hostile intent in the
level of hostile

can the enforcement

101

unwise to include a laundry

ROE.

aircraft's

(ECM) or chaff and

determination of hostile intent
102

How

on the use of force

may be

characterized as a

in Article 2(4). After

under Article 51 has occurred. The action

embarrass the enforcement State. More

of international condemnation.
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all,

no

will, at

likely, it will result in

act

very

some form
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On the other hand, a laundry list may cause the aircrew to hesitate to act in
valid

should they be faced with a situation not previously

self-defense

contemplated.

simply impossible to reliably and comprehensibly predict

It is

those actions that are indicative of hostile intent. That being so,

should not attempt to do

The

so.

far better

course

is

self-defense training that aircrews receive to enable

to rely

ROE

drafters

on the pre-mission

them to evaluate events

as

they unfold.

This does not

mean that rules of engagement should not include

lists

of acts

Most do exactly that. For instance, in the
no-fly environment, being locked on by a fire control radar or having a
potential opponent maneuver into a position from which he can best engage
that might suggest hostile intent.

enforcement

same

is

aircraft.

aircraft are classic

examples of potentially hostile intent. The

true with regard to ground-based

However, whenever such

important to

stress that

lists

SAMs

are included in

they are only possible indicators of hostile intent,

neither exclusive nor determinative in nature.
Hostile intent

is

on to enforcement
ROE, it is critically

that lock

not only

difficult to define,

103

it is

difficult to place temporally.

Recall that the language of Article 51 speaks in terms of an "armed attack."
Yet, surely there

is

self-defense arises.

no requirement
Given today's

104

to take the
effective

first

hit before the right to

weaponry, any such assertion

would be absurd, for taking the first hit in aerial combat
commentators and practitioners agree that there is a
self-defense,

The
need

i.e.,

usually fatal.

Most

right to anticipatory

the right to act in self-defense before the other side attacks.

question that confounds international law
for self-defense be?

The most

is

is

how

anticipatory

may

the

105

widely accepted standard

is

that articulated by Secretary of State

Daniel Webster regarding the Caroline incident in the nineteenth century. For

Webster, self-defense was to "be confined to cases in which the necessity of
that self-defense

moment

for

is

instant,

deliberation"

overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
106

This standard was subsequently referred to

approvingly during the Nuremberg

107

trials.

Today

it

is

expressed as the

requirement of imminency.

But what is it that must be imminent? Imminency cannot possibly be
measured in terms of proximity to the actual attack, for such a standard is not
responsive to the rationale for the right to self-defense, specifically the right not
to

have to

sit idly

by while a

fatal

blow

is

delivered.

The proper measure

of

imminency is that point in time when the threatened act can be viably deterred
or defeated. In other words, one may not act in self-defense until the moment
when failing to do so may be too late. This fine distinction is of critical
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importance in

aerial operations

because of the

finality

act that follows a demonstration of hostile intent.

Self-defense not only has a start point,

it

and speed of the

hostile

108

has an end point as well. Recall the

requirement that self-defense be a response to a threatening or hostile

When

that act ends,

when

i.e.,

there

is

no longer an ongoing

demonstration of hostile intent to respond
persist in

over,

it's

engaging in self-defense. This
over" rule.

operations.

Most

109

to,

hostile act or

the enforcement aircraft

colloquially

is

known

act.

as the

may not

"once

it's

replete with practical implications for no-fly zone

It is

significantly, if

an

aircraft

is

acting in self-defense against

and unambiguously breaks off the
engagement, then the attacked aircraft has no right under self-defense to
110
It too must break off (absent a mission accomplishment
continue the fight.
111
rule to the contrary). This may seem contrary to good sense,
which would
suggest that the aircraft which committed the hostile act remains a threat by
definition. So it, in fact, does; however, recall that self-defense only grants a
another

aircraft,

and that

aircraft clearly

respond to threatening

legal right to

acts,

not mere

threats

how

(no matter

potent)

What if the

action of the enforcement aircraft defeats the threat before

engaged? For example, assume an enforcement aircraft
fire

control radar of a

SAM

site.

This would in

is

many

it is

illuminated by the
cases constitute a

demonstration of hostile intent and permit an immediate attack on the

site.

However, the threatened aircraft's most prudent course of action would usually
be to maneuver to evade the missile if fired and depart the SAM's weapons
engagement zone. This is so because a quick, immediate response to a SAM site
with whatever ordnance happens to be available is a dangerous proposition;

SAMs

are specifically designed to shoot

down

aircraft.

The

alternative,

often better, approach tends to be a measured sequential attack
aircraft carrying anti-radiation missiles, followed

cluster

bomb

units or "iron"

to coordinate

site

by

by those employing either

May the aircraft withdraw and take

time

such an attack?

No it may not,
Once

bombs.

112

on the

and

there are

at least

no

not pursuant to the

aircraft within the

self-defense rules of

engagement.

SAM's weapons engagement zone (WEZ)

no present threatening act to defend against. This poses a Catch-22
dilemma for no-fly-zone enforcement. An aircraft that is illuminated is at
immediate risk and generally should maneuver out of the WEZ as quickly as
possible. However, once it does, international law intervenes to deny the
there

is

aircraft or

its

self-defense.
is

applied

fellow aircraft the right to subsequently attack the site in

The quandary
could

easily

is

obvious.

frustrate

The

State against

enforcement
257

by

whom the no-fly zone
simply

illuminating
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enforcement

thereby forcing enforcement aircraft into the Hobson's

aircraft,

choice of breaking off the overall mission as planned or attacking under

than optimal circumstances.

A remedy

less

113

found in mission accomplishment ROE. By definition, the
original mandate called for the enforcement of a no-fly zone, but it is unlikely to
to be

many specific restrictions on this tasking. The zone cannot be enforced

include

effectively

to alter

is

if ground-based

defenses are permitted to force enforcement aircraft

planned missions simply by turning on their radar systems. 114 Therefore,

the authority to enforce the zone necessarily implies corresponding authority to
take whatever reasonable steps are called for to do so safely; this authority

would

SAM

logically include the right to destroy

demonstrated

and

intentions

hostile

sites

thereby,

are,

that have already
frustrating

overall

accomplishment of the mandate. The proper method for articulating the right
is through mission-accomplishment ROE, not an overly expansive view of the
legal right of self-defense.

Reasonableness

prudent to take out

the key.

is

all

One might

Absent

it

would be even more

SAM sites with an ability to reach enforcement aircraft,

regardless of whether or not they
hostile intent.

argue that

had committed

specific authority in the

a hostile act or demonstrated

mandate, doing so

as part of the

no-fly operation without any incidents of interference with operations
likely

would

be judged to be beyond either the Charter-based use of force

authorization of the mandate or the Article 51/customary international law
right of self-defense. Reasonableness requires that issuance of the mission

accomplishment

moved

from evidence that

rule result

activities at the site(s)

have

along the continuum from a mere threat towards a target which has

it

acted in a threatening manner. Having just demonstrated hostile intent or

committed

a hostile act

would

clearly

meet the threshold.

In such cases, the temporal element surfaces again.
since the qualifying action, the
air

strike

more

difficult

against the offending site(s)

mandate. This

is

flying in the area

particularly so

if

at

as

it

will

The

longer

it

has been

be to justify an after the fact

an appropriate exercise of the

some point following the

incident, aircraft

were not threatened; the absence of reaction might indicate

that the initial malevolent act was an aberration. Since international law does

not permit acts in mere retribution
authorization), a strike

prudent

ROE

(at least

absent specific Chapter VII

may be questioned on

legal grounds.

Therefore,

drafters will limit the extent of the authorization to restrike,

recalling the policy

component of ROE,

the relative political

fragility

setting time standards (e.g.,

to a level at

minimum

consistent with

of the particular operation. This can be done by

no

strike

more than
258

X hours

after the incident) or

Michael N. Schmitt

by physical

criteria (e.g., strike

only with aircraft currently airborne or on strip

alert).

Finally,

shorthand

which

it

remember

for the necessity

more

slightly

vital to

it is

is

restrictive

that hostile intent

than either intent or

committed. Consider an individual
it

fact, necessity is

act, for there are situations in

when

firing a pistol

easily

out the door of a helicopter at
little

threat

lengthen the distance/altitude from which

Unless the mission accomplishment

trailing the helicopter.

been

a hostile act has

out of the zone. In most cases, the weapon poses

which can

to the fighter,

hostile acts are merely

requirement of self-defense. In

not necessary to engage, even

a fighter trailing

and

ROE

it is

allow a

on the act, there is ample time to seek guidance before
resorting to force. Remember, the use of force in self-defense has no retributive
or deterrent purpose; it merely serves to protect one's self and one's unit. There
is no authority to engage under the law of self-defense until friendly forces
forceful response based

actually

need

to be protected.

The second prong

115

of self-defense

is

proportionality. Proportionality

is

defined as the requirement that "the use of force be reasonable in intensity,
duration,

and magnitude, based on

all

the facts

known

to the

commander

at

the time, to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure
the continued safety of U.S. forces."

merit mention.

One

is

116

Several fine points about this definition

the pervasive question of proportional to what?

Many

laymen interpret the requirement as "proportional" to the force used against
them. By this interpretation, one could not respond to small arms ground fire
with bombs or use a missile to down a helicopter that has employed machine
guns against an aircraft. This is clearly not the proper reading. The right to use
self-defense

is

hostilities; it

is

designed to protect without unnecessarily escalating the

not a rule designed to ensure a

"fair fight"

on

a level playing

field.

Properly understood,
application of

no more

proportionality
117

site

ROE

other side to "knock

it off,"

—

at least

and rescue (CSAR)

the

without taking

themselves. For instance, a missile launch by a single

would not merit a response in self-defense against other

country

allows

Aircrews train to the standard of using the

minimum force necessary to get the
risks

used in the

force than necessary to counter the hostile act or

demonstration of hostile intent.
unnecessary

as

not in self-defense.
effort.

118

Similarly, consider a

SAM

SAM

sites in a

combat search

A column of soldiers moving towards a downed crew

member likely harbors hostile intent if the aircraft was shot down by its forces.
The troops would reasonably appear to be on their way to capture the crew
member. The existence of necessity is clear, for the opposing forces are unlikely
259
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to be deterred except by force (or a demonstration thereof)

and the threat is
imminent (they are approaching). May the column be attacked and destroyed?
Recalling that a no-fly operation is underway rather than open hostilities, the
answer is it depends. If the column can be deterred by warning shots or
,

—

selective destruction of only a few of the vehicles without forfeiting the ability
entirety, that should

be

On the other hand, if it is nearly

to destroy

it

upon the

pilot or shooting at him, destruction of the entire

clearly

in

its

be an appropriate response.

cease

an

its

amount of force

threatening act?

aircraft

the

armament of the enforcement

May it be used? Yes, because the law does not deprive

under attack of the right to defend

when determining

the weapons load.

itself

pursuant to Article 5

fully anticipate

The

available"
aircraft

may

the nature of the

ROE

U.S.

very situation by specifically authorizing a response by
120

aircraft

actually necessary to cause the other side to

merely because the mission planners did not
threat

column would

119

What then of the situation where
clearly exceeds the

tried.

"all

account

for this

necessary means

Consistent with the law of self-defense, then, an enforcement

amount and

use the

type of force currently available

to

it

that

is

reasonably necessary to deter a demonstration of hostile intent or defend against
a hostile act.

As should be clear from the
determining when self-defense is

discussion of necessity and proportionality,

no easy task, particularly in the
heat of potential battle. Enforcement aircrews can only make subjective
educated guesses based on the information at hand. That information must be
121
"convincing,"
but the resulting determination need not be correct, it need
only be reasonable
i.e., would a reasonable airman enforcing this specific
appropriate

is

—

no-fly zone in the circumstances then prevailing
sufficient to

training

is

have believed the information

conclude an attack was forthcoming?

the key to achieving reasonableness.

122

Constant scenario-based

123

Before turning from the distinction between mission accomplishment and
self-defense
limits

ROE,

the other.

accomplishment
self-defense.

it

must be understood that they

An

ROE

are independent; neither

action authorized in accordance with the mission
is

not disallowed because

it fails

to

meet the

criteria for

Thus, hostile intent and hostile act are generally not relevant

when acting pursuant to the mission accomplishment ROE. By the same token,
and more importantly, self-defense ROE are never limited by mission
accomplishment ROE. If the two should ever come into conflict, self-defense
always "trumps" mission accomplishment rules.

124

U.S. approach to rules of engagement, one that

is

260

This

is

a core principle of the

so central that U.S. forces are
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not permitted to operate under multinational rules of engagement inconsistent
with U.S. notions of self-defense.

125

This absolute severability of the two genre of
implications

accomplishment

zone

no-fly

in

ROE

enforcement.

usually

will

impose

For

very

ROE

important

has

example,

stringent

mission

identification

may be engaged. The goal is to preclude
made during the Black Hawks shoot-down incident.

requirements before a zone violator
mistakes such as those

However,

if

the violator commits a hostile act or demonstrates hostile intent in

an immediate response, it may be engaged in
self-defense regardless of whether or not it has been identified to the level
provided for in the mission accomplishment ROE. Similarly, if the mission
a

situation necessitating

accomplishment

ROE

permit, a violator

may be engaged even when

it

has

neither committed a hostile act nor demonstrated hostile intent.

The

ROE System

ROE systems differ from State to State, with the exception that each country
usually issues some form of broad ROE that establish overarching national
These are supplemented for specific operations. Whenever serving in a
combined operation, the need to understand a coalition partner's ROE system
is self-evident, particularly if a set of common ROE cannot be agreed upon.
When this occurs, it will be left to the Coalition Commander and the senior
officers from each nation contributing forces to develop tactical guidance that
rules.

accounts for their respective

ROE

differences in a

way that

plays to the

strengths in each country's rules.

The

U.S. system

is

relatively straight forward.

At

the pinnacle are the Joint

Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE).

the

SROE

set forth general rules

126

Promulgated in 1994,
of engagement which govern the use of force

by the U.S. military during both peacetime and armed conflict (absent a
specific

exemption).

127

They

introduces the rules, and four enclosures:
for U.S. Forces;

A

A

-

B - Supplemental Measures; C

Commander's Special ROE; and
Enclosure

which
Standing Rules of Engagement
- Compendium and Combatant

consist of a Chairman's Instruction,

D

-

References.

contains the basic rules of engagement that apply in

operations, including those involving no-fly zone enforcement,

No

further authorization

zone.
rules.

is

needed

for their

and

all

at all times.

execution by aircraft enforcing a

128

The enclosure describes the purpose, scope and policies underlying the
More importantly, Enclosure A contains the self-defense rules of

engagement. Appendices

for

Seaborne Forces, Air Operations, and Land
261
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Operations

are

environment

When

attached.

arise, it is to

issues

of

self-defense

the

in

A that reference should be made.

Enclosure

no-fly
129

Supplemental measures, grouped into appendices for general measures,
maritime, air, and land operations, are found in Enclosure B. It is essentially a
catalogue of draft rules of engagement that decision makers at the appropriate

can turn to in crafting mission accomplishment

level

rules to support a

particular operation. For example, possible measures such as the authority to

pursue aircraft across designated borders, defend designated non-U. S.
or conduct reconnaissance are included.

The

authorization level for the

supplemental varies depending on the nature of the
Enclosure

C

contains a

compendium

standing rules of engagement issued

complement the SROE
controls.

130

assets,

rule sought.

on the ROE. It also gathers
by the U.S. Combatant Commands to
of guidance

command
to understand both the SROE

the area or function the combatant

for

In a no-fly zone operation,

it is

essential

and the standing ROE of that command which has authority over the operation. 131
Lastly, Enclosure

D lists references and contains a glossary of abbreviations,

acronyms, terms and definitions.

The glossary is particularly useful in achieving

common understanding of the rules. For instance, some States do not allow the
use of force in the face of hostile intent as a measure in self-defense. Yet,
optimally, the threshold to cross prior to using force should be the

assigned forces in a combined operation.

To

same

for all

achieve this commonality,

non-U. S. armed forces that do not apply the intent criterion would have to
receive the equivalent of mission accomplishment ROE authorizing a response
to hostile intent before they could react as U.S. forces would under the SROE.

Sometimes the difference

is

more one of form than substance. For

U.S. forces usually consider being illuminated by an
to

aircraft's fire

instance,

control radar

be a demonstration of hostile intent that may require a forceful response.

Certain coalition

on the other hand, may characterize the illumination

allies,

ROE are consistent. The glossary can
common ground between differing national

as a hostile act. In practical terms, the

provide a useful tool for seeking
terminology. Conversely,

it

can be used to identify substantive variance when

the same or similar terms are used.

As

noted, combatant

commands

issue

supplemental measures that are the

operation-specific mission accomplishment rules of engagement.
are

usually

operation.

133

Those selected

activated

in

an Operation Order outlining execution of the

They may

also

be requested by any subordinate commander (usually

a Joint

Task Force QTF] commander) tasked with enforcing the

option

is

comes

to believe his

JTF commander
to successfully execute the

available throughout the course of the operation. If the

ROE

are flawed or insufficient
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mission, he

is

necessary to remedy the

Should Enclosure B not contain a suitable mission accomplishment

shortfall.

meet

rule to

obligated to seek whatever authority

is

he may draft and propose one of his own.

his needs,

The need to revise

the

ROE during an operation is not uncommon. After all,

the original rules were responsive to the political and military environment
existing at the time of issuance; however, the

For instance, additional

SAM

ROE

regarding

how

in constant flux.

Or

may be prudent to request more
order to ensure the new SAMs do not

consider identification ROE,

intruders and/or threats are to be identified,

performance fighter

surety. If the target State deploys high

i.e.,

the rules

and with what

aircraft into

where there had previously been only helicopters or low performance
it

in

would be prudent to develop beyond
lieu

of existing

enforcement

aircraft

ROE

visual range

it

requiring visual identification.

shift in

aircraft,

ROE

Alternatively,

if

with a greater capability to identify potential intruders

may be

wise to

make

at least vis-a-vis missions involving

A

an area

(BVR) identification

(TAOR) then for legal and
identification ROE more restrictive,

deploy into a JTF's tactical area of responsibility
policy reasons

may

If so, it

for air-to-ground strikes in

interfere with the mission.

is

systems or ones with greater capabilities

deploy into a previously benign area.
robust

environment

the

such

,

aircraft.

the ground situation can also require revision. Consider, the

combat search and rescue (CSAR) ROE.

If

there are friendly forces or friendly

indigenous groups in the area, then the rules of engagement for

support to a

much less robust than in a region where anyone
crew member is probably unfriendly. In the former case, a

downed crew member
approaching the

air

friendly-fire incident

will

be

a concern, thereby

is

making

it

absolutely essential that

those approaching be positively identified. In the latter, the primary concern
will

be safe and prompt recovery of the crewman.

changes, then so too should the

—

change in the environment
review of the ROE.

When

ROE

(or the

If

the ground situation

guidance thereon) Indeed, any
.

political, military, or legal

—should occasion

a

134

drafting supplemental

ROE, combatant commands should not

SROE self-defense rules. Self-defense is already fully
provided for in the SROE to the maximum extent allowed in international law.
attempt to supplement the

Along these same

lines,

use of self-defense terms of art such as "hostile act" or

"hostile intent" in the

combatant command's

combatant commander

ROE

expand or explain the

ROE

is

also ill-advised, for

are mission accomplishment rules.

right of self-defense in the

may inadvertently result in interpretations
263
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aims

enforcement

As

a

operation

the

for

or

complicate

the

of self-defense

exercise

by

aircraft.

hypothetical

engagement that

example,

consider

a

combatant command

rule

of

JTF aircraft by fire control radar of a
a demonstration of hostile intent justifying an attack

reads, "Illumination of

surface-to-air missile site

is

on the emitting site in self-defense." This seemingly clear rule invites confusion
for a number of reasons. Those experienced in ROE will know that the
combatant command ROE are intended for mission accomplishment. Their
immediate question will be whether or not this rule sets a different standard than
the

SROE

The

maybe the
is but a poorly articulated effort to set a lower threshold than would normally

draftsmanship
rule

ROE

self-defense principles, particularly since a basic premise of
is

to never create

be the case for self-defense

is

or altitude parameters of the

lists

of hostile intent.

strengthened by the operational fact that the range
fire

control radar of some

exceed their weapons engagement zone.

an unfriendly

act,

but it

is

sense that

135

SAM systems significantly

When this is so,

illumination

may be

not a demonstration of hostile intent because no threat

136

By this stream of analysis, the rule is interpreted as a poorly
drafted mission accomplishment rule that allows the SAM site to be engaged at a
can be posed.

point which might not be justified in self-defense. This
the threshold would be unreasonable or unlawful.
rule along these lines
safe

is

in

is

not to say that lowering

A mission

accomplishment

most no- fly contexts a reasonable attempt to create a

environment in which to operate. The point is simply that if the intent

is

not

to alter the existing threshold, the rule invites confusion.

The

is

is

equally possible. Given inclusion of the terms self-defense

would be that the rule is an attempt
refine the already applicable SROE self-defense rules. But if the actual intent
to lower the threshold, then that intent will have been frustrated.

and
to

obverse

hostile intent, a reasonable conclusion

Conversely,

if

the goal

is

to clarify self-defense, there

is

a risk that aircraft will

what would otherwise be a
demonstration of hostile intent until they have been illuminated by a fire
control radar. This is the very danger that the drafting prohibition on lists of
hesitate to defend themselves in the face of

acts demonstrating hostile intent

The

possibility of

confusion

is

is

directed against.

not far-fetched. Envision a scenario in which

multiple enforcement aircraft are in the no-fly zone. Suddenly, there are
several radar warning receiver

by

fire

(RWR)

control radar; one pilot reports seeing a missile

Meanwhile, another enforcement
acquisition radar associated

radar.

137

indications that they are being painted

with a

Standard hostile intent

aircraft receives a

SAM

site,

on

way

up.

RWR indication of target

but no indication of fire control

ROE would allow an immediate
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its

attack

on the

Michael N. Schmitt

site

emitting in the acquisition mode.

At least one other ground site has

already

committed a hostile act, and activation of acquisition radar by a second site
would reasonably appear to be a continuation of the effort to down an
enforcement aircraft. Further, some SAM systems are able to fire their missiles
while in target acquisition mode, switching to missile guidance only after the
missile has been launched. A rule crafted in terms of fire control radar could
delay appropriate actions in self-defense against the second site.

The

suggestion that combatant

command

supplemental

place to amplify self-defense, and the urging against

ROE

is

the wrong

of acts which

lists

mean to imply that rules
of possible scenarios. What it does

constitute a demonstration of hostile intent, does not

of engagement should be set forth in a void
suggest

is

that tying

them

to real-world situations

is

best

with the actual execution of the mission, most often a JTF
Joint Forces Air

left

to those tasked

Commander and his

Component Commander (JFACC).

It is at this level

that the third,

and for the aircrew most critical, phase of no-fly

ROE development and implementation occurs. Typically, a JTF commander will
138
issue guidance on the application of the ROE to his aircrews.
This guidance
should be drafted jointly by the operation's

staff

judge advocate,

who

will

be

attuned to legal concerns and the nuances of precision draftsmanship as well as

The guidance will be
organization who best

the JFACC, the officer responsible for operational matters.

commander, the one individual in the
understands the policy mandate he has been given. Thus,
components of the ROE are accounted for in the guidance.

issued by the JTF

The commander's guidance

is

may

do.

The commander's guidance on

takes those instructions and sets out

how the

instance, the mission accomplishment
aircraft violating the no-fly

engaged.

The

zone

ROE

guidance, by contrast,

it is

that enforcement

the application of the

will state that a particular type of

and if it does not,
outlines the form and content of the
to depart,

criteria before the violating aircraft

no act not already authorized
SROE or the combatant command's supplemental ROE.
shot down.

Though

It

ROE

tasks will be accomplished. For

may be warned

warning and the requisite identification

may be

three underlying

not a formal part of the rules of engagement.

Rules of engagement set forth the parameters of what
aircraft

all

authorizes

in either the

lengthy by comparison to the ROE, the commander's guidance

should inform crew members

how

they can defend themselves and accomplish

the mission, not constitute a legal treatise. Furthermore, the

ROE

guidance

should be based on various situation specific factors: the tasked mission, the

and air-based systems, capabilities of enforcement assets,
good sense. It must also be subject to a robust legal analysis, not

threat from ground

and

tactical
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only for compliance with the legal limits/authorizations found in the ROE, but

more generally with international

law, especially the law of

armed

conflict.

Recurring Issues
In any no-fly zone operation, there are three seminal goals:

1)

no

violations;

no mistakes; and 3) no friendly losses. The first is intended to achieve the
policy mandate without raising the political stakes by actually having to shoot
down an aircraft that dares test the zone. Its success depends on deterrence
through credibility, the product of capability and perceived willingness to
enforce. Critical to this deterrence is maintaining control over when and in
what way enforcement aircraft occupy the zone. In other words, it is important
2)

that the target State not be able to drive enforcement aircraft from the zone,

thereby opening

it

to their

own.

139

It is

equally important that the engagement

decision matrix not be so involved, or the authority to engage so highly

enforcement

aircraft

The second

goal,

set,

that

cannot react in a timely fashion.

no mistakes,

is

intended to maintain the international

cohesion that made possible establishment of the zone in the

political

first

on the sovereignty of a State, setting
one up is a rather exceptional decision for the international community to
make. Continued legitimacy of the zone depends on strict compliance with the
limits of the mandate by enforcing States.

place. In that no-fly zones are intrusions

Lastly, the operation

must be mounted

safely,

both

for the sake of the

and international support for the
understanding of what the law of self-defense,

aircrews involved and to maintain domestic
operation. This requires a

full

and the ROE articulating it in the operational context, allows. None of these
goals can be achieved without clarity of purpose and execution. In the
remaining section of
generate

this article, several of the recurring issues that

confusion or hesitation during no-fly zone operations

tend to
will

be

examined.

Who

When? The

who

more complex
than might appear at first glance. To the extent the policy mandate does not
specify the precise subjects of enforcement, the ROE must do so. Of course,
those ROE cannot extend enforcement authority beyond what is a reasonable
to

Shoot and

question of

to shoot

is

far

interpretation of the mandate, for mission accomplishment rules permitting

the use of force depend on the mandate involved for legality and legitimacy.
Effectively drafted mission

accomplishment

following clear for enforcement aircrews.
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What nationality are the aircraft that enforcement action can he taken
against? Zone prohibitions should be framed with specificity in the ROE.
•

Obviously, aircraft of the target State will be included. However, that State

might be allied or cooperating with other States, the aircraft of which may
attempt to enter the zone. If so, decision makers should consider extending
the zone's prohibitions to include aircraft of such States. Alternatively, a zone

may be

expressed in terms of a general prohibition, with specific aircraft

UN

exempted. For instance,
Iraq,

and do so often in

humanitarian

their

by

flights

aircraft are

permitted to

weapons monitoring
countries

specified

in the zones over

fly

role.

140

Similarly, relief or

organizations

or

may be

exempted. Whenever there are either exemptions to a general prohibition or

on

specific prohibitions

aircraft of a certain nationality, rigid identification

may be engaged. 141 As

procedures must be in effect before a possible violator

Hawks shoot-down

the Black

aircraft nationality
•

zones

Does

can be a challenging proposition.

may be enforced
(KAL

007

demonstrated, determining

tragically

the prohibition extend to civil aircraft?

against civil aircraft
flight

so

is

There

against military aircraft.

142

a far less settled issue, as the

007)

is little

The

legality of using force

downing of Korean Airlines

over the Soviet Union in

International outrage was expressed loudly

doubt that no-fly

1983 demonstrated.

and immediately. But

143

for a Soviet

would have passed a resolution declaring that "such
use of force against international aviation is incompatible with the norms
governing international behavior and elementary considerations of
144
humanity."
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

veto, the Security Council

approved

a

containing

resolution

commission

fact-finding

review

identical

of

the

language.

incident,

145

the

ICAO

subsequently reaffirmed that "whatever the circumstances which

caused the

aircraft to stray off its flight

Following

.

.

.

a

Council

may have

plan route, such use of armed force

and invokes generally recognized
legal consequences."
Not long thereafter, the ICAO Assembly adopted a
proposal for amendment of the Chicago Convention. Article 3 his provides that
"the contracting states recognize that every state must refrain from resorting to
the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of
interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of the aircraft must
constitutes a violation of international law,
146

not be endangered."
necessary to

come

147

Though

it

into effect, there

fact declaratory of existing

has yet to secure the 102 ratifications
is

some support

customary law.

for the position that

Despite the crescendo of condemnation following
a Security

it is

in

148

KAL 007,

the existence of

Council Chapter VII mandate would arguably allow enforcement
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against a civil aircraft in a no-fly zone, even
violate international law.

Nevertheless,

it

The Charter

if

would otherwise

it

discussed earlier, supreme.

as

is,

downing

should be obvious that any downing of civilian aircraft would

be highly controversial, regardless of

ROE vis-a-vis civil aircraft,

purported

its

legality.

Therefore, before

must be absolutely clear that the original
mandate authorizing the zone was intended to cover them; during
post-incident furor over a civil aircraft shoot-down is the wrong time to
drafting

discover that

Even

if it

it
is

it

does not.
clear that such action

authorized by the mandate, the

is

authorization level for actually engaging should remain at a level where the

maker can

decision

The

and

factor in the policy

political

environment then

one can shoot down a civil aircraft violating a no-fly
zone does not mean that one should. Downing armed fighters that violate the
existing.

zone

is

fact that

from a policy perspective; shooting down

relatively straightforward

civilian aircraft

is

an

entirely different matter.

it

may engage

a civil aircraft in

carefully considered. In particular, the

the application of the

only should the approval

must perform
mission accomplishment need to be very

level be highly placed, but the steps that the

before

Not

enforcement

ROE

ROE) must ensure

aircraft

(and commander's guidance on

and impose

positive identification

redundant warning requirements. The warning requirement is particularly
important it acts to shift the onus of responsibility for the shoot-down to the

—

violating aircraft. Additionally, because civil aircraft are being intercepted,
tactical

guidance

for

procedures set forth by ICAO.
Finally, in

determining

should be taken of what

if,

when, and how

it is

if it is

Even with

to engage civil aircraft,

The

they are doing.
less

guidance based on what the

execute.

comply with the

149

performing a military function, the

ROE

methodology should

intercept

the political

aircraft

a visual (VID) intercept,

is

it

closer the aircraft

that

risk. It is likely

may prove

doing

may be

account
is

to

ROE or

difficult to

impossible to determine

carrying military or humanitarian relief supplies. Nevertheless, in certain

circumstances,

Of course,

if

ROE based on act

a civil aircraft

necessitating a

(e.g.,

commits

air-dropping supplies)

may make

sense.

a hostile act or demonstrates hostile intent

response in self-defense, enforcement aircraft

may defend

themselves.
•

Does

the type of aircraft

helicopters were

make a

difference?

downed over northern

Iraq,

When
some

the two Black
criticism

Hawk

was voiced

because the helicopters posed no serious threat to the two F-15s. What is
forgotten in this assertion is that mission accomplishment ROE were applied in
the shoot-down; a threat

is

not generally a prerequisite in these
268
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question of whether the F-15s were threatened by the helicopters

been

actually

Hinds)

Iraqi

150
is

one of self-defense; in

fact,

(if

they had

there was never any

claim that the F-15s mistakenly acted in self-defense.

The

incident highlights the fact that the type of aircraft violating the zone

when contemplating enforcement

matters

action.

The more

offensively

more acceptable the enforcement action, and the less
likelihood of negative impact on the policy aims underlying the zone.
Understanding this fact is useful in crafting ROE and ROE guidance that is
responsive to the policy component of the rules of engagement.
capable the

.

When

aircraft,

the

considering criteria and intercept procedures based

on

type of

probably the cleanest distinction that can be made, at least from the

aircraft,

perspective of the enforcement aircraft's cockpit,

between fighter/attack

Whether

transport aircraft, and helicopters.

aircraft,

is

the three should be

handled differently depends on the context in which the no-fly zone

exists. If

have been active in air-to-ground operations, the need to
distinguish between engaging fighters and helicopters is minimal. Both are
offensively oriented threats to the maintenance of peace. By the same
reasoning, if establishment of the zone was primarily in response to the threat
helicopters

ground attack

to peace posed by

may be prudent

aircraft, it

to set different

procedures for responding to helicopters and transports. This certainly
required as a matter of law so long as the mandate covers

but

it

a prudent political step to take.

is

The

point

all

is

is

not

military aircraft,

that enforcement

procedures and criteria must reflect attendant conditions; type of aircraft is one

ROE drafters and enforcement operation commanders should consider

variable

to ensure this.

decision

If a

differences will
risk

is

lie

made

to treat varying types of aircraft differently, the

primarily in identification

and warning. Because of the high

involved in flying close enough to fighter/attack aircraft to visually identify

them,

it

is

appropriate to authorize beyond visual range identification and

engagement
threat to

most circumstances. By contrast, since they pose minimal
high performance fighter aircraft, a visual identification of helicopters
in

and transports

is

ordinarily

a

reasonable

perspective. If tactically acceptable, doing so

requirement

from a

tactical

would certainly make sense from

a legal or policy perspective.

Differences in the warning requirement take two forms, procedural and
substantive. Procedurally, the

of helicopters or transports,
aircraft

ICAO intercept procedures are viable in the case
but would not be when intercepting a fighter

with air-to-air capability. Substantively, the nature of a particular

operation

may

justify

dispensing with the warning requirement altogether for
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even

fighters, or

for helicopters if they

offensive operations. Violating the zone

engaging them.

may be

may alone be

sufficient justification for

On the other hand, and again in situation-specific scenarios, it
warn helicopters or transport
shoot them down.

politically judicious to

area before acting to
•

have previously been involved in

Who

aircraft

out of the

Whereas the authority

authorizes engagement of violators?

to act in

must reside in the cockpit, the decision as to when to engage in a
mission accomplishment intercept can be set at whatever level makes sense
151
from a policy and operational perspective.
Context is controlling. The more
self-defense

sensitive

politically

a

type

particular

authorization level should be

of

engagement,

For example,

set.

if

the

higher

the

consistent with the

may be made to let the aircrew of the
enforcement aircraft determine when to engage a fighter, but require a decision
by the JFACC or task force commander to engage anything else. The most
operational context, the decision

sensitive issues surround civil aircraft. It

would be unwise

to let aircrew act

against civil aircraft without higher approval; the political consequences of the
act are simply too

momentous.

Who to Defend? As noted earlier, U.S. aircraft may always defend themselves or
other U.S. military assets. No supplemental rule is required to effectuate this
right.

This core principle extends to

the task force or not. Thus,

if

all

U.S. military assets, whether assigned to

Iraqi forces

engaged U-2

flights

operating in

UN

weapons monitoring operation (United Nations Special
Commission-UNSCOM), as was threatened, U.S. forces of either SOUTHERN or
support of the

NORTHERN WATCH could act in their defense without any further approval. 153
Beyond

that,

a specific

supplemental rule must be issued to authorize

defense offerees of any other State or organization. In most cases, there will be
a

supplemental rule authorizing defense of

all

aircraft

participating

monitoring the no-fly zone. Careful review of the scope of the authorization
well-advised.

Does

it

exercise of this collective

154

Are there geographical limits placed on the
155
self-defense?
Are there any tactical limits?

may not

a matter of law, States

States absent their consent.
until

156

unilaterally

Collective defense

planning phase of the operation.
the

An

extent of self-defense

extend protection to other

ROE should not be

such a request has been received; generally,

involves

is

only apply to aircraft assigned to the operation or to

aircraft of those States generally?

As

in

this will

approved

occur during the

interesting derivation of this premise

authorized.

If

the protected State's

narrower than the U.S. interpretation, e.g., by
limiting self-defense to hostile acts, may U.S. aircraft nevertheless act based on
interpretation of self-defense

is
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their

own

standard (which includes notions of hostile intent)

The answer

?

is

an appropriate criterion for self-defense
under Article 5 1 of the UN Charter, which does not distinguish between State,
individual, and collective defense. However, they should do so only if the
technically "yes," because intent

consent of the protected State
of the ab

initio

need

is

is

express.

157

This position

is

a logical extension

consent to collective self-defense.

for

Extension of direct defense to international governmental organizations

UN), non-governmental

organizations

(e.g., relief

organizations), or

(e.g.,

any other

may be threatened (e.g., the Kurds) also requires specific
authorization. As in the case of States, a request for such assistance should precede

groups

its

that

on the issue of immediately necessary
and groups. Beyond that, mission accomplishment

execution. This point bears only

self-defense of such organizations

ROE may be fashioned to implement a national policy providing for their defense.
The question of defense involves not only who to defend, but also against
whom. For U.S. forces defending themselves, the SROE rule is clear anyone. The
matter is murkier when defending forces of other States or organizations. A
coalition partner may be engaged in entirely separate operations in the target State

—

or have disputes with neighbors unrelated to the no-fly zone enforcement.

come

to the defense of

context

is

its

aircraft in

To

other than the no-fly zone enforcement

to risk creating the impression that the U.S. or

taken sides in an unrelated dispute.

158

When

its

coalition allies

this potential exists,

ROE

have

and/or the

guidance issued thereon must be carefully drafted to ensure collective defense

engaged in only

as

it

pertains to the no-fly operation

is

itself.

Where Can Enforcement Aircraft Fly
and Enforce? There are few
principles more established in international law than territorial inviolability.
.

.

.

This inviolability extends not only to physical crossings of international
borders, but also to the causation of harmful effects in other States.

over airspace by a State

is

near absolute within

its

159

Control

land borders and territorial

160
even more absolute skyward to the point where space begins.
The
three exceptions to the need for State consent prior to entry into national

sea;

it is

airspace are flights pursuant to a Chapter VII authorization
necessity in a self-defense situation, force majeure,

immediately necessary to save

and

ROE

First,

and

ROE

because

lives.

Each

(e.g.,

a no-fly zone),

and assistance entry when

applies in the no-fly zone context,

guidance should reflect the relevant legal principles.
of

the

principle

of

territorial

inviolability,

an

ROE

supplemental rule must specifically authorize the crossing of international
borders.

The

legal basis for the authority to cross into the target State

obviously the Security Council's express or implied mandate.
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Beyond

is

that,

Clipped Wings

consent would be required to cross any other borders necessary to enforce the
zone.
oft

If not

granted, violators could not be pursued into neighboring States.

heard contrary assertion

borders

when enforcement

is

that they

aircraft are in

mistaken, for the term hot pursuit

enforcement

proportional

the

or

Moreover, the pursuit

is

may be chased

typically

is

An

across international

"hot pursuit."

161

The

assertion

is

a legal concept limited to either law

protection

of

territorial

sovereignty.

from the enforcement State's

territory into

international airspace, not into the sovereign airspace of a third State.

being no international legal doctrine of hot pursuit per

162

There

se applicable to a no-fly

zone operation, any pursuit that occurs must be based on the authorizing

mandate or consent. Where pursuit

is

generally appropriate

in pursuing a

is

violating aircraft back across a no-fly line within the target State. Since the
flight

is

into the target State's airspace, permitting enforcement aircraft to

pursue such violators

is

a reasonable interpretation of the

indications otherwise that

it

was not so intended.

Another argument sometimes heard

that

is

if

neighboring States as sanctuary from enforcement
States

fail

aircraft

facto sanctuary.
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may cross

This

is

violating

aircraft,

to act effectively to preclude that practice

enforcement

mandate, absent

aircraft

use

and the "host"

from continuing, then

the relevant border to deny violating aircraft de

impermissible without express or implied Security

Council authorization. The right to cross borders in self-help derives from
of

application

the

law

of

neutrality

and

the

existence

opposing

of

164

However, no-fly operations usually occur in the absence of
classic belligerency between the States enforcing the zone and the target State.
Additionally, Security Council approved actions are typically specific as to the
identity of the target of the sanctions. The sanctuary State is not yet one. That

belligerents.

being

so, additional

authorization should be sought before crossing borders not

encompassed by the

The major

original grant of authority.
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exception for no-fly zone enforcement border-crossing authority

involves self-defense. There

is

no geographical

limitation to the inherent right

of self-defense. Enforcement aircraft defending themselves or others

its fire

neighboring border, a response in self-defense

cross

an intruder aircraft
control radar from across a

or shoot across any borders in self-defense. For example,

illuminates an enforcement aircraft with

may

may be

if

necessary.

The

existence

of the border should not affect the aircrew's decision to defend. Further, in an
actual air-to-air engagement, the existence of all aspect missiles and the ability

of high performance aircraft to rapidly turn and engage often
if

not impossible, to ascertain

enforcement

aircraft

when an engagement

may sometimes have
272

make

has broken

off.

it

difficult,

As

a result,

to "pursue" intruder aircraft across
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borders while the engagement

is

ongoing. Recalling that this

the continuation of the engagement)
still

ROE are

reasonable. Since each

based on the right to self-defense, no specific supplemental

is

is

the principle of international law that a State must allow an

(from weather, mechanical problems,

aircraft in distress

and land

of military

right

is

required.

Force majeure

airspace

(really

legal so long as the aircrew's belief that

is

engaged and need to defend themselves

of these situations

an act in

than one in mission accomplishment, the pursuit

self-defense, rather

they are

is

if

no other

safe alternative

to

aircraft

claim force

Nevertheless, given the alternative, which

etc.)

available to

is

majeure

may

entry

it.

to enter

Note

is

its

that the

unsettled.
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very well be bailing out over

the territory of the no-fly zone target State, the logical course of action in most
cases

is

to at least attempt entry

on the

Finally, the right of assistance entry

basis of force majeure.
is

the right to enter a State's territorial

downed crew member at sea. 167 Whether
it extends to downed crew members on land is unsettled. Arguably, it is an
obligation of the State in whose territory a downed crew member is located to
come to the aid of such a person. 168 If that State is not attempting to recover the
crew member or refuses to consent to entry of the rescue aircraft from the
sea or airspace to effect the rescue of a

enforcement

forces,

and

injuries or the elements,

appears the lives of the crew are at risk due to

it

then a colorable claim

of self-help, rescue forces

may

exists that,

under the doctrine

enter for the very limited purpose of recovering

the crew.

Miscellaneous Issues. There are a myriad of context-specific issues that arise
during no-fly-zone operations,

the

resolution

of which depends

on an

extremely close working relationship between judge advocates and operators.

Many

arise in the air-to-ground arena.

The key

to effective air-to-ground

ROE

on the distinction between the self-defense and mission
accomplishment ROE. Mission accomplishment ROE, designed to create a
benign environment in which to enforce the zone, should never be mistaken
for self-defense ROE, which are intended to ensure an enforcement aircraft an
is

to

focus

adequate defense against a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.

Along these

lines, a

pervasive issue

SAM sites in mission accomplishment.
indications

on an

accomplishment
before a

site

aircraft's

ROE may

is

the identification criteria for engaging

It is

not unusual

RWR gear of SAM site

activity.

require multiple indicators

may be engaged

in mission

for there to

be spurious

Therefore, mission

which must be received

accomplishment. After

all,

in order for

deterrence to work, the entity to be deterred must be able to determine clearly
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at

which of its

was aimed. However, the

acts the response

affect a crew's response in self-defense.

likelihood of spurious returns

whether a

no way

Aircrews need to be sensitive to the

and factor that

reality into their

determination of

demonstration of hostile intent has occurred. That

hostile act or

said, the decision to

criteria in

engage in self-defense

whether mission accomplishment

criteria

is

theirs alone to

make, regardless of

have been met.

Another common air-to-ground scenario involves combat search and
rescue operations.
aircraft

As noted earlier,

when may supporting
downed crew member. As with

a crucial question

engage ground forces approaching the

is

ROE and commander's

any self-defense situation, the

guidance should avoid

creating checklists of acts demonstrating hostile intent.
indicators though, caveating the

list

who

may

cite

controls the territory he

is

is

down

(hostile fire

in (the target State

or indigenous groups friendly to the enforcement operation), and

approaching him and what their reaction
force,

such as the presence of enforcement

should also set forth

downed crew

is

who controls

to

who

is

aircraft.

The commander's guidance

SAM

is

disjointed.

The

ROE on sound

169

intelligence

and

tactics

is

of whether an act in self-defense

is

control radar illumination

fire

system

become

commander, though the commander's

The determination

necessary in the face of

is

measures short of the use of

serving in that role.

In both these examples, basing
crucial to success.

who

the decision that a response in defense of the

decision should rest with the on-scene

whether the

is

necessary, lest the recovery operation

guidance must make clear

sample

with the need to apply them contextually.

Relevant factors may include the reason the crew member
or mechanical problems?),

It

mobile or not.

If

may need

intelligence

is

to turn

on

generally reliable

and an enforcement aircraft receives a RWR indication of a non-mobile SAM
site from a location at which there is no known site, that should cause less
concern (possibly a spurious hit) than an indication of a mobile SAM that may
have been placed there under the cover of darkness. Similarly, recall the
discussion of the threat system's

that

considering defensive actions.

complacency when they receive an indication oi a
that cannot reach their altitude. Yet, good intelligence work may indicate

Some might be

SAM

WEZ when

it is

lulled into

possible to use the radar of that particular system to feed data to

another system armed with a missile of greater altitude
intelligence data will likely be determinative in assessing

capabilities.

This

whether to engage

in

self-defense.

In the air-to-air environment, a recurring concern

There
the best approach

necessary before engaging a violator.

dilemma. As a general

rule,

170
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is
is

is

the degree of certainty

no easy answer
to require

all

to this

reasonably
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engaged if it poses no
require visual identification, but it would also

available systems to attempt to identify a target before

Not

threat.

only would this

necessitate a call by any
as

AWACS)

an

aircraft

had no indications the

working the area (such

was anything but a
Additional sources of information that should be considered

that

wrongful violator.

command and control

it is

it

target

include intelligence information, the location of the aircraft

when

it

was

first

was it in the target State), on-board electronic identification
systems that enforcement aircraft possess, non-responsiveness to warnings, and
The further one
identify friend or foe (IFF) squawks (or the absence thereof)
moves along the continuum toward aircraft which pose a threat, the more
authorization of beyond visual range identification and engagement may be
noted

(e.g.,

m

.

appropriate.
aircraft

Of

course, identification criteria should never serve to keep

from defending

itself

against

what

it

an

reasonably believes to constitute a

threat under the self-defense rules of engagement.

Rules of engagement, and the commander's guidance on ROE issued to
implement them, are tools for integrating policy, legal, and operational
concerns and limits during a no-fly zone operation. It is absolutely critical that
all

three concerns be carefully factored into their development, for the speed

with which the aerial picture unfolds
very

and

precisely

implemented

at

carefully

minimum

is

crafted

risk.

As

ROE for no-fly zones must be

such that
if

the

political

Hawks

the Black

mandate

is

to

be

incident so tragically

no room for error.
Ultimately, two themes must pervade the development of effective ROE for
no-fly zone enforcement. First, the distinction between self-defense and mission
accomplishment rules has to be clear on the face of the ROE and any guidance

illustrated, there

is

who

thereon. If not, either the mission or the crews
risk.

execute

it

will

be placed at

Second, the importance of ensuring that operational concerns are addressed

ROE and guidance

in the

grasp not only

is

paramount. Effective

ROE

are the product of a firm

on the law and the foundational policy objectives of the operation,

but also operational

reality.

Abstract legal or policy discourses only serve to

obfuscate the guidance aircrews need to succeed and survive.
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between the occupying power and

An aerial occupation,

which

found

arise as
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not a legal one. In

is

for physical control
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use of
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own

is
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accordance with resolution 666 (1990), or supplies intended

The Resolution
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its

in
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a)

strictly for

and

its

at

an

airfield
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its

State of
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661 (1990) or the present resolution, and

is
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unless Iraq
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implements
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international peace and security in the area." S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). The

fully

term

.

"all

17.

.

.

necessary means"

the standard phraseology for authorizing armed force.

is

U.N. CHARTER art.

51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right

of individual or collective self-defense

if

an armed attack occurs against

a

Member of the United

Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international

peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense

shall

be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security
as

it

deems necessary

Numerous

Council under the present Charter to take

self-defense since ratification of the
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any time such action

agreements and pronouncements have reaffirmed

international
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rights: "In
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rights in
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regard to the steps actually taken, the protection of
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humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction of
with the training, arming, and equipping of the Contras.

installations, or again

oil

The Court

concludes that the argument derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot
afford a legal justification for the

conduct of the United States." Military and Paramilitary

Actions in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
case, regardless of the merits,

is

an

v.

U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 13, at para. 268.

illustration of

disapproves of humanitarian intervention.

It is

in a position of strength vis-a-vis the State in

why most

The Nicaragua

of the international
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which the intervention occurs.
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"Nothing in
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CHARTER art.
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23.
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instance, the United Kingdom's forces

of Operation
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Other countries may use different names. For
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are those of the U.S.

more than one country)

forces of

here— PROVIDE COMFORT, NORTHERN WATCH, and

WARDEN.

Nevertheless, since the U.S. labels are those generally used to refer to

the operations as a whole, that convention

is

adopted here.
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MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW 254-5 (1992). Talks between
Iraqi and Coalition military leaders followed on Mar. 2, 1991. The next day, the Security Council
24.

Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The

(1993) See also
.

issued Resolution 686 formalizing implementation of the cease-fire at the international level.

S.C. Res. 686 (Mar.
a

Mar.

2,

1991), U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991), reprinted in 30 1.L.M. 567 (1991). In

1991, letter from Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz to the President of the Security

3,

Council, the Iraqis agreed to accept the terms of 686. U.N. Doc. S/22320 (1991). Approximately

one month
687 (Apr.

later, a

3,

much more

detailed set of demands was passed as Resolution 687. S.C. Res.

1991), U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 843 (1991).

Its

terms

General and President of the
Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations
the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,

were grudgingly accepted by the

Iraqis in letters to the Secretary

Security Council. Letters from the

Addressed Respectively to

MOORE, supra, at 497.
25. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDLESS TORMENT: THE
IRAQ AND ITS AFTERMATH (1992).

Apr.

6,

1991, U.N. Doc. S/22456 (1991), reprinted in

1991 UPRISING IN

Not only were

helicopters used, but in some cases fixed wing aircraft were employed,
ban thereon, to suppress the uprisings. See George Bush, Letter to Congressional
Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance with United Nation Security Council Resolutions,
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Sept. 16, 1992, at 1669.
26.

despite the

27.

For instance, in February 1991 President George Bush seemed to

of Hussein

when he

Iraqi military

stated, "There's

and the

the overthrow

another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that

Iraqi people to take matters into their

Hussein, the dictator, to step down."

call for

Ann

Devroy, Wail and See
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is

for the

own hands and force Saddam
on Iraq, WASH. POST, Mar. 29,

Clipped Wings

1991, at A-15. See also John
2,

M. Goshko,

Rebel Urges West

Aid

to

Iraqi

Kurds,

WASH. POST, Apr.

1991,atA-15.
28. S.C. Res.

688 (Apr.

15, 1991),

U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).

Bush announced the operation on April

1991. According to Bush, it was
whose lives have been endangered
by the brutal and inhumane actions of the Iraqi government." George Bush, U.S. Humanitarian
Assistance to Iraqi Refugees (White House stmt., Apr. 5, 1991), reprinted in DISPATCH, Apr. 8,
1991, at 233. On Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, see John P. Cavanaugh, Operation Provide
Comfort: A Model for Future NATO Operations (May 1992) (unpublished manuscript
available through DTIC, and on file at the
and Army Command and General Staff
College libraries); David E Clary, Operation Provide Comfort A Strategic Analysis (Apr.
and Air War
1994) [unpublished manuscript available through DTIC, and on file at the
Donald
College
libraries];
G.
Goff,
Building
Coalitions
for
Humanitarian
29. President

"designed to alleviate the plight of the

many innocent

5,

Iraqis

NWC

—

NWC

Operations

—OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

through DTIC, and on
30.

The

file

(

Apr. 1992) (unpublished manuscript available

NWC and Army War College libraries)

at the

use of helicopters against the Kurds was prevalent in the

North

as well as the

Dab Balz, Bush Criticizes
WASH. POST, Mar. 15. 1991, at A-37. See also Rick Atkinson,
Iraq Shifts Troops to Combat Kurds, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1991, at A-l, A-12; Johnathan C.
Randal, Kurds' Spring of Hope Collapses Amid Feelings of Betrayal, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1991, at
South, and President Bush warned the Iraqis against such use in March.
Iraq's

Use of Helicopters on

Rebels,

A-l.

Ann

Devroy and John M. Goshko, U.S. Shift on Refugee Enclaves, WASH. POST,
Ann Devroy, U.S. Seeks to Protect Kurd Refugee Areas,
Apr. 10, 1991, at A-l; John E. Yang
WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1991, at A-l. Though the zone did have the effect of protecting the
Kurds, it was established in part as a security measure for the Coalition forces on the ground in
31. See

&

northern

Iraq.

32. Operation
file

NORTHERN WATCH Command

Briefing (unclassified version) (1997) (on

with author)

The two Kurdish groups are the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP) The Iraqis sided with the KDP in their 3 1 August attack on the PUK
33.

Id.

.

stronghold of
34.

Irbil.

See William H. Johnson,

Than War

A Piece of the Puzzle: Tactical Airpower in Operations Other

(1994) (unpublished manuscript available at the

NWC library), at 12.

Although singling out the Kurds, 688 applied generally to all Iraqis. The resolution
[glravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian
stated, "The Security Council
which
population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas
." S.C. Res. 688, supra note 28.
threaten international peace and security.
35.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Remarks Announcing Missile Strike on Iraq, Sept. 3. 1996,
32 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1641 (1996). The response also
included two separate cruise missile attacks designed to suppress air defense facilities
& II). DoD Press Release No. 190-M,
Strike
I
(Operation, Desert
36. President William Clinton,

<http://www.milnet.com/milnet/dstrike/dstrikeO.htm>.

On Sept. 4,

1996, the President issued

which he stated that the expansion of the southern no-fly zone was a
"reasonable response to the enhanced threat posed by Iraq." PRESIDENT WILLIAM CLINTON,
a report to Congress in

REPORT TO CONGRESS,
37.

Id.

Sept. 4, 1996.

In the report, the President stated that the zones "were established pursuant to and

in support of United

Nations Security Council Resolutions
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(UNSCR)

678, 687, and 688, which

Michael N. Schmitt

condemned

Iraq's repression of its civilian population, including its

Kurdish population, as a

threat to international peace and security in the region." Id.
38. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 16.
39. S.C. Res.

& 688, supra notes 24 & 28 respectively.

687

London Conference, Doc. LC/C7 (Final), Aug. 27, 1992,
reprinted in 31. I.L.M. 1539 (1992). Subsequently, on September 15, 1992, measures to
implement the decisions were agreed upon by the London Conference Working Group on
40. Specific Decisions by the

Confidence and Security-Building and Verification Measures. Report of the Secretary-General

on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, paras. 103-109, U.N. Doc. S/24795,
Nov. 11, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1549, 1574-5 (1992). See also U.N. Doc. S/24634, Oct. 8,
1992. Additionally, in a Joint Declaration, the Presidents of Croatia and the Former Republic of

UNPROFOR

Yugoslavia agreed to permit

observers at airfields in their countries as a

confidence-building measure. Joint Statement of 19 October 1992 Issued by Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia President Cosic and President Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, para.
previously issued in

& S/24702

U.N. Docs. A/47/571

5,

(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1581, 1582

(1992).

U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (1992).

41. S.C. Res. 781 (Oct. 9, 1992),
42. S.C. Res.

816 (Mar. 31, 1993),

paras. 4-5,

U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993)

(emphasis

added)
43.

"The Security Council

shall,

where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or
its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken

agencies for enforcement action under

under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
."
U.N. CHARTER art. 53(1). The one exception is for the purposes of collective self-

Council.

.

.

defense pursuant to Article 5 1
44.

The

effort did

not prove particularly successful. As one commentator has noted,

had not even been particularly successful at the

no-fly zone

tactical level.

"

[T] he

For example, there were

over 650 violations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina no-fly zone between April 1993 and January
1994. This

is

a direct result of a flawed operational design that allowed the

Bosnian Serbs to

helicopters essentially unchallenged despite the helicopter's devastating firepower.

Serbs also continued to
targets

even after heavy

fly

fixed-wing aircraft in strikes of their

retaliatory

U.N.

air strikes in

own

fly

The Bosnian

against Bosnian

and Croat

September 1995." Shanahan, supra note

2,

at 15.

Dayton Peace Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 1A, Agreement on the Military
I. For a summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, see
Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Summary of the General Framework Agreement, Nov. 30, 1995,
45.

Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Art.

< http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-summ.htm>
46.

With

Chapter VII

regard to airspace, the relevant Security Council Resolution provided that under

it

IFOR Member States, "acting under paragraph 14 [of the
in accordance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, to take all necessary

was authorizing

resolution] above,

measures to ensure compliance with the rules and procedures, to be established by the

Commander of IFOR,
with respect to

all

governing

civilian

and

command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina

military air traffic." S.C. Res. 1031 (Dec. 15, 1995),

U.N. Doc.

S/RES/1031 (1995).
47.
for

It

also included troops

from Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia and Morocco. Partnership

Peace troops were provided by Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,

Finland,

Hungary,

Latvia,

Background information on

Lithuania,
this topic

Poland,
is

Romania,

available in
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Sweden,

NATO,

and

the

Ukraine.

Basic Fact Sheet No. 4:

Clipped Wings

NATO's

Role

in

Peace

Bringing

Former

the

to

March

Yugoslavia,

1977,

<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/bpfy.htm>.
48.

Background information on

NATO-led

SFOR is available at NATO, Basic Fact Sheet No.
(SFOR)

Force

Stabilization

in

and

Bosnia

Herzegovina,

11,

April

The

1997,

<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/sfor.htm>.
49.

The zone would be

violation of

UN

a use of force against the territorial integrity of a

member

State in

Charter Article 2(4). Consider the Corfu Channel case. British ships were

Channel in Albanian territorial waters when they were fired upon by
Albanian gunners. Several months later, two British warships were struck by mines (made in
Germany) within those waters. Therefore, the British sent in their minesweepers to clear the
mines, relying on the right of innocent passage. The International Court of Justice found the
Albanians liable on the basis that they knew of the mines' presence but did nothing to warn the
passing through the Corfu

British warships.

also held the first passage of the warships

It

through the channel lawful under

law of the sea principles. However,
therefore, violated

it found that the minesweeping was not innocent and,
Albanian sovereignty. See generally Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J.

4. Interestingly, for

separate reasons,

50. Petersen, supra note
51.

1994 (on

it

UK which was awarded damages.

was the

2, at 8.

Combined Task Force Public Affairs, Operation Provide Comfort Fact Sheet, July 1,
file with author) The fact sheet details other instances in which Coalition aircraft were
.

threatened, and in which a forceful response ensued.
52. Fact Sheet

No.

4,

supra note 47.

The

fact sheet details other uses offeree during the

operations in the former Yugoslavia. See also Marian Nash, U.S. Practice: Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International

522-25 (1994).
53. Shanahan, supra note
process to breakdown.
54.

2, at 15.

The capture nearly caused

INT'L L. 5 15,

the Dayton Peace

Agreement

On the incident, see Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Report, Vol. II, Summary of

Facts (unclassified, undated) (copy
55.

Law (NATO Action in Bosnia), 88 AM. J.

Id.

at

on

file

with author).

46

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
ASSOCIATED TERMS, Joint Pub 1-02, 329 (1994). See also SROE, supra note 4, at GL-15.
57. The National Command Authorities consist of the President and Secretary of Defense
or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Joint Pub 1-02, supra note 56, at 253,
56.

<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/old_pubs/jpl_02.pdf>.
58.

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87

he so perceptively noted, "the

political object

means can never be considered

in isolation

is

(Michael

Howard

the goal, war

is

from the purpose."

59. For example, in the former case, they

the

& Peter Paret eds.,
means of reaching

from the

air

make execution

aircraft that

and the

of the relief mission free from

may prevent

had SOUTHERN

WATCH

aircraft shot

one of the Iraqi military helicopters transporting Haj pilgrims returning from

engaged Iranian

As

that could threaten the fragile control over an on-going conflict.

60. Similarly, consider the political consequences

down

it,

.

Id.

interference by a rogue State's aircraft and helicopters possible; in the latter, they
military actions

1984)

Mecca

or

penetrated the southern no-fly zone to attack the camps of Iranian

TORONTO

STAR, Apr. 23, 1997, at
A-19; Baghdad Says Iran Bombed Exiles in Iraq, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at A-l.
6 1 Military lawyers (judge advocates) have long played an integral role in the development
opposition groups in Iraq. Iraqi Copters Cross No-fly Zone,

of ROE. See,

e.g.,

(requires the

Dep't of Defense Directive 5100.77,

Chairman of the

DoD Law of War Program

Joint Chiefs of Staff
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Quly

and Unified and Specified

10,

1979)

Command

Michael N. Schmitt

ROE comply with the law of armed conflict); JCS Memorandum MJCS
0124-88, Implementation of DoD Law of War Program (Aug. 4, 1988) (on file with author)
(legal advisers are to review ROE for compliance with the DoD Law of War Program) The
Commanders

to ensure

.

requirement

for legal

involvement in armed conflict

is

Convention
36 Stat. 2277, 205

long-standing. See,

e.g.,

War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1,
Hague IV] (signatories are to issue instructions to their forces on
Convention's annex); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 144 (Parties "undertake

Respecting the Laws and Customs of
Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter
the

.

Convention

to disseminate the text of the present

.

as widely as possible in their respective

programmes of military and, if
."); Protocol Additional I, supra note 6, art. 82 (".
Parties
shall
possible, civil instruction.
ensure that legal advisers are available when necessary, to advise military commanders at the
appropriate level on the application of the convention and this Protocol and on the appropriate
instruction to be given to the armed forces in this subject."). On the requirement for and role of
legal advisers, see LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 73-82 (1985).
countries, in particular, to include the study thereof in their
.

62. Joint
63. "All

Pub

.

.

1-02, supra note 56, at

329

.

.

.

.

& 215 respectively.

Members shall refrain in their international relations from the

threat or use of force

against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other

inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N.

CHARTER art.

manner

2(4).

The Charter

of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg specifically
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justified by
military necessity" as a war crime. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(b), 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. The offense was further clarified in The
64.

characterized "the

Hostage Case:

[Military necessity] does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for the purpose

of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to

kill.

The

destruction of property to be unlawful

must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is
a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable connection between the
destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces.

The Hostage Case
principle

is

(U.S. v. List), 11

in Article 23(g) of

Hague

T.M.W.C.

IV,

759, 1253-54 (1950). Codification of the

which prohibits

acts that "destroy or seize the

property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively

demanded by

enemy's

the necessities of war."

Annex, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note
art.
61,
23(g). Though there is occasionally some discussion as to whether the article protects all
property or only State property, both the U.S. Army and the International Committee of the Red
Cross opine that it covers any property, wherever situated and however owned. See 2
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Pamphlet No. 27-161-2) 174 (1962);
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 301 (Jean S. Pictet

Hague

IV,

ed., 1958).

65. During an international

armed conflict, the issue
which

that would be protected as a civilian object, but

usually arises in the context of a target
in

military effort. Since the law wishes to protect civilians

requirement of directly contributing to an enemy's war
protection.
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some way now contributes to the
and civilian objects, it imposes a

effort before

it

will

dispense with that

Clipped Wings

DESERT STRIKE

66. E.g., air defense related facilities as in the case of

DoD

of

Transcripts

Press

on

Briefings

Examples

<http://www.defenselink.mil/iraq/brief.html>.
nevertheless, imaginable. For instance,

it

Desert

would

Strike

of

I

&

in 1996.

II

collected

are

necessity

questions

at
are,

violate the principle of military necessity to

destroy an electrical generation station serving a city from which a shoulder-launched

SAM had

been launched simply to convince the other side not to launch additional missiles. In the no-fly
context, the relationship between that act and the goal of precluding the SAM sites from
engaging enforcement aircraft is too attenuated.

Though

67.

the United States

is

not a Party to the agreement, Additional Protocol

two proportionality provisions, both of which the U.S. characterizes
international law. Article 51 (5) provides that "an attack
loss of civilian

life,

damage

injury to civilians,

which may be expected

to civilian objects, or a

would be excessive in relation to the concrete and

as declaratory of

I

contains

customary

to cause incidental

combination thereof, which

direct military advantage anticipated"

disallowed as indiscriminate. Article 57(2) (b) requires an attack to be canceled or suspended

becomes apparent that the objective

may be expected

attack

objects, or a

is

is

if "it

not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the

to cause incidental loss of civilian

life,

injury to civilians,

damage

to civilian

combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct

military advantage anticipated." Additional Protocol

I,

supra note

6,

arts.

51(5)

&

57(2)

(b)

summary of Protocol I and the U.S. position on key articles, see INTERNATIONAL
and Operations Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Dept of the
Air Force, Operations Law deployment Deskbook, tab 12 (n.d.). An unofficial article often
respectively. For a

cited as accurately setting forth the U.S. position
States Position

on

the Relation of Customary International

Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U.
68.

The

Michael

is

J.

Matheson, Session One: The United

Law to the 1 977 Protocols Additional to the 1 949

L & POLT 419

INT'L

J.

(1987).

area (measured in range and altitude) in which targets can be effectively engaged

and destroyed.
69.

The advantage

calculation would shift

if

such violations occurred because the overall

would diminish. Thus, even under the principle of proportionality,
downing subsequent similar violators following adequate warning might be justifiable.

effectiveness of the zone

70.

As noted

in the Nuclear

Weapons

case,

"

[The] prohibition of the use of force

is

to be

considered in the light of other relevant provisions of the Charter. In Article 51, the Charter
recognizes the inherent right of individual self-defense

use offeree

is

if

an armed attack occurs.

may take

envisaged in Article 42, whereby the Security Council

A further lawful

military

enforcement

measures in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter." International Court of Justice, Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No. 95, July

8,

1996, para. 41,35 I.L.M. 814

(1996) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons] This point must not be carried to an extreme, for the Court
.

was speaking to the

issue of the resort to force, vice

Michael N. Schmitt, The

International

LEG. STU. 57 (1997) (and
71.

Justice
1.

is

The

to

.

force.

On the case, see
7 USAFA J.

WAR

generally recognized as being set forth in priority order.
.

employ

of sources found in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of

listing

The Court

(a)

NAV.

methods used

Court of Justice and the Use of Nuclear Weapons,
C. REV., Spring 1998, at 91).

.

It

provides:

shall apply:

international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly

recognized by the consenting States;
(b) international
(c)

custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

(d) subject to the provisions

of Article 59, judicial decisions and teachings of the most
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Michael N. Schmitt

highly

qualified

of the

publicists

various

nations,

as

subsidiary

means

for

the

determination of rules of law.

Statute of the International Court of Justice,

art.

38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993,

Bevans 1179.
72.

CHARTER

U.N.

art.

The

103.

International Court of Justice has in fact noted the

primacy of Security Council actions. In the Lockerbie case, the Court declined to indicate
provisional measures requested by Libya

on the

basis that

Charter obligations prevail over those

Montreal Convention. The Charter obligations were contained
in Resolution 748 (1992), which cited Chapter VII as its basis. The holding of the Court
illustrates the degree to which Council actions are determinative: "Whereas both Libya and the
in other agreements such as the

United

States, as

Members

of the United Nations, are obliged to accept and carry out the

decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter; whereas the

Court, which

is

this obligation

at the stage of proceedings

on

provisional measures, considers that prima facie

extends to the decision contained in resolution 748 (1992); and whereas, in

accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the Parties in that respect prevail
over their obligations under any other international agreement, including the Montreal
" Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, (Libya v. U.S.) 1992 I.C.J. para. 39, 3 1 1.L.M. 662
(1992). In The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 31, Oct. 2, 1995, 31 I.L.M. 32 (1996), the court
rejected claims that the Security Council establishment of the Tribunal based on Chapter VII of
the Charter was inappropriate. In particular, it stated that "the Security Council has a broad
discretion in deciding on the course of action and evaluating the appropriateness of the measures
to be taken." It declined even to consider the question of legality.
,

73.

The Vienna Convention on

"peremptory," as follows: "Art. 53.

with a peremptory

norm

the

Law

A treaty

is

of Treaties describes the norm, using the label

void

if,

at the time of

its

conclusion,

it

conflicts

of general international law. For the purposes of the present

Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law

is a norm accepted and recognized
norm
from which no derogation is
States as
as a
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.

by the international

community of

a whole

39/27 (1969), 63 AM.J.lNT'LL.875 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).

It

should be noted that Article

64 of the Convention provides that "if a new peremptory norm of general international law of the
kind referred to in Article 53 emerges, any existing treaty which

becomes void and terminates."

The

Id. art.,

is

in conflict with that

norm

64.

norms is controversial. Indeed, in North Sea Continental
Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 4, 42, the International Court of Justice noted that it was not "attempting to
enter into, still less pronounce on any question of jus cogens. " In fact, there have been no cases in
which a treaty provision, or implementation thereof, has been determined violative of a jus
cogens norm. For conflicting views on the existence of jus cogens norms, see LAURI
74.

entire issue of jus cogens

Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms in International Law: Historical Development,
Criteria, Present Status (1988) and Jerzy Sztucki, Jus Cogens and
Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Critical Appraisal (1974).
75.

On

armed conflict,
N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 815-821 (4th

the distinction between international and non-international

GREEN, supra note

6, at

52-66;

MALCOLM

The Vienna

1997).
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see
ed.
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76.

the

Law

The SROE guidance on the subject is as follows: "U.S. forces will always comply with
of Armed Conflict. However, not all situations involving the use of force are armed

conflicts

under international law. Those approving operational

determine

if

the

recognized

internationally

Law

Armed

of

rules of

Conflict

engagement must
applies.

In

those

when armed conflict, under international law, does not exist, Law of Armed
may nevertheless be applied as a matter of national policy. If armed conflict
occurs, the actions of U.S. forces will be governed by both the Law of Armed Conflict and rules of
engagement." SROE, supra note 4, at A-2 to A-3. The UN position is that the Law of Armed

circumstances

Conflict principles

Conflict as articulated in the primary conventions (1949

Geneva Conventions,

Additional, and the Cultural Property Convention) should apply in

all

Protocols

peace operations. Draft

Model Agreement Between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and
Equipment to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary General
(May 23, 1991), U.N. Doc. A/46/185, reprinted in UN PEACE OPERATIONS (Walter G. Sharp
ed., 1995). The difficulty of determining the status of an armed conflict is illustrated by the case
of the former Yugoslavia. Seemingly contradictory conclusions on the subject have been reached
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Compare Prosecutor v.
Drazen Erdomovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, Oct. 7, 1997 (finding
an international conflict vis-a-vis the Bosnian Croats) with Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, May 7, 1997. On these cases, see Leslie C. Green,
Erdemovic-Tadic-Dokmanovic: Jurisdiction and Early Practice of the Yugoslav War Crimes
Tribunal (unpublished manuscript on file with author, forthcoming in LESLIE C. GREEN,
Further Essays on the Modern Law of War, Transnational Pub.).
77. As has been pointed out by others, ROE can also be viewed as a crisis management tool
commanders that allows them, when unable to be present personally, to exercise positive
control over their forces during stressful situations. Viewed thusly, ROE do not so much limit a
commander's courses of action, as they frame them. On the point, e.g., see Douglas C. Palmer,
Rules of Engagement as an Operational Tool 1-3 (Feb. 22, 1993) (unpublished manuscript on

for

file

at

NWC library).

78.

There

is

evidence that fear of prosecution in the event the

ROE

are violated has also

Army Specialist James Mowris
and his platoon were on patrol in a Somali village when they saw two men running in an adjacent

contributed to hesitation to act in self-defense. In February 1993,

military area that

was abandoned. Mowris chased them and, by

into the ground to convince

them

to stop.

One

subsequently convicted of negligent homicide in a

were poorly

force

understood by the

Forces:

A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering,

consequence of the prosecution was that

ROE

that suggested the

The
Mark S.

court-martial

on the use of

convening authority

Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land

143 MIL. L. REV.

soldiers in

warning shot

of the Somalis was killed. Mowris was

trial

soldiers.

subsequently decided to set aside the conviction.

his account, fired a

1,

17,

66 (1994). Apparently, one
fire even when

Somalia "were reluctant to

There is no doubt that
upon for fear of legal action. It took weeks to work through this.
had a major effect on the theatre." Letter from Colonel Wade H. McManus, Jr.,
Commander, Division Support Command, to Major General Guy A.J. LaBoa, Subject: Specialist
James D. Mowris (Sept. 28, 1993), reprinted in I Record of Trial, U.S. v. Mowris, GCM No. 68
fired

.

.

.

this case

(Fort

Carson

79.
civilians

The

& 4th Inf. Div., July

1,

1993), cited

in id. at

66.

principle requires belligerents to distinguish

and civilian objects.

It is

codified in Protocol

80. Deterrence, properly understood,

is

I

between valid

military targets

Additional, supra note

4, art. 5 1 (4

and

& 5)

the product of the will and capacity perceived by

the subject of the deterrent action.
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81.

The

classic

account

for

example of

failure to

at Beirut International

Headquarters

an increase in the

adequately do so

is

bombing of the Marine

the

Airport in October 1983. In that case, the

terrorist threat, as

ROE failed

to

evidenced by the earlier bombing of the U.S.

Embassy. Dep't of Defense, Report of the Commission on the Beirut International Airport

October 23, 1983 (Dec. 20, 1983); various lectures by Professor Richard
Grunawalt, Legal Counsel to the Commission, Naval War College, 1995-97.

Terrorist Act,

82. In aerial operations, "operator"

is

a term of art for a flyer.

It is

J.

absolutely essential that

the judge advocate have a basic understanding of operational concepts and weapons system
capabilities.

For a survey of these matters, see Robert A. Coe

& Michael N. Schmitt, Fighter Ops

42 A.F.L. REV. 49 (1997).

for Shoe Clerks,

83. Recall, for instance, that Iraqi military helicopters penetrated the southern no-fly zone

over Iraq to pick up pilgrims returning from the Haj.

With

regard to the decision not to engage

DoD spokesman Kevin Bacon stated, "We are not prepared to stop what appear
small-scale and humanitarian operations." Iraqi Copters Cross No-fly Zone, TORONTO

the helicopters,
to be

STAR, Apr.
84.

23, 1997, at

A-19.

A "combined operation"

is

"(a)n operation conducted by forces of two or more allied

nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission." Joint

Pub 1-02, supra note

56, at 77.
85. For a superb discussion of the right to self-defense in international law, see

Dinstein,
86.

War, Aggression, and Self Defence 175-308

The

supra note

hierarchy of self-defense

4, at

A-4

to

A-5. The

based in part on that set forth in the

is

SROE

SROE. SROE,

describe collective self-defense as a subset of national

and individual self-defense

self-defense,

YORAM

(2d ed. 1994).

as a lesser

included form of unit self-defense.

It is

probably more useful to think of them as separate entities that operate quite differently in
differing contexts.

87.

Id.

at

88. This
Justice stated:

necessity

A-6.

was made clear in the Nuclear Weapons

"The submission of the exercise of the

and proportionality

is

case.

There the International Court of

right of self-defense to the conditions of

a rule of customary international law.

As

the Court stated in the

case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua

v.

United

whereby
self-defense would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, a rule well-established in customary international law.' This dual
condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the means of force employed."
Nuclear Weapons, supra note 70, at para. 41.

States of America) (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 94, para. 176): 'there

is

a specific rule

89.

SROE,

90.

An act in self-defense must comport with both the elements of self-defense and the jus

in hello.

supra note

4, at

A-6.

Nuclear Weapons case, supra note 70,

91.

Id.

92.

SROE,

93.

Id.

94.

0( course, ROE

supra note

4, at

at para. 42.

GL-9.

are always contextual. If a similar aircraft employing identical tactics

approached the no-fly-zone boundary the previous day and attacked an enforcement

aircraft, the

threshold for engaging on this day would certainly be lower.
95.

The MiG-25 downed by

the

SOUTHERN WATCH F-16

testing U.S. resolve to enforce the zone. Petersen, supra note

Coverage of

Iraqi No-fly

Zone

Increases,

A.

F.

TIMES, Jan.

287

in

December 1993 was

2, at 8;

11, 1993, at 4.

likely

William Matthews,
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The SROE cite four factors without amplification:

96.

political tension;

SROE,

information.

97. This

is

1)

military preparations; 3) intelligence;

2)

the state of international/regional

and

indications

4)

and warning

supra note 4, at GL-9.

likely to

be the case,

in the event of a

e.g.,

mistaken enforcement action, such

as

Hawk shootdowns. Another example of a period posing such a risk was during the Iraqi
involvement in the Kurdish in-fighting, the shift from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to
NORTHERN WATCH, and the resulting pullout of French forces.
98. A SAMbush occurs when a SAM system "ambushes" an enforcement aircraft. For
the Black

example, a mobile
"bait" aircraft
aircraft to

hidden

SAM system could be placed in a hidden location near the no-fly boundary. A

might then

maneuver

fly

quickly towards the line knowing this will cause the enforcement

into a position to engage the potential violator that

SAM site. This

is

but one possible

Stand-downs are used to prepare the

99.

is

within range of the

SAMbush scenario.
aircraft, plan,

and ensure adequate

rest for

aircrews prior to combat.
100. Chaff consists of metallic filaments released by the aircraft to disrupt ground-based

radar by creating returns that effectively "cloud"

heat-seeking missiles. See
101.

If so,

Coe

not only does

over. Flares are dropped to disrupt

& Schmitt, supra note 82, at 81.

this

allows the aircrew greater time to

lower the likelihood of the act constituting hostile intent,

make

difficulty of

to the judge advocate to
in the

mere seconds

do

so,

pointing out the

available in the cockpit.

which acts

Self-defense being a legal standard, operators expect the judge advocate to determine

The temptation to do so must be resisted, for such a
aircrews at risk. The list will inevitably tend to be viewed as

meet

it.

The SROE language

103.

is

as follows:

intent.

commander

No

guidance

is

list

list

places both national policy and

exclusive.

"Commanders should

determine hostile intent. Intelligence, politico-military
require a

factors,

use

all

available information to

and technological

capabilities

to consider a wide range of criteria in determining the existence of hostile

of indicators can substitute for the commander's judgment.

The

following

not meant to be a 'checklist' but rather examples which taken alone or in

combination might lead a commander to determine that a force

Among

is

evidencing hostile intent.

the actions that might lead to a reasonable belief that hostile intent exists are.

SROE,

supra note 4, at A-B-l. Though this particular caveat
worded proviso would be appropriate for aerial operations.
104. For a discussion of this issue, see

Peacetime:

it

the hostile intent determination.

That said, operators will typically look
making a complex determination

102.

it

Do

The concern

U.S. Ships

Have

to

Take

George Bunn,

the First Hit?

is

for

International

Commander of the

.

seaborne forces, a similarly

Law and the Use

NAVAL WAR C. REV., May-June

that political pressure will require excessive risk-taking

Falklands Campaign, the

."
.

is

of Force in

1986, at 69.

not new. During the

Falklands Battle Group was worried that "political

requirements could result in our entering [the exclusion zone around the Falklands declared by
I thought it was all too possible that I was going
" He was worried that his political masters
must
fire
the
first
shot.'
to be told again, 'The enemy
would want the United Kingdom to appear the "wronged party." SANDY WOODWARD, ONE
HUNDRED DAYS: THE MEMOIRS OF THE FALKLANDS BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER 108
(1992). Admiral Woodward's concern appears well founded. In a joint U.S. Naval War College
and UK Royal Naval Staff College seminar held in October 1996, the British position was that
"UK ROE will normally accept the risk of first hit, i.e., do not fire unless fired on." Royal Navy
Staff College Background Paper, ROE. Political Tool or Military Nightmare? (undated, n.p., on

the British] with our hands tied behind out backs.

file

with author).
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105. Professor Dinstein adopts the terminology "interceptive" self-defense.

It

occurs after

the other side has "committed itself to an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way."
argues that interceptive self-defense

is

He

consistent with Article 51. DINSTEIN, supra note 85, at

190.
106. Letter from Daniel

Webster

Ashburton (Aug.

to Lord

6,

1842), reprinted in

JOHN

A

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 411, 412 (emphasis added). The
Caroline incident involved a Canadian insurrection in 1837. After being defeated, the insurgents

BASSETT MOORE,

2

and planned further operations. The
troops crossed the border and destroyed the

retreated into the United States where they recruited

Caroline was being used by the rebels. British

and sending her over Niagara Falls. Britain justified the
action on the grounds that the United States was not enforcing its laws along the frontier and
that the action was a legitimate exercise of self-defense. 2 DIGEST, supra, at 409-11.
Caroline by setting

fire

to the vessel

107. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg)

205 (1947). The German leaders tried to

L. 172,

against an anticipated British attack from

Judgment and Sentence, 41 AM. J. INT'L

,

justify the

invasion of Norway as self-defense

Norway.

occasionally asked whether an aircraft must "call home" to
The SROE do require that the threatened aircraft call home
if time permits. However, if there is time to radio to the air operations center (AOC) for
instructions, usually the threat is not imminent. The crew may seek general guidance (or even
authority to engage under the mission accomplishment rules), but in most cases it may not
engage in self-defense until there is no longer time to call home until the need is "instant and
overwhelming." Simply put, the imminency requirement is that an enforcement aircraft may not
108.

Along these same

lines, it

is

seek authority to act in self-defense.

—

act in self-defense until
to

become
109.

it

has

to,

but

it

need not necessarily wait

until the hostile intent

is

about

a hostile act.

Of

course, though the right to self-defense

overemphasized that mission accomplishment

no longer

cannot be
may provide a separate and distinct
is

ROE

operative,

it

authorization to engage.
110.

Note that

a "clear

discern. Therefore,

convinced
111.

armed

It

it is

and unambiguous" breaking off of the engagement will be
sound and legally acceptable to continue the

tactically

difficult to

fight until

over.

it is

would

conflict,

also appear to conflict with the general

i.e.,

approach to surrender of aircraft during

that surrenders are seldom accepted in aerial

combat because of the

difficulty

DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CONDUCT OF
Armed Conflict and Air Operations (AFP 110-31), para. 4-2d (1976).
112. Such missions are labeled SEAD
suppression of enemy air defenses. When the sites
of verifying true status.

—

are actually destroyed, vice simply suppressed for a period sufficient to allow friendly aircraft to
transit the area,

SEAD is sometimes labeled DEAD

& Schmitt, supra note 82, at 53.

It is

the aircraft being threatened

armed with a

on

is

—destruction of enemy

HARM,

may

well be to attack immediately. For this reason,

"shooter" into the

WEZ

first

to determine

whether the

Descriptions of air-to-ground weapons are found in
113. This

is

defenses. See

id.

SAM
it

sites),

home

in

then the best course of

may be prudent

SAM

Coe

specific. If

a missile specifically designed to

a target's radar emission (and thus very useful against

action

air

important to understand that tactics are situation

to send a

HARM

site is likely to act aggressively.

at 67-70.

a particular problem for reconnaissance missions. No-fly zone or associated

operations generally have a reconnaissance

component

to allow the task force to

remain

apprised of the threat to enforcement aircraft. Unfortunately, tactical reconnaissance aircraft
usually

must

fly

within the

WEZ of the

clarity for use in identifying threats.

site it is

imaging to secure photos that are of sufficient

Thus, such

289

aircraft

cannot simply

fly

around or above
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ground-based threat systems.
It

should be pointed out, in this regard, that the U.S. definition of self-defense does allow a

reaction to hostile acts intended to impede the mission. Illumination with

however,

is

a demonstration of hostile intent, not a hostile act,

and the

does not extend to impeding mission accomplishment. Moreover,

as a

fire

control radar,

hostile intent provision

matter of international

is more an act of
than of self-defense, though the use of force as a means of self-help under the Charter
regime is controversial. See VON GHLAHN, supra note 6, at 633-62. On self-help in a peacetime
context, see Corfu Channel, supra note 49.

law vice national policy, acting in response to an effort to impede the mission
self-help

became somewhat of

114. This possibly

a reality in Operation

DENY FLIGHT.

NATO

to attack SAM sites in Bosnia-Herzegovina that threatened enforcement
UN disapproved the proposal out of fear that the action might result in retaliation
against UNPROFOR troops on the ground. As a result, NATO aircraft enforcing the ban were

commanders wanted
aircraft.

The

required to

A.

F.

fly

WEZs

outside the

of known

TIMES, July 24, 1995, at 3. In

sites.

Steven Watkins, Does Deny

this case, operational

Flight Still

Work?

concerns gave way in the face of greater

UN policy implementation.
One must

115.

be careful about black and white characterizations of lawfulness.

determination of actual necessity

will

be

made

in the cockpit based

on the

The

aircrew's subjective

judgment.

SROE,

116.

supra note

117. For instance, the

only open

fire

ENDANGER
original).

IFOR

against a person

LIFE,

A-5.

4, at

AND THERE

IS

ROE guidelines

(ground)

if

he/she

is

on opening

fire

provided, "You

may

committing or about to commit an act LIKELY

NO OTHER WAY TO STOP THE
Number

Force Commander's Policy Directive

13,

TO

HOSTILE ACT" (emphasis in
I: Ground

Rules of Engagement, Part

Forces, July 19, 1993, reprinted in Bruce D. Berkowitz, Rules of Engagement for U.N. Peacekeeping

Forces in Bosnia, ORBIS, Fall 1994, at 635, 643.

mean

118. This does not
It

simply

means that

it

that an attack on the country's air defense system would be illegal.
would not be justifiable under the principle of self-defense. This point

emphasizes the fact that actions during no-fly operations, other than in self-defense, are
essentially political in nature.

must be taken not

119. Care
risking the

downed

SROE,

121.

Id.

122.

It is

not a justification

for

survivor. Uncertainty should always be resolved in favor of protecting the

crew member or other
120.

to read this principle too liberally.

assets involved in the

supra note 4, at A-5.
atGL-10.
See. e.g., The Hostage Case (U.S.

CSAR effort.

v. List), 11

T.W.C. 759 (1950)

(acquitting general

who had ordered destruction during German evacuation of Norway on basis that destruction was
necessary due to general's mistaken belief that Soviets were pursuing his forces). For an example
of such an evaluation in the context of state-sponsored assassination, see Michael N. Schmitt,
State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17

YALE J.

INT'L L. 609, 648-650

(1992).
123. For an excellent article
principles that

124.

on ground

can be applied to the

The SROE

aerial

forces

ROE

and

training,

which contains many

environment by analogy, see Martin, supra note

78.

includes the following provision repeatedly throughout the document.

do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessaryand to take all appropriate action in self-defense of the commander's unit and
other U.S. forces in the vicinity." See e.g., SROE, supra note 4, at A-3.
"These

means

rules

available

125.

The

relevant provisions of the

SROE

are as follows:
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(1)

U.S. forces assigned to the

will follow the

OPCON

[operational control] of a multinational force

ROE of the multinational force unless otherwise directed by the NCA. US

forces will be assigned

and remain OPCON

to a multinational force only

if

the combatant

commander and higher authority determine that the ROE for that multinational force are
consistent with the policy guidance on unit self-defense and with the rules for individual
self-defense contained in this

(2)

When

U.S.

forces,

document.

under

US OPCON,

multinational force, reasonable efforts will be

made

operate

to effect

in

conjunction with a

common ROE.

If

such

ROE

and obligation of self-defense
in
this
document
while
seeking
guidance
from
the appropriate combatant
contained
command. To avoid mutual interference, the multinational force will be informed prior to
U.S. participation in the operation of the U.S. forces' intentions to operate under these
SROE and to exercise unit self-defense.
cannot be established, U.S. forces

will exercise the right

common ROE extends beyond multinational concerns to the
between U.S. forces. On at least two occasions, different sets of ROE
applicable to U.S. forces have not been consistent. During operations in Somalia in 1994, there
was a point at which U.S. snipers had more restrictive ROE than those assigned to UNOSOM II
(United Nations Operations in Somalia II). This was the result of an incident in which a U.S.
sniper acting in compliance with the ROE killed a Somali in the back of a truck armed with a
crew-served weapon that was approaching a U.S. compound. Soon thereafter, Somalis appeared
charging that he had shot a pregnant woman. In the ensuing brouhaha, the U.S. JTF changed its
rules on snipers, while UNOSOM did not. See F.M. Lorenz, Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were
they Effective? 42 NAVAL L. REV. 62, 69-72 (1995). The second incident occurred during
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. When the operation commenced, some U.S. forces involved were
assigned to IFOR, while others were not. The former applied NATO ROE; non-IFOR troops
were governed by U.S. ROE, including the SROE. NATO ROE were eventually made applicable
to all U.S. forces in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Letter from Headquarters, European
Command to Commandant (sic), Naval War College, Subj: Lessons Learned from Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR, June 28, 1996, USAFE/JA Joint Universal Lessons Learned QULL) (n.p.)
Id.

at

A-l. The need

consistency of

(on

file

126.

127.

made

ROE

to seek

as

with author)

SROE, supra note 4. On the SROE generally, see Grunawalt, supra note 4.
The previous rules primarily governed operations during peacetime. The decision was

had the potential for creating confusion in the transition from peace to
war. Therefore, the current iteration was designed to apply regardless of the state of conflict. The
1988 Peacetime Rules of Engagement were promulgated by Memorandum from Secretary of the
Joint Staff for Unified and Specified Combatant Commanders and Commander U.S. Element,
NORAD, Peacetime Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces (Oct 28, 1988) (on file with Oceans
Law and Policy Dep't, Naval War College). The current ROE provide: "These ROE apply to
U.S. forces during all military operations and contingencies. Except as augmented by
supplemental ROE for specific operations, missions, or projects, the policies and procedures
established herein remain in effect until rescinded." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction (CJCSI 3121.01), CJCS Cover Letter (the Instruction itself), Oct. 1, 1994, at para 3.
The SROE do not apply when military forces are assisting federal and local authorities during a
civil disturbance or disaster. Id. at A-2.
that this approach

128. Unless, of course, there are

with which

all

combined

rules of

engagement

for the particular

operation

contributing States must comply. In such cases, the combined operation's rules
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supplant the SROE for the purposes of that operation. As noted above, though, the U.S. will not
be bound by such rules unless they are consistent with the U.S. position on self-defense.
129.

Though much

of the enclosure

information on self-defense that

is

is

classified,

not. This section

the

first

eight pages contain general

can be used

as a

strawman

for the

development of coalition self-defense ROE.
130.

The Combatant Commands

are established in 10 U.S.C. 164. In layman's terms, they

are the broadest military organizations

report directly to the

which employ combat

Combatant commands
They may be organized either

forces.

NCA (President and Secretary of Defense)

.

The five geographic commands are Atlantic Command (primarily
continental U.S.), European Command, Pacific Command, Central Command (Middle East),
and Southern Command (Latin America). The functional commands are Strategic Command,
Transportation Command, Special Operations Command, and Space Command. On command
relationships, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (Joint Publication 0-2),
geographically or functionally.

Feb. 24, 1995.
131. For instance, NORTHERN WATCH is a European Command operation, whereas
SOUTHERN WATCH falls under the control of Central Command. Only Central Command,
Pacific Command, and Southern Command have issued ROE of their own.

132.

Drawing on

a naval example,

whereas others define

it

some

States define disabling

as firing into the bridge. Similarly,

into the rudder,

fire as firing

warning shots

at sea are variously

described as firing across the bow, firing into the funnel, and raking the bridge.
133. The planning and execution process for U.S. military operations is described in JOINT
Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations Qoint Pub. 5-0), April 23,

1995.

The bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983
in this regard. The Commission found that the "ROE

134.
failure

detracted from the readiness of the
materialized

[Marines]

is

the generally cited example of

contributed to a mind-set that

to respond to the terrorist threat

on 23 October 1983." Commission Report, supra note

135. E.g., the missile

which

81, at 135.

may not have the range of the radar associated with the SAM system.

and white assertion must be tempered by operational prudence. For
sources may indicate a missile has a certain range, but it may, in fact, have

136. This rather black
instance, intelligence
a greater range

than advertised or previously witnessed.

mode, they simply search the sky for
mode, they are locked on to and follow a particular
guidance mode, radar guides a missile that has been

137. Radars operate in various modes. In the acquisition
targets. In the target tracking (fire control)

target in preparation for launch. In missile

launched to

target.

Whether

or not the functions are distinct (and distinguishable by aircraft)

depends on the radar system. For example, the phased array radar on an Aegis cruiser performs
all

three functions.
138.

The guidance can take multiple forms.

In Operation

NORTHERN WATCH, e.g., it is in a

booklet entitled the Commander's Guidance on the Application of the Rules of Engagement,

which

is

one part of an overall

SOUTHERN WATCH,
issued by the

set of guidance labeled the

by contrast, the guidance

is

Consolidated Operating Standards. In

contained in a Special Instruction (SPIN)

JTF Commander.

139. For example, by employing the technique of illuminating aircraft with

SAM system fire

on self-defense.
140. The mission is performed by the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM).
141. This need is compounded by the distribution of similar aircraft in the air forces of many
States. For instance, during DESERT STORM, both Iraq and members of the Coalition flew
French-made Mirages and Soviet-built MiGs.

control radars discussed supra in the section
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Over the course of the last fifty years, there have been a number of incidents in which
military aircraft were downed during peacetime operations. For instance, in 1952 and 1954,
Soviet aircraft shot down B-29s over Japan, in 1953 a USAF F-84 was downed by Czech fighters,
and the Soviets shot down a U.S. Navy P-2 in 1959. In each case, international condemnation
focused on the fact that the aircraft had inadvertently, vice intentionally, violated foreign
airspace. However, when a U-2 was shot down by the Soviets over Soviet territory in 1960 there
was a relative lack of condemnation. These incidents would tend to support the contention that
it is intent of the downed aircraft that will drive international assessments of legality. In the case
of a no-fly zone, the intent of a combat aircraft to violate an internationally "sanctioned"
prohibition approaches res ipsa loquitor status. On the incidents, and the reaction thereto, see
142.

1956

I.C.J.

Pleadings, Aerial Incident of Oct.

Aerial Incident of Nov.

7,

1952 (U.S.

U.S.S.R.); 1959 I.C.J. Pleadings,

v.

1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.) 1956 I.C.J. Pleadings, Aerial Incident of Mar.
v.
Czech);
1958 I.C.J. Pleadings, Aerial Incident of Sept. 4, 1954 (U.S. v.
10, 1953 (U.S.
U.S.S.R.); Schmitt, Aerial Blockades, supra note 7, at 51-52.
7,

;

One hundred six deaths resulted. KAL 007 was certainly not the first incident of a civil
being downed. In 1954 the Chinese shot down a Cathay Pacific airliner which they

143.
airliner

mistakenly believed to be a Nationalist Chinese military

Archives 13733 (1954). Other incidents of downing

aircraft.

Keesings Contemporary

include downings

civil airliners

of:

an Air

over Berlin in 1952; an El Al airliner in 1955 by Bulgaria; a Libyan airliner by the

France

airliner

Israelis

over the Sinai Peninsula in 1973; and the forced landing of a Korean Air Lines aircraft in

1983 by the Soviets. See Schmitt, Aerial Blockades, supra note

7, at

52. See also Bin

Cheng, The

KAL Flight KE007, and Article 3 Bis of the Chicago Convention, in AIRWORTHY:
Amicorum Honouring Professor Dr. I.H. Ph. Dierdericks-verschoor 49, 55

Destruction of

Liber

Storm van Gravesande

(J.W.E.

& A.

van der Veen Vonk

eds., 1985);

Craig A. Morgan, The

Shooting of Korean Airlines Flight 007: Responses to Unauthorized Intrusions, in

INCIDENTS:

Reisman

THE LAW THAT COUNTS

& Andrew

Military Aircraft in

The

144.

Willard

eds.,

IN

WORLD

INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS 202, 204-210 (W. Michael

1988); and John T. Phelps, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and

Time of Peace, 107 MIL.

L.

REV. 255, 266-274 (1985).

text of the draft resolution (S/15966/Rev. 1)

is

reprinted at 22 I.L.M.

1

148 (1983)

Poland also voted against the resolution, and the P.R.C., Guyana, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe
abstained.

U.N. Doc. S/PV.2476 (1983),

ICAO Council Resolution,
ICAO Council Resolution,

145.
146.

147. Protocol Relating to an

Aviation (Article 3

bis),

May

Mar.

F. Fitzgerald,

Incident,

10, 1984, reprinted in

Annals of Air
149.

annex

The F— 15

1154 (1983). See

(May

it

Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7, 1944,

also,

No. 1591, 61

Stat. (2)

1

180, 3 Bevans 944,

Schmitt, Aerial Blockades, supra note

7, at

Mi-24 Hinds during

file

56-64.

their visual
I

with author).

does not matter where the level

engagement, and the

see

Black Hawks as Iraqi
Accident Investigation Board Report, Executive Summary, Vol.

27, 1994) at para. 3 (on

151. Legally,

bis,

pilots misidentified the

identification. See Aircraft

was

Civil Aircraft:

2 (Rules of the Air), 15 U.N.T.S. 295, T.I.A.S.

150.

it

119 (1984).

Convention on International

reprinted in 22 I.L.M.

would suggest

Cheng, supra note 143, at 60-61;
The Aftermath of the KAL 007
291; Michael Milde, The Chicago Convention After 40 Years, 9

L.

& Space Law

Civil

23 I.L.M. 707 (1984).

in light of rules of interpretation,

The Use of Force Against

1984 CAN. Y.B. INTL

Convention on International

to the

intended to be declaratory For a discussion of Article 3

Gerald

1144 (1983).

1984, 23 I.L.M. 937 (1984).

6,

Amendment

Use of the term "recognize,"

148.

reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1138,

Sept. 16, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 1150 (1983).

is

criteria therefore, are appropriate.
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set, so

long as the execution of the

Of course,

the system of authorization

Clipped Wings

cannot be so complex that it fails to function effectively. It has been argued that during DENY
FLIGHT, the requirement to secure both NATO and UN approval for the use of force (in mission
accomplishment) frustrated accomplishment of the mission. The problem was not that of
connectivity (i.e., technology for communications), but rather unwieldy and slow

Command

decision-making. See Brian G. Gawne, Dual Key
Flight: Paralyzed

by Design (Nov. 1996) (unpublished manuscript on

first

fighters.

file

at

down by NATO

152. For instance, in the case of the four Galebs shot

were

and Control in Operation Deny

NWC library).

fighters in 1994, they

NATO AW ACS monitoring the area. They then were warned off by the

warned by

After these warnings went unheeded, the fighters had to secure authority from the

NATO Combined Air Operations Center before

they could engage the violators. Nash, supra

note 52, at 524.
153.
v. the

On the threats, see Containing Saddam, THE ECONOMIST, Nov.

UN,

Continued,

154. For example,

defended even
operation?

The

if

if

Saddam

15, 1997, at 43.

operations are run out of a base in country X, can country X's aircraft be

they are engaged in operations wholly unrelated to the no-fly enforcement

default answer

ROE

do the

155. E.g.,

THE ECONOMIST, Nov.

15, 1997, at 16;

is

no, absent authorization to the contrary.

permit forces to cross a border in order to effectively defend X's

aircraft?

156. Nicaragua Case, supra note 20, at 104-5.

157.
risk in

158.

and

Of course,

this begs the policy

question of

why

own

would not do

circumstances in which a State's

The

classic

example

NORTHERN WATCH

the Turks. Turkey

is

is

forces

U.S. forces should place themselves at
so.

cross-border operations during Operations

PROVIDE COMFORT

against Kurds using northern Iraq as a sanctuary in their war against

also at odds

on

a recurring basis with Syria.

159. Trail Smelter was a case involving a smelter that was discharging sulfur dioxide near
Trail, British

Columbia. The United States alleged that the sulfur dioxide drifted over parts of

Washington. The arbitration tribunal held
have a duty not to

use, or allow the use of,

United States on the ground that countries
their territory for activities harmful to another State.
for the

Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1965 (1941).

AFP 110-31, supra note 111, at para. 2-5; DEPT OF THE NAVY, THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP 1-14M), para.
160. See

2.5.1 (1995). Note, e.g., that in the law of the sea there

No

territorial sea.

such right

exists in the airspace.

is

a right to innocent passage through the

NWP

1-14M,

id.

at para. 2.5.1.

N.M. POULANTZAS, THE RIGHT
271-352 (1969). Roach cites a form of pursuit

161. For an excellent discussion of aerial hot pursuit, see

of Hot Pursuit

in

International

Law

from the hot pursuit of the law of the sea. Roach,
would
certainly be appropriate in the aerial
4,
environment; however, because of the speeds involved, it would be less a pursuit than merely an
ongoing engagement.
162. Poulantzas describes incidents of pursuit during armed conflicts not amounting to war,
labeled "self-defense pursuit," distinguishing

supra note

at

50.

Self-defense

it

pursuit

rejecting the contention that a right to enter a 3rd State's territory exists absent consent.

POULANTZAS,
163.

supra note 161, at 329-338.

Note that the State would be obligated

sanctuary by virtue of Article 2(5)
shall refrain

164.

The

keep

its

territory

from becoming a

article provides that "(a) 11

Members

from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations

preventive or enforcement action." U.N.

German

to act to

of the Charter. That

classic case

on sanctuary

CHARTER art.
in the law of

is

.

.

.

taking

2(5).

armed

conflict involves the Altmark, a

naval auxiliary vessel during the Second World War. In 1940, the Altmark transited

294

Michael N. Schmitt
Norwegian territorial waters carrying British prisoners. Permission to transit had been granted by
the Norwegians, who had also refused British requests that the vessel be searched for prisoners.
After the Altmark had passed through nearly 400 miles of Norwegian waters, a British destroyer
entered the waters and released the prisoners. The British justified their action in part on the
basis that the German vessel was using Norwegian waters improperly as sanctuary. On the
incident, see ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 236-39 (50
Naval

War College

165.

Law

International

Studies, 1955).

A colorable argument could be offered that crossing into the sanctuary State would be

authorized by the original mandate because the sanctuary State

with

its

own obligations under the

Charter. However, doing so

is

unable or unwilling to comply

may present a very real

threat in

terms of an intercept on enforcement aircraft by sanctuary aircraft alleging a violation of their
airspace. Further,

it

would

certainly be less politically disruptive to allow the Security Council to

address the matter.
166.

The Air Force law

of war manual states that

intrusion of military aircraft into national airspace

AFP

other force majeure."

on

"No

settled international rule permits

the grounds of mistake, duress, distress or

110-31, supra note 111, para. 2-5d.

The Navy

version, by contrast

notes that "(a)ircraft in distress are entitled to special consideration and should be allowed entry

and emergency landing
167.

The

rights."

NWP 1-14M, supra note

right of assistance entry into airspace

assistance entry, see Joint Staff,

2410.01A),Apr.

Guidance

is

160, para. 2.5.1.

less settled.

for the Exercise of

On the

U.S. policy regarding

Right of Assistance Entry (CJCSI

23, 1997.

168. In fact, there

is

just

such an obligation in international agreements

for the recovery of

astronauts. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. V, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, arts. 1-4, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.
169. As a practical matter, in a CSAR situation it may be more dangerous to attempt to
defend the downed crew member than seek "repatriation" after capture. The on-scene
commander must direct only tactically sound and safe procedures unlikely to worsen the crew
member's situation.
170. The risk of a mistake is two-fold. First, there are aircraft which are not forbidden to fly in

the zone

(e.g.,

engagement,
issue, see

relief aircraft).

one in which a

i.e.,

Paul

M.

Secondly, there
friendly aircraft

is
is

Ziegler, Considerations for the

always the possibility of a blue-on-blue

engaged. For a brief discussion of this latter

Development of Theater

Hostilities Rules of

Engagement: Blue-on-Blue Versus Capability Sacrifice (Nov. 1992) (unpublished manuscript on
file

at

NWC library).

171.

On

the issue of IFF squawks, see

Coe

&

Schmitt, supra note 82, at 78-79.

The

Hawk incident. The helicopters were
were in. The Mode IV code for
"friendly" was only received momentarily by the lead F— 15. The wingman received no Mode IV
response. It remains unexplained as to why the Mode IV interrogation was unsuccessful. Board

importance of IFF was tragically demonstrated in the Black

squawking

a

Mode

I

code that was incorrect

for the location they

Report, Executive Summary, supra note 150, at

5.

295

The Emerging Role of NATO

in

UN Peace Enforcement Operations
James P. Terry

HE RAPID GROWTH OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS
has obliged the United Nations to seek

new avenues

of cooperation

with groups of member States already organized for joint military action, such
as

NATO.

1

forces serve

This

coupled with Congressional concern that American

fact,

under responsible leadership and that

strict

standards are adhered

whether U.S. forces should participate in any peace
enforcement operation, suggests that U.S. participation in such operations will
to in determining

be significantly restructured in the future.
This restructured participation in international peacekeeping

will likely

among our major allies and other regular contributors
From the U.S. perspective, participation in these

drive similar rethinking
to

these

operations.

operations must

(PDD)

25.

2

now comply with the

This directive, which requires clear accountability in deciding

when

to participate,

likely

preclude U.S. participation in

when

The renewed

and under what conditions,
Somalia-style operations in which

to assign forces,

leadership proved inadequate.

threats

tenets of Presidential Decision Directive

UN

3

U.S. interest in extending the

beyond present

will

NATO borders,

4

as

NATO

Charter to encompass

evidenced in the current NATO-led

UN Peace Enforcement Operations
NATO

Bosnia peace operation, suggests regional organizations such as

become

the

element

leadership

choice

of

UN -sponsored

future

for

may

peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

U.S. Concerns with

UN-Led Peace

Operations

Recent U.S. experience with the United Nations suggests that there are a

number of

limited

enforcement operations
the

UN

must

effectively.

This creates

difficulties in

two ways. While

upon those states with experienced leadership and highly
its more difficult operations to succeed, it must also provide

rely

trained forces for

some opportunity
suggests that the

VI

Chapter

with the experience required to lead peace

States

for participation to

its

188

member

States. This

UN must be encouraged to increase its capability to conduct

peacekeeping

enforcement

each of

minimal,

are

issues

6

operations might be better

Chapter VIII of the

operations

left to

5

where

and

that

a

cease-fire

Chapter

VII

regional organizations such as

exists

and

enforcement

NATO under

UN Charter.

In the nearly seven years since our participation and leadership role in

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in support of the government of
Kuwait, the United States has contributed significant forces, at great financial
cost, to three

complex

direction of the
leadership.

The

military initiatives

UN, and one
military

Bosnia,

currently being undertaken under

commitments undertaken under

Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia,
8

conducted under the authority and

7

as well as the current

responded to multilateral requests

UN

NATO

leadership in

NATO-led operation

for assistance

in

voted upon in

Security Council Resolutions. In another, the humanitarian effort in Rwanda,

our participation was significant, although combat troops were not directly
engaged. In each instance of our participation under

UN

leadership, the

on
the floor of the House and Senate. In the case o{ Somalia, the Byrd and
Kempthorne Amendments forced the U.S. withdrawal from that theater by 31
resulting opposition by Congressional leaders has

March

The

1994.

forcefully expressed

9

carefully developed response of the Clinton administration to these

legislative pressures

UN

been

and

its

is

found in

Department

PDD
of

25.

The

U.S. has strongly encouraged the

Peacekeeping

institutionalize a similar policy analysis in

its

Operations

(DPKO)

to

review o{ those troubled areas

where the use of military force may be the only available international option.

We have recently witnessed greater discrimination in DPKO decision-making
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with respect to proposed operations in Burundi,
suggesting the

UN's own recognition of the

and Angola,

Liberia,

benefit of this rigorous analysis.

What may be more significant for the UN is its apparent recognition of its
own limitations in addressing peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII

UN Charter where "all necessary means" are required. In supporting the
current NATO leadership role in Bosnia, the UN leadership appears to have
of the

faced up to

its

lack of credibility in the areas of logistics support, intelligence

gathering, operational leadership,

apparent the
a

for

UN

PDD 25

PDD 25

role

in

operations

these

For U.S. leaders,

it is

continued U.S. support

—

especially

if

regional

NATO can successfully exercise an expanded charter.

Principles Support Leadership by Regional Organizations

Presidential Decision Directive 25, signed in

same

airlift.

analysis simply will not authorize

leadership

organizations such as

and necessary

principles

May

1994,

is

that underlie the Weinberger Doctrine

10

based upon the
of 1984.

The

Directive provides for careful analysis of those factors most relevant to

determining whether, when, how, and to what degree the U.S. should

and peace enforcement
operations. The PDD 25 policy also requires a thorough assessment and
continuing reassessment of our role to ensure that the operation to which we
have committed forces is effective, well led, and operating within appropriate
participate militarily in international peacekeeping

rules of engagement.

The

integrated leadership structure within

for this required assessment process, while

UN-led

force structures, such as

those cobbled together in recent years for peace enforcement,

The impetus for the PDD,
a tragic loss of U.S. lives

NATO allows

may

not.

Weinberger Doctrine before it, came from
while U.S. forces were serving at the behest of the
like the

international community. Just as the purpose of the 1984 doctrine was to

prevent the reoccurrence of another Beirut bombing incident in which 241

servicemen

lost their lives to Shiite extremists, the

immediate purpose of the

PDD

was to prevent another disaster such as we experienced in Mogadishu,
Somalia, where eighteen Americans were killed by General Mohammed Farah

Aidid's forces in October 1993.

11

The bombing in Beirut can be

traced in part to an unwitting shift in the U.S.

operational posture from that of a non-partisan U.S. force patrolling various
areas of the city

and providing security

at the Beirut International Airport to

that of a partisan force with U.S. naval forces executing

of the Lebanese

Armed

Forces.

The

fire

missions on behalf

tragedy in Mogadishu was similar in that

our operational awareness of the intentions of Aidid was lacking and the force
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committed did not reflect the actual requirements. Both PDD 25 and the
Weinberger principles are designed to preclude the same lack of situational
awareness that arose in Beirut and Somalia.

When

Secretary Caspar

W. Weinberger

outlined specific requirements for

U.S. military involvement, he was not concerned with peace operations per
se.

u Nevertheless, those

principles, stated below,

remain cogent, rational

beacons in any reasoned analysis of the conditions underlying a decision to

commit

forces in every military operation, to include peacekeeping

enforcement under a
•

Any

and peace

NATO aegis.

use of force must be predicated

upon

a matter

deemed

vital to

our

national interest.
•

The commitment must be undertaken with

the clear intention of

winning.
•

We must have clearly defined political and military objectives.

•

The

forces

committed must be

sufficient to

meet the

objectives.

There must be reasonable assurance that we have the support of the
American people.
•

•

The commitment

combat must be

of U.S. forces to

Similarly, the principles within

PDD

a last resort.

25 are presented as factors to be

considered in a decision to commit U.S. forces, and equally important, as
criteria required for the successful

deployment of those

forces.

Of necessity,

the

conditions and requirements for a Chapter VII peace enforcement action are

VI peacekeeping initiative. As a necessary first step,
the PDD requires that before voting for and supporting a peacekeeping or peace
enforcement operation in the UN Security Council, the U.S. must ask whether
the situation represents a threat to international peace and security. Second,

greater than for a Chapter

does the proposed operation, as outlined by the Secretary General or the
leadership

of a regional organization,

objectives? Third,

is

community of interest for dealing
Fourth, if a Chapter VI peacekeeping

there an international

with the problem on a multilateral basis?
operation

is

contemplated,

there financial and

have a defined scope with clear

human

is

there a working cease-fire in place? Fifth, are

resources available? Finally,

is

there an identifiable

end-point?

These are the same factors the U.S. considered in supporting the current
NATO-sponsored peace operation in Bosnia. The PDD similarly requires that
these factors be considered in determining when to extend an existing
operation, such as recently occurred when the Congress approved the
Administration's decision to extend the Bosnia operation. In addition,
significant U.S. troop

involvement

is

when

contemplated in peace enforcement
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operations where

all

necessary

means

makers

are authorized, U.S. decision

must now ask whether we have:
•

The

political
•
•

ability to

and

commit

sufficient forces to achieve

our clearly defined

military objectives;

A clear intention to decisively achieve these objectives; and
The commitment on the part of the UN or a regional organization

to

continually reassess and adjust the objectives, rules of engagement, and

composition of the force to meet changing operational demands.
In committing to participate in the current peace enforcement initiative in
Bosnia, President William Clinton determined that the

NATO-led

could only be met through a

PDD

25 requirements

While U.S. leaders
recognized that a cohesive force led by NATO leaders offered a more effective
means of "executing" the UN mission in Bosnia, there is recognition on the
part of all NATO members that the UN must remain the primary international
"authority" under whose aegis these operations are conducted.

NATO's

Role in International Peacekeeping Under the

Chapter

NATO,

operation.

VIII of the

UN

13

Charter

and

security.

such

refers to regional organizations,

in the context of appropriate regional action in the

international peace

UN Charter

14

It is

as

maintenance of

in this area that a relationship exists

between the two organizations, with ultimate authority centered in the United
Nations. Excepting the area of international peace and security, however, the
relationship between the UN and NATO is not hierarchical.

When

NATO

the

Washington,

15

as a "regional

it

Charter was established in 1949 by the Treaty of

made no mention

of any relationship to the Security Council

arrangement," nor did

it

contain any provision providing for

upon the authorization of the Security Council, or for reporting
"in contemplation." Instead, the Treaty of Washington expressed the

action only
activities

obligation of

NATO's member

under Article 5 1 of the
obligation

to

report

states to

be that of "collective self-defense"

UN Charter and,

correspondingly, embodied only the

"measures taken" to the Security Council.

formulation was adopted by the United States and

its

NATO

allies

16

This

because

subordination of NATO actions as a regional arrangement to Security Council

review in advance during the Cold

War would

have subjected

all

actions to

By characterizing NATO's military actions as "collective
self-defense" under Article 51, there would be no action of a "regional
arrangement" under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and no prior Security
Soviet

veto.

Council review.
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The concerns described above and similar concerns with regard to a possible
Chinese veto have, at least for now, dissolved. With the internal disintegration
of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 and the events in Tiananmen Square in the
People's Republic of China, those two

permanent members of the Security

Council have become more willing to support

UN -directed

involvement in

peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

During his campaign for President of Russia in 1991, moreover, Boris Yeltsin
committed to voting for Security Council initiatives which would support
democratic principles. His current entreaties for continued U.S. financial
assistance should ensure that Russia will not act unreasonably in that forum.

from the 1989 events in Beijing's Tiananmen Square has
caused the People's Republic of China to be extremely careful in their actions
in the United Nations and elsewhere lest they risk their "most favored nation"

Similarly, the fallout

treatment by the United States.

The

17

United States today in determining whether to support a
response by a regional organization under Chapter VIII or that of the UN as a
whole are more pragmatic than political. Our recent experience in Somalia
issues for the

with UNOSOM

and Bosnia with UNPROFOR suggest that UN-led operations
may not be capable of undertaking Chapter VII (all necessary means)
18
missions.
These peace enforcement missions require careful planning,
experienced leadership, and highly integrated command and control
arrangements.

II

This

combination

air-ground coordination and

required

is

air- artillery

to

execute

sophisticated

deconfliction as well as to implement

robust rules of engagement that will protect the force and the civilian

Most importantly, this cohesion is absolutely essential if forces with
experience levels and capabilities are to be successfully integrated to

population.
different

create

force

multiplication

rather

than

force

division.

UN -led

peace

enforcement operations, unless directed by one of a handful of states, will
continue to have difficulty achieving this integration. It is this understanding
that underlies the U.S. support for the current

NATO-led peace enforcement

operation in Bosnia.

NATO As a Regional Organization:
The

adaptation of

NATO

Chapter VIII in Operation

to a role as a Regional Organization

under

peace enforcement charter must be viewed as part of a
broad, long-term U.S. and Allied strategy that supports the evolution of a

Chapter

VIII with a

peaceful and democratic Europe. This strategy benefits U.S. security and builds

on the

bipartisan premise that the security of Europe
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is

a vital U.S. interest.
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American sacrifices in two world wars and the Cold War have
proven our commitment to the region as a community of shared values, and
those U.S. sacrifices have more than established our interest in recognizing and
Certainly,

encouraging the rapid settlement of disputes in the area.

The U.S. and its NATO Allies have pursued a number of initiatives since

War

the

These include negotiation and
implementation of the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
19
(CFE), support for the unification of Germany, bilateral assistance to support
reforms in former Soviet states, negotiation and ratification of the START II

end of the Cold

advance

to

arms control

strategic

this strategy.

programs to dismantle nuclear stockpiles in

treaty,

Russia, the elimination of intermediate nuclear forces (INF)

percent overall reduction in

NATO's

,

including a 90

nuclear weapons in Europe, and most

importantly, active U.S. diplomacy and the deployment of American troops as

NATO-led

part of a

force to help stop the

war and secure the peace in the

former Yugoslavia.

NATO plays an important role in this broader strategy for many of the same
reasons that

played an essential role in maintaining peace and security in

it

Europe during the past

beyond

its

NATO's

fifty years.

accomplishments

defense and deterrence.

as

It also

an

success during this period

effective military

proved invaluable

mechanism

went

far

for collective

as a political institution in

fostering

continuing involvement of the United States and Canada in

European

security.

Adaptation of NATO's interest in broader European security to

under the
Berlin

UN Charter's Chapter VIII began in

Wall.

In July

administration,

1990,

1990, soon after the

activity

fall

of the

under the active leadership of the Bush

NATO's London Summit Declaration set out new goals for the

and declared
that the Alliance no longer considered Russia an adversary. These efforts were
reaffirmed by the Alliance's declaration in Copenhagen in June 1991, which
stated that NATO's objective was "to help create a Europe whole and free." At

Alliance, called for changes in

NATO's Rome Summit
strategic concept,

in

its

strategy

November

and

military structure,

1991, the Alliance adopted a

which reaffirmed the continuing importance of

collective

defense, while orienting

NATO

out-of-area missions,

management, and peacekeeping operations.

Since then,

Chapter

crisis

NATO

VIII role.

At

new

toward new security challenges, such

as

has taken further steps to advance adaptation to a

its

January 1994 Summit in Brussels, the Alliance

made

two important decisions related to its status as a Regional Organization. First, it
launched the Partnership for Peace (PFP) to enable intensive political and
military-to-military cooperation with Europe's
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new democracies

as well as

UN Peace Enforcement Operations
which had considered themselves neutrals during the Cold War. PFP has
proven to be an important and effective program for these States and for the
Alliance: twenty-seven have joined PFP; a PFP Coordination Office has been
established in Mons, Belgium; and thirty major PFP exercises have been held
through June 1997, plus numerous exercises with Partners "in the spirit" of
PFP. The program is proving its merit in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where thirteen
PFP partner States are making substantial contributions to the NATO-led
peace enforcement operation in the Balkans.
States

The second major initiative related to
in Brussels in

adaptation to Chapter VIII by

NATO

1994 was the decision to embrace the concept of Combined Joint

Task Forces (CJTF) This concept will enable both NATO forces and military
assets to be employed in a more flexible manner to deal with peace
.

enforcement obligations.

The

benefits of a

20

NATO

doctrine that emphasizes flexible response as a

Regional Organization are both immediate and long-term, and they accrue not
only to existing and prospective
Alliance. Europe

is

a

NATO allies but to States who are outside the

more secure and

stable region because of

NATO's

work within Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Even now,
Central and East European States are reconstructing their foreign and defense
policies to bring them in line with Alliance values and norms.

commitment

to

While there

NATO—i.e.,

are

cooperation

NATO

many

democratic

—

government,

markets,

free

a close analysis of recent events in

commitment

Organization

reasons for pursuing the values represented by

to flexible response

also exerting a positive

is

peaceful relations.

As an example,

and

security

Europe reveals that the

on the continent as a Regional
influence on States toward more

several recent agreements to ensure stable

and address mutual concerns on the
treatment of ethnic minorities have been signed. These include the
promote

borders,

inter-state cooperation,

Polish-Lithuanian Treaty of 1994, the Hungarian-Slovakian Treaty of 1996, a
series of

agreements in 1996 between Poland and Ukraine, the 1996 treaty

between Hungary and Rumania, and the 1996 agreement between the Czech
Republic and Germany concerning Sudetenland.

The

NATO

acceptance of Chapter VIII responsibilities has been most

significant in Bosnia.

NATO

countries

made

a profound contribution to

European security through their participation in the NATO-led
Implementation Force (IFOR) and are still doing so under its successor
Stabilization Force (SFOR), which is continuing to implement the military
aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords. It is clear from these Bosnian missions
that NATO members are already restructuring their forces so they can
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participate in the full spectrum of current

including both Article

One

caution arises

and new Alliance demands,

V missions and peace enforcement missions.
from our NATO experience in Bosnia, however.

This

and the concern that military forces are being asked

relates to mission creep

to

perform tasks that are neither military in nature nor related to the agreed
mission statement.

During the

commanders managed

first

year of the

IFOR

to restrict their responsibilities

NATO

mission,

to separating the

opposing factions, collecting heavy weapons, and supervising the exchange of

By early 1997, broader additional taskings were imposed which would
have been better handled by international civilian agencies or Bosnian
authorities. These included requests to help resettle refugees, set up elections,
monitor local police, and sort out control of local broadcast stations. Pressure
has likewise grown on the SFOR to assist in, if not spearhead, the arrest of
21
dozens of war criminals.
territory.

The
if

U.S. understands that non- Article

V NATO missions will only succeed

military personnel are limited to military tasks for

trained. It

is

critical that

NATO

which they have been

leaders carefully define force size, force

SFOR proceeds. Allowing assignment of routine
police functions to a military force will jeopardize many of the other obligations
that the SFOR has assumed in Bosnia.
structure,

and mission

as the

Observations and Conclusions

NATO

acceptance of non-Article

contemplated by

its

Charter.

With

V

missions

is

both necessary and

the end of the Cold War, there

is

a unique

opportunity to build an improved security structure to provide increased
stability in

the Euro-Atlantic area without creating divisions

members. The

NATO

alignment, with

its

among

NATO

history of military integration

and

cooperation brought about by years of successful planning and training for

mutual defense
in peace

responsibilities,

enforcement

earlier,

in the ideal position to participate effectively

activities requiring the exercise of "all necessary

under Chapter VII of the

As noted

is

UN Charter.

peace enforcement operations, to be effective, require

careful planning, experienced leadership,

control arrangements.
forces

means"

The

and highly integrated command and

current Bosnia operation reflects that

can meet these requirements

NATO-led

comply with the principles of
The carefully developed response of

as well as

commitment embodied in PDD 25.
leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance to the military requirements of the
Dayton Peace Accords reflect the immense potential resident in NATO for

force
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peace enforcement.

NATO

and

The

has proven

UN has recognized the need for regional leadership,
that
can successfully execute missions under UN
it

authority, following rational requirements for troop deployment.

Notes
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, comprised of sixteen member States and three
new invitees (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, who are to be accorded membership in
1999), provides for collective defense in Article V of its Charter. Non- Article V missions
authorized for consideration include peacekeeping and peace enforcement, now properly
1

considered under Chapter VIII of the
2.

UN Charter.

Presidential Decision Directive

Operations,"

is

a classified directive.

(PDD)

An

25,

May

4,

1994, "Reforming Multilateral Peace

unclassified version has

International Organizational Affairs, U.S.

Department of

been published as Bureau of
No. 10161, The Clinton

State, Pub.

Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (1994).
3.

See James P. Terry, U.N. Peacekeeping and Military Reality, 3

AFFAIRS

135,

136 (1996), for a review of

UN

BROWN

J.

OF

WORLD

inadequacies in peacekeeping and peace

enforcement operations.
4.

During

NATO's Rome Summit

administration, the Alliance adopted a

in

new

November

strategic

importance of collective defense, while orienting
out-of-area missions,
5.

1991,

at

the

urging of the Bush

concept which reaffirmed the continuing

NATO toward new security challenges, such as

management, and peacekeeping operations.
UN Charter includes Articles 32-38 and addresses "peaceful
Although peacekeeping is nowhere mentioned in Chapter VI or

crisis

Chapter VI of the

settlement of disputes."

elsewhere in the Charter, these articles (32-38) are interpreted to authorize the presence of an
international interpositional force only after a peace agreement has been signed and the consent

of the parties to the force presence and
6.

Chapter VII of the

its

mandate has been obtained.

UN Charter includes Articles 39-51

and addresses "breaches of the

peace." Because sovereignty claims under Article 2 of the Charter are subordinate to the
international interest in redressing aggression, Chapter VII authorizes "enforcement" actions to
restore the peace

and maintain the international "status quo," without the requirement

to obtain

the approval of the disputing parties.
7.

Operations in Somalia included Operation

SCOR, 47th

RESTORE HOPE,

authorized by the

UN

in

3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992), and
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3185th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/814 (1993). Operations in the former Yugoslavia included Operation DENY FLIGHT,
authorized in S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3919th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993),
Operation PROVIDE PROMISE, authorized in S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th
S.C. Res. 794, U.N.

UNOSOM

II,

Sess.,

authorized in S.C. Res. 814, U.N.

U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992), and Operation SHARP GUARD, authorized in S.C. Res. 781,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (1992). Operations in Haiti
mtg.,

included Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, authorized in S.C. Res. 940, UN SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994), and UNMIH, authorized in S.C. Res. 964, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3470th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/964 (1994).

The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) implemented the military aspects of the
It has now been succeeded by the
NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). While President Clinton earlier set June 1998 as the
end-date for U.S. participation, in December 1997 he agreed to extend that date.
8.

1995 Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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The Byrd Amendment,

9.

that any funds appropriated for

Sect.

8156 of the FY 94 Defense Appropriations Act, provided

DoD may be obligated for expenses incurred only through March

31, 1994, for "operations of United States

Armed

Forces in Somalia." Department of Defense

Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8156, 107 Stat. 1418 (1993) (enacting the

Byrd Amendment). The Kempthorne Amendment, Sect. 1002 to the FY 95 National Defense
Authorization Act, although
military personnel

less

onerous than the Byrd Amendment, restricted funding

on a "continuous"

Authorization Act of 1995, Pub.

Kempthorne Amendment).

L.

basis after

No. 103-337,

See James P. Terry,

§

A

for U.S.

September 30, 1994. National Defense
1002, 108 Stat. 2663 (1994) (enacting the
Legal Review of

US

Military Involvement in

Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations, 42 NAVAL. L. REV. 79 (1995), for a discussion of
other legislation which would limit the President's Article II authority to engage in
peacekeeping. These include the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment to the FY 95 Defense

Authorization Act, the Peace Powers Act, and the National Security Revitalization Act.
10. Secretary of

Defense Caspar

before the National Press Club

verbatim in

on October

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

articulated criteria for U.S. intervention

28, 1984. Secretary Weinberger's

speech was printed

Oct. 29, 1984, at Al, A4.

The Evolving US Policy for Peace Operations, 19 S. ILL. L.
Our formal efforts to improve UN peacekeeping were begun, even before the 1993
by former President George Bush. In a September 1992 speech to the UN, the

See discussion in James P. Terry,

11
J. 1

W. Weinberger

19 (1994)

disaster,

.

then-President responded to the positive steps reflected in the Secretary General's 1992

"Agenda

for

Peace" by committing the U.S. to work with the then-Undersecretary for

UN peacekeeping capabilities.

Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, to improve

The Weinberger

12.

Criteria evolved

from "lessons learned" from the Long Commission

Report, largely written by Professor Grunawalt while serving as Commission Counsel, which
documented the flawed U.S. actions leading to the 1983 Beirut bombing.

Chapter

13.

VIII, in Articles

arrangements or agencies

52-54 of the

for dealing

UN

Charter, specifically provides for "regional

with such matters relating to the maintenance of

international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. Article 53 provides, in

pertinent part:

The

Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or

agencies for enforcement action under

its

authority.

But no enforcement action

shall

be

taken under regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

See

14.

An Agenda

A/47/277-S/24111.

Report of the Secretary General, Jan. 31, 1992, U.N. Doc.
paragraphs 60-65, Boutros-Boutros Ghali called upon regional

for Peace,

In

organizations to do more. In his 1995 Supplement to

Secretary General, Jan.

3,

An Agenda

for Peace,

Report of the

1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-5/1995/1, the Secretary General specifically

endorsed, in paragraph 79, the present

NATO-led

operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Treaty of Washington (North Atlantic Treaty), 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. 1964 (entered

15.

into force

August

24, 1949).

Article 5 of the Treaty of

16.

Washington provides,

Any such armed attack and

all

measures taken

in pertinent part:

as a result thereof shall

reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated

immediately be

when

the Security

Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace

and

security.

307

UN Peace Enforcement Operations
17. See Terry, supra

note

18. See discussion in

9, at

84.

BOWETT, THE

LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

164-66 (4th

ed. 1982).
19.

This agreement alone has resulted in the elimination of more than 50,000 pieces of

equipment in Europe.
20. A third major initiative involves the invitation of additional European States to join
NATO. While this NATO Enlargement Initiative is not directly related to Chapter VIII
involvement by NATO in peace enforcement activities, the training and increased
military- to-military relations that will accompany enlargement will complement NATO's
military

increased capacity to perform as a regional organization.

war criminals agreed to turn themselves in to SFOR
exchange for speedy trials. The U.S. has agreed to furnish
investigators and military prosecutors to ensure compliance with the speedy trial guarantee.
While not a part of the U.S. SFOR commitment directly, it reflects the type of military
requirements we must be prepared to meet in peace enforcement operations.
21. In addition, several alleged Croat

officials in

November 1997

in
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Nuclear Weapons and the World Court:

The

ICJPs Advisory

and

Its

Opinion

Significance for

ILS* Strategic Doctrine

Robert F. Turner

Introduction

Y THE

NARROWEST OF VOTES

(a 7 to 7 split

on perhaps

most

its

controversial conclusion), in fifteen opinions (including six dissents),

270 pages, following eleven days of hearings during which twenty-five
States testified and more than 30 submitted written materials,
the
International Court of Justice (ICJ or World Court), on 8 July 1996, provided
2
the United Nations General Assembly with a nonbinding advisory opinion on
totaling

1

the lawfulness of using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons. In the process,
it

solemnly affirmed the obvious, obfuscated the serious, and on at least one

important issue that was not even raised by the General Assembly's request
almost certainly reached the wrong conclusion with decisive unanimity. In the

Nuclear Weapons and the World Court

process,

it

may have

for international

inadvertently and gratuitously undermined the prospects

peace and world order on the eve of the

new millennium.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the opinion was quickly "interpreted" for the

media by the "spin-doctors" representing such groups as the original
"ban-the-bomb" Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), 3 Greenpeace, 4
and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, 5 as a
decisive victory for opponents of nuclear weapons
ignoring the fact that their
most vociferous defenders on the Court had issued strong dissenting opinions,
while at the same time the opinion was generally welcomed by prominent U.S.
Government lawyers 6 as about as harmless a decision as anyone could have
anticipated under the circumstances, especially given the opinion's political

—

genesis.

7

Particularly

revealing were

the

reactions

of the Japanese mayors

of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who had made impassioned appeals to the Court to
declare nuclear weapons illegal. Hiroshima Mayor Takashi Hiraoka told
reporters that "the

outcome looks

suggested that "the court

as if to

8

is

controlled by nuclear powers." Nagasaki

Itcho Ito expressed his "anger" at the
press: "I felt enraged.

In reality, despite

approve of the status quo," and

World Court's

Mayor

opinion, declaring to the

." 9
.

.

some

serious shortcomings,

once properly understood, the

core of the advisory opinion was consistent with well-established principles of
international law and

is

largely to

be welcomed. Nevertheless, because

it

will

and international policy debates in
and some generally reputable authorities have already
the coming years
10
clearly been misled
it is important to understand what the Court did and
did not say, and to identify a few clear shortcomings in the opinion.
certainly continue to be cited in national

—

—

two separate requests before the World Court for an
advisory opinion on this issue, but the one brought by the World Health
Organization was turned down by the Court because it was outside the lawful
11
scope of the WHO's responsibilities. While the United States and several
other countries urged the Court to use its discretion and reject the companion
request from the General Assembly as well, the authority of the Assembly to

There were

initially

seek such an opinion was obvious.

12
13

The General Assembly had taken the position in nonbinding resolutions as
early as 24 November 1961, that "the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear
14

... a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;"
however, these were typically approved by narrow votes that were hardly
15
indicative of a broad international consensus. Furthermore, even some of the
General Assembly resolutions seemed to recognize that no legal rule had yet

weapons

is

310

Robert F. Turner

been established outlawing nuclear weapons per se;

for

example, an ambiguous

1978 resolution asserted that "the use of nuclear weapons
prohibited.

.

.

.

should ... be

." 16
.

.

Responding

to

an

launched

initiative

by

several

anti-nuclear

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), on 15 December 1994, the UN
General Assembly approved Resolution 49/75 K, which provided in part that
the Assembly:

Decides, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph

1,

of the Charter of the United

Nations, to request the International Court of Justice urgently to render
advisory opinion

weapons

The

on the

its

following question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear

in any circumstances permitted

under international law?"

resolution was approved by a vote of 78 to 43, with 38 abstentions.

Thus, only a plurality of those States voting registered support for such an
advisory opinion; or, put differently, a slight majority of the organization did

not approve the request. While the Charter seems to exclude abstentions in
determining the outcome of a vote,

17

the Court might certainly have

considered this reality in deciding whether to respond positively to the request.

More

significantly,

an argument might be made that the resolution

itself

required a two-thirds majority to pass pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 18 of the Charter

18

—on

the theory that urging the

World Court

to

declare nuclear weapons per se illegal (the clear objective of the resolution)

could have the potential to undermine the entire system of nuclear deterrence

upon which international peace and stability have been premised for fifty years.
Writing about the Court's decision while still a New York University law
professor, the current Deputy Legal Adviser to the United Nations argued that
"it would not have been difficult to hold that a question relating to the threat or
use of nuclear weapons"

falls

under the two-thirds majority requirement, but

noted that "inexplicably no representative objected" on these grounds.
Nevertheless, he concluded: "It would seem that the Court, in perhaps

unseemly eagerness to address what is evidently one of the most interesting and
important current legal questions, failed to consider the possibly most serious
objection to

its

jurisdiction to

do

so."

19

Misstating the Question

There

is

resolution:

It

more fundamental problem with the General Assembly
was not phrased in the language of international law, and indeed
a
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seemed calculated to shift the burden of proof from those who argued that
nuclear weapons were unlawful to those who felt otherwise. The underlying
premise of modern international relations

is

that sovereign States are coequal

and generally independent of constraints except to the degree they consent to
limitations on their freedom of action (normally in exchange for similar
constraints

on the conduct of other

States)

,

either through treaties

and other

international agreements or by a consistent practice that States recognize as
reflecting a legal obligation.

The burden

thus

falls

upon those who claim

breach has occurred to identify the conventional or customary
limits the sovereign discretion of the State

The

classic

of Nations

—

in the

—

legal rule that

accused of the breach.

statement of this principle was

International Justice

made by

the Permanent Court of

the predecessor to the ICJ established under the League

landmark 1927 case of the

S.S. Lotus:

International law governs relations between independent States.

law binding upon States therefore emanate from their

own free

The

rules of

expressed

will as

in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law

established

order

in

a

to

regulate

the

relations

and

between these co-existing

independent communities or with a view to the achievement oi common aims.
Restrictions

upon

the independence of States

cannot therefore be presumed.

This principle was reaffirmed by the ICJ

as recently as the

20

1986 Paramilitary

21

and the improper wording of the 1994 resolution was objected
22
to by several States in their written and oral presentations to the Court. The
23
while at the same time
Court essentially ruled this harmless error,

Activities case,

acknowledging: "State practice shows that the

weapons

as

contrary,

is

illegality

of the use of certain

such does not result from an absence of authorization but, on the
formulated in terms of prohibitions."

24

However, it was clear from the declarations and opinions of the individual
judges that accompanied the Court's opinion that the Lotus principle is under
assault by judges from the Third World who wish to see greater constraints
placed upon States without having to obtain their consent. Thus, President

Bedjaoui of Algeria contended in his Declaration that, while the Lotus case had
"expressed the

It

spirit

of the times":

scarcely needs to be said that the fact of contemporary international society

much

altered.

law which

.

still

.

.

The

is

resolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of international

held sway at the beginning of the century

—and

to

which the

Permanent Court also gave its support in the aforementioned [Lotus]
judgment has been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a

—
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law more readily seen

as the reflection of a collective juridical

a response to the social necessities of States organized as a

conscience and as

community. 25

Restricting the Right of Self-Defense

The
first

real question before the

Court was actually

far

narrower than might at

appear from a reading of the General Assembly's Resolution, as

it

was

weapons did not confer some sort
of immunity from the prohibition against the aggressive use of force embodied
26
Thus, the only real question to be addressed was not
in the UN Charter.
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was ever lawful, but whether
international law prohibited a State in possession of nuclear weapons from
using them, or threatening to use them, under any conceivable circumstances
27
in a defensive response to armed international aggression.
universally agreed that possession of nuclear

Indeed, since deterrence

itself is

premised upon an implied "threat" to use

whatever existing weapons may be necessary and otherwise lawful in the event
of aggression, the IC] was essentially being asked to outlaw the most powerful

instrument in international relations for the dissuasion of aggression and the

promotion of peace.

28

The Court does not appear

to

have focused on

this

was at least implicit in the statements of some of the States
who provided comments. 29 One of the most compelling reasons for the Court
30
and not issued the requested opinion in
to have exercised its discretion
reality,

although

it

—

addition to the fact that a majority of the General Assembly had not supported
the request, and several States had warned that such an opinion might

—

undermine diplomatic negotiations was that the most likely consequence of
even hinting that nuclear weapons were per se unlawful might well be to
undermine the policy of nuclear deterrence that has worked so well for
half-a-century in keeping the world out of

addressed

World War

III.

This point will be

31

infra.

The Proper

Legal Standard

The proper role of the International Court of Justice is not to decide what
good public policy or "fair" or
from deep meditation, but to determine

result a majority of judges believe to be
"just,"

32

or to divine legal rules

whether the presumptive
interests in a specific

legislate.

manner has been

." 33
.

limited by an established rule of

As the Court acknowledged:

international law.

cannot

right of sovereign States to pursue their perceived

.
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"It

is

clear that the

Court
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Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ sets forth the sources of international law

the Court

may

use in deciding whether conduct has been prohibited:
Article

1

.

The

Court, whose function

is

to decide in

law such disputes as are submitted to

a.

38

it,

accordance with international

shall apply:

international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules

expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b.

international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c.

the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d.

subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings

of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary

means

for the

determination of rules of law.

Ascertaining the Relevant

Law

Thus, the role of the Court was to examine each of these sources of law to

and if so to what extent, they might limit the threat or use of
nuclear weapons and then to inquire whether there were any conceivable
defensive settings in which the threat or use of a nuclear weapon might not be
in conflict with any such legal rules. The basic inquiry was whether
ascertain whether,

international law included a per se prohibition against every threat or use of

nuclear weapons and that the proper test was not the "worst case" setting of a

massive aggressive assault involving the delivery of thousands of large nuclear
devices against another State's

cities,

but rather the "best case"

of a nuclear weapon on the High Seas to destroy an

launch weapons of mass destruction against the
seeking to defend

itself.

Court that nuclear weapons were

On the

as a use

enemy warship preparing to

civilian population of the State

34

International Conventions. Quite correctly,

law.

—such

free

no State contended before the

from constraints under international

contrary, the nuclear powers readily

conceded that any threat or

use of such weapons must comply with the jus ad helium governing the initiation

and the jus in hello regulating the conduct of military
some provisions of which were embodied in treaties and others in

of hostilities
operations

—

customary law.

35

was universally acknowledged that the UN Charter limited
any threat or use of nuclear (or any other) weapons to acts of individual or
For example,

it
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when

collective self-defense or
Similarly,

it

authorized by the

UN

Security Council.

36

was accepted without dissent that the laws of armed conflict

on noncombatants, the infliction of
unnecessary suffering, and the use of weapons that are incapable of
are applicable to
discriminating between combatants and noncombatants
prohibiting such behavior as attacks

—

nuclear weapons.

The Court

is

37

to be

commended

for rejecting a variety of assertions

opponents of nuclear weapons, such

Covenant on
life")

Civil

and

by

as that Article 6 of the International

Political Rights (guaranteeing the "inherent right to

outlawed the defensive use of nuclear weapons in combat

holding would presumably have outlawed

all

lethal weapons).

38

It

(a

contrary

also rejected

claims that a variety of environmental treaties implicitly outlawed nuclear

weapons,

39

that various treaties prohibiting "poisonous weapons" applied to

nuclear weapons,
genocide.

The

40

or that any use of nuclear

weapons would constitute

41

States

which denied the existence of a per

weapons recognized that there were a variety of

se

prohibition

treaties

on nuclear

and international

on nuclear weapons, ranging from bilateral
arms control agreements negotiated by the United States and the former
Soviet Union to multilateral treaties prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear
weapons in outer space, on the seabed or ocean floor, and in several geographic
agreements imposing legal

"nuclear-free" zones.

limits

42

After a lengthy discussion, the Court concluded that while the growing

number of treaties limiting nuclear weapons might be seen as "foreshadowing a
future general prohibition on the use of such weapons,
they do not
.

constitute such a prohibition by themselves."

noted that under several of these

43

.

.

In this connection, the Court

treaties "the

nuclear-weapon States have

reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances," and "these
reservations

met with no objection from the

the Security Council."

[other treaty] parties ... or from

44

International Custom.

As

already noted, historically, and as a general principle

today, States are only obligated to abide by legal rules to
individually consented

—

which they have

either by entering into treaties or other international

agreements intended to be binding under international law, or by joining in a
widespread practice with other States out of the belief (opinio juris) that
obligation of international law.

The
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provisions of treaties

constrain States which have not consented to
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persistently

registers

international law

objection

to

an

emerging

normally not bound by that

is

However, there

its

is

an exception

consent to be bound by a legal

customary

of

rule

rule.

to the general principle that a State

must

Since the Court's Statute was written, a

rule.

consensus has emerged that certain "peremptory norms" of international law
are of such

fundamental importance that they

will

be imposed even upon

Often identified by the Latin
expression jus cogens, these principles have been so universally embraced
through all major legal systems, and the consequences of their breach are

persistent objectors despite their lack of consent.

viewed

as so objectionable, that the collective

agreed to impose them on

embodied

all

States. Classic

in Article 2(4) of the

world community basically

examples include the prohibition

UN Charter prohibiting the aggressive use of

military force, the prohibition against certain categories of large-scale

murder

contained in the Genocide Convention, and the prohibitions against piracy

and the slave

trade.

The Court acknowledged

the existence of such "intransgressible principles
45

in the Nuclear

Weapons

case, but

such norms

the decision.

The standard

for constituting a

preemptory

of international customary law"

were not

norm

critical to

of international law

is

considerably higher than that for normal rules of

customary law, and there are no

jus cogens rules that are

not clearly also

customary law. Once having found that there were no rules of customary law
prohibiting every threat or use of nuclear weapons,

46
it

was unnecessary

Court to ask whether these norms had achieved peremptory

for the

status.

To be sure, no country has actually used a nuclear weapon in hostilities since
1945; but the Court rejected assertions that this was evidence of customary law
1
because of the clear absence of an opinio juris* Another contention that was

rejected was that a series of

UN

General Assembly resolutions should be

accepted as evidence of a customary
general "lawmaking" authority,

supported by
juris.

member

However,

as

rule.

48
its

While the General Assembly has no

resolutions can,

when overwhelmingly

States, serve as evidence of the existence of

an

opinio

the Court observed, the antinuclear resolutions often

provided that nuclear weapons "should be prohibited," and they were "adopted

with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions," leading the Court
to conclude: "although those resolutions are a clear sign of

regarding the problem of nuclear weapons, they
the existence of an opinio juris

on the

illegality

still fall

deep concern

short of establishing

of the use of such weapons."

49

General Principles of Law, National Judicial Decisions, and Scholarly
Writings. The basic nature of the issue before the Court precluded serious
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recourse to "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the

question of threatening or using nuclear weapons
character.

50

While the Court did note that

an internal use of nuclear weapons,"

51

it is

it

is

inherently international in

was "not called upon

to deal with

obvious that "civilized nations" have

not formulated special "principles of law" governing the domestic use of
nuclear weapons. Similarly, there was
for

little

recourse to such "subsidiary means"

determining legal rules as national judicial opinions and scholarly

treatises.

52

The
The

Dispositif,

or

Dispositif

operative provisions,

of the Nuclear Weapons

case

consisted of six conclusions in paragraph 105 of the opinion, half of which were

more than what the Court's Vice President (and current President)
," 53 Thus,
acknowledged to be "anodyne asseveration [s] of the obvious.
no
State has ever contended that there was any "specific authorization of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons" in customary or conventional international
54
law, and including a sentence on this point made little legal sense other than
as a political concession to the framers of the General Assembly Resolution
who had couched their request in such terms.
Similarly, deciding that "a threat or use of force by means of nuclear
weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations
55
Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful,"
little

.

is

— akin

obviously tautological

international law

is

.

to solemnly declaring that "an act prohibited by

unlawful." Again, the inclusion of such an obvious and

unquestioned conclusion presumably can be explained as a concession either
to the supporters of the General

dissenters

Of an

who had wished

Assembly Resolution or to the Court

to declare a per se prohibition.

essentially similar nature

is

the Court's unanimous conclusion that:

A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons should also be compatible
with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict,

and rules of international humanitarian law,
obligations under treaties and other undertakings which

particularly those of the principles
as well as

with specific

expressly deal with nuclear weapons.

56
.

.

.

Again, the nuclear-weapons States had conceded

have to

this writer's

all

knowledge never been seriously

in dispute.

money invested
member States.

conclusions hardly justified the time and

General Assembly, the Court, or the

of these points,
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Turning to more controversial matters, by a
eleven-to-three, the Court decided:

still

vote

decisive

of

There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
as such.

58
.

.

.

This was perhaps the most important part of the decision, both because of the
Court's nearly four-to-one majority

on the

and because

issue

it

answered the

basic legal questions implicit in the General Assembly's request.

To

be sure, the Assembly had actually asked whether there were any

circumstances in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted

under international law, but the Court quite properly had rephrased the answer
to be consistent with the reality that international law permits that which is not
59
prohibited. Indeed, had the Court limited its reply to this sentence
perhaps

—

accompanied by language noting that the lawfulness of any use of a nuclear
weapon, like all other weapons not prohibited per se by international law, must
be determined in the context of both why and how they are threatened or
used it would have been an excellent opinion.

—

Perhaps the most controversial of the Court's conclusions reads:
It

follows from the

above-mentioned requirements

law of

[of the international

weapons would generally be
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;

armed

conflict] that the threat or use of nuclear

However,
fact at

its

in

view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of

disposal, the

Court cannot conclude

definitively

whether the threat or

use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance

of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.

Perhaps the

first

observation that should be

Court's Dispositif is that

it

was not

required by the Court's Statute.

61

initially

made about

60
.

.

.

this part of the

reached by the majority vote normally

Judge Andres Aguilar Mawdsley, of Venezuela,

—

month before the case was argued leaving a Court of
only fourteen members, who divided evenly, seven-to-seven, on this conclusion.
died in October 1995, a

Since in contentious cases

it is

highly undesirable for tribunals to be unable to

reach a decision, the Court's Statute provides:
In the event of an equality of votes, the President or the judge
place shall have a casting vote.

62
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Because of the application of this

rule,

President Bedjaoui of Algeria

weapons

in his separate Declaration characterized nuclear
evil"

63

—was permitted

to cast a

provision to eight- to-seven.

second vote, bringing the

One might

note that

coincidence of timing, for had the vote occurred
distinguished

American

jurist

this

less

—who

as "the ultimate

official

count on

outcome was

than a year

this

totally a

later, after

the

Steven Schwebel was elected President of the

Court, a different opinion would presumably have resulted.

As an

one might argue that the Court has the discretion to withhold
the "casting vote" procedure in advisory opinions. The considerations which
encourage the definitive resolution of contentious disputes between or among
States are not so clearly applicable in the case of a request for an advisory
opinion. The Statute gives the Court discretion to decide which of its
64
procedural rules are "applicable" to an advisory opinion, and it would have
65
been consistent with the Statute and fully responsive to the General Assembly
aside,

to reply that:

(1)

International law does not prohibit the threat or use of nuclear weapons per

se\

(2)

Like

all

weapons, the threat or use or nuclear weapons must comply with

and jus

existing jus ad helium

(3)

in hello,

Based upon the Court's understanding

66

of the nature of such weapons, their

use would only be lawful in an exceptional setting; and

(4)

In the absence of more detailed information about the characteristics of the

weapon

in question,

its

intended target, the purpose for which the threat or use

made, and many other circumstances, the Court is unable
to provide more specific meaningful advice that would be applicable to every

of nuclear weapons

is

situation.

In any event, the weight to be accorded the Court's nonbinding "advice" to the

General Assembly on
evenly

split

this point

vote that produced

ought to be evaluated in the context of the

it;

and the "casting vote" procedure should be

recognized as the jurisprudential equivalent of a coin

However,

having

said

that,

one

circumstances, the basic conclusion

Court

is

is

might

not

all

also

toss.

note

that,

under

the

that remarkable. Essentially, the

saying that by the narrowest of possible margins

it

has decided that

it

cannot decide whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful,

even "in an extreme circumstance"; and, given the horrific consequences
commonly associated with any use of nuclear weapons, such a cautious
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conclusion

is

not

all

that surprising

—

particularly in the absence of a concrete

case or detailed information about the characteristics of

generations

of)

modern

(or future

nuclear weapons.

Indeed, had the Court merely reported that

it

"cannot conclude definitively

whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an
extreme circumstance of self-defence," omitting the further qualifying
language "in which the very survival of a State would be at stake,"

this writer

would probably have found that reasonable and acceptable. Given the stakes
involved, speculative conclusions in the absence of necessary facts probably
serve

little

One

purpose.

can embrace the Court's recognition that international
humanitarian law would preclude the use of nuclear weapons in other than
"extreme circumstances," but to conclude further than such circumstances
would necessarily have to involve "a threat to the survival of a State" is
certainly

unwarranted by any established or identified

legal rule.

As

shall presently

be

demonstrated, there are easily conceivable settings in which a State might have

no

effective alternative to using a nuclear

lives

of millions of

continue to exist

civilians,

its

if it

weapon

to neutralize a threat to the

even though the State might nevertheless

And

elected to endure such a sacrifice.

principle of international humanitarian law that precludes

nuclear weapons as a means of deterring

illegal

if

even a

there

is

any

threat to use

international aggression

involving the use of unlawful weapons of mass destruction, the Court has failed
to identify

it.

Indeed, any rule that would prohibit a State in lawful possession

of nuclear weapons from even threatening to use

them

defensively to preserve

the lives of tens of millions of innocent noncombatants would stand as clear

evidence that law had become part of the problem
Dickens: "If the law supposes that, the law

is

—

or,

a ass, a idiot."

in the

words of

67

Dangerous Ambiguity: The World Court and the Use of Nuclear
Weapons in Defense of Third States
The Court does not

whether a distinction exists
between threatening or using nuclear weapons in response to "extreme
circumstances of self-defense" threatening the survival of the nuclear-weapons
State

itself,

and

in the Dispositif clarify

a threat by such a State to use nuclear

weapons

in collective

defense against a threat to the survival of a third State; however, elsewhere in
the opinion there

is

weapons "in an
very survival would be at

a reference to a State using nuclear

extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its
68
stake." This is an alarming statement, and it is contrary to the
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United Nations Charter, which expressly recognizes "the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations."

69

Senator Arthur Vandenberg,

subcommittee of Commission

III

at

San Francisco that

who

chaired the

actually drafted Article

51, explained to his Senate colleagues in 1949:

To make

—

La tin- America rebelled and so did we. If the
omission [of the right of collective self-defense] had not been rectified there
would have been no Charter. It was rectified, finally, after infinite travail, by
agreement upon article 5 1 of the Charter. Nothing in the Charter is of greater
a long story short,

immediate importance and nothing in the Charter
importance.

Similarly, in explaining this provision to the

Committee

of equal potential

is

70

Senate Foreign Relations

John Foster Dulles affirmed:

in July 1945,

At San Francisco, one of the things which we stood for most stoutly, and which
we achieved with the greatest difficulty, was a recognition of the fact that that
doctrine of self-defense, enlarged at Chapultepec to be a doctrine of collective
self-defense, could stand

the Security Council.

unimpaired and could function without the approval of

71

There is a strong argument that the right of sovereign States to use necessary
and proportional lethal force in defense against armed international aggression
is

not only "inherent,"

also

as the English- language text of Article

"imprescriptable"

(as

the

51 terms

Russian text of Article 51

"inalienable" (as the United States argued in 1928

73

).

it,

asserts

but

72
)

or

In his separate opinion,

Judge Fleischhauer (Germany) argued that the Court could also have found
legal support for this right in "the general principles of

law recognized in

all

no legal system is entitled to
demand the self-abandonment, the suicide, of one of its subjects." 74 This view
was also embraced by President Bedjaoui, who acknowledged that "[a] State's
legal systems," as

right to survival

law."

75

It is

it is

is

universally recognized "that

... a

fundamental law, similar in many respects to a

certainly not a right to be

narrowed by

'natural'

judicial fiat of the

Court, and anyone asserting that a victim of aggression

World

may not defend itself by

the use of lawful weapons, against lawful targets, in compliance with the law of

armed

conflict

—

or

may not

obtain

voluntary

assistance

peaceloving States in meeting the aggression collectively

from

other

—has the burden of

identifying the legal basis for such a rule in conventional or customary

international law.

peace

is

The

principle of acting collectively to

not only unimpaired by the Charter,
321
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meet

the very

threats to the
first

objective
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embodied
compelling
insufficient

Charter 76

the

in

legal

authority,

simple

declarations,

implying

or

asserting

—even when they emanate from

has acknowledged,

it

"cannot

suggests that "legislate"

Few

and

;

is

legislate,"

exactly

77

such limitations,

by
are

World Court. As the Court

yet a careful reading of their opinions

what some of the judges attempted

have been more

legal doctrines

the

unsupported

to do.

critical in deterring aggression

78

and

weak victims of
aggression to call upon other peaceloving members of the world community for
assistance in the event they are victims of armed international aggression; and
why the World Court seems determined to undermine this important Charter
79
principle is unclear. In essence, the World Court seems to be announcing that
promoting peace than the recognized right of

States that can acquire

weapons of mass destruction and do not respect the rule

of law will be free to use
lack such

weapons

relatively

them

at will against

weaker peaceloving States that

—because the nuclear-weapons

States will be prohibited by

international law from responding (or even threatening to respond) in kind to

even the most flagrant criminal
academic importance,

acts of aggression.

because

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

81

80

This point

is

of more than

one of the incentives in the Nuclear
to encourage States to forego their right to

develop nuclear weapons was a promise, endorsed by the Security Council, that
the nuclear-weapon States would

come

threatened with nuclear weapons.

82

to their defense in the event they

As Judge Oda

(Japan)

said

in

were
the

conclusion of his dissenting opinion in the case:

on the one hand, the NPT regime which
presupposes the possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon States
has been firmly established and that, on the other, they have themselves given
security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States by certain statements they

One can conclude from

the above that,

have made in the Security Council. ...
regime

is

It is

generally accepted that this

a necessary evil in the context o{ international security,

doctrine of nuclear deterrence continues to be meaningful and valid.

NPT

where the
83

Pactum de Contrahendo or Pactum de Negotiando?
The

paragraph of the Dispositif was also reached by unanimous

final

decision:

an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and

There

exists

effective international control.

84
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This part of the opinion may warrant more consideration than

it

has thus far

While the General Assembly's request for an advisory opinion was
clearly politically motivated and poorly phrased, the question focused entirely
upon the existing legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and did
not even suggest that advice was being sought on obligations to negotiate new
85
Nevertheless, the Court sua sponte elected to address this
limitations.
presumably as another consolation to States that had hoped or
issue
expected a decision that nuclear weapons are unlawful per se.
received.

—

Not

surprisingly, this dicta did

not escape the attention of the General

Assembly, which in December 1996 approved a resolution thanking the Court,
"taking note" of the opinion, and then resolving that the General Assembly:

Underlines the

3.

to pursue in

disarmament in

4.

Calls

upon

multilateral

unanimous conclusion of the Court that there

good

faith

all its

all

and bring

to

aspects under strict

States to

negotiations

fulfill

in

exists

an obligation

a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear

and

effective international control;

that obligation immediately by

1997

leading

to

an

early

commencing

conclusion

nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production,

of

a

testing,

deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and
providing for their elimination.

Because

dicta

86

from the IC] advisory opinion

duty now exists to reach agreement on these
carefully at this part of the Court's opinion
it is

is

being used to argue that a legal

issues,

and

it is

important to look more

at the legal theories

upon which

premised.

By way of background, paragraph F of the Dispositif was premised upon
Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which provides:
Article

VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control. 87
In paragraphs 99 and 100 of

its

advisory opinion, the Court quotes this

provision and then provides this conclusion:

The

legal

importance of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of

conduct; the obligation involved here

is

323
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result

—nuclear disarmament

in

aspects

all its

—by adopting

a particular course

of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith.

.

.

.

This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns
the 182 States parties to the Treaty ... or, in other words, the vast majority of the
international community.

88

Despite the unanimous vote on paragraph F of the

seems clearly to have confused two related

the Court

Dispositif,

an agreement to
conclude a specific agreement in the future (pactum de contrahendo) and an
agreement to negotiate in good faith in the future in an effort to reach
agreement on a specified issue (pactum de negotiando). In this case, the Court's
conclusion
It is

is

simply not reconcilable with the text or travaux of the agreement.

NPT

submitted that Article VI of the

interpreted

89

to,

does not, and cannot reasonably be

obligate treaty parties to conclude anything

clearly only to "pursue negotiations in

The

legal concepts:

good

faith"

— the

obligation

is

towards that end.

basic principles for interpreting international agreements are set forth

90
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which, while not binding
as conventional law on all parties to the NPT, are widely recognized as
reflecting customary international law. Under the heading "General rule of
interpretation," the Convention provides, inter alia:

in the

Article 3

1.

A

treaty shall be interpreted in

meaning
its

good

faith in

accordance with the ordinary

to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context

and

in the light of

object and purpose.

The

"ordinary meaning" of a promise to "pursue negotiations"

reach an agreement"

—which,

if it

the same obligation would exist for the second State

of the 185 parties to the treaty. Does this
a

not "to

has any meaning, presumably would require

States to accept the best terms the other side was willing to offer.

World Court can obtain

is

—

all

To be

sure,

or in this instance for

mean that the

judgment requiring

91

first

all

State to get to the

of the other treaty parties to

"conclude" the treaty favored by the petitioning State? Since the so-called
"obligation to
treaty,

.

.

.

conclude negotiations"

but one incorporating

"strict

and

in the Court's

wisdom

first

assume the

proposal brought before

it,

is it

and

that proposal includes such control, to compel every

other treaty party to adhere to those terms?
to

not simply for a disarmament

effective international control,"

the proper role of the Court to consider the
if

is

legislative task of drafting

324
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does the Court instead intend

perhaps hundreds of pages of highly

Robert F. Turner

detailed

and

and

intrusive inspection

verification terms, to be

imposed upon

sovereign States irrespective of their consent?

What, pray tell, is the Court then to do with the States that are not parties to
the NPT and thus have clearly not consented to this alleged "obligation ... to
conclude negotiations?" Having declared that all treaty parties must enter into
"a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control," what is the Court then to do about the small number of
non-parties to the treaty who do not elect either to surrender all of their
weapons or to submit to the controls the Court seeks to impose upon treaty
parties? Are they to be rewarded by being allowed to remain outside the

—presumably expanding
neighbors
discount
of
weapons —

disarmament regime
of-business"
their

rid

prices) as their

territory

or

all

"acceptable" draft treaty submitted to

it

will

their arsenals (at "going-out-

are compelled by the

the

Court to

Court anoint the

first

by any treaty party as establishing a jus

cogens obligation erga omnesl

Perhaps the most interesting practical question raised by such an approach is

how

long the

invoked

its

NPT would

right

out- of- control

continue to exist before one State after another

under Article

World Court

X

to

withdraw from the treaty

as the "extraordinary

the supreme interests of its country?"

92

—

citing the

event" that has "jeopardized

Surely world peace and the rule of law

would not be furthered by such an obvious misinterpretation of the NPT.
Fortunately, the

NPT

is

safe,

because the World Court clearly reached the

wrong conclusion in this nonbinding advisory opinion. The issue raised by
Article VI of the NPT is not one of first impression in international law. Even
when the language of an agreement clearly provides that the parties will not
just negotiate

but conclude a future agreement, unless the terms are essentially

fixed by reference to the original agreement, tribunals tend to treat

nothing more than a commitment to negotiate in good

Tacna Arica Award

(Chile

v.

Peru)

faith.

as

Thus, in the 1925

—which involved an agreement
manner

them

to conclude

which the plebiscite is to be
carried out, and the terms and time for the payment by the nation which
93
remains the owner of the provinces of Tacna and Arica"
the arbitrator
a future protocol to prescribe "the

in

—

found:

As

the Parties agreed to enter into a special protocol, but did not

their

undertaking was in substance

to negotiate in

good faith

Party waived the right to propose conditions which

and appropriate

to the holding of the plebiscite, or to

by the other Party which

it

deemed

protocol with undefined terms did not
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that

deemed

.

.

.

terms,

Neither

to be reasonable

oppose conditions proposed

The agreement to make a special
either Party was hound to make an

inadvisable.

mean

it

to that end.

fix its
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agreement unsatisfactory
special protocol

to itself provided

did not act in bad faith. Further, as the

it

was to be made by sovereign

implied in the agreement

.

.

.

States,

it

must

deemed

also be

to be

that these States should act respectively in

accordance with their constitutional methods, and bad faith

is

not to be

predicated upon the refusal of ratification of a particular proposed protocol

deemed by

the ratifying authority to be unsatisfactory.

In 1931, the predecessor to the current

—

94

World Court

—the Permanent

Opinion on
Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland at the request of the League of
Nations. Summarized briefly, in an effort to resolve a quarrel between the two
countries, the Council of the League of Nations had approved a resolution
recommending "the two Governments to enter into direct negotiations as
soon as possible in order to establish such relations between the two
neighbouring States [as] will ensure 'the good understanding between
," 96
nations upon which peace depends'.
This resolution was accepted by
both countries, and Poland subsequently contended that Lithuania was
obligated to agree to reopen a section of railway between Vilna and Livau
that had been destroyed during World War I.
Court of International Justice

(PCIJ)

issued an Advisory
95

.

The

.

PCIJ concluded that both States were legally

bound by the "agreement

to negotiate" contained in the Council's resolution, but rejected the Polish

view that

come

to

this

was in

reality a legal obligation

"not only to negotiate but also to

an agreement," explaining:

The Court

is

indeed

justified in considering that the

engagement incumbent on

the two Governments in conformity with the Council's Resolution

enter into negotiations, but also to pursue

concluding agreements.

.

.

.

them

as far as possible,

is

not only to

with a view to

But an obligation to negotiate does not imply an

obligation to reach an agreement.

97
.

.

.

In 1950 the newly established International Court of Justice was asked for an
advisory opinion

on whether South Africa had

trusteeship agreement to place the former

a legal duty to negotiate a

German colony

of South-West

—which had been placed under South African control by
Nations mandate following World War — under the new UN
Africa

I

system.

98

While the Court majority found no such

a

League of

trusteeship

obligation, in his dissent,

Judge Alvarez found not only a duty to negotiate but also an "obligation" to
reach an agreement. However, he acknowledged: "even admitting that there is

no

obligation to conclude an agreement, there
.""
obligation.
legal

.

.
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Consider as well a 1972 arbitral award by a tribunal established to resolve

between Greece and Germany resulting from World War II. The
tribunal was asked to decide whether an undertaking to engage in "further
discussions" and "negotiations" included an obligation to reach an actual
disputes

agreement.

With

The

tribunal held;

the ratification of the Agreement, the parties

anew notwithstanding the

their dispute

.

.

.

undertook to negotiate

earlier refusals of

from positions that had hardened over the

both sides to retreat

must be considered
between
the parties in the
as
present case is not a pactum de contrahendo as we understand it. This term should
be reserved to those cases in which the parties have already undertaken a legal
10 °
obligation to conclude an agreement.
years. Article 19

a pactum de negotiando. The arrangement arrived

.

The

went on

tribunal

to note that

.

at

.

even a pactum de negotiando creates

legal

obligations for the parties:

However, a pactum de negotiando is also not without legal consequences. It means
that both sides would make an effort, in good faith, to bring about a mutually
satisfactory solution by way of a compromise, even if that meant the
relinquishment of strongly held positions earlier taken.

It

implies a willingness for

the purpose of negotiation to abandon earlier positions and to meet the other
side part way.

An

article

International

101

published in the highly acclaimed Encyclopedia of Public

Law

neither contains

good

in 1997

on these two

an enforceable

types of agreements concluded that

legal obligation to

do more than negotiate in

faith:

no relevant

between the two pacta in the
legal quality of the obligations resulting from these instruments. There is no case
where an absolute "agreement to agree" has been recognized by an international
tribunal. Therefore, the contractual obligations to negotiate in good faith with a
view to concluding a subsequent agreement, laid down in pactum be it named
pactum de contrahendo or pactum de negotiando will only differ slightly according
to the circumstances in the particular case: the margin of negotiation on matters
of substance left open to the parties for shaping the ultimate agreement will be
larger or smaller according to the degree to which the substantive contents of the
102
final agreement can be determined by means of the pactum itself.
In the author's view there

is

distinction

—

—

International
decisions

and National

Treatises,

If

one were

to

examine

"judicial

and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
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one would find similar conclusions. One of the world's foremost
authorities on treaty law was Lord Arnold Duncan McNair, who during his
distinguished career served as president of both the International Court of
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. He provides this discussion
in his classic 1961 treatise, The Law of Treaties:
nations,"

Pactum de contrahendo
This term

and

.

.

.

When

valid obligations.
is,

a State to

conclude a later

agreement, and these preliminary agreements are of frequent

occurrence.

It

an agreement by

correctly applied to

is

final

.

.

they are expressed with

sufficient precision,

they create

.

however, necessary to distinguish between a true obligation to enter into a

and an obligation merely to embark upon negotiations for a later treaty
and to carry them on in good faith and with a genuine desire for their success.
Less happily in our opinion, the term pactum de contrahendo is applied to an
obligation assumed by two or more parties to negotiate in the future with a view to
later treaty

the conclusion of a treaty. This

is

a valid obligation

upon the

parties to negotiate

do so amounts to a breach of the obligation. But the
obligation is not the same as an obligation to conclude a treaty or to accede to an
existing or future treaty, and the application to it of the label pactum de
104
contrahendo can be misleading and should be avoided.
in

good

faith,

and

a refusal to

Turning to United States law, Professor Allan Farnsworth served as
Reporter to the Second Restatement of Contracts, and his multivolume treatise,
Farnsworth on Contracts,
States.

He

discusses

a

is

among

the leading texts

on the

of judicial opinions

variety

issue in the

refusing

to

United
enforce

agreements to agree on the grounds that they were "vague and indefinite," and

under the heading "Agreements to Negotiate"
Under an agreement
if

they

fail

writes:

to negotiate, the parties negotiate with the

to reach ultimate agreement they

will

not be bound.

knowledge that
parties to an

The

agreement to negotiate do, however, undertake a general obligation of fair
dealings in their negotiations.
[H]ere there is no way of knowing what the
.

.

.

terms of the ultimate agreement would have been, or even whether the parties

would have arrived at an ultimate agreement .... Because of the uncertain scope
of an undertaking to negotiate, a court cannot be expected to order its specific
performance, though it might enjoin a party that had undertaken to negotiate
105
exclusively from negotiating with others.

on this
having "condemned an

Professor Farnsworth notes that English courts have been "adamant"
issue,

quoting "a distinguished English judge" as
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agreement

'to

negotiate fair and reasonable contract sums'

"

by saying:

"If

law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (where there

fundamental term yet to be agreed)
contract to negotiate."

it

seems to

me

it

the
is

a

cannot recognise a

106

The Travaux Preparatoire, If there is any remaining doubt about whether
Article VI of the NPT is an agreement to conclude a future agreement, it is
useful to return to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
Article

32

Supplementary means of interpretation

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory works of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order

meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
to confirm the

to

1

While

it is

or obscure

—

contend that the language of Article VI is ambiguous
or otherwise meets the test for resorting to supplementary means
difficult to

—

of interpretation

nevertheless useful to consult the travaux preparatoires

it is

unanimous World Court reached the wrong result. The
standard reference on the NPT is Mohamed I. Shaker's multivolume study,
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959-1979,
which provides useful background on Article VI.
to confirm that the

Dr. Shaker notes that the original drafts included merely preambulatory
references to the importance of ending the nuclear arms race

and achieving

disarmament, and notes that "the two super-Powers preferred a simple treaty
without linking
India,

with any other arms control and disarmament measures.

it

." 108
.

.

however, "advocated that a non-proliferation treaty must embody an

article of solemn obligation

under which nuclear- weapon States would negotiate a

meaningful programme of reduction of existing stockpiles of weapons and their
delivery vehicles.

.

.

.

The

meaningful programme but

obligation was therefore not merely to negotiate a
to

undertake certain measures."

proposed that "(t)he nuclear weapon States Parties to

adopt specific measures.
[I]t

was

realised that

and the United

it

States.

.

.

.

However,

as Dr.

109

this

Similarly,

Romania

Treaty undertake to

Shaker observes:

would not have been accepted by both the Soviet Union
Moreover, it was pointed out that it would liave liardly been
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feasible in legal terms to enter into obligations to arrive at agreements.

that could be done, therefore, was to introduce in the

NPT

The

least

[sic]

an obligation "to

pursue negotiations in good faith" as proposed by Mexico, or "to negotiate" as

proposed by

Brazil.

co-Chairmen in

.

.

.

The Mexican formula was

the one adopted by the two

their identical treaty drafts of 18 January 1968.

m

Lest there be any doubt about the obligation that resulted, Dr. Shaker notes:

Under the
allies,

pressure of the non-aligned States as well as from

the two super-Powers merely accepted in the

NPT to undertake to pursue
American

negotiations in good faith, but not, as pointed out by one
"to achieve

any disarmament agreement,
and

exact nature

results of

since

such negotiations."

it is

some of their own
negotiator,

obviously impossible to predict the

112

thus clear from the text, the travaux, and the underlying legal principles

It is

—

VI of the NPT constitutes only a pactum de negotiando an
obligation to negotiate in good faith towards the specified end
and, despite the
unanimous character of the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion on this point to
involved, that Article

—

the contrary,

it

does not constitute a pactum de contrahendo. Indeed, the very

language of the agreement

and

a

references to "effective measures"

effective international control"

"to pursue negotiations in
It

—with

might be added that

good
if,

—

faith"

explains

on the

why

this

and

"strict

was but an undertaking

subject.

despite the clear language to the contrary, this was

pactum de contrahendo, the terms of this agreement would presumably need

to

Unless the Court

is

be objectively ascertainable with reasonable

clarity.

prepared to spell out the precise terms of a "treaty on general and complete

disarmament under strict and effective international control," including
identifying when, where, by whom, and under what conditions the highly

—

intrusive international verification inspections are to occur

possible to identify

which States

—

very seriously.

mere brutum fulmen.

It is

It is

it

will

are in breach for failing to anticipate

accept those terms

it is

so that

difficult to

be

and

take this portion of the Court's decision

evident that the Court cannot flush out even basic terms for any such

agreement, because no such agreement ever existed in the minds of the parties

when

they entered into the treaty. Presumably, they

all

shared a vision that

someday the world might live at peace without war, and some may well have
had in mind specific provisions they intended to try to insert in any convention
promoting this end. But the convention travaux provide no suggestion that
anything approaching final treaty terms was ever discussed as the NPT was
drafted.
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Equally clearly, one can be confident that few countries would have ratified
the

NPT

with the expectation that the World Court might subsequently

them in breach of an obligation to ratify a subsequent treaty containing
not
highly intrusive but unknowable verification and inspection provisions
and premise their security upon the
to mention to surrender all of their arms
Court imposing a verifiable and effective machinery to prevent all possible
violations of this unknown future convention. Put simply, Article VI of the
NPT creates nothing more than an obligation to negotiate in good faith; and
declare

—

—

the Court's 1996 advisory opinion cannot change that.

A Legal Use of Nuclear Weapons: The Missing Hypothetical
The World Court is,

in the view of the present writer, clearly mistaken in

its

conclusion that the only conceivable lawful use of nuclear weapons would
involve a threat to the survival of a State, but the fault
of the judges.

Much

of the public debate

on

may not be

this issue

entirely that

has been fueled by

and 1960s, on the
destructive nature of nuclear weapons, and the nuclear-weapons States have
understandably surrounded their more recent weapon-development programs
scholarship and government studies, dating from the 1950s

in a shroud of secrecy.

One would have

thought, given the importance of the issue and the

widespread reports of the existence of a

new

generation of low-yield, highly

accurate nuclear weapons, that at least one of the nuclear powers would have

one hypothetical that the Court could use in its legal analysis
phase applying the law to specific facts but other than a few vague
113
references to "High Seas," "submarines," and "deserts,"
this does not appear
to have been done.
set forth at least

—

—

Candidly, even these brief references should have given the Court sufficient

some

insight to envision

weapons that would not
example would have permitted

possible uses of nuclear

necessarily conflict with existing laws

—

a single

a conclusion that under certain conceivable circumstances the threat or use of

nuclear weapons

may be

lawful.

The

ICJ Statute provides that in

its

advisory

functions the Court shall be "guided by the provisions of the present Statute

which apply

in contentious cases to the extent to

which

it

recognizes

them

to

114

and those provisions provide a plethora of fact-finding
instruments. Unlike the situation in American courts, where the absence of a

be applicable,"

party permits the tribunal to accept the facts as properly pleaded by the other
party, the

World Court must

party "satisfy itself

.

.

.

before rendering a decision in the absence of a

that the claim

is

well founded in fact
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also call

upon

explanation,"

produce any document or to supply any
and may "entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or

parties to a case "to

116

other organization that

it

may select, with the

giving an expert opinion."

who argued

Sadly, instead of asking States

uses of nuclear

task of carrying out an inquiry or

117

weapons were per se unlawful

that not

all

potential threats or

one or more examples,
bypassed the task of applying the law to the most

the Court essentially

to provide

favorable conceivable set of facts implicit in the question before

118
it.

As Judge

Higgins observed:

It is

not

sufficient, to

answer the question put to

state the requirements of the

it,

for the

Court merely briefly to

law of armed conflict (including humanitarian law)

and then simply to move to the conclusion that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons is generally unlawful by reference to the principles and norms. ... At no
point in its Opinion does the Court engage in the task that is surely at the heart of
the question asked: the systematic application of the relevant law to the use or
threat of nuclear weapons.
detailed analysis.

reasoning

This

is

An

It

reaches

essential

—has been omitted.

its

conclusions without the benefit of

step in the judicial process

—

that of legal

119

number of

unfortunate, because there are any of a

hypotheticals

which the Court could have envisioned (or which the nuclear-weapon States
might have suggested) that might be used to illustrate a lawful use of a nuclear
weapon. A single case should have allowed the Court to inform the General
Assembly that in at least some circumstances the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful as the Court was neither requested nor expected to
provide a comprehensive legal evaluation of every conceivable circumstance.
Even at this date, it would seem useful to have such a hypothetical.

—

Consider

moment

for a

often been required to go

regime promises

little

the plight of the Russian Navy, whose sailors have

months without

a

paycheck and

for

whom

the

new

of the glory of earlier decades. Imagine that a group of

Russian officers and their crew decide that action is warranted, and they decide
to sell their Delta IV, Typhoon, or
terrorist

newer

Bore;y-class

group or international criminal cartel

120

nuclear submarine to a

for a

few million

Alternatively, imagine they decide themselves to use this powerful

dollars.

weapons

system to compel the world to restore Leninists to power throughout the old
demanding in the process that all elected leaders of each
Soviet Empire

—

current regime be publicly executed, or

To

enforce these

demands and

else.

illustrate the else, the

submarine launches three SS-N-18

121

sea-launched
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from the mid-Atlantic, each with three 500-kiloton reentry vehicles (each
with more than twenty-five times the destructive power of the device
detonated over Hiroshima in 1945), targeted

for air bursts

over London, Paris,

and Berlin during afternoon rush hour. Within less than an hour, millions of
casualties are reported in Europe, and the long-term projections are even more
frightening.

Having demonstrated its seriousness, the submarine continues towards the
American coastline, its captain announcing that three of its remaining missiles
will soon be fired at targets in the Washington, D.C., New York and Chicago
areas. It will then move to the Pacific and attack targets in Los Angeles, San
Diego, and Mexico City; and if confirmation has not been received that the
changes in regimes and executions of "traitors" have taken place, similar
attacks will be made in Japan, China, and perhaps other population centers in
Asia.

that

To deter any foolish efforts to destroy the submarine,
all

of his missiles will be launched immediately at American

any detection of another submarine or warship in
a

launched torpedo
Let

the captain explains

us

suppose

is

its

cities

vicinity, or if the

upon

sound of

detected.

further

that,

with

the

cooperation

of the

Russian

Government, the United States has been able to track the movement of the
submarine. The Military Committee at the United Nations convenes, and
upon its advice the Security Council immediately asks the United States to
take effective military action to destroy the submarine before
missile

now

it

launches the

reported to be aimed to impact within 500 meters of the

UN

Headquarters.

Does international law

really require the

American representative

to the

Security Council to announce:

Mr. President and Members of the Security Council.

have been in contact with
my Government, and I have some good news and some bad news. The good news
is that our Air Force reports that its pilots have the skill to drop a 20-kiloton
nuclear device sufficiently close to the submarine that they are certain it would be
I

destroyed instantaneously and without any warning, before any additional
missiles could be launched.

The bad news

is

that,

pursuant to the legal principles

enunciated by the International Court of Justice in the 1996 Advisory Opinion

on the Threat

or Use of Nuclear Weapons, since the United States could clearly

"survive" the attacks

which

are being threatened

of 10-20 million of our people

—

it is

—

albeit

with the projected

loss

unlawful for us to attempt effective measures

to defend ourselves (or the United Nations) in this situation. Indeed, the
weapons that previously would have been available to address such a threat were
removed from our inventory and dismantled some years ago. Let us pray.
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Perhaps the threat instead would come from a Libya, Iran, Sudan, North
Korea, or even Cuba that had purchased a used Soviet diesel submarine and
installed primitive ballistic missiles designed to disperse toxic anthrax or other

biological agents across population centers in various countries.

One

could

hypothesize numerous such scenarios that would be as credible as any
suggestion in 1989 that a year later

Saddam Hussein would invade Kuwait and

threaten to use weapons of mass destruction against

UN

sanctioned forces

Kuwait and its neighbors. One could multiply such examples
the venue shifted from destroying submarines or other warships

trying to protect

several fold as

on the High Seas, to striking tanks or super-hardened military command posts
or weapons bunkers in the desert, to assorted other options not involving direct
attacks near population centers.

Indeed, as this writer has suggested elsewhere,

means of deterring aggression
elites

who

is

to

122

one of the most

effective

have the capability to attack radical regime

initiate aggressive wars. Possession of a highly- accurate, low-yield,

deep penetrating "bunker-buster" nuclear device might well persuade a future
Saddam Hussein who had sacrificed hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers

—

in his

war against Iran and was

1991 resistance to the

UN

clearly willing to risk massive troop loses in his

Security Council

—

that initiating or continuing

massive international aggression might well have negative consequences of a
highly personal nature.

One need

123

not devote pages of analysis to demonstrate that using a nuclear

weapon against a terrorist submarine on the high seas, if necessary to terminate
an ongoing barrage of far more destructive weapons of mass destruction against
innocent

civilians,

clearly consistent with jus

is

ad bellum and jus

in hello. It

would not "threaten the survival
Therefore, the Court's extremely narrow exception in
of the State."
paragraph E of the Dispositif is simply wrong as a matter of international law.
Fortunately, of course, advisory opinions of the World Court have no binding
follows as well that the hypothesized attacks
124

authority over States.

125

Making the World Safe for World War III:
Limiting Defense and Undermining Deterrence
For anyone

who

has witnessed the inhumanity of war firsthand and cares

about the preservation of peace, portions of the Court's advisory opinion are
disquieting. Without in the least disputing the horrendous consequences likely
to be associated with

any use of nuclear weapons, one can

still

wonder whether

the judges have forgotten the frightening realities of conventional warfare?
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Why, one must wonder,

are they so eager to outlaw

even the

—

response to major acts of armed international aggression
of

"fair play"

that leads

Saddam Husseins

them

to wish to assure future

threat of a nuclear

some sense
Adolph Hitlers and
is

there

that the consequences of massive aggression will never be

too unacceptable?

The primary reason

for the establishment of the

the International Court of Justice

is

United Nations, of which

the "principal judicial organ,"

succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

." 127
.

.

126

"to save

is

Yet many of the leaders

of the antinuclear campaign which precipitated the General Assembly's
request

an

for

aggression

—

opinion

advisory

irrespective of the

nuclear weapons.

One

view

problem

the

weapons used

—but

not

merely eliminating

as

scholar, for example, envisions "an

opportunity" as the world approaches the

new

stopping

as

unprecedented

century "to create a world in

which our children will be free from the threat of nuclear war."
tempted to respond: "You mean like in Europe in 1915 and 1943?"

128

One

is

He tells us that "[s]ince 1945, humanity has lived on the edge of a precipice,
129
with human history literally hanging in the balance,"
and that "[f]or over
forty years, the

world has lived with the relentless and harrowing fear that the

nuclear arms race might eventually result in a nuclear war."

130

One need

not

no small part because of
the perceived horrendous consequences of such a war, during this same period,

quarrel with such conclusions to note, as well, that in

most of the world has

also lived in peace.

This same writer expresses understandable alarm at estimates that a
strategic nuclear

exchange attacking only "key military targets" could kill 10 to

20 million people;

131

but he fails to remind us that two-to-four times that

people died in the conventional phases of World

War II,

132

million people have died in major conventional wars in this

many

more than 100
133
century,
and that
that

advances in conventional military technology in the past half-century strongly
suggest that a non-nuclear

World War

human life than were any earlier wars

III

—even

could be
if

far

more destructive of

one assumes

that,

such a conflict would not ultimately escalate to the use of even

once

illegal

started,

weapons

of mass destruction.

The most

vociferous critics of nuclear deterrence

apparently see no

between the possession of such weapons by liberal democracies
firmly committed to upholding the Charter principles and possession by rogue
States and terrorist groups
ignoring a compelling body of political science
distinction

—

that demonstrates that by far the most important variable in predicting the

outbreak of war

is

not the existence or absence of any category of weapons, but

the nature of the political systems of the potential parties to the conflict.
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Compelling

data

statistical

do

democracies

that

indicate

not

attack

democracies, and aggression results not from peaceloving States being too well

armed, but
leaders

far

more commonly from a relatively small number of radical regime

concluding that they

benefit from aggression because

will

potential adversaries lack either the will or the
aggression.

Latin

135

maxim

As
qui

ability

their

to respond effectively to

American Founding Fathers understood, 136 and as the
131
desiderat pacem praeparet bellum
affirms, it is perceived

the

weakness, rather than strength, in

its

potential victims that encourages

aggression.

Indeed, the most impressive contemporary scholarship demonstrates with

remarkable

clarity that

both World

War I and World War

II

resulted in large

part from perceptions by potential aggressors that their victims, and States

which might come

to their aid, lacked both the will

effectively to aggression.

138

and the

ability to

respond

Thus, the eminent Yale University Historian

Donald Kagan notes that, following World War I, "British leaders disarmed
swiftly and thoroughly and refused to rearm in the face of obvious danger until
139
it was too late to save France and almost too late to save Britain,"
and he
observes that the failure of the League of Nations to act to defend Ethiopia

from aggression in 1936 helped persuade Mussolini to join forces with Hitler:
"The democracies seemed weak, indecisive, and cowardly, and their failure and
inaction gave courage to their enemies."

When

Hitler

moved

140

to remilitarize the

Rhineland in violation of the

Kagan notes that "British policy was to avoid war at
Hitler had actually promised his generals that he would

Versailles Treaty, Professor
all costs,"

withdraw

141

and that

his forces at the first sight of

later writing:

"The

French

forty-eight hours after the

the most nerve-wracking in

my

life. If

resistance.

march

He

quotes Hitler as

into the Rhineland were

marched into the
between our legs, for

the French had then

Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our

tails

the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for

even a moderate

resistance."

142

Professor

Kagan

writes:

There is no doubt that some leaders of the German Army were powerfully
opposed to an attack on Czechoslovakia ... [in 1938] because they believed it
would lead to a general war for which Germany was not prepared and which it
was bound to lose. When they confronted Hitler he assured them that Britain
Perhaps the most important reason for the failure
and France would not fight
of this belated attempt at deterrence was that it lacked credibility. Whatever its
military capabilities, would Britain have the will to use them? Whatever their
Small
commitments, would the British have the courage to honor them?
.

wonder that Hitler never seems

to

have taken
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his

.

.

opponents' warnings seriously.
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As he

laid plans for the attack

leaders of Britain

worms.

and France.

"I

on Poland he discounted the danger from the
saw them at Munich," he said. "They are little

»143

World War II did not result from a failure of "arms control" or the presence
of too many weapons. The London and Washington naval agreements helped
weaken the military power of the democracies, and after the war was over,
Japanese leaders explained that watching movie newsclips of American
soldiers in Mississippi training

American weakness
Harbor.

—and

with wooden

rifles

had helped convince them of

thus strengthened the case for attacking Pearl

144

Properly utilized, international law has a powerful contribution to

make

to

the cause of international peace and security. But parchment barriers like the
145
and the
NPT, the Geneva Protocol on chemical and bacteriological warfare,
146
are not enough to guarantee peace.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
The reason Hitler did not use his chemical weapons when the tides of battle
turned against him during World War II was not out of respect for
international law, but because he knew the Allies would retaliate in kind as a

belligerent reprisal. Indeed,

more solemn,

if all

that were necessary to control aggression were

we would need no new

legally-binding, promises,

treaties

—

for

any act of aggression will automatically breach the most fundamental principle
of the

UN Charter. Why assume that a tyrant who
147

is

willing to ignore the

UN

Charter is going to abide by any lesser legal obligation that is not self-enforcing?

The world should have

learned from recent experiences with North Korea

and Iraq that, by itself, the NPT is not likely to prevent the unlawful
procurement of nuclear weapons. As has been noted time and again, that
"genie" is out of the bottle, and the basic technology is reportedly even
available in public libraries and on the Internet. Efforts to erect new legal
while not
barriers to the possession, threat, or use of nuclear weapons
necessarily unhelpful or a bad idea
risk missing the point that the primary
goal is to prevent war of any kind.

—

—

intelligent, articulate,

and

in a

Weston

one of the most
and respected scholars in the "ban-the-bomb" camp;

University of Iowa Professor Burns

1989 address to the

First

is

certainly

World Congress

Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, Professor
rid ourselves of the nuclear habit

Yet he acts

as if there

Weston

observed: "to

war habit." 148
between aggressor and victim,

we must rid ourselves

were no distinction

of the International

also of the

more menacing to the long-term well-being of our
planet than the sincerely communicated threat to use nuclear weapons if and
when sufficiently provoked." 149 He apparently sees no moral distinction, and
contending that "nothing

is
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no implication for the preservation of peace, between that "threat" being made
by someone like Saddam Hussein to compel peaceful Kuwait to submit to his
aggression, and such a "threat" being made by a State that is being "provoked"
by a flagrant act of armed international aggression and is acting under the
authority of a resolution of the Security Council, in order to dissuade the
aggressor from resorting to the illegal use of weapons of mass destruction that

might claim millions of innocent

lives.

150

There

is

a difference.

Rather than permitting peaceloving States to use the threat 151 of a nuclear
response to deter aggression and protect peace, Professor
us disarm

them of the weapons

Weston would have

that have proven most effective in deterring

massive acts of international aggression for most of this century; suggesting in
the alternative that

the world really needs are a few

all

new "mutual

nonaggression" pacts. In 1989 he wrote of the need for such treaties between

NATO and the Warsaw Pact,

152

and between the United States and the Soviet

153

and one might assume that today his solution to what might be called
the "Saddam Hussein problem" would be to get the Iraqi leader to sign a new
binding international agreement promising, henceforth, to be good.
Union;

Of

course,

Iraq

is

already

a

UN

party to the

the Nuclear

Charter,

Nonproliferation Treaty, and various other solemn international treaties

which

clearly prohibit the

things

Saddam has been doing

(invading his

neighbors, developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, etc.); but

we could just get him to
ways especially if we could

surely
his

if

able to respond

The

logic

think of

it

is

most

effectively

sign

assure
if

so compelling that

earlier?

Imagine the

one more piece of paper he would change

him

that his victims will

he violates

no longer be

his promise.

one can only wonder why the world didn't

lives that

might have been saved had we

just

been able to get Germany and Japan to ratify a binding international treaty
condemning "recourse to war for the solution of international controversies"
154
and renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy" a decade before the
outbreak of World War II. Readers who recall the optimism that greeted the

1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact may

both Japan

155

and Germany

outbreak of World

War

II

an instrument of peace.
experience
aggression;

is
157

156

recall as well that

was solemnly

—leading many people

ratified

by

to conclude after the

that international law was inherently ineffective as

A

better lesson to

draw from

that unenforced international law

and

it

a corollary

may

is

this

unfortunate

an unreliable barrier to

well be that aggression

is

encouraged

when

law-abiding States are denied the legal right to seek to deter aggression with
their

most

effective legal

weapons and the
338

aid of other peaceloving States.
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Put simply, the (former) President of the World Court was mistaken
described nuclear weapons as being "the ultimate
there

is

an "ultimate

evil"

it is

evil.

," 158
.

When

freedom.

nuclear weapons

—

and the subjugation of
or any weapons
are used for that

—

When they are used to dissuade potential

from slaughtering or enslaving

their neighbors, they serve a positive

moral value. The weapons themselves have no inherent moral content.

The

if

probably the kind of armed international aggression

purpose, they are used in an evil manner.
aggressors

In this context,

.

that results in the large-scale slaughter of innocent people

human

when he

Military Utility of Nuclear

159

Weapons

A central theme of much of the legal criticism of nuclear weapons

is

that,

because of their inherent nature, they have no legitimate military purpose or

them

and there is no
legitimate "cost" in banning them. For example, in his book Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons: The Relevance of International Law, Elliott L. Meyrowitz
asserts that "the nature and effect of nuclear weapons are such that they are
value. Thus, States should not hesitate to give

up,

inherently incapable of being limited with any degree of certainty to a specific
military target."

160

have no military

From such reasoning he concludes

that "nuclear

weapons

161

utility."

Even if one were to assume that no State would ever
likely again elect to resort to such weapons during combat, it is a dangerous
fallacy to assume that weapons can have no utility or "military value" outside of
combat. Indeed, the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu emphasized this point
well more than 2,500 years ago when he wrote: "For to win one hundred
victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy
162
without fighting is the acme of skill."
This

A

is

simply mistaken.

thorough discussion of the

utility

of nuclear weapons

is

far

beyond the

scope of this short chapter, but two examples should suffice to establish the
point.

The

first is

the critically important role that nuclear weapons obviously

played in keeping Europe at peace throughout the Cold War; and the second
the successful use of the implied threat of a nuclear reprisal

continued with
1

his plans to use

if

is

Saddam Hussein

chemical or biological weapons during the

990-9 1 Persian Gulf conflict.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Cold War. It is critically important to keep in
mind, as the world seeks relief from its fear of intentional or accidental nuclear
holocaust, that the world as a whole has seen a remarkable era of relative peace
for

more than

half-a-century,

and that no
339

single factor has likely played a

more
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decisive role in bringing this about than the shared perception of the

unacceptability and futility of nuclear war and the realization that such an

outcome might be an unintended consequence of the escalation of any major
act of aggression by conventional weapons.

Conrad Harper, the Legal Adviser

to the U.S.

Department of State in 1995,

cautioned the Court that "nuclear deterrence has contributed substantially
during the past 50 years to the enhancement of strategic

stability,

the avoidance

of global conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security."
Similarly, Sir Nicholas Lyell,

two

[T]hese

requests

Organisation] ignore

.

.

Agent

United Kingdom, observed:

General

the

[by
.

for the

Assembly

remains a fragmented and dangerous place, and in

have

now the legal basis of the

.

Health

.

.

Our

real

world

this real world, to call in

system of deterrence on which so

relied for so long for the protection of their people could

destabilizing effect.

World

and

the somber but vital role played by nuclear weapons in

the system of international security over the past 50 years.

question

163

many States

have a profoundly

164

Perhaps no one formally involved in the case expressed

this point

more

eloquently than Judge Rosalyn Higgins (United Kingdom):

One cannot be

unaffected by the knowledge of the unbearable suffering and vast

destruction that nuclear weapons can cause.
it is

expected of those

should declare

its

who

cause

care about such suffering

illegal. It

may

human

as

to self-defence,"

circumstances involved.

The

can well understand that

and devastation that they

well be asked of a judge whether, in

engaging in legal analysis of such concepts

damage" and "entitlement

And one

"unnecessary suffering," "collateral

one has not

judicial loadestar

.

.

lost sight of the real
.

must be those values

and protect. In the present case, it is the
physical survival of the peoples that we must constantly have in view. We live in
a decentralized world order, in which some States are known to possess nuclear
weapons but choose to remain outside of the non-proliferation treaty system;
while other such non-parties have declared their intention to obtain nuclear
weapons; and yet other States are believed clandestinely to possess, or to be
working shortly to possess nuclear weapons (some of whom indeed may be a
party to the NPT). It is not clear to me that either a pronouncement of illegality
in all circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons or the answers formulated by
the Court in paragraph 2E best serve to protect mankind against that
that international law seeks to promote

unimaginable suffering that we

WMDs

all fear.

165

Gulf War. Anyone who doubts that the
threat of a nuclear response can deter wrongful conduct should read the

Deterring Saddam's

in the
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Dissenting Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case of then-World Court Vice

M. Schwebel (United States), who cites
chapter and verse in demonstrating that in 1990-91, American threats to
retaliate with nuclear weapons persuaded the Iraqi regime not to make use of
the 150 bombs and 25 ballistic-missile warheads filed with anthrax toxin that
President (now President) Steven

had been

specially prepared for use during the war.

Judge Schwebel quotes at

length, for example, from a Washington Post article of 26

Iraq has released to the United Nations

new evidence

August 1995:

that

it

was prepared to

use deadly toxins and bacteria against U.S. and allied forces during the 1991

War

Persian Gulf

that

Ambassador Rolf Ekeus

liberated

Kuwait from

its

Iraqi

U.N.

occupiers,

said today.

Ekeus, the chief U.N. investigator of Iraq's weapons programs, said Iraqi

admitted to him in Baghdad

officials

week

last

that in

December 1990 they

loaded three types of biological agents into roughly 200 missile warheads and
aircraft

bombs

that were then distributed to air bases

U.S. and U.N.

officials said

and

a missile site.

the Iraqi weapons contained

enough

.

.

.

biological

agents to have killed hundreds of thousands of people and spread horrible
diseases.

.

.

.

Ekeus said
receiving

a

Iraqi officials

strong

administration

on

but

Jan. 9,

claimed they decided not to use the weapons after

Bush
1991, that any use of unconventional warfare would
worded

ambiguously

warning

from

the

provoke a devastating response.

Iraq's

leadership assumed this

meant Washington would

nuclear weapons, Ekeus said he was told.

retaliate

with

166

Judge Schwebel also quotes from an interview with Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz on the U.S. public television program Frontline, in which Aziz was
asked

why

replied:

the expected chemical attack

forces "never came."

He

"We didn't think that it was wise to use them. That's all what I can say.

—was not

That was not
with

on U.S.

wise to use such kind of weapons in such kind of a

—with such an enemy."

war

167

After placing on the record an abundance of evidence of the impact on Iraqi

American threat 168 to retaliate with nuclear weapons in the event
of an Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction (even though such a response
had apparently been eliminated as an option before the war started 169 ), Judge

policy of the

Schwebel concluded:
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Thus

on record remarkable evidence indicating that an aggressor was or
may have been deterred from using outlawed weapons of mass destruction
against forces and countries arrayed against its aggression at the call of the
United Nations by what the aggressor perceived to be a threat to use nuclear
weapons against it should it first use weapons of mass destruction against the
there

forces

is

of the coalition.

calculated

— and

principles of the

by the threat.

The

Can

it

seriously be

—

maintained that Mr. Baker's

apparently successful
threat was unlawful? Surely the
United Nations Charter were sustained rather than transgressed

170

Characteristics of Modern Nuclear

Weapons, For perhaps understandable
reasons, governments are reluctant to discuss publicly the details of their most
sensitive military programs. Former government officials and employees who
have been granted access to highly classified defense programs are usually
prohibited from discussing such details as well. Having been personally
involved

—

quite unsuccessfully

—

in trying to persuade

the United States

Government to declassify persuasive evidence in connection with an earlier ICJ
171
the present writer is not completely
case more than a dozen years ago,
surprised that the official submissions to the Court did not focus on the
technical details of the latest generation of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the
strongest statement in this regard was by the

Kingdom, which

Government of the United

told the Court:

[M]uch of the writing on nuclear weapons on which these arguments rely dates
from the 1950's and early 1960's. Modern nuclear weapons are capable of far
more precise targeting and can therefore be directed against specific military
objectives without the indiscriminate effect on the civilian population which the
172
older literature assumed to be inevitable.

Many

references to the nature of nuclear

weapons

in presentations to the
173

suggest that this
and even portions of the Court's opinion,
observation by the United Kingdom is correct. Not all "nuclear weapons" are
identical. The Soviet Union, for example, once designed a nuclear weapon
with a yield of 150 megatons and tested one with a yield oi approximately 50
174
Identifying a use for such weapons consistent with the law oi
megatons.
armed conflict would be extremely difficult, and most possible uses of a weapon
capable of l/100th of that level of destructiveness might well conflict with the
law particularly if used anywhere near a concentration of noncombatants.
But the reported trend in the latest generation of nuclear weapons is towards
much smaller and far more accurate devices, and it is these devices that must

Court,

—

be considered

—

in the light o{ all of the circumstances of a given situation
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in
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assessing the lawfulness of a potential use.

The Court seems

effort to inquire into the characteristics of such

weapons,

175

to

have made no

apparently finding

more convenient to make assumptions based upon knowledge acquired in
earlier decades and undocumented assertions made by critics who quite likely
were also not privy to information on highly classified defense programs of the
it

nuclear-weapons States.

Thus, the President of the Court concluded that:
weapons

Nuclear

can be

—

expected

—

in

the

present

state

of

scientific

among combatants and
non-combatants alike, as well as unnecessary suffering among both categories.
The very nature of this blind weapon therefore has a destabilizing effect on
humanitarian law which regulates discernment in the type of weapon used.
Until scientists are able to develop a "clean" nuclear weapon which would
development

at least

to cause indiscriminate victims

.

.

.

between combatants and non-combatants, nuclear weapons will
clearly have indiscriminate effects and constitute an absolute challenge to
176
humanitarian law.
distinguish

The

present writer has had

no

access to classified information

this topic

from readily available press reports

in well over a decade, but judging
likely that

on

modern nuclear weapons have

it

seems

already satisfied this requirement.

A

report in Time magazine in connection with the recent confrontation between

Saddam Hussein and

the

UN Security Council, for example, noted that "New

weapons with ever increasing accuracy led the Pentagon to be confident that
few will stray, thus limiting what military euphemists refer to as 'collateral
damage' innocent, but dead, civilians." 177 It notes that in the September
1995 attacks on Bosnian Serb strongholds that led to the Dayton Accord, the
Air Force reported 97 percent accuracy of its "smart bombs" far superior to
the success record in Operation Desert Storm less than five years earlier. By
using Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites for guidance (rather than
lasers, which could be thrown off target by smoke or bad weather), and new
high-tech fuses that can actually "count" floors in an underground bunker and
explode only upon reaching a pre-selected level, the United States had
178
achieved weapons of unprecedented accuracy.

—

—

Because of the increased accuracy, most targets can be defeated by the use of
conventional high-explosive warheads, such as the

5,000-pound "bunker busters;" however, the highly

GBU-28 179 and GBU-35 180
regarded Aviation Week &

Space Technology quotes a retired senior Air Force general as saying "You can't
attack

all

the chemical and biological weapons storage sites" in Iraq, because

"[s]ome are too

far

underground.

." 181
.

.
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Frank Robbins, Director of the Precision Strike Weapons Technology
Office at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, was quoted in Defense

Week as

stating

that GPS-guided munitions "could hit a target the size of a man's upper torso

within a metropolitan area as large as

when

.

.

Washington-Baltimore."

.

that man's upper torso-size target

bombers,

the only

an aggressive war

—

However,

buried deeply underground, below

is

weapon

that can be carried by the latest U.S.

means of deterring

a foreign tyrant considering launching

the range of any conventional
183

182

or neutralizing his supply of

weapons of mass destruction

before they can be fired at the civilian populations of neighboring States

—may

be with a nuclear warhead.

The

Bulletin of the

had

States

Atomic

Scientists

earlier that year

reported in late 1997 that the United

deployed the B61 earth-penetrating nuclear

warhead to destroy "superhardened" or "deeply buried"
and bewildering

precision

United States

asserts that the

with

targets,

agility,

greater

is

no matter

targets "with great

their location."

184

The

article

seeking the ability to destroy "underground

discrimination,"

for

counterproliferation

possible

purposes, and that one recent report by nuclear weapons experts suggests that
"a small nuclear
agents."

The

warhead

[like

the B61]

is

present writer emphasizes that

about any of these programs, but assuming

way to neutralize anthrax
he has no personal knowledge

the best

for the

well-connected sources are correct, they identify

moment that these

generally

important military

critically

missions which might not be achievable through the use of conventional

ordinance. While

it is

obvious that the legality of any particular use of such

weapons must be determined

in the context of the purpose for

projected collateral damage, and other considerations,

it is

which it

is

used,

equally clear that

not every use of such weapons would be unlawful. Indeed, one could

easily

conceive of settings in which such a use of nuclear weapons would claim few

if

any noncombatant lives, while in the process saving millions of lives that might
otherwise be vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction.

Once

again, the utility of

such weapons must also be evaluated in terms of

their contribution to maintaining peace by deterring potential aggressors
initiating conflict. If small nuclear

weapons make

it

possible for the

States to place the potential aggressor State's leadership at risk,
neutralize

an anthrax bomb before

it

can harm anyone,

this serves

from

United

and

to

both to

diminish the perceived value of anthrax weapons and to place at personal risk
decision makers
these

who may

be contemplating threatening the peace. Both of

consequences are highly desirable

weapons would ever

—

irrespective

actually be used in combat.
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of whether

such
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Perhaps

was inevitable

it

—and even

wise

—

for the

Court to

refrain

from

making a detailed speculative inquiry into the technological characteristics of
modern nuclear weapons. But without doing so, the Court obviously lacked the
knowledge necessary to draw legal conclusions based upon the application of
the legal principles it had identified as being germane to the threat or use of
these weapons. Its conclusions must therefore be considered in the light of this
shortcoming.

some very

and respected military
professionals who have concluded that nuclear weapons are unnecessary and
185
Their technical understanding of such weapons is far
inherently immoral.
superior to that of the present writer, and in terms of the actual use of such
weapons they may well be right. Surely, anyone with an ounce of sense realizes
that nuclear war would be horrible beyond description. But precisely because of
their perceived horror, the existence of these weapons has ironically thus far
been a powerful force for world peace. And with admitted exceptions, military
and political leaders in the democracies who know the most about these
weapons continue to believe they have military utility. 186
There

are

able,

knowledgeable,

Nuclear Weapons as a Force for Peace
Perhaps

it

is

time for a "reality check." Strategic nuclear weapons are

capable of incomprehensible devastation, and
decision to

make

this point. It

is

it

doesn't require a

World Court

not coincidental that they have not been used

more than half-a^century since they were first developed and
bring an end to World War II. One can only pray that they will never

a single time in

used to

have to be used again.

But one can also look back at the Cold War era and realize that the world
might well be a far different place today had such frightening weapons not been
introduced into national inventories. They have imposed a level of sanity on

world leaders

who

otherwise had considerable incentives to promote violent

change. Largely because of the respect

among

decision makers

on

all

sides for

the consequences of nuclear conflict, an unstable political confrontation that

might

easily

have resulted in World

half-a-century of political

was replaced by nearly
struggle and occasional detente, punctuated on

occasion by relatively minor

presumptive

The

War

187

III

coercive settings

on the periphery of the

battlefield.

weapons will not acknowledge it, but it is quite probable
that the existence of nuclear weapons was the single most important factor in
keeping Europe at peace for nearly half-a-century following World War
foes of nuclear
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II

—longer than Europe had experienced peace

in

many centuries. To be

sure,

the standoff was frightening and the risks of error were horrific; but the
existence of a nuclear-armed

NATO probably saved tens of millions of lives in

Europe alone.

Complete Disarmament
In a 1793 letter to James Monroe,

Is

an Impractical Dream

Thomas

Jefferson remarked, with his

but a single

America there has been
sentiment on the subject of peace and war, which was in favor of

the former.

.

characteristic perception: "I believe that through

.

We

.

adapted to secure
for as

have
188

it."

all

differed, perhaps, as to the

tone of conduct exactly

We may also have differed on the price to be paid for

it,

John Stuart Mill once noted:

War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things:

the decayed and degraded state

of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing worth a war,

man who

has nothing which he

is

willing to fight for, nothing

is

worse. ...

A

which he cares

more about than he does about his personal safety, is a miserable creature who
has no chance of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better

men

than himself.

189

Who doesn't want peace? No rational, sane citizen of any country favors war
when peace can be had without price, and
enticing.

A

simple

—perhaps

fought with weapons,

if

—

overly so

we can just

rid the

the vision of a world without war

is

logic suggests that since wars are

world of weapons we can guarantee

peace. Wars, by this theory, result largely from the existence of weapons and

from military imbalances which promise benefits
this

theory

is

easily

for the strong.

(The wisdom of

established by reviewing the past two centuries of

U.S. -Canadian relations.)

we

which all
beings lived in peace and respected the rights of others, it follows that we would
incorporate the aspirational goal of general and complete disarmament in
precatory language designed to make everyone feel good at the conclusion of a
as was apparently done in
less ambitious effort to control instruments of war
Since

all in principle

favor peace

and would welcome a world

in

—

Article VI of the

NPT.

190

This

is

not to suggest that the parties were disingenuous

committing to pursue negotiations "on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control" presumably

in

—

every peaceloving State would favor such a goal,

if

the control machinery were

and could be implemented without totally undermining
but it is
the sovereignty of individual States and the privacy of their citizens

certain to be effective

—
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only the most naive delegates anticipated witnessing the conclusion

likely that

of such an agreement in their

own

Professor Richard B. Bilder

is

lifetimes.

but one of many respected commentators to

observe that the "nuclear genie"

is

"out of the bottle," and that "[t]here are

already over 50,000 of those weapons, knowledge of

never disappear.

." 191
.

.

The

inability of the

them

will

world community to

drugs provides some insight to this dilemma, and

illicit

activity takes place despite serious efforts

who recall

to build

Certain chemical and biological weapons are even

simpler to build and to conceal.
control

how

much

by host States to prevent

the experience of the Gulf War will realize that

it is

it.

of that

Those

necessary to be

able to send inspectors not only to established military installations

and

chemical or medical laboratories, but also to inspect such places as "baby milk"
factories

192

— and

quite likely alleged "religious"

one might anticipate that

well. Indeed,

if

and

"cultural" properties as

any single category of

facility

were

declared "off limits" for inspectors, that would be the most attractive place to

engage in prohibited behavior.

One would

certainly expect a clever leader

who wished

development and production of prohibited weapons to

to engage in covert

try to "raise the costs of

inspection" by concealing such activities in locations that might prove

embarrassing for foreigners to enter, and then to use political warfare
techniques to intimidate and discredit the inspectors

endeavored to do their

demand

job.

At

if

they nevertheless

the same time, potential violators would

most intrusive inspections within democratic
States
both as an intelligence-gathering technique and as a means of
pressuring other States to accept what might be called "informal
accommodations" which would lessen the mutual inconvenience of

presumably

—

the

inspections (and probably in the process
Professor

make them

virtually meaningless).

193

Almond has observed: "Because disarmament agreements are very

difficult to verify

without major intrusions into the territory of each of the
194

Other
experts have made similar points.
It is also clear that the closer one comes to
total disarmament, the more significant a small amount of "cheating" becomes
and thus the greater the incentive to cheat. In a world with tens of thousands of

parties, the possibility of

concluding such an agreement

is

slight."

195

nuclear weapons, a State that can covertly manufacture half-a-dozen nuclear
devices
if

is

not going to dramatically transform the balance of power

the Security Council can remain functional. But

eliminate

all

of their

nuclear weapons

interpretation of Article VI of the
well

— then the incentives

for

—and,

NPT,

if all

especially

law-abiding countries

pursuant to the Court's

their conventional

an ambitious tyrant to
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weapons

as

secretly build a small
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inventory of prohibited weapons are considerably enhanced.

A tyrant with a

monopoly on weapons of mass destruction, and a willingness to actually
use them, would be a powerful actor indeed. So, in the absence of "strict and

global

international control"

effective

(assuming that were even

guarantee

to

no State was "breaking the rules," an unenforceable
agreement requiring States to destroy all nuclear weapons (or all weapons of
theoretically possible) that

any kind) could well prove highly counterproductive to such Charter values
international peace,

human

dignity,

as

and freedom.

Today, any tyrant contemplating building nuclear weapons

for aggressive

purposes must consider the assurances of the world's strongest military powers
that they will

come

to the defense of any

NPT

party that

aggression or a threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons.
fairly

strong disincentive:

harass your neighbors
conflict with the

if

Why

a victim of

is

196

That

is

a

bother to build a small nuclear stockpile to

the immediate consequence will be to bring you into

major nuclear powers?

seems so anxious to undermine

We

must ask why the World Court

this disincentive, in the process increasing the

and military value of a small stock of illicit nuclear weapons
(and thus the incentive to acquire them) perhaps a thousand-fold?

relative political

Any

country that pretends to take seriously the vision of general and

complete

disarmament

ought

first

to

be

willing

to

effectiveness of such a concept at the national level. Let

guns and clubs from their

own

military

and police

forces,

demonstrate

them

first

remove

all

the

take the

kitchen

knives from their homes, and display for the world to admire a functioning

Utopian model of universal peace and tranquillity without the threat or use of
force.

(To paraphrase

a

comment once made about

the practical shortcomings

wrong species.") Until that is done, the serious business
of trying to promote a more peaceful world ought not be distracted by such silly,
of socialism: "nice idea;

dangerous, illusions.

G

iven the political nature of the entire process, and the risk that under
pressure

from so-called "peace" groups,

NGOs, and numerous

Court would have ignored the law and pronounced a
dangerous new doctrine limiting the rights of States to use nuclear weapons to
deter aggression and defend themselves and their allies if necessary, one must

Third-World

States, the

on balance view
Basically, the
is

the advisory opinion with relief and

Court got the law

right. It

no conventional prohibition per

some

satisfaction.

overwhelmingly concluded that there

se against
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weapons, and similarly found no rule of customary law to support the position

embodied

that, like all

It also

quite properly noted

weapons, nuclear weapons may not be used in violation of jus ad

bellum or jus in hello
or in a

Assembly Resolution.

in the General

—such

as to

commit aggression

against a prohibited target

manner disproportional or unnecessary to the legitimate defensive needs

of a particular situation.

It

also

noted that the highly destructive nature of such

weapons, and the commonly associated collateral
radioactive contamination, clearly

and

effects like fallout

made such weapons

unsuitable for any but

From the standpoint of its proper function and

the most serious of settings.

had the opinion stopped there
not only unobjectionable but quite commendable.
rules of international law,

it

the

would have been

From a political standpoint, however, such an opinion would have been less
would have constituted a complete rejection of the views of the
countries and NGOs that had championed the initiative. While the Court's
courage in resisting political pressure on the fundamental legal issues raised by
the request is commendable, its decision to go further and include language
than ideal, as

it

apparently carefully designed to placate this considerable political bloc (and
regrettable.

The

judicial task of identifying

and

presumably the personal preferences of several of the judges)
decision led the Court

first

to depart

from the

is

applying legal principles to specific facts associated with the highly technical

and secretive field of modern nuclear weapons technology for which it lacked
both the necessary factual information and the scientific expertise to make
meaningful judgments; and secondly to gratuitously address an issue that had
not been part of the request and, more sadly still, to arrive unanimously at the
wrong answer.

—

As has been discussed,

the Court's speculation about possible uses of nuclear

weapons that might comply with existing jus in bellum quickly took the judges
into a realm where they lacked sufficient expertise or information to make
sound judgments. Apparently (and understandably) not being familiar with the
characteristics of the latest generation of nuclear weapons, the Court seems to
have assumed that any such weapons would necessarily and indiscriminately
slaughter hundreds of thousands if not millions of combatants and
noncombatants alike; and trying to hypothesize any scenario in which such
conduct would not conflict with the laws governing military operations was, not
surprisingly, difficult.

Trying to emphasize the extreme nature of any such exception, the Court
spoke in terms of defending against a threat to the survival of a State

—which

is

not a bad example of a situation in which resort to a nuclear weapon might be
justified.

But

it is

hardly the only example.
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It

would seem

clear, for

example,
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that a victim of aggression that concluded that the use of nuclear weapons

an aggressor's underground stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction
hardened military delivery systems for such weapons) was the only defense

against
(or

likely to save the lives of tens of millions of its citizens

—even though
population—would be
the State

might ultimately "survive" with even half of its original
permitted under international law to make use of such weapons. The mere
threat of such a defensive response is still less objectionable as a means of
dissuading aggressive intentions.

As an

some confusion may

from a misreading of the quite
accurate and important language in paragraph 47 of the Court's opinion
aside,

result

linking the lawfulness of a "threat" to use force with the underlying question of

whether the actual use of force
The Court concluded:

The

in that setting

is

permissible under the Charter.

notions of "threat" and "use" of force under Article

Charter stand together in the sense that
illegal

—

In short,

for

whatever reason

if it is

is

correct.

helium and

is

the use of force

2,

paragraph

itself in a

4,

is

threat to use such force will likewise be

in conformity with the Charter.

But

it

threat or use of force under jus in

hello.

illegal.

must be

197

this rule

jus

applies in

A

State

is

for that reason,

it is

some

when

lawful to attack an otherwise lawful military target,
tyrants find

it

and

convenient to place important military

targets in the middle of population centers

—presumably hoping

that even

if it

United States to attack the target (which
generally does) considerations of humanity and more pragmatic concerns of

remains "legal" for a country
it

a

required to consider the

probable magnitude and risk of collateral damage to noncombatants
deciding whether

is

—which governs ad
analyzing
of the Charter—

does not follow that

associated with Article 2(4)

of the

given case

to be lawful, the declared readiness of a State to use force

a use of force that

This

—the

if

like the

,

public opinion will act as a deterrent. But a threat to use nuclear (or other)

weapons

in a defensive response to

armed aggression does not endanger the

interests protected by international

humanitarian law.

noted, the aggressive threat or use of nuclear weapons

is

198

Since, as already

already prohibited by

the Charter, any analysis of potential defensive behavior needs to discriminate

between actual use (which must comply with jus in hello) and expressed or
implied threats aimed at enhancing deterrence. Deterring armed international
aggression, after all, is an important Charter value.

The legal test that ought to be used in responding to the General Assembly's
question

is

not whether the Court majority successfully anticipated every

future act of aggression

which might

legally
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nuclear response, but whether in every given situation the use of such weapons

some governing

necessarily violates

legal principle.

The

Court's ignorance

about recent (or future) technological developments in the characteristics of
nuclear weapons does not alter the principle legal conclusions of the opinion.

The proper test of the lawfulness of nuclear weapons is precisely the same as the
test applied to any other weapon that has not been expressly banned: Does the
action under

all

of the relevant circumstances violate any applicable provision

of international law?

Applying

this test, it

is

abundantly clear that:

Nuclear weapons may not be used aggressively, or in any other manner contrary
to a State's relevant treaty

commitments;

Nuclear weapons may not be used contrary to any applicable rule of customary
international law binding

upon the State considering

their use;

199

Nuclear weapons may not be used against targets prohibited by international
1

law;

200

Nuclear weapons may not be used even
legal rules

which constrain the use of
such

self-defense,

These

defensively

all

except consistent with the

and
and discrimination.

force in self-defense

as necessity, proportionality,

principles are uncontroversial, unobjectionable,

and

collective

fully consistent

with United States military doctrine dating back more than four decades.

Beyond

that,

the

characteristics of

all

Court's

speculation

that

horrendous

the

201

inherent

nuclear weapons would preclude any use from satisfying

these legal tests that did not involve a threat to "the very survival of a State"

is

only legally meaningful to the extent that the Court's comprehension of the

nature of such weapons

—today and tomorrow—was

significant point to the opinion

is

the

test

accurate.

The

legally

to be applied, not the prescience of

the judges in foreseeing every conceivable circumstances that might threaten a
State in the years ahead, or their perspicacity in understanding current military

technology.
inquiry

To

the

—one might

extent

the

Court's

better say noninquiry, as there was

inquiry in the opinion

—

into the technical nature of

was unsoundly premised, the

legal conclusions

drew from that factual predicate are of

little

little

speculative

evidence of serious

modern nuclear weapons

seven of the fourteen judges
value.

constitute binding rules limiting the conduct of States.
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and

uninformed

They

certainly

do not

Nuclear Weapons and the World Court

As much

as the sponsors of the

General Assembly request may have wished,

once the Court properly recognized that neither conventional nor customary
international law prohibits the defensive threat or use of nuclear

weapons (so
long as such conduct complies with the law of armed conflict), the Court
clearly lacked the authority to modify those legal rules to conform to the
political preferences of members of the Court or a plurality of members of the
United Nations. Therefore, the Court's subsequent speculation about possible
settings in which the use of such weapons would comply with the laws of armed
conflict may have been a useful reminder of the potential horror of nuclear
weapons, but to the extent it was premised upon factual error or limited vision,
it is of no legal significance. The test remains whether a threat or use of nuclear
weapons is consistent with the relevant rules of international law under all of
the specific circumstances in which it occurs. It is a good test, and it is precisely
the test that the United States has long recognized as controlling. The fact that
the judges who most strongly favored a per se prohibition on the threat or use of
nuclear weapons found it necessary to dissent from the majority opinion stands
in clear refutation of the "spin control" efforts of antinuclear activists to portray

the advisory opinion in a light more favorable to their political perspective.
clear reality

is

that they

lost,

and, as ironic as

it

may seem

The

to some, the cause of

international peace and effective deterrence emerges clearly victorious from a

proper reading of the case.
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supra note 27, at 3.

192.

One

of the military targets

newly painted sign

bombed by

(in English) crudely

the coalition was exhibited to the press with a

marked: "Baby Milk Factory."

See, e.g., Melissa

Healey

&

James Gerstenzang, Iraq Says It Has 11,131 Chemical Warheads in Stock Military, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1991, available in 1991
2295201; Walter Putnam, Iraq Admits Experiments with
Anthrax, Botulin Toxin, A.P. Aug. 6, 1991, available in 1991
6195955.

WL

WL

193. To set the stage for such accommodations, one might expect States wishing to
undermine the inspection regime to intentionally plant information to encourage their
adversaries to

landmarks)

demand

—and the

State in question

and must be

is

inspections of politically-sensitive sites

(e.g.,

religious or cultural

resulting negative results will be used as evidence to

show both that the

being "picked on" unfairly and that the inspection regime

is

"out of control"

curtailed.

194. Harry H.

Nuclear Weapons,
195. See,

e.g.,

Almond,

Jr.,

Deterrence and a Policy -Oriented Perspective on the Legality of

in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW,
WELCH, supra note 136, at 13-14.

196. See supra note 82

and accompanying

supra note 27, at 57, 68.

text.

197. Nuclear Weapons, para. 47.
198.

It is

of course conceivable that under certain circumstances such a threat might

foreseeably have consequences

command

beyond an enhanced

level of anxiety for the aggressor's military

structure ("They can destroy this hardened bunker with their

—

new deep-penetrating

B61-11 warhead!")
such as producing widespread panic leading to the trampling of
noncombatants near a threatened target and such a possible reaction ought to be considered in
connection with any such threat; but as a general principle, international humanitarian law is
concerned with consequences of the conduct of hostilities and is not offended by mere threats.

—

While customary international law is just as "binding" as conventional law, neither
category normally binds States which have not consented to the rule in question. Thus, except
when they incorporate rules of such established character and fundamental importance that
they have attained the character of preemptory norms, treaties do not create obligations for
non-parties. While a State may by acquiescence become bound by an emerging customary norm
(conducting itself in such a manner to justify an implication of consent), a State which
persistently objects or through its behavior demonstrates its unwillingness to consent to an
emerging norm is not normally bound thereby.
199.

200. This

is

not to say that

it is

per se unlawful for any such target to be destroyed or injured

by an otherwise lawful use of a weapon.
201. U.S.

Army

Field

Manual No. 27-10,

"atomic weapons," whether by

air, sea,

for

example, provides that "The use of explosive

or land forces, cannot as such be regarded as violative of
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international law in the absence of any customary rule of international law or international

convention restricting their employment."

DEFT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE,

para. 35 (1956).
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XV
Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense
in the Charter Era:

What the

Treaties

Have Said

George K. Walker

A

DEBATE CONTINUES on whether
permitted in the era of the

that States need not await the

principles of necessity

when
others

States

seem

Most

may
to

first

anticipatory

self-defense

UN Charter. Two recent commentators say
blow but may react in

2

self-defense, provided

and proportionality are observed. They differ, however, on
3

claim anticipatory self-defense. This

change views.

4

Still

others take

anticipatory self-defense claims since

no

not surprising, since

is

clear position.

World War

II

5

have been asserted

by States responding unilaterally to another country's actions. Claims of
nature are more likely to be raised in the future.
declares in part that "Nothing in the

individual or collective self-defence

Member

.

.

.

until the Security

international peace

is

1

.

.

if

i.e,

The

UN

this

Charter, Article 51,

Charter shall impair the inherent right of

an armed attack occurs against

a

[UN]

Council has taken measures necessary to maintain

and security." This

to individual self-defense,

.

6

article

proposes to analyze the alternative

collective security pursuant to treaty.

After examining nineteenth century international agreements and those of the
first

half of this century, the scope of collective self-defense in Charter-era treaties

What
will

be analyzed.

The

the Treaties

inquiry for these agreements

anticipatory collective self-defense

is

what

collective self-defense,

on

is

is

whether

a right of

stated in them, paralleling States' right to

claim individual anticipatory self-defense.

limitations

Have Said

If

there

is

a right of anticipatory

the scope of that right, and what are the

it?
7

began the nation-state system, the
Congress of Vienna (1815) started the modern movement toward collective
9
security. It is from this benchmark that Part I examines treaty systems through
If

the Peace of Westphalia (1648)
8

World War

I.

Part

II

analyzes treaty systems during the era of the

the League of Nations (1920-46),

World War

II.

Part

10

and the Pact of

Covenant of

Paris (1928)

11

through

examines the drafting of the Charter and court

III

Nuremberg International Military Tribunal,
immediately following World War II. Part IV examines collective self-defense
decisions,

treaties

the

including

concluded since 1945. Part

V

offers projections for the future of

anticipatory collective self-defense in the Charter era.

In terms of treaties and practice affecting the United States, between the
alliance with France

12

that helped support a successful Revolution and the

Declaration of Panama,

13

the United States did not ratify a single mutual

The

self-defense agreement.

worldscale record has been different, but lack of

U.S. participation in this kind of arrangement

may

explain

why many

in the

United States are not familiar with the concept of collective self-defense, and
particularly anticipatory collective self-defense. Because there has been a
concept of anticipatory collective self-defense for nearly two centuries,
including the 50 years that the Charter has been in force, this form of joint

response by States appears to have attained the status of a customary norm.

I.

From

the Congress of Vienna to

World War

I

Within months after an ad hoc alliance 14 defeated Napoleon I at Waterloo
and established the Congress system, 15 the principal powers began building
alliances to assure peace. Austria, Prussia, and Russia pledged in the Holy
Alliance (September 1815):

Conformably to
Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider
each other as brethren, the Three contracting Monarchs will remain united
by ... a true and indissoluble fraternity, and considering each other as fellow
countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and
assistance; and, regarding themselves toward their subjects and armies as fathers
of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are
.

.

.

animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice.
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Although

at least six

European

Prince Regent did not;

November 1815

17

acceded to the Alliance, Great

states

Britain's

the result was a Treaty of Alliance and Friendship in
18

to continue the earlier alliance's collective security policy.

Besides confirming standing forces in France, the
together, without loss of time, as to the additional
for the support of the

common

.

.

allies

troops to be furnished

.

and they engage

cause;

need, the whole of their forces ... to bring the

agreed to "concert

War to

termination, reserving to themselves to prescribe, by

.

.

to employ, in case of

a speedy

and successful

common

consent, such

conditions of Peace as shall hold out to Europe a sufficient guarantee against

the recurrence of a similar calamity!,]"

i.e.,

advent of another conquest. They

upon their common interests,
and for the consideration of the measures which at each of those periods shall
be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and
also agreed to

for the

meet

periodically to "consult

.

maintenance of the Peace of Europe."

The

.

.

19

which France was admitted as part of the Concert of
Europe in 1818, had two policies: periodic consultation to consider measures
to help preserve peace, and commitment of forces to end any conflict that had
Alliance, to
20

ignited.

The

Alliance thus bespoke the collective self-defense concept and,

depending on the nature of consultations and actions decided, a potential
anticipatory self-defense.

21

An

example of the

latter

occurred in 1848,

for

when

revolution in France accompanied transition to the Second Republic. Fearing a

new war of French national liberation,
Russia directed

its

sending 30,000 to
It

was in this context that the

in the Caroline Case (1842),
self-defense

is

admissible

—no

i.e.,

for

alert

was formulated

that a proportional anticipatory response in

when the need is

moment

its

right of anticipatory self-defense

admitting of no other alternative with no

requirement

Rhine troops on

and
armies to be ready for war. Tsar Nicholas was dissuaded from
22
help Prussia, a move that might have resulted in war.
Prussia put

necessary, instant, overwhelming

moment

—

deliberation

for deliberation.

is

not

consultation clauses in the early treaties. States then and

23

The

inconsistent

now may

and

final

with

consult and

decide to employ anticipatory collective self-defense as an option to a threat.

Moreover, States then and

now might agree that those countries claiming a right

of anticipatory self-defense might thus respond as part of collective self-defense.

The Crimean War. The

potential for reactive

and anticipatory
24

collective

was stated again during the Crimean War (1854). The war began
when Russia occupied the Turkish principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia;
self-defense

Britain

and France declared they
367

What
.

.

.

[had] concerted,

and

will

the Treaties

Have Said

concert together, as to the most proper means for

from Foreign

and for
accomplishing the object
[of reestablishing peace between Russia and Turkey
and preserving the continent from "lamentable complications which ... so
the

liberating

Sultan

of the

Territory

.

.

Invasion,

.

unhappily disturbed the general Peace"].

.

.

[T]hey engage to maintain,

.

common

according to the requirements of the War, to be judged of by

agreement, sufficient Naval and Military Forces to meet those requirements, the
description,

number, and destination whereof shall,

if

occasion should

arise,

be

determined by subsequent Arrangements.

They renounced "Acquisition

of any Advantage for themselves" and invited

other European powers to accede to the alliance.

25

Austria and Prussia tried to

avoid participation in the war "and the dangers arising therefrom to the Peace
of Europe"; they concluded a Treaty of Alliance, which, inter

mutual Offensive Advance

is

stipulated

incorporation of the Principalities, or
Russia."

26

.

.

Later that year an alliance

.

alia,

only in the

for

said that "a

event of the

on or passage of the Balkans by
among Austria, Britain, and France
attack

attempted to protect Austria's occupation of the principalities against return of

war broke out between Austria and Russia, the three
countries pledged their "Offensive and Defensive Alliance in the present War,
and will for that purpose employ, according to the requirements of the War,
." 27
Similar terms appeared in an 1855 allied
Military and Naval Forces.
28
convention with Sardinia. In 1855 Britain and France also pledged to "furnish
Pvussian forces. If

.

Sweden

.

Naval and Military Forces to Co-operate with the
Pretensions or
resist
Naval and Military Forces of [Sweden to]
29
Aggressions of Russia." A treaty ring around Russia thus tightened.
.

.

.

.

.

.

sufficient

.

.

.

.

.

.

Preparations for the Crimea expedition, noted in the Anglo-French treaty,

were in the nature of anticipatory self-defense, and the Austro-Prussian
alliance recognized a concept of "Offensive Advance," i.e., anticipatory action,
if

Russia

moved through

the Balkans; the parties would attack Russia only

if

Russia passed through territory close to Austrian borders. Similar concepts

were recognized in the Austro- Anglo-French alliance and the Sardinia military
convention. The Swedish treaty also provided for anticipation of Russian
action.

A

30

verbal

agreement

between

Franco- Austrian war (1858-59).
alliance," a

France
It

and

Sardinia

preceded

the

included a "defensive and offensive

French pledge to come to the aid of Sardinia

if it

or Austria declared

war, and a statement that occupation of Italian territory, Austrian violation of
existing treaties,

declaration.

31

"and other things of a similar kind" would cause a French war

During the Franco-Prussian
368

War

(1870-71), the belligerents
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agreed to cooperate with Britain to assure Belgian neutrality

threatened by an opponent.

32

if

it

were

In both cases, the potential for action was great

and could have included what would be considered anticipatory self-defense
today. An example from the 1858-59 conflict was Napoleon Ill's hearing
reports that Prussia was mobilizing six army corps "inclined him further to
," 33 The Franco-Sardinian understanding
was also an example
make peace.
of an informal self-defense arrangement, made without benefit of a formal
treaty. A similar instance came in the U.S. Civil War, when a Russian admiral
confidentially advised U.S. Admiral David G. Farragut in 1863 that he had
sealed orders to support the United States if it became involved in conflict with
a foreign power (e.g., Britain or France) which supported the Confederacy, a
war that never was. 34 This form of informal collective self-defense is available
35
under the UN Charter, as will be seen.
.

.

In Latin America there was a counterpart conflict, the

War

of the Triple

Alliance (1865-70); Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay signed an "offensive and
defensive" alliance, claiming Paraguay had provoked war.

At

the same time,

however, other Latin American countries signed defense alliances pledging
consultation and mutual defense against an aggressor or any acts to deprive

them

the United States,

36

Western Hemisphere States, but not
were thus negotiating the same kinds of treaties as in

of sovereignty and independence.

Europe.

The Treaty Map Up to World War 1, 1871- 1914. After the Franco-Prussian War
ended,
Italy),

37

agreements leading to the Triple Alliance (Austria-Hungary, Germany,

and those

resulting in the Entente of France

and Russia and ultimately

Great Britain, had examples of reactive or anticipatory self-defense.

Hague Conventions,
forbid resort to

war to

self-defense issue.
self-defense

if

would impose

alliance systems

and sometimes

39

rules for

war declarations

38

and

but do not apply to the collective

continued to provide for collective

explicitly recognized anticipatory self-defense, e.g.,

an opponent mobilized. Taylor makes the point that these

along with economic development on the Continent, gave Europe 34

years of peace.

40

Cannot the same be

economic development

The Convention
from a third
parties]

in force,

collect contract debts,

The

resort to self-defense
treaties,

still

The 1907

treaties

42

since

said about alliance systems

World War

41

and regional

II?

Schonbrunn (1873) provided: if an "aggression coming
Power should threaten to compromise the peace of Europe, [the
of

mutually engage to

come

to a preliminary understanding ... to agree as

to the line of conduct to be followed in

common."

be necessary to undertake military action.
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43

A special convention would

In 1878 Britain concluded a

What

the Treaties

Have Said

Defensive Alliance with Turkey aimed at Russian

territorial

interests in

Turkey, promising to join Turkey to defend with force of arms. 44 In 1879

Austria-Hungary and Germany negotiated a Treaty of Alliance aimed

at

an active co-operation or by

Russia. If Russia attacked either party alone or "by

which constitute a menace to the Party attacked," the other
had to assist "with the whole war strength of their Empire [,]" 45 It was "the first
permanent arrangement in peace-time between two Great Powers since the
end of the ancien regime"* 6 Two years later, the three empires were on the same
side, pledging that if one party were at war with a fourth Great Power, the
47
others would maintain "benevolent neutrality." At about the same time Chile
fought Bolivia and Peru in the Pacific War, which resulted in loss of Bolivia's
coast and Peruvian territory; the defensive alliance between the two States
military measures

pledged defense against

foreign aggression" or acts designed to deprive a

"all

party of sovereignty and independence.

48

Treaties to isolate France began with the Treaty of the Triple Alliance

(Austria-Hungary, Germany,

Italy,

"one of the most stable and

1882),

important of the European alignments," lasting until 1915.

France attacked Germany, or

Italy,

"without provocation," and were at
other had to join the conflict.

50

49

If France

attacked

one or two signatories were attacked
war with two or more other Powers, the
if

Articles 4

and 5 provided:

Treaty should threaten the security
Power nonsignatory to the
Part[y], and the threatened Party should find itself forced
of the states of one
on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to
reserves to itself, in
observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each
[If]

a Great

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

this case, the right to take part in the war, if

cause with
.

.

.

If

its

it

.

should see

.

fit,

to

make common

Ally.

the peace of any

.

circumstances foreseen by

.

.

.

.

Part[y] should
.

chance

Articles [1-4], the

.

.

to be threatened
.

under the

Parties shall take counsel

together in ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view to

eventual co-operation.

Secrecy was pledged;

51

this

was among many "secret"

which were not truly secret, being so only
53
they were "engines of publicity."
In 1883,

Romania and Austria-Hungary agreed

"threatened by an aggression under [these]

that

.

.

.

if

arise.

the other were
If either

acceded to

this treaty, as did Italy.
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were

conditions," the governments

confer, with a military convention to govern operations.
55

52

for specific terms. In their "secrecy"

attacked "without provocation," an obligation would

would

treaties of the era,

54

Germany
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The

third Triple Alliance

56

resulted in the beginning of the Entente Cordiale,

whose exchange of notes stated a Franco-Russian agreement that if "peace
[a] part [y] should be threatened
should be actually in danger, and especially if
with an aggression, the two parties undertake to reach an understanding on
measures whose immediate and simultaneous adoption would be imposed upon
.

.

.

the two Governments by the realization of this eventuality."

Convention followed

in 1892, providing that

if

A

57

Military

Triple Alliance forces or an

Alliance State should mobilize, France and Russia, "at the

first

news of the event

and without the necessity of any previous concert, shall mobilize immediately
and simultaneously the whole of their forces and shall move them ... to their
frontiers" to

attempt to force a two-front war. Respective general

cooperate to prepare and

facilitate

execution of these measures.

58

staffs

would

These terms

were generally not known, but most diplomats considered France and Russia
partners.

59

Britain joined the Entente by separate arrangement with France

60

61

and Russia (1907) but signed no formal defense alliances, although
62
Russia wanted them. Britain began unofficial military and naval conversations
(

1 904)

with France in 1906, however.

63

A 1904 Bulgar-Serb alliance "promise [d] to oppose, with all the power and
command, any hostile act or
occupation" of four Balkan
provinces; it was directed at Turkey. The alliance also pledged joint defense
"against any encroachment from any source ... on the present territorial

resources at their

.

" If either

.

.

would conclude a special military
convention. These countries negotiated the same arrangement in 1912, with
65
Bulgaria also negotiated an alliance with Greece; it
a military convention.
provided that if either "should be attacked by Turkey, either on its territory or
through systematic disregard of its rights, based on treaties or on the
fundamental principles of international law," they would agree to assist each
66
other. In 1913 Greece and Serbia signed an alliance and military convention;
if "one of the two
should be attacked without any provocation on its part,"
67
the other would assist with all of its armed forces.
unity

event happened, the

allies

64

.

.

.

commit in Europe, 68 Britain concluded a
defensive alliance with Japan; the treaty had the almost standard articles for
prior consultation, armed common defense upon unprovoked attack or
aggressive action by a third State, with a military and naval arrangement to
In 1911, despite reticence to

follow,

and periodic

military consultations.

69

Analysis. This labyrinth of agreements did not prevent, and

contributed

to,

70

the Great War. Neither the

Hague ultimatum

may have

system,

71

nor

the language of these treaties, which pledged reactive self-defense but
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occasionally contain a potential for anticipatory self-defense, could stop

and war

mobilizations

diplomacy, or failure

and not provision

The

72

was applying military force and
73
to apply force and diplomacy properly through treaties,
declarations.

It

them, which resulted in the cataclysm.

for self-defense in

of 1815-1914 were not drafted with today's concepts of

treaties

self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, or collective self-defense in mind.

have been superseded by the Pact of
offensive

war

76

Conventions.

Paris insofar as they justify resort to

74

and by the Covenant and the Charter as to
They were conditioned by the 1907 Hague

as national policy,

secrecy provisions.

their

75

Nevertheless, several principles emerge. There was a concept

of collective self-defense, multilateral and bilateral.

statements requiring prior consultation.
self-defense,

i.e.,

awaiting a

today's restrictive view,

This

is

They

first

77

Many

treaties

had general

Although most spoke of reactive

attack before responding, consistent with

some contemplated

anticipatory response.

particularly true for the aftermath of the

78

Napoleonic Wars, where the

victors established the Congress system with a multilateral defense treaty

incorporating consultation and anticipatory self-defense principles.

79

The

Crimean War illustrates response to a regional conflict. States opposing Russia
agreed on terms among themselves for prior consultation and to try to contain
the conflict by warning Russia, at least on paper, of consequences of widening
the war. Peripheral treaties,

e.g.,

that with Sweden, were anticipatory in

nature, warning Russia of consequences of wider action.

80

In a very rough

between the Congress and the Crimea systems, we have the forerunner
an overarching instrument
of the treaty system in place since World War II
82
81
regional multilaterals like the North Atlantic Treaty, and
like the Charter,
83
elsewhere around the world.
bilaterals
sense,

—

Like Charter-era commentators,
the pre-World

argue

a

position,

provisions laid
as a source of
fulfilled

War

I

treaties

treaty

law

if

the record for anticipatory self-defense in

mixed. Unlike commentators

drafters

groundwork
86

is

84

who

who can

only

included anticipatory self-defense

for State practice

85

in that they could be involved

those treaties were carried out.

If

other agreements were

through anticipatory self-defense, a view that anticipatory self-defense

was a feature of international law before 1914 was strengthened.

II.

The Covenant

The League

of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris

of Nations

Covenant and the 1928 Pact of Paris,

also

known

as

the Kellogg-Briand Pact, were the principal governing instruments during the

interwar years, 1920-39. These treaties, including the self-defense reservation
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to the Pact of Paris

the

views

demonstrate

commentators,

of

self-defense

and other agreements negotiated before World War

remained

as a legitimate response

that

anticipatory

and

II,

collective

under international law.

League of Nations. The Covenant of the League of
87
Nations, a part of the World War I peace treaties, was treaty law by territorial
89
88
application to League Members' colonies and dependencies for much of the
Earth from 1920 through 1945. Major exceptions were: Germany, a member
from 1926-35; Japan, a member from 1920-35; the USSR, a member from
1934-39; and the United States, which was never a member.

The Covenant

of the

The Covenant's

relatively

weak principles

address self-defense issues directly.

for regulating use of force did

preamble declared that parties to the

Its

accept [ed]
Covenant, "to achieve international peace and security
[and] Agree [d] to [the] Covenant
obligations not to resort to war
.

.

.

not

.

.

Covenant Article 10 provided: "... Members

.

.

.

.

.

.

."
.

.

undertake to respect and

.

preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing
political

independence of all Members.

... In case of

any such aggression or in

upon

case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise

means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." (The Council included
France, Great
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers from World War I
Britain, Italy, and Japan
and four more League Members.) 90 Article 11
provided for League action in case of war or threat of war:
the

—

—

1.

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any

or not,

is

.

.

any action

.

.

deemed wise and effectual

such emergency should

Member

.

.

.

.

declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and

.

.

.

forthwith

.

2. It is also

.

.

arise the

summon

.

.

.

.

.

shall take
[If]

any

Secretary-General shall on the request o{ any

a meeting of the Council.

Member ...

to bring to the attention of

Council any circumstance whatever affecting international

which threatens to disturb international peace
understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

relations

The Assembly included representatives
had functions

[it]

to safeguard the peace of nations.

the friendly right of each

.

the Assembly or

Members

similar to the

UN

or

the

good

of all Members; the Secretary-General

Secretary-General.

91

Members

also agreed to

resolve disputes by arbitration, judicial settlement or resolution by the Council

or the Assembly.

was

"ipso facto

Members

,"
.

.
.

.

92

If a

Member resorted to war, disregarding these covenants, it

deemed

have committed an act of war against all other
which would undertake economic and other sanctions, leaving
.

.

to
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recommendations. 93 The offending Member could
did not register with the League, and the Assembly was

military options to Council

not invoke treaties

it

charged with examining registered agreements for

to peace.

risks

Covenant was silent on options if the Council did not recommend
it did and Members did not comply.

The

similarity of

Covenant

94

The

action, or

if

Articles 10-11 to Articles 1(1)

and 2(4) of the
the peace or threats against any State might

UN Charter regarding threats to
be noted:

Article

The Purposes
1.

To

1

of the United Nations are:

maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take

effective collective

measures

for the

prevention and removal of threats to the

peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace.

.

.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members,
shall act in

4.

All

in pursuit of the Purposes ... in Article

accordance with the following Principles:

Members

.

.

1,

.

from the threat or

shall refrain in their international relations

use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other

manner

inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

95

Besides providing for external aggression against Members' territorial integrity,

Covenant

Article 10 also referred to "threat or danger of such aggression."

Article 11(1) declared of "war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting"
a

Member

as

League concern, and the League could take "any action" deemed

wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." Article 11(2) allowed a

Member

to bring forward "any circumstance

relations

which threatens

The Covenant

whatever affecting international

to disturb international peace.

drafters thus

had

in

."
.

.

mind more than war

outbreak of war. Like the Charter a quarter century

later,

declarations or

the Covenant

contemplated action against threats or dangers of aggression, or threats of war,
or "any circumstance whatever
Article 16(1) declared that a

.

.

.

threatening to disturb international peace."

Member's

resort to

war

in violation of certain

Covenant obligations would automatically result in that Member's action
." Under treaty
being "deemed ... an act of war against all other Members.

7

.
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96

weak as

was in terms of enforcement,
contemplated collective action to counter hostile intent and hostile action.

interpretation canons,

Although the

the Covenant,

it

Covenant did not mention individual or

self-defense, other Treaty of Versailles provisions declared that

forbidden to maintain or

fortify certain parts

collective

Germany was

of the banks of the Rhine.

Maintaining armed forces, whether permanently or temporarily stationed

permanent mobilization works, was forbidden. If Germany violated
these provisions, she would "be regarded as committing a hostile act against the
Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of
Powers signatory [to] the
97
the world." This was a statement of a potential for anticipatory collective
self-defense. Unratified bilateral agreements between France and the United
States, and France and Great Britain ancillary to the Treaty, confirm this view.
These would have provided for Great Britain's and the United States' coming
immediately to the aid of France if Germany committed "any unprovoked
movement of aggression against her[.]" Because these agreements were
effective only if Britain and the United States ratified respective bilaterals with
there, or

.

France,

98

.

.

U.S. failure to ratify the Treaty

99

torpedoed the

bilaterals,

the France-UK agreement that was otherwise in force, as well.

100

including

Nevertheless,

use of "movement" in these treaties, and the Versailles Treaty language, shows
that the treaty drafters considered anticipatory collective self-defense action as

an option. Available evidence of the secret military convention between
France and Poland (1921) could lead to a conclusion that it, too, contemplated
anticipatory self-defense, as did the France-Czechoslovakia alliance (1924).

On

101

the other hand, eastern European States' alliances creating the Little

Entente provided for reactive self-defense.

102

them adopted by the Assembly)
confirmed that legitimate self-defense was not excluded in the Covenant
103
prohibition on recourse to war.
Principal League Members were unable to
accept a proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, open to all States, where any
In 1931 League Assembly reports (one of

party attacked

would receive immediate,

effective assistance

from other parties

same part of the world, or the Protocol of Geneva, which would have
branded any State choosing war over arbitration of a dispute as the aggressor,
104
unless the Council decided otherwise.
The right of self-defense became more
explicit in reservations to the Pact of Paris and authoritative interpretation of
in the

the Pact.

105

Locarno, the Pact of Paris, and the Budapest Articles; Other Treaties. In 1925
five powers
Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy signed the

—

—

Locarno Treaties. Belgium and Germany, and France and Germany, pledged
375
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would not attack, invade, or resort to war against each other. This
core Treaty of Mutual Guarantee stated exceptions for these undertakings:
"legitimate defense" and the parties' action to settle a conflict or stop an
aggressor if the League did not. Legitimate defense was defined as "resistance to
that they

a violation of the undertaking" not to attack or invade, or resistance to flagrant

breach of the Versailles Treaty's demilitarization provisions,

"if

such breach

an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of
armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary." 106 The
Locarno treaties also created a system in the nature of collective self-defense. 107
The parties pledged to "collectively and severally guarantee
maintenance of
frontiers between Germany and Belgium and
the territorial status quo [of]
between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed
constitutes

.

.

.

.

.

.

1

The parties agreed to come immediately to the
109
State.
To the extent that the Locarno parties agreed

by" the Versailles Treaty.
assistance of the target

to act collectively for flagrant breaches of the Versailles Treaty,

Locarno could

be said to restate anticipatory collective self-defense, in that failure to maintain
a demilitarized area or status could be a hostile threat to other states.

when

countries were formal parties, but

their colonial empires

states are considered, Locarno's territorial scope

was quite

Only five

and associated

great.

110

renounced war as an instrument of
111
The Pact is still
disputes by pacific means.

Parties to the Pact of Paris (1928)

national policy, agreeing to settle

in force, partly superseded by the Charter,

112

with 69 parties by 1997.

113

Treaty

114

The Pact's principles
more states.
116
became part of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, they were affirmed
117
as customary law by unanimous UN General Assembly Resolution 95 (l).
succession principles

may

apply

it

to

115

Although the Pact did not address self-defense, an understanding promoted
118
to which 14 major signatories including the colonial
by the United States,
powers

119

agreed,

self-defense.

120

The exchanged

commentary on and
reference

to

said the treaty did not affect the "inalienable" right of

notes

were

interpretation of the

anticipatory

self-defense

.

.

or

.

"an

and binding
There was no specific

authentic

Treaty."

121

self-defense

collective

in

the

diplomatic correspondence, but Great Britain broadly claimed:

.

.

.

[T]here are certain regions

.

.

.

the welfare and integrity of which constitute

and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government
have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions
Empire a measure
cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the
Britain accept [s] the new
of self-defense. It must be clearly understood that
their freedom of
prejudice
treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not
a special

.

.

action in this respect.

1

2
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.

.

.
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Britain referred to parts of its Empire, probably Egypt

perhaps other areas.

that "the result would be that there

the Pact could be applied."
colonies, self-governing

may have reserved a
Commonwealth and

and the Persian Gulf, and

A few States objected to the UK note, the USSR stating

123

124

would probably be no place

Since the

left

.

.

.

where

Commonwealth system included

Dominions, India, and the

Irish Free State,

125

the note

defend units of the

right of self-defense for Britain to

Covenant provisions allowing League
membership for colonies and Dominions 126 underscored a potential for
collective self-defense based on these relationships.

The

the Empire.

U.S. note, to which states had responded in general agreement, spoke
127

of the "inherent" and "inalienable" right of self-defense.

That

this

continued

the prior law, which included rights of anticipatory self-defense and collective

was apparent from

self-defense,

Little

in 1921,

128

Council's

Entente of Balkan

negotiated

common

Pact of Paris,
indefinitely.

129

judicial decisions

War II.

between 1928 and World

The

and

treaties, State practice

states, following bilateral self-defense treaties

Pact of Organization in 1930, declaring

its

would be inspired by, inter
and the Locarno Treaties; the 1921
policy

accepted the concept in

130

treaties

the presumption

self-defense considerations.

its

have contemplated anticipatory self-defense among
further evidenced by

were renewed

is

its

widely

that the Entente

That the Entente may

its

response options

is

agreement with other area countries, which pledged

its

reaction to "aggression,"

131

otherwise not defined, since the original 1921
132

Whether

clear.

However,

agreements pledged joint reaction to "unprovoked attack."

meant more,

e.g.,

action short of attack,

citing the Pact of Paris indicates the
as a response option if

governing

the Covenant, the

alia,

Since the Pact incorporated the Pact of Paris with

accepted self-defense reservation,

aggression

its

not

Entente accepted anticipatory self-defense

was part of that inherent

it

is

right.

—

Although not forming an organization specifically for the purpose the Pan
American Union 133 was in place at the time Western Hemisphere States,
including the United States, negotiated agreements in 1936 to "supplement
and reinforce" League efforts in seeking to prevent war. 134 These governments,

—

besides reaffirming prior treaty obligations to settle international controversies

between them by pacific means, also agreed to consult if there was a threat of
war among them, subject to Member obligations under the Covenant. The

whose obligations were confirmed. 135 While
136
these treaties
still in force
do not cover a Hemisphere country's war with
a State outside the Americas, in reaffirming the Pact of Paris and its

Pact of Paris was

—

among

self-defense reservation,

treaties

137

—

they reinforce that law.
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Agreement supplementing it 138
would defend merchant shipping and civil aircraft of any State

The 1937 Nyon Arrangement and
declared parties

attacked by surface ships,
Sea.

139

vessels contrary to the

Protocol

the

submarines in parts of the Mediterranean

aircraft, or

The Arrangement,
140

Have Said

besides announcing that a submarine attacking

1930 London naval armaments treaty and

would be attacked and

if

possible destroyed, also said parties' forces

would attack "any submarine encountered
ship not belonging to either

.

.

.

in the vicinity of a position

141

attack."
parties

... in

circumstances

was

valid grounds for the belief that the submarine

guilty of the

Because of further submarine attacks on merchantmen,

Nyon

announced they would sink "any submarine found submerged"

Mediterranean Sea zones under their control.

The Arrangement
anticipatory

collective

own. These

self-defense.

—agreed

143

Nine

is

an example of maritime

states

to protect shipping

states declared they

in

142

and applied

as published

Mediterranean coastlines
their

where a

conflicting Spanish parties [in the Spanish civil

war] ha[d] recently been attacked in violation of the rules

which give

1936

its

—

and

no

with

several
aircraft,

including

would attack a submerged submarine

near an attacked merchantman and later broadened Arrangement coverage to
include submarines found submerged in their patrol areas. (Today
said that a submarine's being in the area

the submarine

is

is

would be

a manifestation of hostile intent,

subject to destruction in anticipation of

attacking merchant shipping in the future.)
states

it

When

its

and

potential for

Mediterranean maritime

cooperated under the Arrangement to suppress submarine attacks, they

acted in anticipatory collective self-defense.
In 1934 the International
Articles of Interpretation of the

(2)

Association had adopted the Budapest

Pact of Paris, which recited these principles:

A signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of

an international dispute or

(3)

Law

conflict

is

guilty of a violation of the Pact.

A signatory State which aids a violating State thereby itself violates the Pact.

(4) In

the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force or war by one

signatory

State

against

another,

the

other

States

may, without thereby

committing a breach of the Pact or any rule of International Law, do

all

or any of

the following things:

(a)

Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact of belligerent

rights,

such

as visit

and search, blockade,
378

etc.;

George K. Walker

(b)

Decline to observe towards the State violating the Pact the duties

prescribed by International Law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral in relation
to a belligerent;

(c)

Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance, including

munitions of war;

(d) Assist

with armed forces the State attacked.

144

Although some States and commentators noted when the Articles were
approved that no State had adopted them as policy, it has been argued that the
Articles and the 1939 Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of
145
legitimated 1939-41 U.S. aid to the Allies in
States in Case of Aggression
World War II before the United States entered the conflict. 146
If

Article

4(c)

supplied

legal

backbone

for

Lend-Lease and similar

arrangements while the United States was not at war, Article 4(d) was a basis

and anticipatory self-defense in particular. Besides
aiding the Allies materially, the United States began escorting war materials
convoys to the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, turning over escort duties to the
Royal Navy and other allied forces at that point. The USS Niblack prosecuted
attacks when there was a submarine threat, the USS Reuben James was sunk,
and the USS Kearney was damaged, during these operations. 147 Although no
text of the UK-U.S. arrangement has been published, perhaps because it was
an oral agreement or due to national security considerations, undoubtedly
148
there was some sort of arrangement between the two countries.
States do not
send their navies into harm's way without agreeing on terms. If Article 4(d)
restated customary and general principles norms, it was proper for U.S.
warships to not only respond to submarine attacks on them, but also to

for collective self-defense

anticipate attacks with appropriate force measures.

Other Treaties Concluded before and during World War II. Defense treaties
signed before and during World War II support a concept of anticipatory
collective self-defense. Because the League of Nations and its treaty

and publication system collapsed, 149 the record of international
agreements during 1935-45 is not complete. What is available supports a view

registration

that

States

believed

treaties

could

provide

for

anticipatory

collective

self-defense.

The USSR's
assistance

if

pacts with France and Czechoslovakia (1935) pledged mutual

"unprovoked aggression." The parties
150
threatened with aggression.
The 1936 treaty with

either were subjected to

pledged consultation

if

379
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Mongolia followed the pattern. 151 When war clouds loomed for the USSR in
1939, and the war had begun for other countries, Soviet treaties with Estonia
and Latvia pledged that each would come to the other's assistance if there was
"direct aggression or threat of aggression" (Estonia), or "direct attack or threat

of attack" (Latvia).

152

and French eleventh-hour

British

Poland provided
assistance

if

a

for reactive

European Power

bilateral

self-defense,

mutual assistance treaties with
but also pledged support and

"clearly threatened,"

by "any action," "directly

or indirectly," a party's independence, and that party "considered

with

resist it

its

armed

forces."

it

vital to

153

After the war began for France and Britain, they pledged aid to Turkey

were involved in

hostilities

with a European power, or

if

if it

an act of aggression

Turkey agreed to observe "at least a benevolent
neutrality" if Britain or France were engaged in hostilities with a European
power and would aid them if they became involved in hostilities because of
guarantees given Greece or Romania. The parties also pledged mutual

were committed against

consultation.

154

The

it.

20-year

self-defense after the

war

if

USSR-UK

became involved

these States again

with Germany or States associated with

(1942) pledged collective

alliance

155
it.

in hostilities

France's alliance with the

USSR

A USSR-UK alliance with Iran pledged defending Iran
had similar terms.
157
presumptively contemplating
from "all aggression on the part of Germany,"
156

only reactive self-defense.
In the Western Hemisphere, the October 3, 1939, Declaration of Panama,

negotiated while the American states were not at war, asserted:

measure of continental self-protection, the American Republics, so long
as they maintain their neutrality, are as of inherent right entitled to have those
waters adjacent to the American continent, which they regard as of primary
concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the commission of any

As

a

hostile act

by any non-American belligerent

attempted or made from land, sea or

The Declaration applied

.

.

.

,

whether such

hostile act be

air.

these standards to a 300-mile zone off the

American

158

Although the zone may have been unlawful in terms of territorial
because it was not proportional, the important point for this analysis
scope,
is that the Declaration asserted a collective claim to freedom from effects of

coasts.

159

"attempted" hostile
a

right

of anticipatory
160

To

that extent, the Declaration implicitly declared

collective

self-defense.

A

1941

Denmark-U.S.

defending Greenland could also be said to be anticipatory in
When it was signed, the United States was not at war, although

agreement
nature.

acts.

for

380
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Germany had overrun Denmark. This
threat to the
latter

Western Hemisphere

was

treaty said there

a perceived

1940 Act of Havana, the

as stated in the

American
The Act created an emergency committee, empowered to act

"considered, in effect, an act of self-defense by the

republics."

161

assume

governance of a
belligerent's Western Hemisphere colony or possession that was "attacked"
or "threatened." If "the need for emergency action [was] so urgent that
action by the committee [could] not be awaited," an American republic,
pending

ratification

of

convention,

a

to

unilaterally or jointly, "[had] the right to act in the

defense or that of the continent require [d]."

open

a

potential

for

anticipatory

.

.

.

."

The 1941

manner which

its

This broad language
self-defense

collective

particularly in view of authority given to
threat[s]

162

make "urgent

.

.

.

own
left

responses,

responses to

U.S. agreement to defend Iceland did not refer to

the Act of Havana, but the president's response in this executive agreement

menace

that Iceland's defense was necessary to forestall a

Hemisphere security

163

might be construed

as

collective

would
the Act of Havana.

anticipatory in nature. U.S. defense of Iceland

American
The

republics subject to

Potential for Anticipatory Collective Self'Defense.

forestall

When

to

Western

self-defense

menaces

to

the Covenant,

the Locarno Treaty, and the Pact of Paris as interpreted by the Budapest
Articles are considered together, there

is

strong argument for a view that they

articulated the potential for anticipatory collective defense, perhaps not with
precision.

The Nyon Arrangement, and

practice under

of anticipatory collective self-defense in action.

The

it,

was a clear example

thrust of the Declaration

some international agreements before and during World War II
were to the same effect. To be sure, the notion of self-preservation as equated
164
but an anticipatory
with self-defense may have been discounted by then,
of Panama and

collective self-defense claim

III.

remained admissible.

Drafting the Charter and Winding

Up World War II

new international organization to replace the
165
League of Nations began during World War II. The UN Charter was signed
Research and drafting

during the

last

for a

year of that war, with original Members' ratifications often

coming after hostilities ended. Agreements to prosecute war criminals, i.e., the
Nuremberg Charter in 1945, 166 were also signed during the war, but judgments
came down years later. The UN's beginnings are, therefore, necessarily
intertwined with the end of the war and the war crimes trials.
381
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drafting of the Charter as

issues of self-defense

related to collective self-defense

it

war criminals

analyzed. Trials of the major

Have Said

and anticipatory

is first

as those proceedings related to the

self-defense are then discussed.

The Charter Drafting Process and Collective Self'Defense. The draft emerging
from discussions and preparations for the San Francisco Charter conference
167
did not provide for self-defense, then considered inherent in nature.
The Act
of Chapultepec, signed a month before the conference, included pledges of
collective measures, including use of force, to meet threats or acts of aggression
168
against a Western Hemisphere country.
Like the interwar agreements and
practice,
the Act in effect declared a right to anticipatory collective
1

self-defense.

Because of Latin American States' concerns, the San Francisco conference
170

Although some argue that the Charter
171
confers a new right of collective self-defense in Article 51,
States had been
practicing collective self-defense, or had stated the right in so many words, in
172
treaties long before the Charter was ratified.
A related problem is whether
there is a variant of self-defense apart from the standards of Article 5 1 Most
173
However, the Nicaragua Case, holding a parallel customary
say there is not.
norm bound the litigants when the Charter could not be applied, 174 may open a
17
and possibly
door to developing principles opposing Charter norms
included Article 51 in the Charter.

.

outweighing Charter principles.

176

Exercising a right of collective self-defense need not be pursuant to a
multilateral arrangement; a country

may assist another under

a bilateral treaty

or without any previous treaty or other arrangement:

[T]he travaux preparatoires
that

it

was

.

.

.

[for

the Charter support this view.

for purposes of fitting regional arrangements,

and

While

it is

true

particularly the

inter- American System, into the general international organization that Article

5

1

was added

only by
also

at

San Francisco. However, the

members of regional arrangements

discussions at

San Francisco not

in the proper sense of that term, but

by parties to bilateral treaties governing their joint security,

as well as

one State to another without any treaty obligation. Article 5 1 was
from Chapter VIII to Chapter VII with the result that
deliberately transferred
self-defense
had become "entirely independent of the
the right of collective
assistance by

.

.

.

existence of a regional arrangement."

177

on "the degree of organization or of
"Collective" covers more than contractual

Collective self-defense does not depend
treaty relationship" of states.

systems of self-defense.

179

178

"Any Member ...
382

is

therefore authorized by the
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Charter to

assist

with

its

armed

force

an attacked

has been any previous arrangement to that effect."

Although

it

whether or not there

State,
180

has been argued that an assisting State must have substantive

rights or interests affected

by an attacking State's action,

181

or that an assisting

182

neither is a prerequisite
must have an individual right of self-defense,
for coming to the aid of a target State. Any assisting State acts out of general
interest in international peace and security, and can do so without a formal
State

treaty as long as the target State consents.

A State

183

assisting a target State

need not be subjected to armed attack, i.e., to invoke the right of self-defense
184
However, "collective self-defense has in any event always to be
for itself.
based ultimately upon the right of an individual State to take action in
If
self-defense.
not linked by a previous arrangement with the attacked
State [e.g., a bilateral or multilateral treaty, assisting states] have the right to
use force to provide assistance on the basis of an explicit request by the [target]
.

state."

185

The

.

.

.

.

.

political truth in today's

information age

treaties instead of informal collective self-defense

point to use of

arrangements. Nevertheless,

such informal arrangements are lawful in the Charter

The

may

era.

foregoing analysis has not responded to the problem of States with

divergences of views on the scope of self-defense,

i.e.,

where some

State's policy

espouses anticipatory self-defense and the other State (s) has or have a more
restrictive, reactive ("take the first hit") policy,

the same general policy,
situations

e.g.,

assisting State

or where States

may

share

that of anticipatory self-defense, but differ as to

and circumstances when the norm

Where an

186

applies.

187

with an anticipatory self-defense policy comes to

the aid of a State with a restrictive view,

it

will

be presumed in the case of prior

treaty or other arrangements or a request in the absence of these that the
restrictive

view State negotiated the treaty or other arrangement, or made the

request, with

State

is

free,

knowledge of the

but

is

and that the

assisting

not obliged, to employ anticipatory self-defense to

fulfill its

assisting State's policy,

arrangement obligations. In the reverse situation, where a restrictive
view State assists a State with a policy of anticipatory self-defense, the same
treaty or

principles should obtain.

The

assisting State

may, but

is

not obliged, to invoke

anticipatory self-defense; the anticipatory self-defense State

knew

or should

have known of the self-imposed limitations on the assisting State. In either
case, there is no need, as a matter of law, for the target State to request a kind or
degree of assistance from the assisting State. However, as a matter of policy, the
target State

may request, and the

assisting State

should consider, a certain kind

or degree of assistance for the target State. Thus, a target State might ask for
self-defense help that

amounts

to reactive

383

and not anticipatory action;

in that
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must consider whether it can, as
commensurate with the perceived need

case, the assisting State

a matter of policy, stop

at that line,

to assure safety of

contributed forces or perhaps

taken by

its

from a State espousing a

what amounts

restrictive view, the

a critical difference

is

e.g.,

action

parliament. In the reverse situation, where an anticipatory

self-defense country asks for

There

municipal governance limitations,

its

its

informal request or arrangement

to anticipatory self-defense help

same

between a

when

principles should apply.

treaty relationship

and

a situation develops. Failure to

more
comply

a

with a treaty term as perhaps understood by prior interpretive practice carries

with

it

risk of

denunciation

circumstances,

The

is

impossibility of performance,

191

189

fundamental change of

etc.

more complicated

The

in circumstances of multilateral relationships.

State or States with the same anticipatory self-defense view aid a group

of States,

of whom have the same reactive view, or

all

States aid a group of States,
result

or claims of breach,

foregoing assumes a bilateral relationship, by treaty or otherwise.

problem
If a

190

188

is

if

a reactive view State or

of whom espouse anticipatory self-defense, the

all

the same as in the bilateral context.

Suppose, however, some assisting States have anticipatory self-defense
positions

and others have

similarly differing views.

and

a reactive self-defense policy,

target States

have

Second, suppose some assisting States have differing

anticipatory defense views,

192

and others have

differing reactive self-defense

The same, and perhaps

policies,

and the same

risks of

denunciations or claims of treaty breach, fundamental change of

is

true for target States.

circumstances or impossibility, might be lodged.

193

One

greater,

solution to this

problem might be the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties approach on
reservations,

194

i.e.,

that anticipatory self-defense applies only as to those states

that mutually agree

on

principles

and that otherwise the lowest common

denominator, perhaps a diminished scope for anticipatory self-defense or only
reactive self-defense, applies as

operation,

this

could create

between
the

parties.

195

In a multinational military

kind of legal nightmare that Vienna
196

Convention analysis promises for multilateral treaties. Alternatives might be
an analogy to the traditional rule for treaty reservations, i.e., all States must
concur 197 or assistance will end. Another alternative is consultation in a given
situation, with a treaty term to that effect if a multilateral agreement is
negotiated, instead of relying on arrangements or target State request (s). That
appears to be the direction of mutual defense treaties.

198

There are two more issues involved with claims of self-defense. First, States
may change policies after ratifying a treaty, perhaps moving from reactive
self-defense to an anticipatory self-defense posture. A State may declare a shift
384
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within policy,

e.g.,

what was not considered a proper circumstance

anticipatory self-defense yesterday

is

for claiming

today within the scope of a proper claim.

Might such a shift in policy at the least cause discomfort among treaty partners,
and at worst trigger denunciations or claims of treaty breach, fundamental
199
change of circumstances, or impossibility of performance?

The second

and an

target State

would tend

involves the attacking State's posture. If an attacking State, a
assisting State share

common

self-defense positions, this

to legitimize assisting State operations as a manifestation of local,

or special, custom.

200

If

the assisting and target States take one view of the

and the attacking State has another, this might be grounds for a claim
that an opponent has not engaged in legitimate action. Thus, if an assisting
State would wish to assert that it is acting within the law, it could more safely
do so if it acts according to its allies' or opponents' views. Where a State has an
anticipatory self-defense view, this might mean employing military force in only
a reactive self-defense mode, or at least claiming to do so, if the opponent or
target State has adopted the restrictive view.. This is a policy decision and not a
question of law; it is akin to rules of engagement (ROE) more restrictive than
actions the law permits. ROE for combat forces may provide for wartime and
peacetime scenarios, in which rights to individual or collective self-defense,
including anticipatory self-defense, may be more circumscribed than the law
would allow. 201
issue,

Many of these issues do not find responses in reported practice or decisional
law.

The

War

Crimes Trials and

Military Tribunal relied

Self-Defense.

on the Pact of

The Nuremberg

Paris in

its

International

findings of guilt.

202

The

Germany had acted in self-defense. 203
was that Germany occupied Norway as a

Tribunal rejected defense claims that

Admiral Erich Raeder's theory

necessary act of self-defense to forestall Allied landings there. Citing the
Caroline Case,

10 *

the Tribunal recognized a right of anticipatory self-defense:

'[Preventative action in foreign territory

is

justified only in the case of

an

and overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation." This was not true for German
205
invasions of Denmark and Norway, the Tribunal ruled.
The defense was
unable to demonstrate "an intention formed in good faith and honesty of

instant

conviction
threatened."
In the

to

protect

one's

safety,

that

safety

being

immediately

206

Tokyo

trials

involving Japanese accuseds, a defense was that because

the Netherlands had declared war

on Japan before Japan had made
385

a formal

What

the Treaties

Have Said

war declaration, 207 attacks against Dutch Asian territories were in self-defense.
The Tribunal held the Netherlands had acted in anticipatory self-defense:

The

fact that the Netherlands,

.

.

fully

.

apprised of the imminence of the attack

war against Japan on 8th December and thus
officially recognised the existence o( a state of war which had been begun by
Japan, cannot change that war from a war of aggression [by]
Japan into
something other than that.
[by Japan] in self-defense declared
,

.

.

.

There was strong evidence of Japan's preparations to invade the Dutch East
Indies, and the Netherlands chose to declare war before Japan's formal
declaration. The Netherlands did not then have self-defense treaties with the
Allies, insofar as the published record shows. However, her acting in concert
with the Allies immediately afterward is some evidence of informal collective
self-defense, a concept recognized before and after ratification of the
Charter.

208

These

decisions,

coming just

Nuremberg Charter

as

anticipatory self-defense

General Assembly had confirmed the

after the

customary law,

and perhaps,

209

strongly evidence

210

a right of

for the Netherlands, the practice of

informal collective self-defense arrangements.

UN System. The

Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense at the Creation of the
record during and just after
collective

self-defense,

World War

II

does not show that the law of

including anticipatory collective self-defense, was

anything other than what had gone before.

The Charter

drafters included a

right of collective self-defense, largely at the behest oi parties to the

Chapultepec, but they did so in the context of the Pact of
Treaties,

and other agreements,

thereafter.

212

treaty, informal

Locarno

211

and bilateral treaties in 1935 and
self-defense under the Charter could come

e.g.,

Invoking collective

through formal

Nyon

Paris, the

Act of

arrangement, or by target State request.

213

Problems of varying views on the scope of self-defense within these modalities
H The
were not resolved when this norm was written into the Charter.

Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments were not handed down

until after the

Charter was in force, but they confirm a right of anticipatory self-defense.

21

IV. Collective Self^Defense Treaties during the Charter Era
Bilateral

and

have been concerned with
Article 51 states a right and not a duty of

multilateral defense agreements

collective self-defense since 1945.
self-defense; however, the right

216

is

transformed into a duty in self-defense
386
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217

treaties.

Part IV.

A discusses these arrangements, and Part IV. B argues that

national decision makers should be

known

bound by what they knew

at the time the decision to

or should have

respond in anticipatory self-defense was

made, the standard used in the law of armed

conflict,

the jus in

i.e.,

The Act

Treaties Providing for Collective Self'Defense.

hello.

of Chapultepec,

218

was replaced by the Rio
Treaty (1947), Article 3(1) of which provides that armed attack on an
American State is considered an attack on all American states and that each
instrumental in shaping Article 51 of the Charter,

party undertakes to assist in meeting the attack "in the exercise of the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51.

Article 3(1)

is

nearly identical with Part 1(3) of the Act.

219

."
.

.

Undoubtedly, the

Treaty drafters wished to carry forward the meaning of the inherent right of

Act

self-defense incorporated in the

in 1945,

which had been adopted

in

220

Article 5 1.

The Treaty also declares that " [o]n the request of the State or States directly
attacked" and until there

of Consultation, each party
to

a decision by the Inter- American System's

is

may determine "immediate measures"

the collective self-defense obligation.

fulfill

can proceed

until the

UN

and

territorial integrity,

affected by aggression that

These

it

may

take

self-defense measures

Security Council takes measures necessary to

maintain international peace
inviolability,

221

Organ

is

security.

222

If

any American State's

sovereignty, or political independence

is

not an armed attack, by a conflict, "or by any

other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America," the Treaty's

Organ of Consultation must meet immediately

to agree

taken, in case of aggression, to assist a victim of aggression,

should be taken for
security.

common

on measures to be
or on measures that

defense and the maintenance of peace and

221

Western European Union (WEU)
"the object of an armed attack in Europe, the

Article 4 of the 1948 treaty creating the

provides similarly that

other

.

.

.

attacked

if

a party

is

Parties will, in accordance with
all

.

.

.

Article 51..., afford the party so

the military and other aid and assistance in their power."

224

The

Treaty provided for a Consultative Council "[f]or consulting together on
the questions dealt with in the
to exercise

its

.

.

.

all

Treaty, which shall be organized as to be able

functions continuously."

225

(In

1955 the Council was renamed

the Council of Western European Union, but otherwise

its

functions remain

226

The 1948 agreement also provides for reporting to the Security
Council and ending WEU action when the Council takes measures necessary to
the same.)

maintain or restore international peace and security. Nothing in the Treaty
387

What
"prejudice [s] in any
," 227

Charter.

.

.

way the

There

is

the Treaties

Have Said

obligations of the

.

.

Parties

.

under the

nothing in the Treaty to indicate that

its

.

.

.

drafters did

not consider that they were carrying forward the understanding of the Charter

WEU States can invoke the inherent right of self-defense; the
Treaty's explicit reference to Article 51 tends to confirm this. The 1954 WEU
drafters,

i.e.,

that

Protocols provide for forces to be contributed for self-defense.
declares that parties "shall

the Council and

its

agency

information and advice.
revived in 1984 in

1980-88 Tanker

War

work

229

in close co-operation" with
rely

will

The WEU,

on

NATO

228

Protocol

NATO, and

I

that

military authorities

for

more than a decade, was
connection with European Union integration; 230 the
inactive for

also spurred action.

231

In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed; Article 5 provides in part that

[A]rmed attack against one or more of [the parties] in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently [the
parties] agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of
.

.

.

the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51
assist

.

.

.

will

the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in

deems necessary, including the
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic

concert with the other Parties, such action as
use of

armed

force, to restore

it

232

area.

Specific reference to Article 5 1 carries forward

an understanding that

parties

and collective self-defense. Article 7 adds
that the Treaty "does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any
way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are [UN]
have inherent

members

.

.

.

rights to individual

or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the

,

233

States also agreed to
maintenance of international peace and security."
"consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
234
Part[y] is threatened."
integrity, political independence or security of any
.

.

.

In 1950 the Arab League signed a Joint Defense Treaty, whose Article 2
provides:

.

.

.

Contracting States agree that an armed aggression, directed against any

one or more of them or against
against

all.

.

.

.

their forces, shall be considered as directed

[T]hey agree, in virtue of the right of legitimate self-defence, both

once the State or States so attacked and to
measures and
adopt immediately, both individually and collectively, all
force,
to repulse the
armed
of
employment
means at their disposal, including
individual

and

collective, to assist at

.

.

.

.

aggression and restore peace and security.
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The

Security Council must be informed immediately of an aggression and steps

235
and measures taken. Although

it

does not refer to Article 51 specifically, the

Treaty could not contravene individual and collective self-defense rights

proclaimed in the Charter.

.

.

.

236

Article 3 also pledges:

one of them, whenever
independence or security of any one of them is

States shall consult together at the request of any

the integrity of the territory,

exposed to danger.
In the event of the imminent risk of war or the advent of a sudden
international development believed to be dangerous,

hasten to coordinate their measures as the situation

The

latter clause directly supports a

.

.

may

States shall at once

.

require.

237

view that the inherent right of collective

self-defense includes a right of anticipatory self-defense.

That the League

contemplated more than reactive collective self-defense

also supported

the Treaty's Military Annex, Article

created by the Treaty
all

is

more

.

.

In 1951 Australia,

.

;

.

.

.

military

Committee
plans to meet

armed aggression which might be attempted

Contracting States or their forces."

New

by

the Permanent Military

charged with "[p]repar[ing]

foreseeable dangers or any

against one or

1 (a)

is

238

Zealand and the United States concluded the

ANZUS Pact. Similar to other mutual security agreements, and modeled on the
North Atlantic Treaty, 239 the Pact provides for consultation. 240 There is
Part[y]
"recognition] that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any
would be dangerous to [other parties'] peace and safety." Parties will "meet the
.

common
earlier

danger in accordance with

agreements, there

is

[their]

.

.

constitutional processes." Like

a pledge of reporting to the Security

Council and

ending self-defense measures once the Council takes necessary measures.
Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, however, there

on one

is

241

no statement that attack

242

an attack on all.
However, the "armed attack" provision should
243
receive the same construction as the phrase in the Charter, Article 51.
is

The 1954 SEATO Treaty

includes similar language

on aggression by armed

attack; consultation after a threat to a party's territory, sovereignty or political

independence; and reporting to the Security Council. The Treaty requires a
government's invitation or consent before action can be taken on that

member's

territory.

244

The

Pacific

Charter

(1954)

declares

parties'

"determination] to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in
the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or
territorial integrity."
its

245

Although

SEATO

Treaty obligations remain in

supporting organization ceased to exist in 1975.

389

246

effect,

France, the United

What
Kingdom and
members.

among

the United States are

the

SEATO and

Pacific Charter

247

The Second Balkan Pact was
Entente;

Little

Have Said

the Treaties

its

was only a couple of years. 248 Like its
pledged consultation but "immediate ..." collective

effective

predecessor, Pact parties

signed in 1954, a partial successor to the 1933

life

defense against "armed aggression," invoking Article 51 of the Charter. Thus,
if

Pact parties asserted individual claims to anticipatory self-defense, they

would have incorporated those claims by joining the Pact. 249
In 1955 some Arab League members signed the Baghdad Pact; Article
declared: "Consistent with Article 51

.

Parties will co-operate for their

.

.

1

and defence," perhaps through special agreements. 250 Unlike the
North Atlantic and other treaties, it did not provide for crisis consultation
beyond agreement to determine measures to be taken once the Pact was in
251
effect.
Members included Iran, Iraq (1955-59), Turkey, and the United
Kingdom. A political failure, it dissolved in 1979. 252
253
In 1955 the USSR and its European satellites signed the now-defunct
Warsaw Pact. Its Article 4 paralleled the North Atlantic Treaty:
security

In the event of an

armed attack in Europe on one or more of the

by any State or group of States, each

.

.

Party

.

.

.

.

shall, in

.

.

.

Parties

.

.

the exercise of the right

of individual or collective self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 ...

,

afford

the State or States so attacked immediate assistance, individually and in

agreement with the other
including

.

.

.

armed

.

.

force.

.

.

Parties
.

.

.

.
.

Parties

,

by

.

.

.

ail

the

means

it

considers necessary,

shall consult together

immediately

concerning the joint measures necessary to restore and maintain international

peace and security.

Measures taken under
accordance with the
as

the

.

.

.

.

.

.

this article shall

be reported to the Security Council in

Charter. These measures shall be discontinued as soon

Council takes the necessary action to restore and maintain

international peace

and

security.

254

Pact parties pledged to consult immediately to provide for joint defense and

maintaining international peace and security,

armed attack on one or more of the
..." The North Atlantic Treaty, it

threat of
arisen.

consultations

if

a party believes a

independence, or security

Cold

if

War

is

member

threatened.

.

.

member "consider [ed]
.

that a

Parties to the Treaty ha[d]

will

be recalled, provides for

State's territorial integrity, political

255

era bilateral defense treaties also

The

had

similar language.

Three

Mutual Defense Treaty,
declares that "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the

binding the United States are typical.
Article 4,

a

390
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Part[y] would be dangerous to its own peace and
Area on either
security and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in
Pacific

.

.

.

accordance with its constitutional processes." In common with the multilateral
the Philippines-U.S. agreement pledges reporting to the Security

treaties,

when

Council and ending defense measures

the Council takes measures

necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
attacks are

deemed

on metropolitan

to include attacks

under their

State, island territories

vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific.

257

jurisdiction, or their

independence or security of either

attack in the Pacific."

258

The Republic

the agreement with Japan

agreements with

260

sometimes naming Germany

War

arrangements; the

II

treaties.

before

261

territories of either

armed

...

is

them the

territorial integrity,

of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty

satellites

to

and

defend against "aggression,"

as the possible aggressor, or building

and France

259

USSR concluded bilateral

Warsaw Pact was not intended

Similarly, Britain

forces, public

threatened by external armed

have similar terms. The

European

its

Armed

Like the multilaterals, the parties pledge to

consult "whenever in the opinion of either of
political

256

ratified the

on World

to supersede these

Treaty of Dunkirk (1947)

WEU was formed; the Treaty states it was designed to prevent Germany

from again becoming a "danger to the peace," and
bilateral

aggression.

262

mutual

promised

agreements

like the abortive Versailles

support

if

Germany committed

Depending on how aggression might be defined, 263 the plain

language of these agreements could support a view that they contemplated
anticipatory

and reactive

self-defense, despite

some

States' policy of reactive

self-defense.

Each of these agreements

requires consultation

ANZUS

Pact, they say that

Without exception, they

there

is

independence, security, or the

party's territorial integrity, political
for the

when

armed attack on one

is

a threat to a
like.

Except

an attack on

all.

Charter requirements of reporting to the

refer to

Security Council, etc.

Do

response to a threat?
State

room for anticipatory collective self-defense as a
Under a restrictive view of self-defense, i.e., that a target

these terms leave

must await the

State B, with
attack.

whom

first

State

Assuming there

is

blow,

A has

Article 51 allows response by State

a

mutual self-defense

treaty,

a right of anticipatory self-defense,

respond before receiving the

first

A after

has suffered an

265

State

B could

blow, subject to necessity and proportionality

266

The remaining question is whether State A, which has not been a
of attack, could respond to an attack on State B and successfully claim

principles.

target

264

collective anticipatory self-defense.
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the Treaties

Have Said

For reasons grounded in Charter law, the language of the collective
self-defense

themselves,

treaties

the

agreement negotiations, and the practical
warfare,

267

there

is

agreements

require,

268

there
first

is

blow

nothing

the Charter,
planning,

a customary

270
it is

agreements

the

"The

for collective

have recourse to collective defence."
is

modern methods

self-defense response, as

in

struck.

is

United Nations to prepare in advance

self-defense

of

self-defense

of

a right to anticipatory collective self-defense in the Charter

consultation before the

right to

collective

realities

must be consultation before a

era. If there

of

history

269

norm, in terms of the

right of

defence

forbidding

Members

is

most

of the

implicit in their

Since a right to collective
treaties

and practice before

implicit in that customary right as well. Consultation, or

can include measures to be taken in anticipatory collective

self-defense.

The Charter does not

self-defense,

whether the response be reactive or anticipatory

forbid planning for individual or collective

Article 5 1 of the Charter, a treaty that has as

its first

in nature.

and primary principle

and purpose the maintenance of international peace and

security,

271

lists

alternatives of the inherent rights of individual or collective self-defense.

The

same conditions applying

and

individual

to

self-defense,

proportionality, apply to collective self-defense.
collective self-defense

and

if

individual

is

272

necessity

e.g.,

If this

is

so,

a right of

coterminous with a right of individual self-defense,
includes

self-defense

commentators and States argue,

273

anticipatory

self-defense

as

collective self-defense includes that option

too.

Given the

history of negotiations

contemporaneous with the Charter (the

Act of Chapultepec 274 ) and running through the Rio Treaty (1947), the WEU
Treaty (1948), the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), the Arab League Joint
Defence Treaty (1950), and more recent agreements, there is evidence in the
language of the agreements themselves to support a view that negotiators had
anticipatory self-defense in mind, particularly with respect to consultations to

deter

aggression,

including

recognition of sovereignty

is

armed

aggression.

275

When

combined with the "inherent"

and the supremacy of Charter law over inconsistent

the

Charter's

right of self-defense

treaties,

276

parties could

not contract away an inherent right of self-defense, including collective
self-defense, guaranteed by the Charter.

And because

the Charter negotiators

operated against a background of prior treaty law, practice, judicial opinions,

and commentators' views supporting a

right of anticipatory self-defense,

277

that

right in the collective self-defense context carried forward into the Charter era.
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The Temporal Problem: When Does Liability Accrue? Convictions at Nuremberg
were based on what defendants knew, or should have known, when they decided
278
Since then, there has been no authoritative statement on
to invade other States.
whether liability accrues based on what decision makers know, or should know,

when

or

reactive

a

anticipatory

response

self-defense

Commentators have been tempted

establishing liability

later.

281

Geneva Conventions of 1949

Article 51,

proper standard for

what decision makers know, or should have known,

is

Declarations of understanding
284

on

279

for jus in hello confirms that the

when an operation was authorized. Hindsight can be
280
time may be clouded with the fog of war.
the

contemplated.

to justify opinions, at least in part,

evidence available after a decision, perhaps years

The developing law

is

20/20; decisions at the
282

of four countries to 1977 Protocol

283

I

to

state that for protection of civilians in

protection of civilian objects in Article 52,

be taken in attacks set forth in Article 57,

286

a

285

and precautions

commander should be

to

liable

based on that commander's assessment of information available at the relevant
time,

i.e.,

when

Convention's

288

by information available
Protocol

I,

287

made. Two of the 1980 Conventional Weapons
protocols have similar terms, i.e., a commander is only bound

a decision

with

is

when

its

common

is

made.

289

understandings, and the Conventional

Convention protocols are on
treaties'

a decision to attack

their

way

to acceptance

among

statement, in text or declarations, that

Weapons

States.

290

commanders

These
will

be

held accountable based on information they have at the time for determining

whether attacks are necessary and proportional has become a nearly universal
291
norm. The San Remo Manual recognizes it as the standard for naval warfare.
It

can be said with

hello. It

fair

confidence that this

should be the standard for jus

self-defense response,

same standard

as a

ad.

is

the customary standard for jus in

helium.

A national leader directing a

whether reactive or anticipatory, should be held to the

commander

in the field deciding

on

attacks.

A

national

what he or she, or those reporting to the
knew or reasonably should have known, when a decision was made to

leader should be held accountable for
leader,

respond in self-defense.

V. Conclusions and Projections for the Future
Since

the

Congress

of

Vienna

attempted

to

impose

order

on

post-Napoleonic Europe, countries great and small have tried to preserve

peace and promote national security interests through collective security
systems.

Some arrangements have been

general, e.g., the alliance system after

393

What

the Treaties

Waterloo. Others have been regional,

Crimean War. Many have been

Have Said

e.g.,

bilateral.

treaties negotiated during the

Although many had terms

stating a

reactive self-defense theory, others provided for anticipatory self-defense.

Practice of those times reveals use of informal arrangements as well.

The new

factor emerging after the Franco-Prussian

War

292

was defensive

which could promote aggressive
reactive and anticipatory collective

alliance systems, often in secret treaties,

coalition warfare, but

for

Arrayed against these alliances were

self-defense.

agreements
self-defense.

which provided

that

bespoke

also

reactive

and multilateral

bilateral

and

anticipatory

collective

293

The Treaty

established the League of Nations.

postwar peace

treaties, did

Covenant can be read
self-defense.

World War

of Versailles and other agreements ending

The Pact

as

The Covenant

of the League, Part

not address self-defense

I

I

of the

although the

directly,

not excluding self-defense, including anticipatory

of Paris and

its

reservation through diplomatic notes,

while outlawing aggressive war as national policy, preserved an inherent right
of self-defense. Based

on the

treaty record before the Great

right included anticipatory collective self-defense as

international peace and security.

War,

an option

The Nyon Arrangement,

this

inherent

for preserving

practice under

it,

other international agreements, the Budapest Articles, and international
military tribunal decisions after

World War

right of anticipatory collective self-defense.

informal arrangements could be concluded.

Thus,

when Charter

II

confirmed continuation of a

There

is

also evidence that

more

294

Article 51 provided in 1945 for an inherent right of

individual and collective self-defense in the context of the contemporary

Act

of Chapultepec, the right the Charter negotiators intended as inherent

included a right of anticipatory collective self-defense.
multilateral treaties,

bilateral

29

The

record of

agreements and State practice since 1945

confirms that right, which includes a right to conclude more informal

arrangements.

And while prior consultation may be a customary prerequisite to

exercise of that right, consultation

may

planning for anticipatory responses. There
forbid such.
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The

include prior planning, including
is

nothing in the Caroline Case to

inherent right to anticipatory collective self-defense,

including a right to engage in more informal arrangements, continues today as
it

has existed since the Congress of Vienna. States can no longer adopt war as

an instrument of national

policy,

but beyond that limitation, a right to

self-defense, anticipatory or reactive, individual or collective, continues as
297
before.
:
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Anticipatory
self-defense,

self-defense,

collective

anticipatory

unilateral

like

always tempered by necessity and proportionality principles.

is

Nevertheless, the treaty record since 1815, although tortured, occasionally

and sometimes muffled through

phrased,

obscurely

secret

treaties

or

reservations not part of published agreements, demonstrates that international

law has recognized, and continues to recognize, a right of anticipatory

and participation in the

collective self-defense. If confidence

through affirmative Security Council action continues,
will

be more, not

decisions

299

less,

use of anticipatory responses,

on further methods

it is

298

UN

likely that there

followed by Council

to contain threats to the peace, breaches of the

One

peace, threats to States' territorial integrity, aggression, or invasion.
that should be resolved in the future

the temporal problem. States and their

is

decision for anticipatory collective response

SEATO

302

may

taken.

300

self-defense

Warsaw Pact

301
)

World War

II

have

or have fallen into disuetude

(e.g.,

303

304

and North Atlantic
treaties, remain in
305
The surviving agreements'
agreements have come and gone.

be

arrangements,

the

(i.e.,

Others,

).

force. Bilateral

roles

is

multilateral self-defense treaties negotiated since

been abrogated

changing.
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may

the Rio

e.g.,

may be
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New

agreements,

What

negotiated.

perhaps

informal

anticipatory

collective

or

role

play in these evolving developments

is

not

the terms of prior agreements, negotiated before and after
practice,

issue

what they knew, or should have known, when a

leadership should be held to

Some

system

show that it would be

However,
1945, and State
clear.

appropriate, as a matter of international law, to

include anticipatory self-defense as a response option until the Council acts

pursuant

to

Article

peremptory norm
the future.

(jus

How

51.

cogens)

fits

anticipatory

collective

into this analysis,

if

at

all, is

self-defense
also

as

a

an inquiry for
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of St.
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...
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testifying

by unalterable good

will the

animated, to consider themselves
the three allied Princes looking

govern three branches of the

all

as

mutual affection with which they ought to be
members of one and the same Christian nation;

on themselves

One

as

merely delegated by Providence to

family, namely, Austria, Prussia,

confessing that the Christian world, of which they and

no other Sovereign than Him

reality

infinite

Word

Governments
service, and of

In consequence, the sole principle of force, whether between the said

wisdom, that

is

to say,

to

whom

all

their people

part, has in

the treasures of love, science, and

God, our Divine Saviour, the

of Life. Their Majesties consequently

and Russia, thus

form a

recommend

Word

of the

Most High, the

to their people, with the

most

tender solicitude, as the sole means of enjoying that Peace which arises from a good
conscience, and which alone

more

in the principles

is

durable, to strengthen themselves every day

more and

and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to

mankind.

The preamble

.

.

.

asserted that the signatories
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no other object than
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of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective
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in their political relations with every other
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an immediate influence on the councils of Princes, and guide all their steps, as being the
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.
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Cavour of Piedmont, July 20, 1858, arts. 1, 3-4, 1 HURST, supra note 17, at 401.

Independence and Neutrality of Belgium, Aug.

32. Treaty Relative to
Brit.-Pruss., arts. 1-2, 141

Neutrality of Belgium, Aug. 11, 1870, Fr.-Gr.

19, 1839, art. 7,

88

id.

art. 7,

1870, Gr.

id.

441, 443-44. Treaty Relative to

82

id.

255, 259; Treaty of London,

445, 449, also had guaranteed Belgian neutrality.

Belgian neutrality was a cause of
33.

1-2,

Brit., arts.

Separation of Belgium from Holland, Nov. 15, 1831,

Apr.

9,

Consol. T.S. 435, 438-39; Treaty Relative to Independence and

PALMER, supra note

World War

I.

KAGAN,

German violation of

supra note 20, at 61, 129, 204.

15, at 118.

34. The Russian fleets were then wintering in New York and San Francisco. JAMES P.
DUFFY, LINCOLN'S ADMIRAL: THE CIVIL WAR CAMPAIGNS OF DAVID FARRAGUT 220-21

(1997).

The Russian visit came

at a

low point in Union fortunes; the Russians were feted in

York, San Francisco, and Washington.
alliance then or in 1861 has

toward that end. See D.P.

Whether Russia and

been debated; most

New

the United States discussed an

assert that there

were

at least conversations

CROOK, THE NORTH, THE SOUTH, AND THE POWERS 1861-1865,

at

317-18 (1974); DONALDSON JORDAN & EDWIN J. PRATT, EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL
WAR 200-01 (1969); ALBERT A. WOLDMAN, LINCOLN AND THE RUSSIANS ch. 9 (1952).
GADDIS, supra note 29, at 5-6, linked this proposed cooperation to U.S. "benevolent neutrality"
during the Crimean War.
35. See supra note 17, infra notes 177-85

and accompanying

36. Treaty of Alliance Against Paraguay,

May

1,

1865,

Treaty of Union and Defensive Alliance, Jan. 23, 1865,
Alliance, July 10, 1865, 13

some of these

1 id.

States sputtered

text.

art. 1,

art.

1,

131 Consol. T.S. 119, 120;

130

id.

401, 402; Treaty of

305, 306; see also STOETZER, supra note 17, at 10, 266.

on

until the

Apr. 11, 1871, 143 Consol. T.S. 129, 132.
37. Definitive Treaty of Peace,

May

A war with

United States mediated an armistice. See Armistice,

10, 1871, Fr.-Ger.,

400

143 Consol. T.S. 163.
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38.

PACT 6
1907,

ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIME: THE ORIGINS OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND
(1968), referring to

arts. 1, 3,

39.

36

Stat.

2259, 2271 (Hague

Hague Convention

Contract Debts, Oct.
40.

Hague Convention

TAYLOR,

(II)

Opening of Hostilities, Oct.

Relative to

(III)

18,

III).

Respecting Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of

18, 1907, art. 1,

id.

2241, 2251 (Hague

II).

supra note 17, at 255.

Cold War,
coinciding with much of the Charter era, are more durable than those of the past century, which
depended on skill of a Metternich or Bismarck to hold them together.
41.

GADDIS, supra note

29, at 222, notes that the simpler alliance systems of the

42. For analysis of alliance systems since
self-defense, see infra notes

World War

216-78 and accompanying

Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty

Map

in the context of collective

II

George K. Walker,

text.

6

of the Continent,

Integration

and

TRANSNAT'L LAW.

1,

12-24 (1993) surveys development of European economic systems, particularly the European
Union.
43.

May

Agreement,

25/June

6,

1873, Aust.-Hung.-Russ.,

2-3, 146 Consol. T.S. 217,

arts.

220-21, to which Germany acceded Oct. 22, 1873. See 2 HURST, supra note 17, at 508; PALMER,
supra note 15, at 151.
44.

Convention of Defensive Alliance, June

4,

1878, Gr. Brit. -Turk.,

art. 1,

153 Consol.

T.S. 67, 69.
45. Treaty of Alliance, Oct. 7,

extended
2

for five years

1879, Aust.-Hung.-Ger.,

1-2, 155

id. 303, 307,
by Protocol in Regard to Prolongation of Alliance of 1879, Mar. 22, 1883,

HURST, supra note

arts.

Concerning Continuation of Treaty of 1879 and
1902, Aust.-Hung.-Ger., id. at 732, extended the arrangement

17, at 629. Protocol

Protocol of 1883, June

1,

on a three-year renewal basis.
46. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 264; see also WILLIAM L. LANGER, EUROPEAN ALLIANCES
AND ALIGNMENTS 171-96 (1931); PALMER, supra note 15, at 163-66, reporting talks between
French and Russian staffs through the next decade.

indefinitely

47. This provision applied

if

war with Turkey, but only

a party were at

after previous

agreement among the three States. League of the Three Emperors, June 18, 1881, art. 1, 158
Consol. T.S. 461. Treaty Concerning Prolongation of Treaty of 1881, Apr. 15, 1884, 2 HURST,
supra note 17 at 634, extended and slightly modified the 1881 agreement. In Treaty of Alliance,

June 16/28, 1881, Aus.-Hung.-Serbia, 159 Consol. T.S.
neutrality

if

the parties pledged benevolent

1,

was at war; Treaty Prolonging the Treaty of 1881, Jan. 28/Feb. 9, 1889,
id. 485, extended it to 1895. Declaration Affirming Engagement of

either

Aus.-Hung.-Serbia, 171

Mutual Neutrality, Oct.
"loyal neutrality"

if

either

2/15, 1904, Aust.-Hung.-Russ., 196

id.

392, 394 pledged reciprocal

was involved in war with a third State; the treaty did not apply to the
LANGER, supra note 46, at 196-212; TAYLOR, supra note

Balkans. For analysis of the League, see
17, at

who says

279-72, 304,

there was

no

the League was a "fair-weather system" that "worked only so long as

conflict."

48. Treaty of Defensive Alliance, Feb. 6, 1873, Bol.-Peru, art.

and Protocol, May
Chile-Peru, 162

id.

5,

1879,

id.

1,

145 Consol. T.S. 475, 484,

482; see also Treaty of Peace and Amity, Oct. 20, 1883,

453; Armistice Convention, Apr.

4,

1884, Bol.-Chile, 163

id.

423; STOETZER,

supra note 17, at 10, 266.
49.

LANGER, supra note

50. Treaty of Alliance,
51.

Id., arts.

46, at 246.

May

20, 1882, arts. 2-3, 160 Consol. T.S. 237, 241.

4-6, renewed by Second Treaty of Triple Alliance, Feb. 20, 1887,

139, 141. Separate Treaty, Feb. 20, 1887, Aus.-Hung.-Italy,

1887, Ger. -Italy,

id.

147, required

Germany

to go to

401

war

if

id.

Italy

art. 1,

169

id.

143; Separate Treaty, Feb. 20,

went

to

war to protect

its

African

What
Germany and

interests.

317, pledging that

if

the Treaties

Have Said

Russia signed the Reinsurance Treaty, June 18, 1887,

either

went

to

war with

a third

arts.

1-2, 169

id.

Great Power, the other would observe

benevolent neutrality, and recognized Russia's interest in the Balkan peninsula and that the
Bosporus and Dardanelles should always remain open.

Straits of the

June

1887,

18,

government

An

Additional Protocol,

323-24, provided that Germany would help Russia establish a regular

id.

in Bulgaria,

and that Germany would be a benevolent neutral

if

Russia had to

defend the entrance to the Black Sea. The Reinsurance Treaty was allowed to lapse in 1890.

PALMER, supra note

May 6,
id.

15, at 179.

A third Triple

Alliance was negotiated in Treaty of Alliance,

1891, 175 Consol. T.S. 105. Fourth Treaty of Triple Alliance, June 28, 1902,

art. 14,

191

286, 295, renewed the alliance for six years, with a possibility of a further six-year renewal.

Agreement Explaining and Supplementing Article VII of Treaty of Triple Alliance of 1887, Dec.
15, 1909, Aust.-Hung.-Italy, 2 HURST, supra note 17, at 812, dealt with Balkan issues. Fifth
Treaty of Triple Alliance, Dec.
time.

The 1882

5,

1912, 217 Consol. T.S. 311, renewed the alliance for the last

treaty's operative terms, arts. 1-5,

Nov.

52. E.g., Secret Protocol,

15, 1818,

Napoleonic wars, had a Military Protocol,
treaty; Protocol of Conference, supra

id.

remained the same throughout.

69 Consol. T.S. 369, among the victors of the

374, and was signed the same day as the published

note 30, admitted France to the Concert of Europe. See also

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.

18

art.

required that League Members' future treaties be registered with the League Secretariat and be

published by
Alliance,

it.

May

No treaty would be binding until registered. This superseded terms like Treaty of

20, 1882, art. 6, 160 Consol. T.S. at 241,

peace openly arrived at" had been the

Covenant Members soon ignored

first

art. 18.

and State

practice.

Woodrow

of President

"Open covenants

of

Wilson's Fourteen Points.

FERRELL, supra note 38, at 54-61. U.N.

CHARTER art.

102 admonishes Members to submit their treaties for registration; a consequence for nonfiling

UN organ. See also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5,

that a treaty cannot be invoked before a

610-14; SlMMA, supra note

1,

at

TAYLOR,

54.

Romania had

at

1103-16. Security agreements are often not published.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987) (RESTATEMENT (THIRD)).
53.

is

§

312

r.n.5

supra note 17, at 264.
to aid Austria-Hungary only

if

she were attacked in territory of States

bordering Romania. Treaty of Alliance, Oct. 30, 1883, Aus.-Hung.-Rom.,

arts.

2-3, 162 Consol.

T.S. 488, 491.

Germany accepted

55.

the treaty verbatim; Italy required consultation before action.

Treaty Providing for Accession of Germany, Oct. 30, 1883, 162

Accession of

Italy,

May

Aus.-Hung.-Rom., 177

id.

15,

1888,

171

id.

61.

id.

Germany

to the Alliance,

May

7,

379, extended the alliance to 1902.
1899,

id.

1892,

Germany and Italy acceded. Treaty
Nov. 11/12, 1892, 178 id. 17; Treaty

Providing for Accession of Italy to the Alliance, Nov. 28, 1892,
id.

13/25,

273, renewed the relationship;

Providing for Accession of

183

487, 493; Treaty Providing for

Treaty of Alliance, July

Germany and

383; Accession of Italy, June

5,

1899,

id.

Italy

389.

id.

39. Protocol, Sept. 30, 1896,

acceded. Accession of Germany,

The

relationship was extended by

Third Treaty Renewing Alliances of 1892 and 1896, Apr. 4/17, 1902, Aust.-Hung.-Rom., 191

id.

117; Treaty Providing for Accession of Germany to the Alliance, July 12/25, 1902, 2 HURST,
supra note 17, at 729; Treaty Providing for Accession of Italy to the Alliance, Dec. 12, 1902,

Aust.-Hung.-Italy,
5,

id.

730; and by Treaty Renewing the Alliances of 1892, 1896, and 1903, Feb.

1913, 217 Consol. T.S. 384; Treaty Providing for Accession of Germany to the Alliance, Feb.

13/26,

id.

390; Treaty Providing for Accession of Italy, Mar.

5,

1913, Aust.-Hung.-Italy,

56. Treaty of Alliance, supra note 51; see also supra notes

402

id.

49-53 and accompanying

393.
text.
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Note of Russian Ambassador to France M. de Mohrenheim to French Foreign Minister
M. Ribot, Aug. 15/27, 1891, annexing Letter of Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Nikolai Giers to
de Mohrenheim, Aug. 9/21, 1891; Note of Ribot to de Mohrenheim, Aug. 27, 1891, 2 Hurst,
57.

supra note 17, at 662-65.
58. Draft of Military Convention, 1892, Fr.-Russ., id. 668, approved by Note of Giers to
French Ambassador to Russia M. de Montbello, Dec. 15/27, 1893, id. 669. For diplomatic history
analysis, see 1 WILLIAM L. LANGER, THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM 1890-1912 chs. 1-2

TAYLOR, supra note 17, ch. 15.
59. PALMER, supra note 15, at 180.
60. Id. 203; TAYLOR, supra note 17,

(1935);

Morocco, Apr.

Fr.-Gr.

1904,

8,

Newfoundland and West and Central

KAGAN,
61.

and
Convention
Respecting
198;

ch. 18, analyzing Declaration Respecting Egypt

195

Brit.,

Consol.

T.S.

Africa, Apr. 8, 1904, Fr.-Gr. Brit.,

id.

205. See also

supra note 20, at 177-78.

PALMER, supra note

Convention Relating

at 211;

15,

TAYLOR,

supra note

17,

at

427-46, analyzing

and Tibet, Aug. 31, 1907, Gr.

to Persia, Afghanistan,

204

Brit.-Russ.,

Consol. T.S. 404.
62. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 511. Only after the Great War began did Britain, France,
and Russia sign the Pact of London, Sept. 5, 1914, 220 Consol. T.S. 330, pledging to continue
the conflict until a satisfactory peace could be obtained. PALMER, supra note 15, at 232.
63. KAGAN, supra note
FORGING THE ALLIANCE 33

Treaty of Dunkirk, Mar.
effect allied

(1989) claims Britain's

first

15, at 209.

DON COOK,

peacetime defensive alliance was

1947, Fr.-U.K., 9 U.N.T.S. 187. However, the United

4,

Kingdom

in

with other States in Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, supra note 18, to enforce the

Congress of Vienna system, the

Arrangement Supplementary
Poland

PALMER, supra note

20, at 150-51;

just before

World War

to

Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 135, and
the Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 17, 1937, id. 149, and with
See supra notes 14-22; infra notes 138-43, 153, 224-31, 262

II.

and accompanying text. While Cook's statement
treaties was a defense alliance in each case.

is

technically correct, the effect of these

64. Treaty of Alliance, Mar. 30, 1904, Bulg.-Serb., arts. 2-4, 2

HURST,

supra note 17, at

752.
65. Treaty of

Amity and

Alliance, Feb. 29/Mar. 13, 1912, Bulg.-Serb., 215 Consol. T.S.

390; Military Convention, Bulg.-Serb., Apr. 29/May 11, 1912, 2

An Alliance, Sept.
Convention,

12/Oct.

art. 4, id. at

6,

1912, Monteneg.-Serb.,

id.

HURST,

supra note 17, at 822.

828, included a decision in the Political

829, to go to war with Turkey. Military Convention,

arts.

1-2,

id.,

provided for strategic defense in war with Austria-Hungary and strategic offense in war with

Turkey.

May

66. Treaty of Defensive Alliance,

16/29, 1912, Bulg.-Gr., art.

See also Military Convention, Sept. 12, 1912, Bulg.-Gr., 2
67. Treaty of Alliance,

Military Convention,

May

May

Treaty of Alliance, Apr. 22/May
Peace,

May

30, 1913,

id.

68. See supra notes

69.
arts.

19/June

19/)une
5,

1,

1,

1913,

1913,

1913, Gr.-Serb.,

id.

id.

117.

KAGAN,

71.

Hague

accompanying

supra note 38,

arts.

1,

17, at 830.

218 Consol. T.S. 166, 167;

The Second Balkan War ended with Treaty of

3,

id.

322.

text.

in Eastern Asia

supra note 20, at 128-29; but

III,

art. 1,

159; Treaty of Peace, July 28/Aug. 10, 1913,

1-3, 5, 214 Consol. T.S. 107-08; see also 2
70.

216 Consol. T.S. 179.

170; see also Protocol Concerning Conclusion of

60-63 and accompanying

Agreement Respecting Rights

1,

HURST, supra note

and

India, Gr. Brit.-Japan, July 13, 1911,

LANGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 58, ch.
see TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 527-28.
36

text.

403

Stat, at 2251; see also supra

23.

note 38 and

What
72. See generally

the Treaties

PALMER, supra note

15, at

Have Said

226-30; TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 520-30;

BARBARA TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 91-157
TAYLOR,

73.

(1962).

supra note 17, at 527-28.

74. Pact of Paris, supra note 11, arts. 1-2. see also infra notes

111-27 and accompanying

text.

75. See supra notes

Hague

76.

II,

51-53 and accompanying

supra note 39,

art. 1,

36

text.

Stat, at 2251;

Hague

III,

supra note 38,

arts. 1, 3, id. at

2271.
77. See supra notes 19, 21, 25, 32, 36, 43, 51, 54-55, 57,
78. See supra notes 21-22, 24-33, 36, 46, 57-61, 64,
79. See supra notes 24-30

80. See supra note 29
81. See infra notes

and accompanying

and accompanying

165-277

69 and accompanying

69 and accompanying

text.

text.

text.

text.

for analysis of self-defense in the

Charter

era.

North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, modified by
on Accession of Greece and Turkey, Oct. 17, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S. 350;
Protocol on Accession of Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 5707, 243
U.N.T.S. 308; Protocol on Accession of Spain, Dec. 10, 1981, 34 U.S.T. 3510, analyzed infra
notes 229, 232-34 and accompanying text. In 1997, agreements were signed to admit Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland to North Atlantic Treaty membership, with perhaps Romania
and Slovenia to follow in a second round. The protocol is before the U.S. Senate for advice and
consent. Predictably, the Department of State has promoted the expansion; others are critical of
82.

Protocol

it.

See generally U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright,

NATO Expansion:

Beginning the

and Consent: Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8 U.S.
Dispatch 1 (Oct. 1997) (favoring expansion); Albright, NATO Expansion: A Shared

Process of Advice

Dep't

and

St.

Sensible Investment: Statement Before the Senate Appropriations Committee,

(same);

MANDELBAUM, supra note

20, at 45-65, 156, 164,

id.

12 (Nov. 1997)

173-74 (opposing expansion)

;

Amos

&Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO'S Expensive Trip East, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 2 Qan.-Feb.
1998) (same). On Mar. 3, 1998, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to recommend
admitting Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO. Steven Erlanger, Key Senate Panel
Passes Resolution to Broaden NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at Al.
Perlmutter

83. See infra notes

255-63 and accompanying

84. See supra note

1

and accompanying

85. E.g., supra note 22

and accompanying

text.

38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, §§ 102-03.
WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ch. 4 (1952) for analysis

86. C/. I.C.J.
87. See F. P.

text.

text.

STATUTE,

art.

of drafting of the Covenant; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 art. 29, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
339 (Vienna Convention), (restating customary rule that unless a different intention appears
from a treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty binds a party as to all its territory); IAN
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 89-92 (2d ed. 1984);
r.n. 2 (noting colonial empires' practice to
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 322

&

specify territorial application).

89.

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS art.

1

States signatory to Treaty of Versailles, supra note 10, of

other States

named

in the

Covenant Annex,

e.g.,

provided that original Members were

which the Covenant was Part

during the war. Other States, Dominions, or colonies could join
also

WALTERS,

accompanying

I,

and

countries like the Netherlands, were neutral
if

the Assembly approved. See

supra rote 87, at 43-44. For the Assembly's function, see infra notes 91, 94 and
text.

The United

States signed the Treaty of Versailles, supra, but the Senate
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never gave advice and consent. See

WALTERS,

and accompanying

supra, ch. 6; supra note 10

text.

90.

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Wilson, Article 10 was the Covenant's key provision.
supra note 87, at 48-49.

arts. 4(1),

Woodrow

For President

10.

KAGAN, supra note

20, at 299;

The United States was also mentioned but never joined the

WALTERS,
League. See

supra notes 10, 89 and accompanying text.
91.
ch. 15;

Id., arts. 3, 6, 1 1;

WALTERS,

92.

see also

U.N. CHARTER arts. 97-101; GOODRICH ETAL., supra note

5,

supra note 87, at 44-47, 49.

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

12-13, 15; see also

WALTERS,

supra

16(1)— 16(2) see also

WALTERS,

supra

arts.

note 87, at 49-53.
93.

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS arts.

;

note 87, at 53.
94.

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

previous era, which often enjoined secrecy

arts.

18-19, countering treaty terms of the

on parties; see also WALTERS, supra note

87, at 54-55;

supra note 52 and accompanying text.
95.

Compare U.N. CHARTER

NATIONS

arts.

arts.

1(1),

2(4), with

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF

10-11.

Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 31(1) (treaty interpreted in good faith in
accordance with ordinary meaning given terms in their context and in light of its object and
purpose); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 325(1); Eduardo Jimenez de
Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 R.C. A.D.I. 1, 42-48 (1978).
96.

97. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 10, arts. 42-44.

Agreement Providing for Assistance to France in Event of Unprovoked Aggression by
Germany, June 28, 1919, Fr.-U.S., arts. 1-2, 112 Brit. &For. St. Pap. 216-17, 13 AM. J. INT'LL.
411-13 (Supp. 1919); Agreement for Assistance to France in Event of Unprovoked Aggression
by Germany, June 28, 1919, Fr.-Gr. Brit., arts. 1-2, id. 213-14, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 414-15 (Supp.
1919), signed the same day as Treaty of Versailles, supra note 10.
99. See supra notes 10, 89-90 and accompanying text.
100. KAGAN, supra note 20, at 297-98; George A. Finch, A Pact of Non- Aggression, 27 AM.
98.

J.

INT'LL. 525, 526 (1933).

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS art. 21, also provided that

nothing in the Covenant would be deemed to affect "validity of international agreements, such

Monroe

as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the

Doctrine, for securing the

maintenance of peace." Article 21 was inserted to try to assure U.S. Senate passage of the Treaty
of Versailles, supra note 10. President Woodrow Wilson and British Prime Minister David Lloyd
George agreed, in exchange, to the treaties, supra note 98, that pledged aid to France if Germany
attacked her again. Latin American States were not happy with the

WALTERS,

Monroe Doctrine

reference.

supra note 87, at 55-56.

101. Military Convention, Feb. 21, 1921, Fr.-Pol.,

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 1914-15,
1924, Czech.-Fr.,

arts.

1-2,

at

116 (1987)

(1

art. 1,

in J.A.S.

GRENVILLE,

THE MAJOR

GRENVILLE) Treaty of Alliance, Jan.
;

117; see also Political Agreement, Feb. 19, 1921, Fr.-Pol.,

id.

id.

21,

116.

These agreements were modified by revised alliances (1925) negotiated in connection with
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Oct. 16, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 289 (Locarno Treaty), analyzed infra at
notes 106-08 and accompanying text. See also KAGAN, supra note 20, at 390.
102. E.g., Alliance,

Aug.

23, 1921, Czech.-Rom., art.
art.

1,

54

id.

consultation);

257, 259

14, 1920, Czech.-Yugo., art.
1,

13

id.

(collective self-defense

THEODORE

I.

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 62-63

1,

6 L.N.T.S. 209, 211; Alliance, Apr.

231, 233; Defensive Alliance, June

GESHKOFF,

1921, Rom.-Yugo.,

7,

from "unprovoked attack";

BALKAN UNION:

A ROAD TO

(1940) (Entente's weakness was that
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also providing for

it

PEACE

IN

did not provide for

What

the Treaties

defense to unprovoked attack by a great power);

Have Said
GRENVILLE, supra note 101, (Entente
10.). France and Italy also

1

designed to maintain the Treaties of Neuilly and Trianon, supra note
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b;

88,

art.

30;

SINCLAIR, supra note 88,

at

94-98, 184-85.
113.

DEPT OF STATE, TREATIES
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117. G.A. Res. 95(1),

principles as a general customary
infra

norm make

this

claim dubious today. See supra notes 115-16,

notes 165, 203-06, and accompanying text.

118. Multilateral Treaty for Renunciation of War: Identic Notes of the
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83-85,

Edwin M. Borchard, The Multilateral Treaty for the
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to Secretary of State Kellogg,

May

19,

1928,

1928(1) FOR. RELS. U.S. 67 (1942).
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INTL
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NORMAN J.
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reprinted in Rights

138, at 49.

Law Association, Budapest Articles of Interpretation: Final Text, arts. 2-4, in
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ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS: AN INTIMATE HISTORY chs. 10, 12 (1950

rev. ed.) for a U.S.
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Stat. 1681, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 and the end of World War II; see also
accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
170. See generally

,

Canyes, The

S.

1,

at 95; 2

17, at 28;

Kunz,

OPPENHEIM, supra note

1,

Inter- American

§ 52aa, at 155;

Tucker, The Interpretation of War under Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q.

1 1,

29

(1951).
172. See supra notes 37-164

and accompanying

text.

THE LAW OF NATIONS 417 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963);
supra note 1, at 271-72; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 344;
166-68;
HANS KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED
at

173. J.B. BRIERLY,

BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE,
JESSUP, supra note

1,

NATIONS 913-14

(1961);

Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B.

D.W. Bowett, Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the
INTL L. 130, 131 (1955); Arthur L. Goodhart, The North Atlantic

United
Treaty

of 1949, 79R.C.A.D.I. 187, 192 (1951).
174. Nicaragua Case, supra note

1,

at 94. See also

id.

at

152-53

(sep.

opin of Singh,

Pres.);

Sohn, supra note 120, at 871.

and drug trafficking suppression.
Combat Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, in LAW AND FORCE,

175. E.g., self-defense principles to justify anti- terrorism

Geoffrey

M.

supra note
176.

1,

Cf

Levitt, Intervention to
at 224.
I.C.J.

Kolosov, supra note

Statute,

emphasize that treaty law,

38(1);

1,

at 234,

proposed a treaty to define self-defense.

Restatement (Third),

supra note 52, §§ 102-03,

the Charter, must be balanced against customary norms, and that

e.g.,

custom can develop contrary
art.

art.

to treaty-based law

and can outweigh

treaty law.

U.N.

CHARTER

103 only applies to treaties inconsistent with the Charter. Moreover, jus cogens norms

outweigh custom or

treaties.

If

a jus cogens

norm develops on
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a track different

may

from a

What

Have Said

the Treaties

Charter-based

norm or a customary norm based on the

other hand,

a Charter-based

customary

if

rule,

is jus

cogens,

it

Charter, jus cogens trumps either.

norm, whether a rule from the Charter

On the

as treaty or a parallel

trumps other standards. Nicaragua Case, supra note

1,

at 100, held

norms under U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) approached jus cogens status, superseding contrary
custom. At least one commentator has argued that the right to self-defense as a jus cogens norm
may be presumed. Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, 3 ILSA J. INT'L

& COMP.

827 (1997). Jus cogens' scope varies widely among commentators. See also
Vienna Convention, supra note 88, arts. 5, 30(1), 53, 64; ELIAS, supra note 124, at 177-87; 1
L. 767,

Oppenheim's International Law, supra note

1,

§§

642, 653; Sinclair, supra note 88, at

2,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, §§ 102 r.n.6,
TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98

17-18, 85-87, 94-95, 160, 184-85, 218-26, 246;

323 cmt.

b,

331(2), 338(2); GRIGORII

(William E. Butler

trans., 1974);

I.

Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature

of Jus Cogens in Contemporary

Law, 111 R.C.A.D.I. 219, 262-63 (1981); Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 96, at 64-69; John
N. Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking, 7 DENV. J. INT'L L.
POL'Y 9, 25-29

&

(1977);

Mark Weisburd, The

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17

MICH.

Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens,
J.

INT'L L.

1

As

Illustrated by the

War

(1995); supra note 112 and accompanying text.

ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 101-02, quoting Waldock, Regulation, supra note 1,
referring to U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51 (Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats

177.

504,

in

the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression)

,

at

to

52-54 (Regional Arrangements)

(italics in original)

178.

179.

BOWETT, supra note 1, at
ALEXANDROV, supra note

Regulation, supra note

180.

KELSEN,
1,

1,

ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at

131; see also

102.

at 102;

179;

1,

Waldock,

at 504.

ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 102, citing GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at
LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 4, at 796; Waldock, Regulation, supra

179;

note

at 504.

181. 2

OPPENHEIM, supra note

1,

§ 52aa, at 155-56; Bowett, Collective Self-Defence, supra

note 173, at 136-40, 159-60.

BOWETT, supra note 1, at 216-20; JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 245 (1959 rev.); Bowett, Collective Self-Defence, supra note 173, at
182.

139-40.
183.

ALEXANDROV,

supra note

1,

GOODRICH ET AL,

at 102;

LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 4,
at 250. J.G.
1,

STARKE, THE

at 792;

ANZUS TREATY ALLIANCE 98-99 (1965)

1951, pmbl., 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3422, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, 84

arrangements

after

(ANZUS

1,

says Security Treaty, Sept.

Pact) memorialized informal

and during the Korean War. See also TREVOR R. REESE,
ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL
4 (1969); W. DAVID MClNTYRE, BACKGROUND TO THE ANZUS PACT, chs.

World War

II

AUSTRALIA, NEW
RELATIONS, chs. 2,
9-10 (1995); infra notes 239-43 and accompanying
self-defense

supra note 5, at 348; KELSEN,

MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note

arrangements also supports,

e.g.,

text.

A

theory of informal collective

actions of states

assisting

South Korea or

maintaining naval forces between Taiwan and the China mainland during the Korean War, or
countries supporting the United Kingdom during the Falklands/Malvinas War. See generally

George K. Walker,

State Practice Since

World

War

11:

1945-1990,

in

THE LAW OF NAVAL
War C.

WARFARE: TARGETING ENEMY MERCHANT SHIPPING 121, 125-30, 153-55 (65 Naval
Int'l L. Stud., Richard J. Grunawalt ed. 1993).
184.
185.

ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 103; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 348.
ALEXANDROV, supra note 1 at 103; Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military

Intervention by Invitation of the

,

Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 218-21 (1985) Waldock,
;
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George K. Walker

Regulation, supra note

KELSEN,

The

at 505.

1,

right to assist another State

LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 4,

This

at 797.

is

is

not an inherent

right.

consistent with one view

of the law of treaties, which declares that treaty parties cannot agree to confer a benefit (here,
aiding a target State) without beneficiary consent.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD),

supra note 52, §

Under this view, if an assisting State and a target State are UN Members, the target state
has a potential benefit if assisted under U.N. CHARTER art. 5 1, a treaty provision; the target must
request help. Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 36(1), is the same as the RESTATEMENT
view but adds that unless a treaty provides otherwise, assent is presumed. Under this approach,
an assisting State could assume that a benefit help against an attacking State is presumed
under the Article 51 collective self-defense. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
324(3).

—

—

1,

§ 627, at 1264, says the Charter

is

impose benefits on a Sate not party,
affect the Article

an exception to the

i.e.,

a State that

may be accused
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, §

otherwise an assisting State

186. See generally,

supra note

e.g.,

anticipatory self-defense policy
187. See,

e.g.,

1,

Requiring a request

of violating U.N.

is

CHARTER

this

cannot

does not

the safer course;

art.

2.

See also

1

626; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 98-106.

and the USSR, which held

ALEXANDROV,

e.g.,

UN

Member. However,

for different views of the

United States, which has an

a restrictive view.

on the

supra note

legality of the

1981

at 159-65, with

1,

Israeli raid

on

MCCORMACK,

285-302.

at

188. Unless a treaty provides otherwise,

denunciation

not a

supra note 3; commentators disagree

the Iraq reactor. Compare,
supra note

1

is

UN Members.

51 request rule among

rule that a treaty (the Charter)

filed.

is

See generally

Law Commission, Report on

it

remains in effect a year after a notice of

Vienna Convention, supra note

88, arts. 56-58; International

Work of its

Eighteenth Session, Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1, reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 171, 250-51
the

1974 (ILC Rep.) BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, at 617; McNAIR, supra note 124, chs.
32-33; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 647; RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
;

supra note 52, §§ 332-33; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 183-88.
189. Claim of a material breach, without notice

claimant to say a treaty

is

terminated. See

ILC

and other procedures, does not

entitle a

Rep., supra note 188, at 253-55. Claims of breach

must go to the heart of an agreement. Special rules apply to multilateral treaties. Vienna
Convention, supra note 88, art. 60; Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 46-47;
Jurisdiction of

note

124,

ICAO Council
618-19;

at

1

RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
190. E.g.,

a

(India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46, 67;

BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES,

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note

1,

§

supra

649;

supra note 52, § 335; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 20, 166, 188-90.

State with a strong anticipatory self-defense

self-defense policy State insisting

on

policy

assisting

a reactive

reactive self-defense aid might claim that reactive aid only

would endanger its forces, configured for anticipatory self-defense, and that this amounts to a
fundamental change of circumstances because its self-defense preparations are keyed to use in an
anticipatory mode. For further analysis of fundamental change of circumstances, see Vienna
Convention, supra note 88, art. 62; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ice. v. U.K.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18;

BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note

TREATY TERMINATION,
188, at 257-58;

1

ch.

1

124, at 620-21;

ARIE

E.

DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF
ILC Rep., supra note

(1975); ELIAS, supra note 124, at 119-28;

OPPENHIEM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note

1,

§ 651;

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD), supra note 52, § 336; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 20, 192-96; Gyorgy Haraszti, Treaties
and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146 R.C.A.D.I. 1 (1975); Oliver J. Lissitzyn,
Treaties

and Changed Circumstances, 61 AM.

191. E.g.,

a

State

J.

INT'L L. 895 (1967).

with a strong anticipatory self-defense policy assisting a reactive

self-defense policy State that insists

on

reactive self-defense aid might claim that reactive
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What

would endanger its forces, configured for anticipatory self-defense, and that
way that these forces can operate, performance under the agreement is

self-defense aid

because

this

is

Have Said

the Treaties

the only

Vienna Convention, supra
ILC Rep., supra note 188, at 255-56; 1

impossible. For further analysis of impossibility of performance, see

note 88,

art.

61;

ELIAS, supra note 124,

at 128-30;

Oppenheim's International Law, supra note
192. See,

e.g.,

l,

§ 650;

Sinclair, supra note 88,

supra notes 3, 187 for differing views of commentators

on the

at

190-92.

validity of claims

of anticipatory self-defense claims for specific operations.

and accompanying

193. See supra notes 189-91
194. See

Vienna Convention, supra note

text.

88, arts. 19-23; supra note 124.

195. This is like the rule of regression to common denominator when States rely on custom
and there are objectors. See generally BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, at 10; 1
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 10, at 29; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 52, § 102 cmts. b, d; Michael Akehurst, Custom As a Source of Law, 47 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 1,
23-27 (1974); C.H.M. Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 R.C.A.D.I. 1,
49-53 (1962); but see Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529,
538-41 (1993) (existence of persistent objector rule open to serious doubt) J. ASHLEY ROACH &
ROBERT W. SMITH'S, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (2d ed.
1996), an exhaustive study of objections to law of the sea claims indicates that the persistent
objector rule is alive and well, at least for law of the sea issues. Undoubtedly, there are thousands
of protests filed annually on many issues in the chancelleries, few if any of which are published. It
cannot, therefore, be assumed, as some commentators do, that the rule of the persistent objector
.

is

in disuetude.

196. Cf.

BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES,

note 52, § 313 cmt.
197. See,

e.g.,

RESTATEMENT

supra note 124, at 611;

(THIRD), supra

b.

Genocide Reservations Case, supra note 124, 1951

I.C.J, at

32 (Guerrero, Vice

Hsu Mo, McNair, Read, JJ., dissenting); BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, at 609;
MCNAIR, supra note 124, at 169; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 616, at
Pres.;

1245;

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD), supra note 52, § 313

198. See infra notes
199. See

supra

216-63 and accompanying
189-91

notes

fundamental change

in law

not discount the possibility

r.n.l;

SINCLAIR, supra note 88,

at

54-55.

text.

and accompanying

Although Iceland claims of

text.

were rejected, Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 164, at 16-21, did
that a large enough change in law could be grounds for a change of

circumstances claim.
200.

Asylum (Colom.

(Port. v. India),

1960

I.C.J. 6;

INTERNATIONAL LAW,
cmt.

v.

Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277; Right of Passage

BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note

supra note

1,

§ 10, at 30;

RESTATEMENT

Over Indian Terr.
1 OPPENHEIM'S

124, at 9-10;

(THIRD), supra note 52, § 102

e.

201.

ROE state options for,

and

conflict situations. In U.S. practice,
their ship, unit, etc.,

i.e.,

U.S. policy. See generally

TOOLS FOR CRISIS

possibly limits on, actions a

commanders

commander may

take in armed

are strongly reminded of their duty to defend

to exercise self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, pursuant to

BRADD

NAVAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: MANAGEMENT
Roach, Rules of Engagement, 36 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 46

C. HAYES,

(1989); J. Ashley
Qan.-Feb 1983), reprinted in 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'LL. &COM. 865 (1988); Ivan A. Shearer, Rules
of Engagement and the Implementation of the Law of Naval Warfare, id. 767 (1988); supra note 1.

202. See supra notes 10, 111-27 and accompanying text.

253-61, has extensive, helpful analysis of the

trials; see also

73-76.
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MCCORMACK,

supra note

1,

at

ALEXANDROV,

supra note

1,

at

George K. Walker
203. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 116, 17 Tr. Maj. War Crim. Before Int'l M. Trib. 458,
469 (1948) (argument of Prof. Dr. Hermann Jahreiss, counsel for defendant Albert Jodl).
204. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
205. The Tribunal also dismissed arguments, based on Secretary of State Kellogg's
comments on the self-defense reservation to the Pact of Paris, supra note 1 1, that Germany alone
could judge legitimacy of its self-defense claim. Nuremberg Judgment, supra, 1 Tr. Maj. War
Crim. Before Int'l M. Trib. at 208, 218-22, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. at 205, 207. See McCORMACK,
supra note
206.

at

1,

254-56; supra notes 111-27 and accompanying

BOWETT,

supra note

at 143; see also

1,

MCCORMACK,

text.

supra note

1,

at

254-56.

Hague III in 1911, the
Netherlands in 1909. DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 60 (3d ed. 1988)
Hague

207. Cf.

III,

208. United States

supra note 38,

arts.

1,

3.

Japan had

ratified

Araki, Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East

v.

(Nov. 4-12, 1948), reprinted in 1 B.V.A. ROLING & CF. RUTER, THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.) 29 April 1946-12

NOVEMBER
also

1948, at 15, 21, 382 (1977); supra notes 17, 33-35, 183 and accompanying text; see

ALEXANDROV, supra

note

1,

at 76;

McCORMACK,

supra note

1,

at

258-59.

209. G.A. Res. 95(1), supra note 117.

210. I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1) (d); Restatement (Third), supra note 52, § 103(2). Most
municipal legal systems recognize a right of anticipatory self-defense. McCORMACK, supra note
1,

at 271. This adds

STATUTE,

38(1)

art.

more weight
(c);

but see

to a

view that the right

RESTATEMENT

exists in international law. I.C.J.

(THIRD), supra, § 103(2).

211. See supra notes 63, 138-43 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text.

213. See supra notes 17, 33-35, 138-43, 149-59, 183, 208 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 167-85 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 202-84 and accompanying text.
216. Part IV does not examine practice under the agreements. Others have. See generally,
e.g.,

ALEXANDROV,

MCCORMACK,

supra note

supra note

1,

1,

at

at 215-90;

GOODRICH ET

AL., supra note 5, at

345-48;

211-39, and sources cited. These discuss better-known

JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919-1991 at 178-213 (4th ed. 1994)
demonstrates that smaller incidents since 1945 that may involve bilateral or occasionally
multilateral responses may supply more content to practice than is now available. Part IV does
situations.

not consider the

arrangements

right,

less

recognized under the Charter and in pre-Charter times, for States to use

formal than a treaty to assert collective self-defense, including anticipatory

self-defense. See supra notes 17, 33-35, 83, 208,

217.

ALEXANDROV,

supra note

1,

213 and accompanying

text.

at 102; Tucker, supra note 171, at 33.

218. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.

Compare Rio Treaty, supra note 168, art. 3(1), with Act of Chapultepec, supra note 168,
The Treaty applies within North and South America and adjoining oceans. Rio
Treaty, supra, arts. 3(3), 4. Act of Chapultepec, supra, Pts. 1(3), III, had provisions similar to the
Treaty, art. 3(1), but the Act declared that provisions were subject to the projected international
organization, i.e., the United Nations, and had no specific geographic parameters of application,
although the whole tenor of the Act pointed toward Western Hemisphere self-defense. Cf.
Canyes, supra note 168, at 506. See also Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30,
219.

Pts. 1(3), III.

1948

(OAS

amended by

Protocol, Feb. 27, 1967, 21

1985, 21 1.L.M. 533 (1985), replacing

Pan American Union, supra

Charter), 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3,

U.S.T. 607; Protocol, Dec.

note 133, in place

5,

when Act of Chapultepec, supra, was signed. The 1985
415

OAS protocol

is

not in

What
force

for

the Treaties

members, including the United

all

Have Said

States.

M.J.

MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS

BOWMAN &

177 (11th

HARRIS,

D.J.

Cum. Supp.

1995). For

Pan American Union, OAS and Rio Treaty contexts,
M. MARGARET BALL, THE OAS IN TRANSITION (1969); GORDON
Connell-Smith, The Inter- American System (1966); Stoetzer, supra note 17; Ann van
Wynen Thomas & A.J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization of American States (1963);
history of inter- American relations in the

see

generally

Charles G. Fenwick, The Inter -American Regional System:

Fifty Years of Progress,

50 AM. J. INT'L L.

18 (1956).
220. See supra notes 167-70, 218 and accompanying text.

221. Rio Treaty, supra note 168,

art. 3(2). at

96-97;

Act of Chapultepec, supra note

168,

had

no counterpart.
222. Rio Treaty, supra note 168,

U.N.T.S.

at 97;

U.N. CHARTER,

art.

art. 3(4). at

97; see also

51. Rio Treaty, supra,

threaten or use force inconsistent with the Charter.

id.,

art. 1,

art. 5,

62 Stat, at 1701, 21

pledges that parties will not

Cf U.N. CHARTER,

103; supra

arts. 2(4),

notes 112, 176 and accompanying text.
223. Rio Treaty, supra note 168,

art. 6. Id., art. 9,

Unprovoked armed attack by

a.

defined aggression as including

a State against the territory, the people, or the land,

sea or air forces of another State; [and]

Invasion, by the

b.

armed

forces of a State, of the territory of

an American

through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a
decision, or arbitral award, or, [absent]

region

.

.

.

.

.

.

frontiers thus

State,

treaty, judicial

demarcated, invasion affecting a

under the effective jurisdiction of another State.

Compare Act of Chapultepec, supra note 168, Pts. 1(3)— 1(4).
224- Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence,
Mar. 17, 1948, art. 4, 19 U.N.T.S. 51, 57 (WEU Treaty) amended by Protocol Modifying Treaty
for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-Defence,
Oct. 23, 1954, 211 id. 342 (WEU Protocol I); Protocol on Forces of Western European Union,
Oct. 23, 1954, id. 358 (WEU Protocol II); Protocol on Control of Armaments, with Annexes,
Oct. 23, 1954, id. 364; Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for Control of
Armaments, Oct. 23, 1954, id. 376; and other protocols in 1990 and 1992, which do not amend
art. 4. See BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 219, at 177 (11th Cum. Supp. 1995).
,

225.
226.

WEU Treaty, supra note 224, art. 7.
with WEU Protocol
supra note 224, art. 4.
Compare
id.

I,

227. Nothing in the Treaty can be interpreted as affecting the Council's authority and
responsibility

under the Charter to take action

international peace and security.

228.

229.

WEU Protocol
WEU Protocol

years, existing in the

II,
I,

it

deems necessary

to maintain or restore

WEU Treaty, supra note 224, art. 5.

supra note 224.
supra note 224,

art. 3.

shadow of NATO, but it was

The

WEU was moribund for more than thirty

revitalized in

1986 to meet

issues arising out of

the Iran-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf. Europe's Multilateral Organizations, 3 DEP'T ST.

351, 354 (1992).
Integration

and

The European Union has recognized WEU's security role.

DISPATCH

Seegenerally Walker,

Disintegration, supra note 42, at 15-17.

ALFRED CAHEN, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO 1016
(1989); The Changing Functions of the Western European Union (WEU) xiii-xxx
(Arie Bloed & Ramses A. Wessel eds., 1994) STANLEY R. SLOAN, NATO's FUTURE: TOWARD
230. See generally

;
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George K. Walker

A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN

173-75 (1985). Treaty of Dunkirk, supra note 63, had been
a WEU predecessor; other European States' desire to accede was a catalyst for WEU. COOK,
supra note 63, at 116, 122, 259-60. Ironically, a European Defense Community had been
contemplated as part of the then European Economic Community; it would have been
"exclusively defensive," but would have allowed response to any "armed aggression" against a

member

State or European Defense Forces constituted under the Treaty.

The Treaty pledged

cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Treaty Constituting the European

May

Defence Community,

LAW DOCUMENTS

27, 1952, arts. 2, 5, reprinted in

NAVAL WAR C, INTERNATIONAL

148-49 (1954); Karl Lowenstein, Sovereignty and
International Co-Operation, 48 AM. J. INTL L. 222, 237-38 (1954). The Treaty failed of
ratification. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Statement to U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee, 32 DEFT ST. BULL. 605, 606 (1955). The United States had not opposed
the Treaty. Message of the President of the United States Stating United States Position on
Relation between the European Defense Community and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, Apr. 16, 1954, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1954, reprinted in NAVAL WAR C, supra at
1952-53, at 147,

232.
231.

WEU Statement on Recent Events in the Gulf,

note 210, at 81;

CAHEN,

Apr. 19, 1988, in

CHANGING,

North Atlantic

232. Article 6 defined the territory of the parties covered by Article 5.
Treaty, supra note 82,

supra

supra note 230, at 47-50.

5-6, modified as to territory covered by Protocol on Accession of

arts.

Greece and Turkey, supra note 82; Protocol on Accession of Federal Republic of Germany, supra
note 82; Protocol on Accession of Spain, supra note 82. These protocols do not affect the
substance of other terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, supra. Currently
of admitting
233.

new members

NATO

in the process

is

in Eastern Europe. See supra note 82.

North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 82,

art. 7; see also

U.N.

CHARTER

arts. 2(4),

103;

supra notes 112, 176 and accompanying text.
234.

North Atlantic Treaty, supra note

THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN

82, art. 4; see also

HARLAN CLEVELAND, NATO:

13-33 (1970) ("golden rule of consultation")

For

.

NATO

and development, see COOK, supra note 63; ALFRED GROSSER, THE WESTERN
Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945 (Michael Shaw trans. 1980);
origins

ROBERT ENDICOTT OSGOOD, NATO: THE ENTANGLING ALLIANCE

(1962);

SLOAN, supra

note 230; John Duffield, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory,

WOODS, EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE

1945, ch. 15 (Ngaire

NGAIRE
Woods ed.,
in

1996); Goodhart, supra note 173.

Economic Co-operation between Arab States, with
Brit. & For. St. Pap. 669-70, 49 AM. J. INTL L. SUPP.
51 (1955) (Arab League Joint Defense Treaty). See also Pact of League of Arab States, Mar. 22,
1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 238; HUSSEIN A. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND
REGIONAL DISPUTES, ch. 1 (1975); MAJID KHADDURI, THE GULF WAR: THE ORIGINS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT 140 (1988); ROBERT W. MACDONALD, THE
LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES (1965); Khadduri, The Arab League As a Regional Arrangement, 40
235. Treaty of Joint Defence and

Military

Annex, June

AM. J. INTL

L.

236. U.N.
237.

17, 1950, art. 2,

756(1946).

CHARTER

Arab League

670, 49

AM.

238.

Id.,

J.

157

INTL

Military

art.

103; see also supra notes 112, 176

L.

text.

& For. St.

Pap. at

SUPP. at 52.

Annex,

art. 1 (a),

157

Brit.

& For. St. Pap. at 672, 49 AM.

at 53.

239.

and accompanying

Joint Defense Treaty, supra note 235, art. 3, 157 Brit.

STARKE, supra note

183, at 77.

417

J.

INT'L L. SUPP.

What
240.

ANZUS

Pact, supra note 183,

MCINTYRE, supra note

Have Said

the Treaties

art.

3,

suspended

183, at 403-05; TIF, supra note

1

for

New

13, at 350.

Zealand Sept.

1986.

1,

For analysis of New Zealand's

ANZUS future prospects, see generally JACOB
bercovitch, anzus in crisis (1988); frank p. donni, anzus in revision (1991);
michael c. pugh, the anzus crisis, nuclear visiting and deterrence (1989);
Thomas-Durrell Young, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security
RELATIONS, 195 1-1986 (1992) W. Keith Jackson & James W. Lamare, The ANZUS Conflict and
New Zealand Politics, in INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 53 (Lamare ed.,
refusal to

admit ships with nuclear capability and

;

1991) Jock Phillips,
;

New Zealand and the ANZUS Alliance:

Changing National

Self-Perceptions, in

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES: INTERNAL CHANGE AND ALLIANCE
RELATIONS IN THE ANZUS STATES 183 (Richard W. Baker ed., 1991); James N. Rosenau,
Peripheral International Relationships in a More Benign World: Reflections on American Orientations
Toward ANZUS, in id. 203.
24 1 ANZUS Pact, supra note 183, art. 4. Like the Rio Treaty and the NATO Agreement, the
ANZUS Pact, supra, art. 5, limits its territorial scope to attacks on parties' metropolitan territories,
island territories under their jurisdiction, or their armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the
Pacific.

242. Compare

ANZUS Pact, supra note

183, art. 4, with North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 82,
North Atlantic Treaties, supra notes 82, 168. ANZUS Pact, supra,
art. 5, limits its territorial scope to attacks on parties' metropolitan territories, island territories
under their jurisdiction, and parties' armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. See also
MCINTYRE, supra note 183, chs. 11-15; REESE, supra note 183, ch. 8; STARKE, supra note 183,
chs. 1-2; Leicester C. Webb, Australia and SEATO, in SEATO: SIX STUDIES 47, 50-57 (George
Modelski ed., 1964). As of 1965, there had been no NATO-ANZUS liaison. STARKE, supra at
art. 5.

Similar to the Rio and

226-28.
243.

STARKE, supra note

244.

It

183, at 121.

did not include application to parties'

armed

forces or public vessels or aircraft.

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, with Protocol, Sept.
83-84, 209 U.N.T.S. 28, 30, 32

Failure of

George Modelski, SEATO:

Its

8,

1954,

6 U.S.T. 81,

arts. 4, 8,

SEATO: THE
Starke, supra note 183, at 221-26;
in SEATO, supra note 242, at 8-45.

Treaty); see also LESZEK BUSZYNSKI,

chs. 1-2 (1983);

Function and Organization,

245. Pacific Charter, Sept.
246.

(SEATO

an Alliance Strategy

8,

1954, 6 U.S.T. 91, 209 U.N.T.S. 23, 24.

BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note

219, at 196; BUSZYNSKI, supra note 244, ch.

6.

247. TIF, supra note 113, at 350.

248. Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Aug.

U.N.T.S. 237 (Second Balkan

cooperation and friendship treaty
later.

9,

Pact), partial successor to the Little Entente, supra

1954, 211

note 129; a

among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia had been signed

By 1956 the arrangement was

in ruins;

by 1962

it

was a dead

letter.

See generally

a year

JOHN O.

BALKAN TRIANGLE (1968); see also J.A.S. GRENVILLE & BERNARD WASSERSTEIN,
The Major International Treaties Since 1945, at 390-91 (1987) (2 Grenville);
IATRIDES,

Gerhard Bebr, Regional Organizations:

A

United Nations Problem, 49

AM.

J.

INT'L L. 166, 182

(1955).

249. Obligations under the Pact were subject to those

owed other

alliances,

e.g.,

the

Atlantic Treaty, supra note 82, for Greece or Turkey; the Pact required consultation

members

for conflicts in these obligations.

Compare Second Balkan

arts. 1,3.

Whether consultation was

arts.

a prerequisite before action

10-11; Protocol, supra
is

debatable; a foreign

minister for a party State said that consultation would not be an obstacle, since

418

among

Pact, supra note 248, arts. 2,

6-7, 10, with Pact of Organisation of Little Entente, supra note 129,

note 130,

North

all

joint plans

had

George K. Walker
been prepared and would be applied when

joint

measures were decided. IATRIDES, supra note

248, at 139.
250. Pact of Mutual Co-operation, Feb. 24, 1955,
Pact). See also Declaration Respecting

U.N.T.S. 205, 206, declaring

parties'

Baghdad

art. 1,

233 U.N.T.S. 199, 212 (Baghdad

Pact, July 28, 1958,

If

1,

9 U.S.T. 1077, 335

"determination to maintain their collective security and to

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE
PACT: ORIGINS AND POLITICAL SETTING (Feb. 1956); Brian Holden Reid, The
"Northern Tier" and the Baghdad Pact, in THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CHURCHILL'S PEACETIME
ADMINISTRATION 1951-55, at 159-74 Oohn W. Young ed., 1988); Margaret Muryani
Manchester, The Tangled Web: The Baghdad Pact, Eisenhower, and Arab Nationalism chs. 1-3
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clark Univ.) (in Naval War College Library) for the
Pact's origins and history.
resist aggression, direct or indirect." See

BAGHDAD

251. There was

members

territorial limitation,

in effect excluded

note 250,
252.

no

all

although the

treaty's

being limited to Arab League

but the Middle East and northern Africa. Baghdad Pact, supra

arts. 2, 5.

The United

States was a "de facto"

Respecting the Baghdad Pact, supra note 250;

member but not

a Pact party. See Declaration

BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 219, at 196; Reid,

supra note 250, at 159-80; Manchester, supra note 250, at 336-45.
253.

Cf. Protocol,

Mar. 31, 1991,

BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note

219, at 196 (11th

Cum.

Supp. 1995).
254.

Compare Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual

Assistance,

May

14, 1955,

219 U.N.T.S. 24, 28 (Warsaw Pact), with North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 82, arts. 5, 7.
For analysis of origins and practice under the Pact, see generally NEIL FODOR, THE WARSAW
art. 4,

TREATY ORGANIZATION: A POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (1990); J.P. JAIN,
DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF THE WARSAW PACT 1-39 (1973). Mark Kramer, The Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe: Spheres of Influence,

in

WOODS,

supra note 234, ch. 5,

is

an overview of the

Soviet system, including the Pact.
255.

Compare Warsaw

Pact, supra note 254, with

North Atlantic Treaty, supra note

82, art.

4.

256. Mutual Defense Treaty, Phil.-U.S., Aug. 30, 1951,

art. 4,

3 U.S.T. 3947, 3950, 177

U.N.T.S. 133, 136 (Philippines Defense Treaty)
257.

Id., art. 5.

258.

Id., art. 3.

259. Compare Mutual Defense Treaty, Repub. of Korea-U.S., with understanding, Oct.

1953,

arts. 2-3, 5

1,

U.S.T. 2368, 2372-73, 238 U.N.T.S. 199, 203-04, with Philippines Defense

Treaty, supra note 256,

arts.

3-5.

260. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, with Agreed Minute and Exchange of

Notes, Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960 Qapan Defense Treaty),

arts.

4-5, 11

id.

1632, 1634, 373

U.N.T.S. 179, 188, with Philippines Defense Treaty, supra note 256, arts. 3-5, 11 id. 3950, 177
U.N.T.S. at 136. Japan Defense Treaty, supra, replaced Security Treaty, Japan-U.S., Sept. 8,
1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329, 136 U.N.T.S. 211. Japan has

defense from

its

Joint Statement

moved to

a policy of offshore land, sea

earlier strategy of defense at the water's edge. See generally

and

air

Japan-United States,

on Review of Defense Cooperation Guidelines and Defense Cooperation Guidelines,
36 I.L.M. 1621 (1997); PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, CULTURAL NORMS

Sept. 23, 1997, reprinted in

and National Security: Police and military in Postwar Japan 132-39 (1996); Mike
M. Mochizuki, A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance, in MIKE M. MOCHIZUKI, TOWARD A TRUE
ALLIANCE: RESTRUCTURING U.S. -JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS, ch. 1 (1997). This shift seems
to mark a change to a more anticipatory self-defense mode. Mutual Defense Treaty, Repub. of
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What

Have Said

the Treaties

arts. 4-5, 6 U.S.T. 433, 436 248 U.N.T.S. 213,
Japan Treaty; the United States denounced it when it
recognized the People's Republic of China. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979). See also 2 GRENVILLE, supra note 248, at 109-113, noting U.S. Senate reservations to the

China-U.S., Dec.

1954, with U.S. Reservations,

2,

215 included the same kind of terms

China

as the

China were
commitment
U.S.
without Senate

treaty forbade U.S. action unless

extension of the

forced to fight in self-defense or territorial
approval.

the United States negotiated

If

formal agreements with Persian Gulf states other than Kuwait after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
1990,

these

bilateral

treaties

may

provide for anticipatory collective

self-defense.

The

Kuwait-U.S. agreement was a reactive defense treaty, since it had been invaded by the time the
United States negotiated with Kuwait. These treaties have not been and may never be published
for national security reasons. See

February 1991, 1991
§

312

2,

Duke J.Comp. &Int'lL.

e.g.,

its

Over Kuwait, August 1990

RESTATEMENT

-

(Third), supra note 52,

Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, Mar. 18, 1948, Bulg.-USSR,

48 U.N.T.S. 135, 144

seek to renew

25, 29-30;

Crisis

note 52.

r.n.5; see also supra

261. See,

George K. Walker, The

(If

either party

is

policy of aggression or with any other State

.

.

.

policy of aggression either directly or indirectly or in any other way, the other

immediately extend to the

.

.

art.

Germany which might
associated with Germany in a

"involved in hostilities with a

.

.

.

shall

Party involved in hostilities military and other assistance with

.

all

means at its disposal!,]" subject to the Charter); Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance
and Cooperation, June 12, 1964, Ger. Dem. Rep.-USSR, art. 5, 3 I.L.M. 754, 756 (1965); (treaty
the

subject to

Warsaw

Pact, supra note 254); see also

GRENVILLE, supra note 248,

at

FODOR,

185; JAIN, supra note

Self-Defence, supra note 173, at 144;

W.W.

Kulski,

The

supra note 254, at 5-6, 188-91; 2
13-14; Bowett, Collective

254, at

Soviet System of Collective Security

Compared with the Western System, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 453 (1950). Treaty of Friendship, Alliance
and Mutual Assistance, Feb. 14, 1950, People's Rep. China-USSR, art. 1, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, 12-14,
had language like the Bulgaria treaty, but said Japan was the potential adversary. See also 2
GRENVILLE, supra at 158-59. USSR satellites also negotiated agreements among themselves,
subject to the Warsaw Pact, supra, e.g., Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance, Apr. 5, 1967, arts. 4-5, Ger. Dem. Rep.-Pol., 6 I.L.M. 514 (1968).
262. Treaty of Dunkirk, supra note 63, preamble,

arts.

1-2,

9 U.N.T.S. at 188-92,

WEU

Treaty, supra note 224; see also COOK, supra note 63, at 33, 75, 114,
supra note 234, at 84-85; supra notes 224-31 and accompanying
GROSSER,
259-60;
116, 122,
text. Countries of the Western alliance systems concluded agreements too; some seem to

predecessor to the

contemplate only reactive self-defense obligations, e.g., Alliance Treaty, July 29, 1953,
Libya-U.K., arts. 2-3, 186 U.N.T.S. 185, 192 (consultation required for an "imminent menace of
hostilities"; also describing
e.g.,

basing rights). Nonaligned States negotiated bilateral agreements,

May

Defense Agreement,

(collective defense against

30, 1967, United

Arab Rep.-Jordan,

art. 1,

6 I.L.M. 516 (1968)

"armed aggression") See also 2 Grenville, supra note 248,
.

at 348,

36 1

263. See generally Walker, Maritime Neutrality, supra note 146, at 131-40.
264. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note

1

and accompanying

text.

266. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying
267.

MCCORMACK, supra note

O'CONNELL,

supra note 4, at

1

101,

1,

at 131;

text.

Mullerson

and O'CONNELL,

& Scheffer, supra note

supra note

1,

1,

at

110-11. 2

at 3, recognized this; writing

O'Connell had concluded, however, that navies were coming to a
reactive view of self-defense. Id. at 83, 171. Perhaps O'Connell's view would be different today;
he seems to say as much in 2 O'CONNELL, supra at 1 101. See also supra note 4 and accompanying

over two decades

earlier,

text.
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268. See supra notes 201-03, 205-06, 214, 217, 220, 224, 233, 236-38, 248-49 and

accompanying
note 250;

The principal exception

text.

see also supra notes

OPPENHEIM, supra note

269. 2

appears to be the

now defunct Baghdad

Pact, supra

250-52.
1,

§ 52aa, at 157.

To be sure, most
However, a customary collective self-defense right may be
claimed if the Charter does not apply. See generally Nicaragua Case, supra note 1 supra notes 112,
270. See supra notes 109-15, 172-73, 202-10 and accompanying text.

States are

UN

Members

today.

;

174-76.

CHARTER

271. U.N.

GOODRICH ET

art. 1(1); see also

Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962

I.C.J. 151,

AL., supra note 5, at 25-26, citing

213-15

(sep. opin.

of Fitzmaurice,

J.);

Sohn, Broadening the role of the United nations in Preventing,
Mitigating or Ending International or Internal Conflicts that threaten
International peace and Security 5-6 (Intl r. of l. Center Occasional Papers, 2d
Louis

B.

No.

Ser.,

1,

1997) (Charter drafters

and

international peace

and

security).

felt

that the United Nations'

Reference in Art.

1 (1)

to

GOODRICH ET
self-defense

is

AL., supra, at

at

Council action. U.N.

CHARTER

art.

A

right of collective

UN system, e.g., through Security

51, preserves an "inherent right of

self-defence" until the Council acts. This

Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J.

(ser.

A) No.

10, at 4, 18;

Report of the Secretary -General on the
reprinted

173,

Empowering

the

at

I.L.M.

Work

collective

.

id., art.

2(1); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v.

U.N. Secretary-General,

An Agenda for Peace:

of the Organization, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111

956,

;

45-49; SCHACHTER, supra note

United Nations,

195, at 530; hut see

.

959 (1992); MICHAEL AKEKURST, A MODERN
International Law 21-23 (Brian Chapman ed., 3d ed. 1977) Brierly,
31

in

Introduction to
supra note

.

buttressed by the continuing vitality of the principle

is

of national sovereignty, also stated in the Charter. See generally

272.

51-52.

not inconsistent with or subordinate to Art. l(l)'s declaration that States should

seek dispute resolution through collective measures within the

(1992),

purpose" was maintaining

maintenance of international peace
security through the UN system.

meant collective
51-52; SIMMA, supra note 1,

security through collective measures has

"first

FOREIGN

HENKIN, supra note

SCHACHTER,

supra note

1,

1,

at 9-15;

Boutros Boutros-Ghali,

AFF., Winter 1992, at 89, 98-99; Charney, supra note

1,

at 9-10.

at 401.

273. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
275. See,

e.g.,

supra notes 203, 215, 220, 223-24, 239 and accompanying text.

CHARTER

276. U.N.

arts. 2(1),

51, 103. See also supra notes 112, 176

and accompanying

text.

277. See supra notes 1-4, 21, 23-30, 32, 78-80, 85, 97-101, 10, 127-32, 143-64,

accompanying

202-10 and

text.

278. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.

279.

E.g.,

ALEXANDROV,

supra note

1,

at 163, appears to support his

view that the 1981

on the Iraqi nuclear reactor could not be supported by self-defense because of the
debate
on imposing sanctions on North Korea, rather than using force, because of the
1994

Israeli raid

danger of nuclear weapons.

McCORMACK,

supra note

1,

at 98-99, derides the claim that Israel

had been given a necessary guarantee of security under the U.S. "Star Wars" program was a
reason why it may not have been necessary for Israel to bomb the reactor.
280. See
281.

VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note

RESTATEMENT (THIRD),

1 1 1,

at

1

17-21.

supra note 52, § 313 cmt. b analyzes declarations and

understandings:
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What
When

the Treaties

Have Said

signing or adhering to an international agreement, a state

may make

a

called,

it

Whatever

unilateral declaration that does not purport to be a reservation.

it is

constitutes a reservation in fact

if it purports to exclude, limit, or modify the state's legal
Sometimes, however, a declaration purports to be an "understanding," an
interpretation of the agreement in a particular respect. Such an interpretive declaration is

obligation.

not a reservation

may

if it

reflects the

accepted view of the agreement. But another

challenge the expressed understanding, treating

it

as a reservation

which

.

.

.

party

not

it is

prepared to accept.

.

.

.

may have complex

IFor] a multilateral agreement, a declaration of understanding

consequences.

If it is

acceptable to

all ...

,

they need only acquiesce.

share or accept the understanding but others do not, there

agreement means, and whether the declaration

is

If,

however, some

may be a dispute

as to

.

.

what the

in effect a reservation. In the absence of

an authoritative means for resolving that dispute, the declaration, even if treated as a
reservation, might create an agreement at least between the declaring state and those who
agree with that understanding. See [RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra, § 313(2) (c), dealing
parties may treat it as a reservation and object
with reservations] .... However, some
to it as such, and there will remain a dispute between the two groups as to what the
agreement means.
,

.

See also

ILC

.

.

Rep., supra note 188, at 189-90; Bowett, Reservations, supra note 124, at 69; supra

notes 124, 197 and accompanying text for analysis on reservations.
282. Protocol Additional to

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating

Protection of Victims of International

Armed

Conflicts (Protocol

Although the United States is likely
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
U.N.T.S. 3 (Protocol
Non-International

I).

Armed

(Protocol

Conflicts

II),

June

I),

June

8,

to

1977, 1125

to ratify Protocol Additional to

8,

Protection

to

1977,

id.

of Victims

the

609,

of

Reagan

and did not seek
Reagan
Transmittal
from
President
to the U.S.
Letter
of
consent
for
it.
Senate advice and
Senate, Jan. 29, 1987; Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State George P. Schultz to President
administration expressed serious reservations concerning Protocol

Reagan, Dec. 13, 1986,
Protocol

II

Additional to

Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of

Armed

Conflicts,

Concluded

at

Geneva on June

100-2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted

283. Convention

(I)

supra,

in

Victims of Noninternational

TREATY DOC. NO.

I,

for

in

10, 1977, S.

26 I.L.M. 561 (1987).

Amelioration of Condition of Wounded and Sick in

Armed

Forces

in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.NT.S. 31; Convention (II) for Amelioration of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, id. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, id.

3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, id. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Fourth Convention)

and 51(5) prohibitions on attacks on
civilians, absent other considerations, e.g., civilians who take up arms, restate customary law.
MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 299 & n.3 (1982)
284. Protocol

I,

supra note 282,

art.

51. Article 51(2)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CONDUCT OF ARMED
Conflict and Air Operations AFP 110-31, ch. 14 ( 1 976) S an remo Manual, supra note
;

5,

11

39;

NWP

1-14, supra note

supra note 238,

note

1,

HH

art.

1,

§ 6.2.3.2. (noting protections also

under Fourth Convention,

33, 6 U.S.T. at 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at 310), 11.2 n.3, 11.3;

6.2.3.2 (noting protections also

NWP 9A, supra

under Fourth Convention, supra note 283,
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art.

33,

George K. Walker
1 1 .3; 4 JEAN S. PlCTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 224-29
STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS, supra note 182, at 684-732; Michael J. Matheson, Remarks,
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Permanent Concerns, Legal Norms,
and

The Changing

International Order
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77*
-<| ORMALLY OR
l.

S.

INFORMALLY,

manner in which those
what

specific interests are

outcomes we seek;

four key sets of questions shape the

in the national security policy arena evaluate

issue fraught with legal implications: (1)

States; (2)

Wood

an

what is the settled policy of the United
at stake, and what are the objective

what are the requirements of the contemporary
international legal regime, and what concrete obligations has the United States
undertaken; and (4) what is the nature and direction of the international
system or environment. It is through the evaluation of the dynamic interaction
of these factors that one determines the course of action. Law is no simple
application of

The key

norm

(3)

to situation, but a rigorous interpretation of both.

variable in future years will be the changing nature of the

international system, including not only the general configuration of power

but the technology of conflict. Policy makers and pundits alike are seeking

both to define and to influence the characteristics of that environment
within which the legal regime will evolve and which will in turn be shaped by
the law.

The Changing

International Order

worth noting in the first place that the United States is entering into
"normal" times. The United States emerged as a great power in the late
It is

nineteenth century at the very

moment when

the preceding period were giving

way

the relatively stable balances of

to titanic struggles over the mastery of

Europe and Asia. America was about to be swept up in the vortex of universal
history.

However brutal yet tawdry the drama would be, the twentieth century
would be no opera comique or afternoon "soap." Many of the actors would be
heroic and even the petty villains endowed with a wickedness to inspire a
Dante or a Milton. The issues would be primordial and the stakes mortal. It
would be

a polarizing century.

1960, or 1980, though some,

contest was

Now,

all

How fatuous

alas, in fact did,

forces;

would be

who

the

to ask in 1918, 1940,

enemy was

or

what the

about.

United States is
a great power without a great

after the heroic struggles of the twentieth century, the

seeking to understand and to play
quarrel.

it

its

role as

And we may discover that it is not peace that is enervating for military

it is

a diffusion of the threats, uncertainty of the stakes,

Such an

the response.

and ambiguity in

era has dangers ultimately as deadly as the protean

struggle of the giants, for the lines

we must defend

are not clearly

marked and

the perilous consequences of error and weakness less immediately apparent.

Even the

polarizing clashes o^ the twentieth century

deceleration and of lassitude.

World War

I,

had moments of

Winston Churchill, writing of the aftermath of

observed:

To the faithful,

toil-burdened masses the victory was so complete that no further

seemed required. Germany had fallen and with her the world combination
that had crushed her. Authority was dispersed; the world unshackled; the weak
became the strong; the sheltered became the aggressive; the contrast between
victors and vanquished tended continually to diminish. A vast fatigue
dominated collective action. Though every subversive element endeavored to
effort

assert itself, revolutionary rage like every other

Through
switched

all its five
off,

acts the

drama had run

form of psychic energy burnt low.
its

course; the light of history

the world stage dims, the actors shrivel, the chorus sinks.

the giants has ended; the quarrels of the pygmies have begun.

is

The war of

1

That same Winston Churchill believed that the devastation of the Second
World War stemmed from the inability of the great democracies in the
aftermath of that first Great War to manage the quarrels of the pygmies and the
demands of the ordinary. As he again wrote, this time in the commencement of
his study of World War II:
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how easily the tragedy of the Second World War
could have been prevented; how the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the
weakness of the virtuous; how the structure and habits of democratic states,
It is

my

purpose ... to show

unless they are wielded into larger organisms, lack those elements of persistence

and conviction which can alone give security
matters of self preservation, no policy
time.

We

pursued

humble masses; how, even

for

even ten or

in

fifteen years at a

We shall see how the counsels of prudence and restraint may become the
how

the middle course adopted from desires for

may be found

to lead directly to the bull's-eye of disaster.

prime agents of mortal danger;
safety

is

to

and

a quiet

life

how absolute is the need of a broad path of international action
pursued by many states in common across the years irrespective of the ebb and
shall see

flow of national politics.

What, then,

2

are the requisites of a great

the people need from those

power

in ordinary times?

What do

who will stand guard over the animating values and

concrete interests of the nation?

must retain a sense of those permanent values and
interests that define and animate this remarkable democratic republic. And
second, it must grasp, if only intuitively and "through a glass darkly," the
First,

true leadership

changes that are moving us beyond the contours of international power in the
twentieth century into the configuration of power and influence and the focus
of competition and cooperation in the twenty-first century.

Yogi Berra observed,

"isn't

what

it

"The

future," as

used to be."

Throughout the course of this century, two great systemic gulfs have
opened. First, a disjuncture between social and political boundaries, and
second, a chasm between the aspirations of our peoples and the competence of
our governments. The two are probably related. This disjuncture between
social and political boundaries is described in many ways
globalization of the

—

economy,

clash

of

tribalization,

civilizations,

global

environmentalism,

information revolutions, the universal reach of weapons, persistent mass
migrations,

and

so forth. In effect,

many important

social activities transcend

many areas is a
positive good. The difficulty stems from the fact that not only are many of these
traditional territorial boundaries. This in itself is not

activities

bad and

in

unregulated by political norms and legal understandings, but they are

connected with no particular community and hence animated by no sense of
the

common

good. This disconnect

is

particularly troublesome to the various

governments around the world, because

do hold those individual
the elements of which they

their peoples

regimes responsible for the general welfare,

sometimes have only tenuous control. In addition to
429
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open to demagoguery, ambition, and
provide even more opportunity for mischief.
possibilities

Hence, the great

avarice, these disjunctives

issue of the early twenty-first century

is

likely to

be that of

how power and authority will be shared within, between,
and across states and how individual liberty and collective action will be
reconciled; what mechanisms will be developed on how and to what degree the

political organization:

be distributed; what norms

will

and without; and what constraints

will

growth in the general storehouse of wealth
legitimize the exercise of power within

will

be expected and enforced.

A moral vision and a political and economic formula will be critical to the
architecture of the

house

will

new

century, but without a foundation of security, the

not withstand the inevitable vicissitudes of economic downturn,

and personal ambition. There will be at least three key
ingredients of that foundation which will affect how we think about general
norms of international law and the laws of armed conflict. They are:
political ineptitude,

First, a solid

even in the new

era, of

to guard against the

our political

undue concentration of international power;

modicum

Second, a

and reassurance: to protect the sinews,
independence and territorial integrity and

structure of deterrence

of international public order: to establish or renew

norms of international behavior and to be prepared, as
circumstance dictates and allows, to enforce those norms through independent
and collective coercive action; and
limited but real

Third a residual capacity to apply military organization to relieve, where
,

appropriate,

What

human

suffering.

are the implications for international law in general

operational law in particular of this

new world and

and

military

the required security

system? Such a question raises both the possibilities and the limitations of any

Law

and interests and provides predictable
norms in terms of which both group and individual decisions are made. In
simple terms, law, to be effective or legitimate, must embody a shared concept
legal code.

reflects social values

of justice and a promise of public order,
arbitrariness reflected in widespread violence

Every legal system constitutes rules for
biological rules of

human

is

The

all

is

the minimization of

human
if

social behavior.

behavior, not physical or
reflective of the interests

always a gap between the legal

so great as to

norm and

and continuity of the legal system
constitute a scandal, an irrelevance, a

issue for the legitimacy

whether or not the gap

danger, or

is

is,

and random

behavior. Hence, even

and values of the community, there
social behavior.

that

of the above.
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central issue in any political-legal order

Typically the answer

is

is

why one should obey

"good,"

is

the "good

all.

three-fold:

the appeal to conscience. This raises such concerns

First,

at

as, is

the regime

the social arrangement "proper," and does the political order sustain
life"?

Second, calculations of interest. Important here

is

the balance between the

immediate possession of "goods" (short term), on the one hand, and on the
other hand, the continuous protection of or access to those goods by virtue of
the social arrangements (long term)
Third, coercion. This involves not simply brute strength but the ability of a
political

regime to invoke obligations arising from a coordinated perspective of

what constitutes

of the subjects of that regime to entrust to
reconcile divergent claims
Politics

norms,
justice.

and enforce compliance.

coercion. Cicero described the political order as an agreement in

This specifically entails the joining of rights to duties within the

framework of an agreed vision of the

common good. Many social communities

are primarily voluntary in character with

have argued that the broader
latter

it

hence not simply consensus but implies enforcement of communal

is

i.e.,

and a willingness on the part
the authority and the power to

collective values, goods, actions

view

or

no coercive

core,

and some

community may be likewise. Indeed, this
Utopian schemes, and undergirded Marx's

political

the basis of social

is

little

notion of the withering away of the State, ironical in view of the Soviet
totalitarian experience. Nonetheless, the

key problem of what Aristotle would

have called a constitutional regime

to define the relationship

is

between

consent and coercion.

The
a.

coercive aspect of politics has three basic elements:

The

moral order.

legitimization of coercion
It

—the

political order

is

necessarily a

was by design that Aristotle's study of ethics and of politics were

considered of a piece;
b.
c.

The complex organization of coercion; and
The regularization and limitation of coercion,

i.e.,

lawful force.

In the most stable political communities, persistent coercion

tends to be distant in the

life

of the ordinary citizen. This

is

not normal and

may be

true of both

on the domestic

side,

Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland, and, pn the international
U.S. -Canadian relations or the European Union.

side,

domestic and of international

The

politics; for instance,

"scandal" of the international politicaMegal system has, of course,

always been endemic violence, even to the point of jeopardizing the very
integrity or

independence, sometimes existence, of the
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States.

As

has

The Changing
been often noted,

International Order

this state of affairs

anarchic character of international

stems in the

affairs:

there

is

first

no

instance from the

universally accepted or

effective keeper of the "ultima ratio" the exclusive right of enforcement.

Exacerbating this structural problem

with

differing conceptions of law,

its

is

the heterogeneity of political systems,

and the periodic disruptions associated

with messianic or imperial visions.
Recall the two systemic disjunctures mentioned earlier

between

—the

increasing gap

and political boundaries and the concomitant distance between
the aspirations of the citizenry and the ability of government to meet those
social

aspirations. In addition to the
political

normal tensions which anarchy, ambition, and

heterogeneity introduce

to

denationalization and globalization of
social

tribalization

complicated

all

the international legal regime,

many economies and

the

the increasing

within and across national boundaries have further

the key elements of both domestic and international law

enforcement.
In a sense

we

are building a

"new international order" while seeking

with the old international order!
state

and the declining

utility

of force whilst such states

legal

creating

new forms

a regular basis.

and

The

such activity has such impact on other individuals

and groups that improvements

in political

and

legal institutional

competencies

of cooperation and control are sought. States, alliances and

coalitions, international organizations are

security realm this has certain

One

quite lively

of activity that transcend current legal institutions and

political authority. In time,

new forms

on

seem

may only be apparent. As noted above, there is always a gap
norm and social behavior. So too, human beings are always

between

or

cope

We hear talk about the demise of the nation

prone, along with "non-state" actors, to use force
contradictions

to

not dying but being recast. In the

immediate implications.

American public officials, military officers, and
political-military commentators speak of the importance of "stability" as an
object of U.S. security policy. Assuming this is not simply a code word for the
status quo and no change, it probably refers to a degree of security and
satisfaction as well as the availability of means of peaceful change among
peoples that is sufficient to minimize violence and reinforce a political order
often

hears

widely accepted as legitimate. In effect, even as

we seek

to realize our

we need to do so in such a way as to reinforce existing
standards or to develop new norms of international behavior and to employ our
immediate

power

interests,

unilaterally

or

in

association

adherence to such norms.
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Earlier, three

Wood

key elements of a security foundation were mentioned

and reassurance, a modicum of public

structure of deterrence

capacity to alleviate

human suffering.

order,

—

and a

In concrete terms, these broad objectives

translate in the first instance into political associations that join in predictable

ways U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military power with that of a number of
great powers. In this regard, some of the key diplomatic, economic, and military
cooperative mechanisms developed after World

NATO,

War II are still relevant

—such

World Bank, the IMF, the American-] apanese alignment, the
UN, and more recent innovations such as the World Trade Organization, the
North American Free Trade Association, new connections being forged with
as

the

Russia and China and others.

If

deterrence and reassurance are to be

must be anchored in normative understandings and articulated
in institutional mechanisms. In effect, structural deterrence is grounded in
collective legitimization. It cannot be sustained by American power alone,
though U.S. military predominance and economic preeminence are probably
key preconditions, nor can it endure by unilateral or ad hoc responses.
structural, they

If multilateralism is a
it is

key element of a deterrence and reassurance structure,

equally so of the "routine" business of maintaining international public

order.

The

control of transnational flows,

many

and transportation technology, may require an

driven by information

unprecedented coordination of international

movements,

incident to globalization and

efforts.

Whether it be population

commerce, or financial transactions, the development of
rules, institutions, and cooperative procedures will become increasingly
urgent. Constraints on the development, manufacture, and use of weapons
of mass destruction will require a higher degree of consensus
both on the
nature of the constraints and the means to enforce them than currently
exist. Witness the fragmented approach to Iraq. The same holds true for the
general issue of terrorism. The definition and maintenance of international
boundaries whether they be
territorial,
diplomatic,
economic, or
illegal

—

military

—

—

—

will

be at the heart of the agenda of re-articulating political

organization in the twenty-first century.

Humanitarian assistance has become an important,

commitment of the member States
requires the commitment of coercive
political intervention

how such

activity

becomes very

if

of the United Nations.
force, the line

fine indeed. It

still

When

inchoate,

such aid

between humanitarian and
is

difficult

here too to see

can be long sustained without a multilateral framework and

collective legitimization.

In a real sense the international legal principles associated with the 1648

Treaty of Westphalia

—

-political

independence,
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territorial
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—

and domestic jurisdiction were a response to the emergence of
independent states and provided the foundation for the international public
order even to the present. Interdependence was not in 1648 nor in 1998
sovereignty,

contradictory to these principles. Indeed,

it

was the

fact that the

emerging

Europe were interdependent, often in a deadly way that impelled the
princes of Europe to define guidelines for that interdependence. The issue of
states of

the emergent international order
of

globalization

economies

is

and

not the interdependence of states but the
the

transnational

character

of

social

movements. And, to a substantial degree, this transnational interlinkage is the
end product of a particular political-economic philosophy, liberal economics,
and the policy of an identifiable power, the United States.

The persistent, if not always consistent, exercise of American power since
World War II for international economic liberalization provided the essential
matrix for the substantial denationalization of the advanced industrial

economies and the remarkably

movement of peoples, goods, services, and
The permeability of state frontiers has been

free

capital across national boundaries.

hastened by the nuclear, information, communication, and transportation

But none of these technological innovations would have been
sufficient to transform the state system as thoroughly as has the political model
of liberal economics. Neither Adam Smith nor John Locke would have been
revolutions.

surprised.

The

essence o{ this model as embraced by the United States

is

the concept

that state power should be so delimited as to allow a wide sphere for private

choice and

including across national boundaries.

activities,

At

the same time,

and practice, the United States rejected the Bodinian concept that
sovereignty cannot be divided but instead acted as if sovereignty could be
dispersed and functionally-based. Coupled with the notions of natural,
individual rights and of obligations transcendent of particular group (e.g.,

in theory

racial, ethnic, familial, religious, etc.) identifications

and the

rule of law

sovereignty

became

remarkable

is

—

—one

in effect,

human

rights

philosophy of limited government and divided

What

a powerful tool in the shaping of world politics.

is

that at almost any point from the end of the nineteenth century

until very recently,

vision

this

—

one could

as well

have projected a wholly different

of statism, nationalism, and autarky.

century, however,

it

is

clear that the liberal

As we approach

the next

model reinforced by

critical

technological changes has decisively altered key elements of the international
system. Social tribalization could ultimately trump this global society and

reintroduce once again

why

new forms of nationalism and statism, but it is not clear

the United States would favor such a return.
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The

implications of this line of reasoning should be clear: U.S. policy should

be aimed at developing and sustaining universal norms that maintain open
This requires not only the removal of barriers to private social

societies.

commerce, across national boundaries but the creation
and enforcement of rules for those activities that meet the expectations of our
publics for justice and equity. This will require not only that many of the
classical norms of the Westphalian order pertaining to the threat and use of
force be upheld, but that norms relevant to a globalized system be defined and
strengthened. This points to rules governing international commerce and what
can only be seen as constabulary functions. The latter includes peace
operations and arms control.
transactions, including

To

be precise on the

last point,

whether

it

be a policy related to the

weapons of mass destruction or to the restoration of order in
Haiti or the enforcement of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia, all entail an
intervention into areas which used to be seen as falling within the sovereign
jurisdiction of states. Unilateralism in these areas can only be seen as violations
both of older concepts of international law and destructive of the development
of norms adequate for societies that are increasingly interpenetrable.
proliferation of

To

put a finer point on

it,

there are growing expectations concerning not

only the external but as well the internal behavior of states and their citizens.

Certain standards of government behavior vis-a-vis one's

own

citizens,

presumed obligations concerning the development and manufacture of
specified weapons systems, commerce in various items such as narcotics,
decisions on trading partners, genocidal activities involving not only
governments but parties to an internal conflict, the degree and character of
public order, and comparable issues are increasingly being presented as raising
questions of international law. And collective and individual state actions are
being taken under this guise. The issue, in effect, is intervention within areas
that historically have been thought as subject to domestic jurisdiction.
Without a fairly specific set of agreed international rules in these areas and
acceptable mechanisms to enforce them, there is a grave danger that states,
and perhaps even non-state groups, will seek to legitimize unilateral
intervention in behalf of parochial state interests by reference to presumed

and modern globalization of our
societies invite this abuse. Both the older order of Westphalia and the newer
order generated by economic liberalization and contemporary technologies will
international standards. Ancient ambitions

fall

victim

While

—with consequent cascading

disorder.

and actions will remain a key element in a still
fragmented international system, and while such capabilities are probably
unilateral capabilities
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crucial for the

United States to play the

constable,

important that those capabilities be employed in such a way as to

it is

be norm-creating or reinforcing, that
held in balance

less

role of coalition builder and, yes, global

to yield

is,

an international system that

is

by brute force and narrow calculations of interest than by,

again harking back to Cicero, an agreement in justice. Both the nature of U.S.
interests

and the

costs of unilateralism dictate that

American power be

oriented not only toward specific goods but toward the creation of a political

command

and

legal

and

lesser powers. In effect, U.S. policy

regime that

will

the assent of a large

number

of the great

makers must exhibit a persistent and

sophisticated understanding of the process of collective legitimization.

no area where all the elements of the security foundation
will come together more clearly than in operational law, which crystallizes
theory into practice in the development and application of rules of engagement
(ROE) The Annotated Supplement to The Commander s Handbook on the Law of
In

there

all this

is

.

Naval Operations defines

armed

ROE

thusly:

"During wartime or other periods of

conflict, U.S. rules of engagement reaffirm the right

the operational

commander

generally to seek out, engage,

forces consistent with national objectives, strategy,
conflict." It further speaks of

National

Command

which U.S.

and responsibility of

and destroy enemy

and the law of armed

Standing Rules of Engagement approved by the

Authorities that delineate "the circumstances under

forces will initiate and/or continue

engagement with other

forces

encountered."
In a critical way, practice appears to be expanding this narrow definition of

ROE

to cover all sorts of activities, including those not normally associated

with "periods of armed conflict," such

aimed not only

as

humanitarian intervention, and to be

at the control of U.S. forces

but coalitional forces as well.

The

scope of peacetime rules of engagement and the practical meaning of the

Standing Rules of Engagement are being progressively expanded. These norms

have provided the foundation not only
to foreign officers

for instruction to

American officers but

around the world.

In a recent international simulation sponsored in Europe by the Naval

War

became evident to the members of that distinguished foreign
audience that abstract commitment to cooperate never has the clarity to affect
events unless tied to rules by which armed forces would join and collaborate.
Scholars of international politics and law will explicate the changing
requirements of international security, and statesmen will forge general

College,

it

agreements.

It

is

in the area of operational law, however, that the true

dimensions of these requirements and agreements
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will

be revealed.

Robert S.

Wood

Jean Girandoux, in a statement not meant to be complimentary, once wrote
that international law is "the most powerful training ground for the

And

and should be. If vast social forces are
transforming the international system, and if, as I have contended, the great
issue of the twenty-first century will be that of political organization, both of
states and the community of states, then we are in a period in which the legal
imagination must be pressed into service. This will require a re - articulation of
the general principles of international law and the extension of the scope and
depth of operational law in the national security arena. Such an evolution is
imagination."

critical

in a real sense

it is

not only for a relatively stable international order but

fundamental to the role of the United States

is

likely to

as a great regulatory

be

and

Both the short-term and long-term interests of the
Republic are bound to the political imagination and will of those American
leaders entrusted with the defense of those interests in a time when, in the
words of Alfred Lord Tennyson, "the old order passeth away. The new is
constitutive power.

struggling to be born."
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